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Abstract 
 
This thesis proposes that the range of institutional logics provided by both Friedland and Alford 
(1991) and Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012) has overlooked the inclusion of an 
environmental societal logic. The concept of an environmental logic is therefore developed and 
applied in order to understand how a ‘green paradox’ surrounding nuclear power emerged over 
the past sixty years of the UK civil nuclear energy programme. The research employs a Critical 
Realist ontology (Bhaskar 1975) and constructs a qualitative and historical case study of the nuclear 
power industry via the analysis of newspaper articles and Government policy documents. 
The findings show that the green nuclear debate was informed by four ‘situated’ manifestations of 
an environmental societal logic which informed the environmental values and expectations of 
different actor groups engaged in the debate. In particular, the thesis shows how a situated target-
based environmental logic emerged within the energy industry as a result of embedded 
institutional work and eventually informed the arguments promoting green nuclear. These 
arguments remained in contention with those of the environmental movement who maintained 
that nuclear power was definitively not environmentally friendly. Additionally, the Critical Realist 
ontology provides a framework with which to explore levels of meaning and structure and thus 
offers a means to explain this ‘situated’ nature of institutional logics. 
This thesis contributes to existing institutional theory in three key ways: Firstly it proposes and 
illustrates the theoretical and analytical utility of an environmental institutional logic. Secondly it 
develops the concept of a situated logic and, in doing so, builds an improved understanding of the 
ways in which agency, institutional logics and the institutional structure of industries interconnect. 
Thirdly it demonstrates and explains how one societal logic may become situated in multiple and 
possibly contradictory ways depending on the actor groups in which it manifests. 
. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
‘Nuclear energy is an inherently dangerous, wasteful and expensive way of generating low 
carbon electricity, which carries with it enormous environmental costs, such as the 
generation of waste which we don’t know what to do with…’ [Quote from the Director of 
Greenpeace in The Times (McCarthy 1989)] 
‘Mr President, the evidence is there. The damage is being done. What do we, the 
International Community, do about it? ...I am thinking of the use of nuclear power which – 
despite the attitude of so-called greens – is the most environmentally safe form of energy’ 
(Thatcher 1989 UN General Assembly Speech) 
The quotes above illustrate the contesting arguments constituting nuclear power’s ‘green paradox’ 
– whereby nuclear power is considered vital to protect the planet from Climate Change (CC) and 
Greenhouse Gasses (GHG), yet its increased usage brings its own environmental dangers. This has 
meant that advocates for nuclear power proclaim nuclear energy as the planet’s saviour whilst 
those against its use see it as potentially environmentally catastrophic. It is this paradox which the 
thesis aims to explain via the application of neo-institutionalism and the development and 
application of an environmental institutional logic. It is argued that the range of institutional logics 
offered by both Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton et al (2012) overlook the societal level 
institutional meaning systems which inform how actors interact with their natural environment. 
The concept of an environmental logic is developed and applied in order to understand how the 
‘green paradox’ surrounding nuclear power emerged throughout the sixty years of the UK civil 
nuclear energy programme. More specifically, with the UK Government moving more and more 
decisively towards a new nuclear power programme the contestation over nuclear power’s 
legitimacy seems to rest on an unresolved debate between different understandings of ‘green 
energy’. 
The thesis finds that the green nuclear debate came to be informed by various situated 
manifestations of a societal environmental logic. These ‘situated logics’ informed the arguments 
and values of conflicting actor groups who perceived the relationship between society and nature 
differently and therefore exhibited opposing understandings of the environmental implications of 
nuclear power. In particular this thesis shows how a situated target-based environmental logic 
emerged within the energy industry to become increasingly drawn on to legitimate a highly 
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quantifiable approach to environmentalism. In so doing the thesis provides a narrative detailing 
how embedded institutional work led to situated logic emergence. Institutional work was explained 
through the examination of relations between multiple levels of analysis (societal logics, situated 
manifestations and the actions of specific actor groups and elites) which explained how the 
emergent situated logic came to reflect the institutional historicities, rationalities, norms and 
conventions of the energy industry.  
The Research 
 
There were two key motivations for this research thesis; the first was the lack of environmental 
theorising within neo-institutional theory in general. The natural environment is predominantly 
marginalised by Organisational Theory because its ontological status as an objective reality is 
assumed. By combining institutional logics theory with sociological literature on the social 
construction of nature (Purser, Park and Montouri 1995), the possibility arises to develop the 
concept of an environmental institutional logic which facilitates deeper exploration into 
organisational approaches to the natural environment. The second key motivation was to 
understand the recent confusion in the media over whether a new nuclear programme in the UK 
was environmentally friendly or harmful. During the opening decade of the 2000s the green nuclear 
debate highlighted opposing institutionalised understandings regarding the relationship between 
nature and society which in turn affected how actors perceived the environmental legitimacy of 
new nuclear. It became apparent that these central issues could be explored in a manner that 
contributed to the development of institutional theory in a number of ways. 
Specifically the thesis extends the concept of ‘situated logics’ to encompass industry level 
manifestations of societal logics in a way that recognises a dialectical relationship between social 
structure (institutional logics) and agency. The Critical Realist perspective of the thesis is therefore 
important because its approach to structure (Leca and Naccache 2006, Delbridge and Edwards 
2013) allows for such a view to make ontological sense. That is, Critical Realism’s conceptualisation 
of a structure and agency duality is integral in underpinning the ways in which the properties of 
institutional levels of analysis and the relationships between them are understood throughout the 
thesis. Indeed the concept of a ‘situated logic’ is reliant upon, and indicative of, a Critical Realist 
perspective. Hence it should be noted that although the application of CR is not intended to be a 
foremost contribution of the thesis, it is consistently implicit throughout the research because it 
provides the ontological concepts and language which underpins how the nature of the green 
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paradox is cast and how it might be explained. With these central elements of the thesis 
established, a summary of the content of each chapter follows.   
Thesis Overview 
 
In Chapter 2 the historical development of neo-institutionalism is outlined. Over the past two 
decades institutional theory has transformed from a body of literature predominantly interested in 
organisational homogeneity and assumptions of actor passivity (Meyer and Rowan 1977, and 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983) to one which has a substantial area of theorisation devoted to 
examining embedded agency and institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio 1988, 1991). The 
chapter reviews institutionalist approaches to agency and how they relate to, and are embedded 
within, institutional social structures such as logics. First, the institutional entrepreneur literature 
is split into explanations for agency which are either ‘structural’ or ‘processual’. The former provide 
insights into how structural conditions such as embeddedness (Leca, Battilana and Boxenbaum 
2008, Greenwood and Suddaby 2006), social position (Battilana 2006, Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy 
2004), elite power (Reed 2012), and institutional logic contradiction (Goodrick and Reay 2011, Seo 
and Creed 2002) produce space for agents to recognise opportunities for institutional change. The 
latter is interested in the agentic processes through which actors ‘work’ on these opportunities and 
primarily reviews the discursive literature on rhetoric (Suchman 1995, Brown, Ainsworth and Grant 
2012, Riaz, Buchanan and Bapuli 2011), legitimation strategies (Vaara, Tienari and Laurila 2006, 
Vaara and Tienari 2002, 2008, Kuronen, Tienari and Vaara 2005), theorisation (Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2005) and the relationship between legitimacy and rationality (Townley 2008, Kalberg 
1980). The chapter then places the processual and structural facets of institutional 
entrepreneurship within a wider understanding of agency. The theories of translation (Zilber 2002, 
2006), inhabited institutions (Binder 2007, Hallet and Ventresca 2006, Delbridge and Edwards 2013) 
and institutional work (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2011, Zietsma and Lawrence 2010, Lawrence 
and Suddaby 2006) are summarised and evaluated in terms of how they connect agency and 
structure.  
The review concludes that theories of agency require better theoretical linkages with broader 
societal level institutional logics (Kaghan and Lounsbury 2011). Recent literature on institutional 
complexity (Greenwood, Diaz, Li and Lorente 2010, Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and 
Lounsbury 2011) has begun to consider these links by showing how multiple institutional logics 
interact in ways which affect how actors at more micro levels of analysis interpret and perceive the 
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legitimacy of certain actions. Alternative streams of institutional research have tried to understand 
how actors may ‘reach outside’ their own organisational field and bring in new institutional logics 
(from social movements for example) to create institutional change (Sine and Lee 2009, Rao, Monin 
and Durand 2005). Nevertheless there is an absence of sufficient theorising within neo-
institutionalism which considers the interconnectedness of institutional levels of analysis and the 
role of embedded actors in constructing, maintaining and changing such connections. To address 
this theoretical shortcoming the concept of a ‘situated logic’ is proposed. Briefly, situated logics 
develop through the localised manifestation of societal logics. The form in which they become 
manifest is an outcome of the meaningful conditions of the field and how they are experienced by 
groups of actors with their own interests who reinforce and enact them. The concept of a situated 
logic is applied throughout the research project and is elaborated when necessary. Two research 
questions are provided at the end of the chapter which speak to the issues outlined above: 
Research Question 1 
 What is the relationship between institutional levels of analysis?  
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ provide insights into the interactions 
between agents, fields and societal logics? 
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ help explain the green paradox of nuclear 
power? 
Research Question 2 
 What role do actors play in the development of ‘situated logics’? 
o How can an institutional work approach be utilised to fully understand the role of 
agency in the construction and/or reinforcement of situated logics? 
o To what extent can processes of institutional entrepreneurship help elucidate the 
manifestation, elaboration and institutionalisation of situated logics? 
o How do the actions of actors contribute to the creation of a green paradox? 
 
Chapter 3 develops and justifies the inclusion of an environmental institutional logic within 
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) inter-institutional system and in later revised versions (Thornton 
2004, Thornton et al 2012). In particular, the chapter proposes that anthropological paradigms 
dating back to Enlightenment times set in motion ways of analysing the human-nature relationship 
which separated human minds from a ‘…primordial, autonomous and mechanistic’ (Goldman and 
Schurman 2000 p.564) natural environment. Organisational theory has typically continued this 
paradigmatic tradition by treating the natural environment as a stable and standardised resource 
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(Shrivastava 1995, Jennings and Zandbergen 1995). However a body of sociological literature has 
begun to understand how the natural environment might be partially socially constructed (Purser 
et al 1995, Castree 2001). As such the aim of the chapter is to unpack the socially constructed 
character of the natural environment in order to argue that this construction is informed by cultural 
and symbolic ‘rules’ which reside within the institutional environment. These rules are symptomatic 
of a higher order environmental institutional logic which informs actors and organisations on what 
the natural environmental represents and thus what constitutes environmentally friendly 
behaviour. The concept of an environmental institutional logic is applied throughout the research 
project thereafter. Its ultimate utility is evaluated in the final discussion chapter. A final research 
question is provided at the end of the chapter:  
Research Question 3 
 How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic provide utility within an 
institutional research agenda?  
o How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic help explain the 
green paradox of nuclear power? 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the methods used to answer the three research questions and places the 
research within a Critical Realist ontological framework (Bhaskar 1975). Firstly the characteristics 
of Critical Realism (CR) are discussed and applied to institutional theory in line with the work of Leca 
and Naccache (2006). It is argued that the analytical dualism of CR, its stratified ontology and its 
focus on context and history fit well with the research agenda of this thesis. That is, the examination 
of the emergence of a certain configuration of societal and situated institutional logics over time 
and the role of actors in its configuration. The application of CR is then achieved through the 
utilisation of Houston’s (2010) steps of Retroduction. The research questions and qualitative 
research design decisions are then discussed in relation to the Retroductive method. Subsequently 
the chapter outlines, justifies and evaluates the methods applied in the research. A historical case 
study was constructed from the analysis of texts from three newspapers (The Guardian, The Times 
and the Daily Mirror) and a mixture of Government publications. The articles taken from each data 
source related to debates over the legitimacy of nuclear power, with particular attention paid to 
articles which presented arguments regarding the environmental credentials of nuclear energy. The 
data covered the period from the inception of the UK civil nuclear programme in the mid-1950s to 
the confirmation of a new nuclear programme in 2010. Lastly the nature of analysis and computer 
aided coding is explained.  
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The historical case study is presented in a chronological manner and begins in Chapter 5. This 
chapter presents the initial two decades (1950-1970) of the civil nuclear power programme and 
begins by introducing the industry and its place within the wider energy context. During this period 
the public debates over nuclear power’s legitimacy were informed by two dominant embedded 
situated logics manifest within the industry: the national-market and state-resource logics. The 
chapter details how these situated logics both conflicted and coexisted throughout the period and 
how they were often drawn on in defence of nuclear power by both the Media and the 
Government. After presenting the institutional structure of the energy industry, the chapter defines 
the way in which the environment was understood during the period. The distinctive character of 
this period is the way in which actors took a broad amenity based approach to the environment 
whereby it was considered as a picturesque ‘facility’. Hence most concerns focused on the visual 
impact of nuclear stations. The lack of environmental anxiety surrounding nuclear power was 
enforced by normalising and distancing discursive strategies which proposed that nuclear energy 
was both ordinary and a peaceful alternative to more devastating nuclear weapons, respectively.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the impact of the environmental social movement in the 1970s on the public 
legitimacy of nuclear power. The environmental movement reduced nuclear naivety and 
introduced the public to the unique properties of nuclear power stations and their potential to 
worsen arms proliferation. The movement also inculcated a new way of understanding the nature 
and society relationship which focused on environmental ethics and the protection of the 
environment for its own sake. The chapter focuses on two interlinked yet distinct central public 
debates which emerged: radioactive-waste and proliferation. The former is in regards to the 
increasing public knowledge of the processes involved in nuclear generation and the lack of 
solutions for their storage or disposal. The latter is in regards to the specific properties of that waste 
(and nuclear fuel) which is used in the development of nuclear weapons. This latter point was 
especially salient given the escalation of Cold War concerns during the period. The impact of these 
debates is discussed in relation to a highly influential report by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (1976) – also known as the Flowers Report – which warned the public of 
an impending ‘plutonium economy’. The report suggested that no more nuclear builds should begin 
unless there was no alternative option given the very real threat of the UK enduring a ‘plutonium 
economy’ and contributing to continued global nuclear weapons proliferation.  
The Labour Government published its official response in 1977 which stated that the report 
essentially endorsed the continuation of nuclear power. The chapter argues that the energy 
industry did not regard it as their duty to consider the environmental impact of energy options. 
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Instead the industry continued to legitimate nuclear power on the basis of the national-market and 
state-resource situated logics. The latter was particularly salient given the national supply 
vulnerabilities exposed by the Miners strikes (1972, 1974) and the OPEC oil crisis (1973). The pro-
nuclear Labour Government and its supportive press claimed that environmentalists were utopian 
idealists whose rejection of nuclear power threatened national energy security given the lack of 
realistic alternatives. The chapter finishes in 1979 with the election of Margaret Thatcher’s pro-
nuclear Conservative party which pledged to expand the UK’s nuclear assets.   
Chapter 7 focuses on the period between 1980 and 1990. This chapter covers the struggle between 
the pro-nuclear Conservatives and escalating nuclear anxiety throughout the public domain. Whilst 
the Conservatives pushed to expand the nuclear power programme the Cold War intensified and a 
number of high profile nuclear accidents severely impacted public and media support. Regardless 
of these concerns the Government legitimated nuclear on the previously established grounds of 
supply security and future market potential. However, Climate Change was officially ratified by the 
UN in 1988 and the Government were presented with an opportunity to propose that non-fossil-
fuel nuclear power was ‘green’. It is at this point in time that the green paradox of nuclear power 
began to emerge. This opportunity marked the beginning of an emergent target-based 
environmental logic within the energy industry. Thus this chapter details how a version of 
environmentalism began to influence the decision making criteria and assessments of legitimacy 
during energy choice comparisons in the very late years of the 1980s. The chapter ends by detailing 
the failed privatisation of the nuclear industry. Thatcher’s market liberalisation agenda for the 
energy sector culminated in the attempted sale of the civil nuclear reactors in 1989.  However, by 
the end of that year it became clear to potential investors that the true costs of nuclear power, 
including the costs of decommissioning and waste disposal were unknown. Consequently the 
Government called for a five year moratorium on all new builds (apart from one in mid 
construction) and many saw it as the end of nuclear power in the UK.  
Chapter 8 considers the eventual reinvigoration of the nuclear industry in the late 2000s. 
Throughout the 1990s carbon targets became internationally binding (Kyoto Protocol 1997) and the 
Government was under pressure to incentivise the now privately owned energy industries (bar 
nuclear) to work towards lowering their carbon emissions. In particular the Conservative 
Government (1990-1997) and the Labour Government (1997-2010) hoped that a large renewables 
industry would flourish in the UK and advance enough to significantly contribute to the UK’s low 
carbon energy mix. Nuclear power continued to appear financially unappealing even after its 
privatisation in 1996. Nevertheless, by 2006 it was clear that renewables could not be constructed 
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on the scale necessary to provide enough low carbon electricity for the UK to meet its emissions 
targets. In 2006 the Labour Government changed its energy strategy against nuclear power. Given 
the supply concerns with oil, gas and coal as well as the prospect of net importation, nuclear power 
was now considered as integral within the energy mix. 
The chapter then details how key members of the energy industry began to legitimate nuclear 
power on environmental grounds by drawing from the situated target-based environmental logic. 
Claims by environmental social movement organisations that nuclear power was not 
environmentally permissible were met with disputations that they remained irrationally idealist in 
their expectations of ‘green energy’. Discursive legitimation strategies in support of nuclear power 
argued that renewables were not able to provide enough clean energy and would thus need to be 
supplemented by fossil-fuels – meaning that nuclear power would be comparatively cleaner and 
without its adoption Climate Change would be inevitable. Environmental social movement 
organisations rejected that carbon mitigation made nuclear power environmentally friendly and 
instead maintained that it should be abandoned on ecological grounds. The debate over nuclear 
power’s environmental credentials culminated in nuclear power’s ‘green paradox’ and was played 
out most evidently in the UK Press. The chapter concludes by describing how the new nuclear 
programme was set in motion by the Labour Government who hoped to meet the deadlines of the 
Kyoto Protocol. A National Policy Statement in 2009 confirmed their pro-nuclear agenda by 
providing pre-assessments of nuclear sites appropriate for rapid nuclear development. On each of 
the site reviews the negative environmental impact of new builds was justified due to Imperative 
Reasons of Overriding Public Interest (IROPI); in other words, the environmental impact of 
increasing carbon levels was considered more important than the local environmental impact of 
nuclear power stations. Moreover, the instigation of a carbon market for emissions trading in 2010 
meant that nuclear power was able to become an economically competitive option against more 
traditional forms of power generation, further escalating interest in nuclear.  
In Chapter 9 the key findings are summarised. These are located within the existing literature and 
four key areas of theoretical discussion and contribution are proposed. Firstly a narrative is 
provided which illustrates how and why the situated target-based environmental logic emerged 
within the energy industry and speaks to the first and second research questions. It is shown that a 
multi-level conceptualisation of institutional work helps to explain how societal logics come to, over 
time, manifest within an industry. Literature exploring elite power and command situations (Reed 
2012) is also drawn on to show how a group of key industry actors who championed nuclear energy 
were able to provoke institutional change. This first discussion is specifically related to the 
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manifestation of a target-based environmental logic within the energy industry from 1988 onwards. 
Secondly, the discussion understands the ‘green paradox of nuclear power’ as an outcome of 
multiple situated environmental logics which relate to a single environmental societal logic. To 
delineate why these situated environmental logics differ from one another the discussion draws on 
the dimensions employed by Biggart and Delbridge (2004) to identify various systems of exchange. 
These dimensions are ‘social relations between actors’ and their ‘rationality orientation’. Both 
these dimensions affected the emergent properties of the various situated environmental logics 
because they influenced how specific actor groups developed perceptions of nuclear power. By 
differentiating actors via these variables it is possible to demarcate four quite different 
interpretations of a societal environmental logic. The subsequent taxonomy of environmental 
situated logics theoretically contributes to more recent considerations of institutional complexity 
and logic interaction. 
Thirdly, the valorisation of environmentalism is discussed as a means to further elucidate the nature 
of the situated target-based environmental logic. This discussion speaks to the body of literature 
on logic coexistence as it reflects an interesting combination of neo-liberal market logics and the 
target-based environmental logic. Instead of being in conflict, the values and norms of both were 
appeased through economic modelling and a carbon pricing system. Finally, the chapter defends 
the utility of an environmental societal institutional logic and argues that an appreciation of such a 
logic may contribute to future research which hopes to understand the institutionalised 
understandings underpinning and legitimating organisations’ environmental actions. The chapter 
ends with an evaluation of the thesis’s implications and a discussion of the limitations and future 
avenues for this research.  
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Chapter 2: An Institutional Approach 
Introducing Institutional Theory 
 
Neo-institutionalism emerged in the 1970s as a perspective which was interested in how 
organisational populations formed and became homogenised. Specifically neo-institutionalists 
pointed to the role of normative and cognitive processes in the development of isomorphic 
relationships between organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Scholars pondered the resilience 
of institutional prescriptions in the form of taken-for-granted institutional templates which could 
become normatively embedded within organisational fields and adopted as a means to reduce 
ambiguity (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 2002) and enhance legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Hence organisations became conceptualised as unwitting recipients of appropriate 
organising structures, facilitated by the notion that such templates dulled organisational members 
to the possibility of institutional change. Hence, ‘Early work on organizational fields…has led to a 
preponderance of overly structural and contingent accounts…’ (Delbridge and Edwards 2008 p.192) 
which demonstrate ignorance towards the role of agency and its effect on the interaction between 
various normative forces within organisational fields. Furthermore the direction of the 
aforementioned literature raised the paradoxical question of how actors could ever envisage 
changing highly institutionalized contexts (Holm 1995, Dorado 2005) and under what circumstances 
this would be likely to occur (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006).  
To overcome these queries recent institutional theory has undergone a transformation from 
examining institutional change from the perspective of convergence and structural determinism, 
towards an investigation into embedded yet endogenous instances of change. According to Seo and 
Creed (2002) there may be a requirement for authors to relax the ‘…assumption that all means and 
ends available to agents are institutionally conditioned’ (p.230) in order to provide space for the 
consideration of autonomy and reflexive agency. Subsequently an influx of literature around 
institutional entrepreneurship has materialized which attempts to provoke an interest in the role of 
human-praxis (Seo and Creed 2002) and social position (Battilana 2006). New ideas around 
Institutional Work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) similarly have recognized the impact of both 
unconscious and intentional agentic behaviour on instances of change (Koene 2006) and the 
importance of micro-level dynamics in regards to how ‘contextual pressures are interpreted and 
acted upon by organizational actors’ (Greenwood and Hinings 1996 p.1024). Ultimately, recent 
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research has come to reflect the notion that institutions do not only constrain human agency, but 
are often the product of such agency (Battilana 2006). 
This chapter first provides an overview of early institutionalism before reviewing the large body of 
institutional literature which has attempted to overcome the issue of embedded agency and, in 
doing so, has provided some insight into the relationship between levels of institutional analysis. In 
particular the chapter focuses on the movement away from structural determinism and towards an 
understanding of how institutional entrepreneurship may be conceptualised – both in terms of the 
contextual conditions necessary as well as what is required from the entrepreneur. In order to best 
understand the occurrence of the green paradox of nuclear power, and the logics and discourses 
reinforcing it, this literature review pays heavy attention to how the roles of legitimation, 
theorisation and rationality have been utilised within institutional change literature. Additionally a 
review of approaches which theorise the relationship between agency and institutions, and it is 
concluded that the institutional work  perspective (Lawrence et al 2011) provides the best means 
by which to understand the different ways in which actors ‘work on’ institutionalised meanings. 
Finally the review find issue with the ways in which the relationship between levels of analysis have 
been dealt with by institutionalists and proposes the concept of a ‘situated logic’ to account for the 
ways in which societal logics manifest, through processes of institutional work, within communities 
of actors such as industries.   
Institutional Beginnings 
 
Between the 1970s and early 1980s a body of literature began to outline the conceptual foundations 
of neo-institutional theory. It postulated that organisations were not only influenced by their 
technical striving for efficiency, but were also subject to cultural and symbolic pressures to act in 
certain ways. Such pressures were in the form of institutions, defined by Greenwood, Suddaby and 
Hinings (2002) as ‘…more or less taken for granted repetitive social behaviour that is underpinned 
by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus 
enable self-reproducing social order’ (p.6f0). Early authors such as Zucker (1977) and Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) drew on the social constructivist foundations of Berger and Luckmann (1966) to 
explore the creation and implications of these institutions. Berger and Luckmann (1966) proposed 
that taken-for-granted myths about what it was to be ‘rational’ were socially constructed. Myths 
provided objectivity through continual reciprocal typification from which they could ultimately 
become external rules and ‘mythical truths’ and act as powerful institutional rules: ‘…rationalised 
and impersonal prescriptions that identify various social purposes as technical ones and specify in a 
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rule like way the appropriate means to pursue these technical purposes’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977 
p.343).  
Institutional rules were understood to constitute an organisation’s ‘institutional context’ (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977) which defined what it was to act rationally and appear legitimate. Instead of 
focusing on how organisations strive to fit a technical and competitive environment, theorists came 
to recognise how an institutional environment prompted behaviour within highly institutionalised 
organisational fields. Institutional theorists delineated a clear dichotomy between ‘hard’ regulatory 
and material pressures, and ‘soft’ social institutional pressures; technical vs. institutional (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977), regulatory vs. sociocultural or the material-resource environment vs. the 
institutional environment (Scott 2000) respectively. Early neo-institutionalists noted that it was the 
institutional environment which compelled organisations to act similarly irrespective of technical 
and economical requirements (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The effect of the institutional environment 
was to infuse certain practices with ‘…value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’ 
(Selznick 1957 p.17) so that they would appear legitimate irrespective of practical necessity. This 
legitimacy was important because organisations did not merely survive by making calculated 
decisions based on material and resource threats, but endured by ‘…appearing to be rational’ (Scott 
1983 p.160) by avoiding illegitimate categories of action (Zuckerman 1999).  
The institutional context required a domain in which to exert its force, and thus the concept of an 
‘organisational field’ was born (Meyer and Rowan 1977). An organisational field denoted ‘…a 
recognised area of institutional life’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991 p.64). Lounsbury and Pollack (2001) 
detailed more specially the kind of material interactions that are contained and are constitutive of 
an organisational field: ‘…materially fields encompass a broad organizational infrastructure that 
contains horizontal interactions having to do with networks and competition and vertical authority 
relations that involve actors such as Governmental agencies and trade associations’ (p.321). Scott 
(1994) further suggested that units within a field share more than just business interactions: ‘The 
notion of a field connotes the existence of a community of organisations that partakes of a common 
meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another 
than with those outside of the field’ (pp.207-208). As organisational fields emerge their developing 
institutional rules begin to create similarity: ‘…once disparate organizations in the same line of 
business are structured into an actual field…powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more 
similar to one another’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991 p65). Meyer and Rowan (1977) had essentially 
suggested an alternative Weberian source of formal structure. The legitimating power of 
rationalised formal structures is generated by norms and conventions denoted by rationalised 
19 
 
myths pertaining to structures and practices within organisational fields. The institutions which 
emerge are imbued with rationalising value and become increasingly institutionalised as coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphic tendencies and drive homogeneity between field level 
participants (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed two types of isomorphism: competitive and institutional. The 
former assumes that organisations converge on a form due to their similar competitive and resource 
environments. However, this should be supplemented by the latter which considers that 
organisations also compete for political power and legitimacy and are thus compelled to converge 
on a form which appears legitimate. The authors provided a triplet of institutional isomorphic 
pressures which may cause this convergence; coercive isomorphism stems from political influence 
which may be conveyed through regulations and accreditation; normative isomorphism is due to 
professional norms and values which lead to accepted practice; and mimetic isomorphism is 
associated with mimicry between organisations as a response to uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Tolbert and Zucker (1983) further extended and empirically tested DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) argument to find that as innovations spread a threshold is reached beyond which adoption 
provides legitimacy rather than improved performance. Their extension was able to illustrate that 
early adopters of civil service reform did so for highly technical reasons, whereas later adoption 
could be explained as an institutional phenomenon based on the quest for legitimacy (also see Zajac 
and Westphal 2004, and Sherer and Lee 2002). Overall, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) recognised that: 
‘As the process of adoption continues, the characteristics of cities become increasingly less relevant 
to the adoption process’ (p.34).  
The Paradox of Embeddedness 
 
The neo-institutional theory of the early theorists envisions actors as deeply embedded within the 
institutional environment to a point where they passively partake in producing field level 
homogeneity. Unfortunately, given the assumed actor embeddedness there are problems with 
conceiving of any institutional action which may lead to radical and formula breaking organisational 
change. These theorists approached organisations as ‘…captives of the institutional environment in 
which they exist’ (Tolbert and Zucker 1983 p.8). Indeed, Zucker (1977) rigorously applied Berger and 
Luckmann’s (1966) social constructivist thesis arguing that practices are only institutionalised when 
they are objectivated and exterior, thus proposing that ‘…institutionalized acts require no 
monitoring or enforcement, but persist solely through transmission from one generation to another’ 
(p.8). Such embeddedness has led to the question of how actors can ever create institutional change 
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when their taken-for-granted expectations of what is deemed rational and appropriate are 
continually compelling them to maintain the status-quo. Battilana (2006) notes that this ‘… paradox 
of embedded agency stems from the fact that neo-institutional theorists have barely tackled the 
issue of human agency. Theorists have tended to neglect the individual level of analysis, 
concentrating instead on the organizational and societal levels of analysis’ (p.655).  
Instead, scholars have applied a number of theoretical mechanisms in an attempt to account for 
institutional change processes which appear to go against field level norms, values and culturally 
socialised practices. For example, Oliver (1991) provided an alternative approach by combining 
resource dependency theory with institutional theory to suggest that individuals have strategic 
options when faced with a pressure to become isomorphic with their environment. Oliver attempts 
to escape the overly deterministic view of the institutional context by arguing that ‘…institutional 
theory can accommodate interest-seeking, active organisational behaviour when organisations 
responses to institutional pressures and expectations are not assumed to be invariably passive and 
conforming across all institutional conditions’ (1991 p.146). By applying resource dependency 
theory, she suggests that active resistance can take place, depending on the nature and context of 
the institutional pressures. However, it may be argued that this model does not overcome the 
paradox of embedded agency because her theory does not say why an individual would decide to 
use a resource and why the organisation would then not suffer from illegitimacy. Evidently dis-
embedding actors in this way is problematic because it does not explain how they came to be dis-
embedded. The most popular way to account for agency and change in subsequent literature was 
thus not to dis-embed actors, but to suggest that any institutional context is fractured, multivocal 
and constituted by numerous contesting yet coexisting institutional meaning systems. The 
interactions and tensions between these may provide opportunities for change without dis-
embedding actors from their institutional environment. Such meaning systems were delineated in 
1991 by Friedland and Alford as ‘institutional logics’.  
Institutional Logics 
 
‘The notion of logics is immensely appealing…it proposes that external rituals and stimuli 
interact with internal mental structures to generate routine behaviour…it is [also] 
consistent with the view that culture is fragmented among potentially inconsistent 
elements’ (DiMaggio 1997 p.277) 
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The concept of institutional logics is prevalent within institutional research. As a meta-theory 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008) the concept of an institutional logic implies an overarching system of 
higher-order institutional pressures which legitimate certain practices whilst rendering others 
incompatible. In developing their conceptualisation of institutional logics, Friedland and Alford 
(1991) argued that understanding individuals as rational-instrumental actors was flawed because 
an individual is itself somewhat of an institutional construct. In other words, the idea of an isolated 
and abstracted ‘individual’ is a flawed production and represents an ‘… analytical category which 
has been shaped by institutional transformation’ (Friedland and Alford 1991 p.240). Alongside 
numerous early neo-Institutionalists, the authors claimed that the context of the individual was 
increasingly becoming ignored in sociological study, and that such a context was best understood 
as an inter-institutional system which instilled limits on rationality and legitimacy. Friedland and 
Alford (1991) defined institutional logics as ‘…symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality, and 
thereby rendering experience of time and space meaningful’ (p.243). They are ‘invisible 
assumptions’ (p.240) which have both symbolic and material properties. The material properties 
are represented in behaviours, but ‘…behaviours [only] make sense to those who enact the 
behaviour only in relation to its transrational symbolic systems and that those symbolic systems 
only make sense in terms of the behavior’ (Friedland and Alford p.250).  
 
Each institutional logic organises the symbolic (ideation and meaning) and material properties 
(structures and practices) of distinct societal sectors (Thornton 2004, Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury 2012) or institutional orders (Friedland and Alford 1991). These were initially defined as 
Capitalism, Christianity, Bureaucratic State, Family and Democracy. Institutional logics define the 
content and meaning of institutions related to each of the orders (Reay and Hinings 2009) and 
provide collective identities which establish a normative origin for group membership, inform 
players of ‘the rules of the game’, inform struggles for status and power, provide classificatory 
categories, and cognitively condition actors’ understandings of what is important and what is not 
(Zuckerman 1999, Thornton and Ocasio 1999, Spicer and Sewell 2010). In sum, they mediate 
between organisations and society through the provision of supra-organisational normative 
‘guidelines’ (Townley 1997 p.263). However, given their variance institutional logics are likely to 
come into contradiction and tension within an organisational field. Each institutional order uniquely 
shapes how reasoning takes place and how rationality is perceived and ultimately ‘…agency and the 
knowledge that makes agency will vary by institutional order (Thornton et al 2012 p.4). The 
meaningful variation between orders lays the foundation for contradiction and tension between 
actors informed by alternative institutional logics. With these foundations set the review will show 
22 
 
how the concepts delineated above have been applied within more recent movements in 
institutionalism.  
The new Neo-institutionalism 
 
Neo-institutionalism is often criticised for a distracted focus on the structural and regulatory 
aspects of organisational environments, providing little attention to the agency and ‘work’ involved 
in institutional change at the micro level of analysis. Although prominent in the rubric of 
institutionalism, an engagement with meanings, symbols and cognition once stressed as 
fundamental by authors such as Zucker (1977) has been marginalised in favour of more overtly 
macro and deterministic accounts of institutional change. Institutional rules are often seemingly 
dislocated from constitutive agents: ‘…in portraying institutions as human creations turned into 
nature-like givens, scholars seem to have neglected the role of social actors in the maintenance of 
institutions’ (Zilber 2002 p.236). In response to such criticisms literature throughout the 1990s and 
2000s has engaged with the agency debate. Early institutional entrepreneurship theorists began 
examining agency with a clear recognition of embeddedness and structure. They understood 
agency as a result of reflexivity and mobilisation inspired by logic contradiction and influenced by 
variables such as social position (Battilana 2006) and level of embeddedness (Dorado 2005). More 
recent studies have emerged which focus on the ‘process’ of institutional entrepreneurship thereby 
recognising the role of actors in developing meaning systems and discourses which result in 
institutional change (Zilber 2002, Hallet and Ventresca 2006). This more cultural and discursively 
orientated literature spawned additional theories around institutional work which moved away 
from the concept of a heroic change agent and towards an understanding that actors are 
continually working on institution maintenance, disruption and change (Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis 
2010). However, a concern still remains that the re-focus on agency fails to localise it within the 
wider societal context. This literature review will argue that a consideration of ‘situated logics’ as 
manifestations of societal logics impelled by contextualised institutional work will aid the 
conceptual re-connecting of the agent, field and societal levels of analysis. The review will examine 
the movement in literature outlined above, clarifying key concepts and ultimately proposing that 
societal logics can be understood as situated within fields and industries. Thus, it will begin with the 
structural nature of institutionalism and the problems therein.   
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Organisational Fields and Scientific Diffusion 
 
Institutional logics research has tended to examine the dynamics of logics purely at the field level 
of analysis (Reay and Hinings 2005, Townley 2002, Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). By 
‘organisational field’ this review is referring to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) definition: ‘… those 
organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life’ (p.148). Often 
field level studies fail to account for both the role of agency during institutional change and the 
origins of the field level logics. The former issue is symptomatic of structural determinist 
assumptions which place all explanatory power in field level institutional structures and 
subsequently imply actor level passivity. Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge (2009) suggested that this 
structural determinacy is rooted in institutionalism’s preoccupation with isomorphism which has 
hardwired the idea that institutional logics diffuse as a given entity to all field actors from a ‘higher 
level’. Zilber (2002) has argued that this mode of diffusion is down to the theory’s tendency to adopt 
a scientific model. ‘Scientific diffusion’ refers to the way in which a rationalised myth (or logic) 
becomes diffused as a whole entity throughout an organisational field: ‘The diffusion model rests 
on the assumption that practices are adopted intact, and thus it holds a somewhat reified and static 
notion of the process’ (Zilber 2006 p.282). Importantly, the scientific diffusion metaphor has led to 
a dominant approach whereby fields have been treated as ‘…systems with objective features and 
contingent effects’ (Delbridge and Edwards 2008 p.193). By treating fields in this way, institutional 
theorists have somewhat underplayed an analysis of agency.  
 
Scott, Ruef, Mendel and Caronna’s (2000) book on the American Health Care field and its on-going 
institutional change rarely veers from the field level of analysis. In fact, Scott et al’s (2000) 
treatment of the micro level is merely to recognise the response of actors to the field level changes. 
Additionally, Thornton (2002) researched competition between the editorial and market logics in 
the publishing field. She sidesteps the individual level of analysis by looking at ‘…the link between 
industry level culture and organisational level social structure and routines’ (p.82) and concluded 
that ‘…organisational level social structures and routines…were carriers of institutional logics’ (p.97) 
rather than individuals. The paper found that publishing houses moved from a professional logic to 
a market logic, representing a shift in societal sector from ‘professions’ to ‘market’. Indeed, in these 
studies a punctuated equilibrium model is often evident as the field alters sporadically from one 
logic to another to then continue in relative stability. As Hoffman notes (1999) ‘…actors within a 
field recognise the dominance of one institutional logic during times that we can characterise as 
relatively stable’ (p.354).  
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The problem is not just one of field level fixation, but also of ontological grounding. Delbridge and 
Edwards (2007) have noted that within institutional literature there is a tendency for fields to 
become objectified and infused with structural variables; they evolve boundaries through 
structuration processes, become recognisable areas of institutional life and are perceived as 
archetypal structures for those researching the ‘top-down’ effects of the regulatory and structural 
dimensions of institutions. An antecedent of this treatment, and possibly a self-perpetuating 
consequence is the assumption that organisational fields have a substance of their own (Emirbayer 
1997) which feeds down and causes similarity within itself. Emirbayer (1997) noted this as a form 
of ‘structuralism’ whereby ‘…holistic theories and “structuralisms” posit not individuals but self-
subsistent “societies”, “structures”, or “social-systems” as the exclusive sources of action’ (p.285). 
Similarly Holt and Mueller (2011) suggested that the drawing of general lines and the fixing of 
meaning in organisation studies leads to ‘…an epistemological tendency to conflate understanding 
of organizational life with the fixing of things and events as extant outside any awareness of the 
experience of this fixing’ (p.3). The terms used within institutional theory such as ‘fields’ are, in this 
sense, confining. 
 
However, Markowitz, Cobb and Hedley (2011) argue that Bourdieu’s (1977) initial notion of an 
organisational field was borrowed by Institutionalists to explain isomorphism and homogeneity 
rather than to appreciate Bourdieu’s conception of them as changing and organic in nature 
(Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) propose that an organisation field is 
composed of interaction as well as structure, and thus constitutes a ground for contestation 
between agents ‘…differently endowed with the resources necessary for gaining and safeguarding 
an ascendant position within that terrain (p.36). Therefore within an organisational field there may 
be multiple competing and contradicting logics challenging existing logics, embodied by actors vying 
for change and power. As such it is not rejected that fields embody norms and values as defined by 
institutional logics, but that they lead definitively to stability is a false simplification. Indeed, this 
resonates with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) thesis that institutionalisation can never be 
completely achieved. The idiosyncrasies and incomplete socialisation of individuals mean that fields 
can never be totally accepted as completely institutionalised: ‘…every symbolic universe is 
incipiently problematic’ (Berger and Luckmann’s 1966 p.106). Therefore, overly socialised views 
which focus on the structural determinacy of institutional forces are problematic because they 
negate the peculiar, creative and distinctive variations in the way individuals conceive of the 
universe.  
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As a consequence, ‘…even though the concept of institutional logics connects field-level values and 
beliefs with action at all organizational levels, most studies focus only on field-level actors’ (Reay 
and Hinings 2009 p.632). Given that these approaches rarely engage with the micro level of analysis, 
an assumption of structural determinacy often underlies their findings. This focus on structural 
determinacy means that field level logics are frequently abstracted from any societal background. 
Given that societal institutional logics transcend organisational fields (Friedland and Alford 1991) 
why are field level logics not linked explicitly to their societal origins? An understanding of field level 
logics as manifestations of societal logics would require both an explicit recognition of its origins as 
well as an understanding of the micro-processes involved in its manifestation. Such an engagement 
can only occur once institutionalists recognise that logics are not self-evident (Zilber 2006) – they 
do not ‘present’ themselves as a given whole outside of human creation - but are enacted and 
reproduced at individual, organisational and societal levels (Seo and Creed 2002). This proposition 
leads the review on to a more specific focus on the ways in which institutionalists have dealt with 
micro-processes of agency in the form of institutional entrepreneurship. Given that institutional 
logics are constantly re-enacted and/or transformed by those actors who are embedded within the 
practices and symbols they legitimate, an understanding of how change may occur is intrinsically 
linked to the ability of those actors to think and act in novel and entrepreneurial ways. 
Bringing Back the Actor: Institutional Entrepreneurship  
 
Institutional logics were introduced as a means to elucidate the diverse range of meanings and 
symbolisms facing actors embedded within a transrational symbolic system. Possibilities for 
understanding agency were predicted by Friedland and Alford (1991) who suggested that, under 
certain conditions, individuals can be ‘…artful in the motivation of different institutional logics to 
serve their goals’ (p.254). It is only recently that scholars have begun to seriously consider how such 
actors might go about eliciting change from with their own institutional context by contributing to 
a growing body of literature on institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio 1988). As Mutch (2007) 
notes ‘…the notion of the institutional entrepreneur was one response to the missing discussion of 
agency within neo-institutionalism’ (p.1135) and refocused the attention on institutionalists to the 
individual context, conditions and characteristics of actors themselves. To review the literature on 
institutional entrepreneurship the body of work has been split into structural and processual 
approaches. The former understands the ability to create change as dependent on actor’s social 
position and levels of embeddedness. The latter reviews the concept of agency as more of a process 
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which is on-going through translation (Zilber 2002, 2006), institutional inhabitation (Hallet and 
Ventresca 2006) and enacted through discursive strategies (Vaara et al 2006). It is the processual 
approaches which engage with the manipulation of meaning systems through legitimating 
strategies utilising rhetoric and discourses. New literature on institutional work (Lawrence et al 
2011) often utilises these discursive strategies to illuminate both intentional and unintentional 
institutional maintenance and disruption. Ultimately it is argued that insights from these micro level 
approaches to institutional change need to be theoretically reconnected with the societal intra-
institutional context. The review will conclude by outlining approaches which begin to tie together 
micro engagements with societal environments by responding to calls to ‘situate’ institutions within 
complex institutional and technical environments.  
Structural Approaches to Institutional Entrepreneurship 
 
The concept of institutional entrepreneurship was initially introduced by DiMaggio (1988) and 
refers to attempts by actors to create new, or transform existing institutional arrangements: ‘…only 
individuals who somehow break with the rules and practices associated with the dominant 
institutional logic…can be regarded as institutional entrepreneurs’ (Battilana 2006 p.657). Given 
that institutional entrepreneurship must recognise the embeddedness of actors, much of the 
structural literature assumes that the extent to which opportunities are recognisable and acted on 
is mediated by an actor’s structural characteristics. These characteristics are used to account for 
why, if all actors are faced with the same circumstance, only some pursue particular courses of 
action (Mutch 2007). Importantly, this does not imply structural determinacy but rather suggests 
that the structural location of actors permits them to recognise institutional opportunities and 
mobilise resources for change. There are two central themes of structural accounts: The first 
regards how the social position and elitism of actors affects their ability to act on opportunities for 
institutional change; the second considers how an actor’s degree of embeddedness with an 
institutionalised field affects their capacity to recognise opportunities for such change.  
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Social Position and Elite Power 
 
Social position has been drawn on by researchers such as Battilana to account for the ability of 
actors to pursue change projects whilst embedded within institutional structures. Battilana (2006) 
proposes that an individual’s position within a network of resources and asymmetrical power 
relationships affects his or her willingness and ability to elicit institutional change. An individual may 
have low status within an organisational hierarchy, hampering their ability to conduct change, 
whilst also having a strong social status due to strong ties to other more powerful actors. The mix 
of positions within formal and informal structural contexts determines the ability of an actor to be 
entrepreneurial. At a higher level of analysis, Markowitz, Cobb and Hedley (2011) suggest that 
institutional entrepreneurs use their ‘social location’ in multiple organisational fields to compete 
with an existing logic and legitimate their new organisational form. Additionally, Phillips et al (2004) 
argue that being central within a field heightens the possibility that the discursive creations of the 
institutional entrepreneur will be consumed. As such, ‘…institutional entrepreneurs must strive to 
attain positions that enable them to bring together diverse stakeholders among whom they can 
champion and orchestrate collective action’ (Leca et al 2008). Both social position and network 
location offer access to political systems and may lead to the identification of political opportunities 
in the shape of identifiable allies, apparent instabilities in the elites and vehicles by which to 
mobilise supporters for collective action (Rao and Giorgi 2006).  
More recent institutional literatures on power and elites have shown how certain social locations 
within both horizontal and vertical networks can lend agents the capacity to enact autonomously. 
Zald and Lounsbury (2010) propose an institutional research agenda which considers national and 
international elites, ‘organisational infrastructure’ (p.964) and power centres in the study of 
important policy issues. They employ the term ‘command posts’ which refer to ‘…traditional centres 
of societal power that regulate, oversee and aim to maintain social order in society and economy, 
both at regional, nation-state and inter-state levels’ (p.954) such as the United Nations, 
Government agencies and other formal bodies of governance and bureaucratic office. Such 
command posts should be understood as embedded within a wider field of organisations, cultural 
beliefs and interests which shape the formulation of policy. In other words, a ‘field approach’ is 
provided which highlights how power is ‘….variably dispersed across a wider set of actors who are 
unified by shared interests, issues or discourse’ (p.965). As such, command posts have institutional, 
normative and cultural components which affect the ways in which particular elites function in 
terms of the decisions they make and the ways in which they negotiate and mobilise resources. The 
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pluralistic conceptualisation of Zald and Lounsbury (2010) frames the notion of ‘elite’ as in flux given 
the autonomy of state actors, the growing importance of expertise, the influence of fame or 
academic credentials and the ways in which these may come together over time and space to shift 
the nature of command posts. As fields change, new actors emerge and develop field powers which 
further affect expert discourses and command post outcomes.  
 
Reed (2012) argues that Zald and Lounsbury (2010) lose track of their own agenda for a re-
engagement with vertical forms of power and control by instead reinforcing the ‘intellectual 
fascination’ with horizontal and culturally based forms. Although accepting that their approach 
begins to sketch out a framework with which to understand the dynamic interaction between 
vertical power structures and ‘emergent power networks’ (Reed 2012 p.205), Reed suggests that 
they underplay the ‘…hierarchically stratified power structures and mechanisms that underlie 
interactional orders’ (Reed 2012 p.206) evident within enduring and resilient domination 
structures. In other words, domination relations and their role in reproducing elite power and 
control cannot be solely understood as cultural phenomena, but instead need to be theorised as 
socio-material relations that are ideologically legitimated and sustained through elite rule and its 
political interests. By studying how vertical and horizontal forms of power relations interplay it is 
possible to unearth how structures of dominancy and emergent elites shape and reshape forms of 
organisational power and control. The nature of elite forms of power, and the way in which 
domination structures and cultural and normative expectations interplay to create potentially 
temporary ‘command situations’ (Reed 2012), may aid an understanding of the propensity of actors 
to mobilise resources in order to enact institutional change.  
Degree of Embeddedness 
 
The ability to conduct institutional entrepreneurship has also been shown to be dependent on 
organisational field level characteristics such as levels of heterogeneity and institutionalisation, 
both of which signal degrees of embeddedness (Leca et al 2008, Sewell 1992). High embeddedness 
may act as a constraint on action (Reay, Golden-Riddle and Germann 2006) because actors are 
highly institutionalised and unaware of alternatives. From this perspective any purposeful activity 
can only be enacted by those with low levels of embeddedness. Low embeddedness can be a 
characteristic of organisations on the periphery of a field because there are less institutional 
pressures on them to comply with a dominant institutional arrangement (Battilana, Leca and 
Boxenbaum 2009). Authors such as DiMaggio (1988) and Fligstein (1997) have both suggested that 
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the possibilities for institutional entrepreneurship are at their most plausible when the level of 
institutionalisation within a field is low and when uncertainty is high. During such eras there are 
loose structural constraints which provide space for action and reconfiguration.  
There have also been studies which argue the contrary and propose that larger and more central 
organisations are in a better position to undergo institutional entrepreneurship. For example, 
Beckert (1999) claims that in relatively highly institutionalised fields actors are more likely to carry 
out strategic action because uncertainty is low and therefore the security of stability is less 
imperative. Similarly, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) examined the institutional entrepreneurship 
of accounting firms within the centre of a highly institutionalised field. The centrality of the firms 
and their embeddedness aided their growth and interaction with new ideas. Similarly, Reay et al 
(2006) illustrate that the microprocesses of ‘small wins’ show how highly embedded actors use the 
expertise and knowledge of their structural, cultural and political environments to accumulate a 
series of accomplishments leading to desired change outcomes. In the authors’ words, 
‘...embeddedness serves as a means of stratification by opening windows of opportunity for some, 
while erecting barriers for others’ (p.979). Key to their argument is the knowledge that practitioners 
hold as a consequence of their embedded position, and also their awareness and determination to 
pursue change via a slow and incremental strategy. It is an interesting example of how structural 
context aids the development of strategies which enables micro activities to effect macro level 
constructs on a continual basis. A more general theory is provided by Dorado (2005) who explains 
how highly institutionalised contexts may provide more space for entrepreneurial behaviour. Both 
the heterogeneity and levels of institutionalisation within a field are taken into account in order to 
build a typology of possible contexts which facilitate institutional entrepreneurship. Field level 
characteristics will have implications for whether or not the field is classed as ‘opportunity opaque’, 
‘opportunity hazy’ or ‘opportunity transparent’ which occupy a continuum of zero opportunity 
provisions towards an almost ‘free for all’ opportunity state.  
Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence (2004) offer an additional dimension of field ‘newness’. The authors 
class fields as either emergent or mature, and argue that the differentiation between the two types 
is consequential upon the institutional entrepreneur’s ability to act in certain ways. In emerging 
fields they argue that ‘…there are no established patterns for leaders to mimic; the widely shared 
values associated with normative forces have yet to develop; and diffuse power makes it difficult 
for individual actors to coerce others’ (p.659). Additionally, the subject positions of institutional 
entrepreneurs coupled with the emergent characteristics of the field allow the authors to outline 
success tactics for entrepreneurs. These studies often imply that opportunities exist and are there 
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to be discovered by well-placed actors. Furthermore, research has also shown that change agents 
may introduce new practices in an attempt to overcome competitive pressures. Leblebici,  Salanik, 
Copa and King (1991) showed that peripheral actors such as ‘fringe players’ in the US radio 
broadcasting industry, can transform the conventions of an industry as an outcome of trying to 
survive: ‘…organization of an inter-organisational field is a product of practical solutions developed 
at the micro level and institutionalized through conventions at the macro level’ (p.393). Actors at 
the periphery are always looking for ways to ‘solve the problem of realising more value from 
transactions’ (p.394) and although they are newer and less powerful participants in the field, their 
experimentation is likely to be less costly and they are less likely to be sanctioned.  In sum, the 
structural position of actors is important to recognise as it can explain both their reasons for 
institutional change (e.g. competition) as well as their ability to ‘get away with it’. However, there 
is still a question of how opportunities for institutional change come to arise. 
Contradiction and Entrepreneurship  
 
‘…the bases of individual and organizational autonomy, and some of their most 
characteristic internal tensions, derive from the contradictory relationship between 
institutions’ (Friedland and Alford p.255). 
The paradox of embedded agency (Mutch 2007) does not just problematise the ability of actors to 
notice and act on opportunities, but also raises problems regarding how these opportunities arise 
in the first place. The initial theory by Friedland and Alford posited that organisational change 
occurs in the wake of actor reflexivity triggered by inconsistencies within the societal intra-
institutional context. Inconsistencies arise because the institutional environment is constituted by 
multiple institutional logics which offer potentially contradictory meanings and countervailing 
determinants of organisational structure (Thornton 2002). A seminal paper by Seo and Creed (2002) 
examined the dynamics between institutional contradictions and human praxis in an attempt to 
escape the caging concern that both actors and their interests are unequivocally institutionally 
determined. Their dialectical framework delineated how, over time, institutional arrangements are 
able to create inconsistencies and contradictions which may ‘…transform the embedded social 
actors into the change agents of institutional arrangements…’ (Seo and Creed 2002 p.223). In 
essence a ‘…complex array of interrelated but often mutually incompatible institutional 
arrangements’ (Seo and Creed 2002 p.225) collide during social interaction. Actors reflect on the 
contradictions thrown into light and may respond by demonstrating human praxis. These 
contradictions are a continuous strain on institutional reproduction as they are inherent by-
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products of an institutionally constituted social world, and may eventually elicit a shift in collective 
consciousness (Leca et al 2008). 
The idea of logic contradiction has lit the way for more recent literature which has moved away 
from studying the tensions between two contradictory logics, and focused instead on the 
interactions between multiple and coexisting logics within fields. For example there has been 
related work on constellations of logics within fields (Goodrick and Reay 2011). In particular, the 
idea of dominant and subdominant or secondary logics has become increasingly important in 
institutional analysis as a means to understand the interactions and contradictions between many 
logics over time within a field. Goodrick and Reay (2011) have argued that mapping logics in 
constellations can help researchers see the ways in which logics do not just contradict but combine 
to guide behaviour. This view considers that logics are embodied in practices, and thus practices 
within one field may be informed by elements of many different coexisting logics. Certainly this is 
an interesting avenue for institutional theorising because it moves past the ‘one logic to another’ 
punctuated equilibrium model and begins to appreciate that there may be an on-going coexistence 
of logics and thus enduring contestation between actors within certain fields (Reay and Hinings 
2009). 
 
The above section has provided an overview of institutional research which has attempted to 
understand institutional entrepreneurialism by examining the structural embeddedness of actors 
and how, given this embeddedness, they may come to recognise opportunities for change. 
However, Mutch (2007) warns that institutional entrepreneur literature has a tendency to imply a 
rational-choice approach due to its focus on self-interest and calculative activity. Instead Mutch 
(2007) suggests that aside from recognising that an individual’s context within a contradictory social 
structure may provide opportunities to enact change, that individual also conducts an ‘internal 
conversation’ (Archer 2003) in which they reflect on moral considerations. As such the agent is not 
only embedded but ‘embodied’ with their personal reflexivity being symptomatic of an historical 
and dialectical interrelationship between themselves and their social contexts. Hence opportunity 
existence and recognition is primarily attributed to the contradictory nature of interactions 
between institutional logics which jolt actors out of their day-to-day rota and trigger a period of 
‘autonomous reflexivity’ (Mutch 2007) which can result in actors recognising and initiating change 
projects. 
 
Nevertheless, although logic contradiction as a result of expansion (Green and Suddaby 2006) or 
new State regulations (Reay and Hinings (2006), for example, may illuminate opportunities for 
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change projects, the literature has shown that actors often need to be in certain social positions in 
order to mobilise resources around their change project (Phillips et al 2004, Rao and Giorgi 2006). 
Additionally, the ability of actors to recognise opportunities for change may also be dependent on 
their level of embeddedness within a field. However, this section has been predominantly 
interested in how embedded actors may come to perceive of the potential for change, but does not 
explain how institutional entrepreneurs ‘negotiate social reality’ (Markowitz et al 2011 p.2). The 
following section reviews the body of literature which examines the processes employed by actors 
to theorise and diffuse their new ideas and operationalise their institutional change projects in light 
of the opportunities presented by structural contradictions.  
Processes of Institutional Entrepreneurship 
 
Institutional entrepreneurial projects involve an array of political and rhetorical struggles for 
securing the legitimacy of new practices (Leca et al 2008). Seo and Creed (2002) noted that 
contradictions do not cause change alone, but are supportive in adjusting political dynamics and 
undermining the hegemonic position of dominant groups. Consequently individuals may gain voice 
and access the resources necessary for political action. Nevertheless the image of a heroic 
entrepreneur single-handedly changing institutions is flawed and institutional entrepreneurs can 
seldom transform institutions alone (Leca et al 2008). Discursive and rhetorical strategies are 
necessary so that institutional entrepreneurs can access social capital, legitimacy and formal 
authority which may enable them to be taken seriously by other actors upon whom they depend 
(Fligstein 1997). Therefore this review will firstly define legitimacy before reviewing the role of 
rhetorical appeals and legitimation strategies in the diffusion of new theorisations. The discursive 
mechanisms under review are those which the literature considers as representative of agency. The 
review will then consider a re-engagement with concepts of rationality, suggesting that they 
provide a valuable means to relate discursive strategies and rhetorical appeals with institutional 
logics.  
Legitimacy and Rhetoric 
 
Leca et al (2008) noted that institutional entrepreneurship is predominantly a discursive strategy 
whereby the role of the entrepreneurial agent is to generate discourse aimed at reconstructing 
institutional environments. Nevertheless they also need to legitimate their proposed meanings and 
values to a wider audience. Discursive strategies are therefore also legitimation strategies which 
provide cognitive frames and alternative scripts in the hope of mobilising legitimacy for the practice 
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or meanings under negotiation. Generally it is accepted that there are three types of legitimacy 
which may be pursued (Suchman 1995, Deephouse and Suchman 2008): pragmatic, moral and 
cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy is based on rational evaluation, moral legitimacy is based on moral 
expectations and cognitive legitimacy is based on the ‘…taken-for-grantedness’ and 
comprehensibility of actions. Suchman (1995) proposes that, ‘All three types involve a generalised 
perception or assumption that organisational activities are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (p577). Institutional logic 
theory says that institutional logics define how legitimacy is to be judged by prescribing appropriate 
norms and conventions and by ‘…often specify[ing] extensive webs of causality, identifying some 
methodologies as “science” and others as “quackery”, regardless of isolated outcomes’ (Suchman 
1995 p.580).  
Hence, institutional entrepreneurs face a difficult challenge in reframing what is legitimate, often 
against taken-for-granted practices and symbolisms established by a dominant logic or assortment 
of logics. Suchman notes that ‘cognitive legitimacy’ is perhaps the most important element in 
legitimating an entrepreneurial project. This is because cognitive legitimacy requires audience 
comprehension which can only be garnered through consistency with larger belief systems and 
experienced reality (p.582). Indeed, this relates to the need for legitimating strategies to reflect the 
institutional environment because they rely on the recognised meanings, norms and practices 
within this environment to be comprehensible. Legitimating is therefore an important part of 
institutional entrepreneurship and discursive strategies employed in its pursuit often evoke 
particular rhetorical appeals in order to generate associations between the proposed change and 
alternative legitimate meanings.  
Rhetoric 
 
Rhetorically focused institutional studies assume that logics can be constituted through language 
and are incorporated into written texts via discursive and rhetorical strategies (Brown et al 2012). 
Rhetoric aims to manipulate the sources of legitimacy and thereby reflects deliberate political 
action towards either the status quo or change. In their seminal essay on legitimacy and rhetoric, 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) focus on the role of persuasive texts in manipulating cognitive 
legitimacy (p.40). They argue that contestations between logics are often ‘…a function of rhetoric 
in which the legitimacy of competing logics is openly debated’ (p.41). In these debates actors 
employ rhetorical strategies to ‘…connect elements of an existing or proposed form to broader 
cultural understandings in an effort to support or challenge the comprehensibility of an innovation’ 
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(p.41). The authors based their text analysis on three primary forms of persuasive appeals 
highlighted by classic rhetoric literature: ‘logos’ (appeals to logic), ‘ethos’ (appeals to emotion) and 
‘pathos’ (appeals to character). Additionally they note ‘kairos’ which is found in arguments sensitive 
to time.  
 
These forms of rhetorical appeal have been subsequently applied in more recent research. For 
example, Riaz, Buchanan and Bapuji (2011) observed rhetorical strategies in media accounts during 
the US financial crisis to understand whether actors were neutral, in support of change or favoured 
the status quo. They identified three strategies which they labelled ‘scenarios tell us’, ‘blame game’ 
and ‘expert knows best’. The first had sub categories related to time frames so that they may appeal 
to past, present or future, and tended to appeal to ‘logos’ or logic. The second created either a 
general or specific ‘them’ and ‘us’ narrative which appealed to ‘pathos’ or emotive reasoning. The 
third either directly or indirectly referred to an ‘expert’ and its appeals were based on ‘ethos’ or 
character. Their study illustrates that the media provide a fruitful platform with which to study 
rhetorical appeals to legitimacy and actor positions within complex debates. Additionally both 
studies explored above show how rhetorical appeals are closely linked to legitimation and 
discursive strategies which are themselves reflective of contestations between institutional logics. 
Thus if the multiple strategies at play within a text can be pinpointed, the nature of the logics 
underpinning them may be inferred.  
 
It should be noted that institutional logics are not merely evident in appeals to logos. Brown et al 
(2012) applied ethos, logos and pathos to a single text to understand how multiple logics made the 
rhetorical appeals of texts complex. Rational argumentation repertoires underpinning each logic 
were shown to be in tension with others when multiple logics were represented in a single text. 
This made it difficult for a text to convincingly support one logic over another on the basis of logos 
appeals, and therefore appeals to ethos and pathos became important. Unlike Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2005) (and informed by Aristotle) they suggest that ethos involves appeals to morals and 
ethics, whereas pathos includes appeals to emotion. They extend Riaz et al (2011) by explicitly 
attempting to link institutional logics with each appeal, arguing that logos has received the most 
attention in logics literature (implicitly), perhaps because the focus tends to be on the ‘logical’ 
prescriptions of logics, rather than their emotive or moral details. The research finds that in the 
context of multiple logics, ethos and pathos can be important appeals within a rhetorical campaign. 
Two strategies in particular were identified as ethos and pathos based appeals: humanisation and 
narritivisation respectively. The first appealed to a societal belief surrounding the moral worth of 
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youth, and the latter related to emotionally resonant stories. With an understanding of rhetorical 
appeals as key elements of discursive legitimation it is prudent to move on to legitimation strategies 
more generally which perhaps relate less explicitly to rhetorical appeals outlined above, yet still 
provide useful insights into the discursive legitimation pursued by agents.  
Legitimation strategies  
 
Humanisation and narritivisation strategies of Brown et al (2012) and Erkama and Vaara (2010) 
speak to a large and established body of work regarding discursive legitimation strategies (Kuronen 
et al 2005, Vaara et al 2006, Vaara and Tienari 2002, 2008). These papers propose that agents can 
‘play with discourse’ (Vaara et al 2006) and draw from research in ‘new rhetoric’ as explored above 
to understand  the role of discursive practices in the legitimation and ‘sensegiving’ (Vaara et al 2004 
p.10) involved during the legitimation of new institutional or organisational forms and practices. 
For example, Kuronen et al (2005) focused on the role of journalists and suggested that they 
confirmed existing presuppositions of the audience, enacting an essential process of the 
legitimation and naturalisation of management ideologies and ideas. Rhetorical constructions 
attempted to convince the audience of the organisational change (merger) through a mix of 
nationalistic and rationalistic legitimation strategies aimed at normalising change. Vaara and 
colleagues (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008) further refine the typologies of these strategies, proposing five 
distinct legitimation strategies: normalisation, authorisation, rationalisation, moralisation and 
narritivisation, similarly with a focus on the media as transmitter: ‘…these specific legitimation 
strategies appear in individual texts [and] their recurring use in the intertextual totality of the public 
discussion establishes the core elements of the emerging legitimating discourse’ (Vaara et al 2006). 
Rhetorical appeals may form or constitute elements of each of these strategies which construct or 
reconstruct senses of legitimacy (Suchman 1995).  
 
Vaara’s work is an extension of Van Leeuwen’s ‘grammar of legitimation’ wherein four general 
types of semantic-functional categories were proposed; authorisation, rationalisation, moral 
evaluation and mythopoesis. Authorisation is legitimation by reference to authority garnered from 
tradition, custom or law. Rationalisation is legitimation by reference to ‘…the utility of social action, 
and to the knowledge that society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity’ (Kuronen 
et al 2005 p.784). Moral evaluation to Van Leeuwen is akin to Vaara’s moralisation whereby 
legitimation refers to specific values, although he notes that rationalisation always has a moral basis 
and is therefore not as distinct from moralisation as it may first seem. Mythopoesis corresponds to 
Vaara’s narritivisation whereby legitimation is attempted through the telling of a narrative-type 
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construction providing some sort of drama that may demonstrate winners or losers, inevitability 
and causation. Finally, Vaara et al’s (2006) fifth strategy is normalisation which was previously 
understood by Van Leeuwen as a form of authorisation from tradition. However, for Vaara and 
colleagues normalisation ‘seeks to render something legitimate by exemplary’ (Vaara et al 2006 
p.798) and either retrospectively or prospectively renders something a ‘natural’ or ‘normal’. 
Therefore when attempting to uncover how and what institutional logics inform a large and 
complex debate it is integral to recognise the diversity and character of legitimating strategies so 
that their rhetorical appeals may be identified and their underlying assumptions known. However, 
it remains to be explained how actors develop these strategies given that such a process would 
need to be conceived of as an embedded practice. To understand the conception of legitimations 
strategies, notions of theorisation are drawn on and explored below.  
Theorisation 
 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) suggest that rhetorical strategies contain two elements; 
institutional vocabularies which represent ‘…the use of identifying words and referential texts to 
expose contradictory institutional logics’ (p.35) and theorisation ‘…by which actors contest a 
proposed innovation against broad templates or scenarios of change’ (p.35). Institutional 
vocabularies develop broad ‘discursive frames’ which include two processual dimensions: 
specification, and justification (Leca et al 2008). Specification is when an institutional entrepreneur 
frames a failure in a way that includes a diagnosis and causation with existing systems. For example, 
Reay et al (2006) showed how Nurse Practitioner advocates framed problems concerning reduced 
physician coverage in a way that fitted the desired solution, invoking the beneficial use of Nurse 
Practitioners to fill the gap in medical treatment supply. Justification is the process of promoting 
the new agenda in a way that de-legitimates the old institutional arrangements, thus allowing space 
for the ‘new way’. Essentially, ‘…proponents and opponents of…new form[s] coalesce into distinct 
discursive communities defined by their institutional vocabularies’ (Greenwood and Suddaby 2005 
p.47) and use these vocabularies to interpret and exploit contradicting institutional logics. As such, 
they are a key part of building legitimating strategies for institutional entrepreneurs in particular.  
 
Theorisation is the means by which these vocabularies are employed to justify new ideas by linking 
them to broader cultural schemas. Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) propose five types of 
theorisation which they label teleological, historical, cosmological, ontological and value-based. 
Shifts in logics are achieved by language and secured by rhetoric which modifies or displaces past 
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logics in order to encode new criteria of legitimacy. Contradictions or exogenous shifts in the 
institutional structure allow the ascendance of new logics which emerge amidst contestation which 
is enacted through actors’ skilled use of language and rhetoric (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). 
When the legitimacy of competing logics is openly debated, institutional vocabularies form one or 
more of these theorisations; that the change is part of a necessary grand plan (teleological), that 
there is an inherent incompatibility between organisational attributes thus requiring change 
(ontological), that the change is naturally occurring (cosmological), that the change is an 
unnecessary deviation from the past (historical) or that the change somehow correlates with 
normative, ethical and moral needs (value-based). Each theorization of change acts as a ‘…linguistic 
device by which actors manipulate the degree of uncertainty implied by an innovation’ (p.59). By 
connecting alternatives to cultural templates, theorisation can make new forms comprehensible by 
‘…naturalising some contradictions and suppressing others’ (p.59) and thus increases the 
intelligibility of change.  
 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2005) argue that the comprehensibility of cognitive legitimacy requires 
‘…active efforts to reshape dominant ideologies within an organizational field’ (p.37). Maguire et al 
(2004) recognise these ‘active efforts’ as the political mobilization of normative support by relating 
the new practices espoused by institutional entrepreneurs with the key values of different actors. 
As such, they propose that theorization is central to the process of institutional entrepreneurship 
because it is how actors assemble an array of arguments which frame problems and justify new 
solutions or practices they support in ways that resonate with a variety of different stakeholders to 
create a broad base of support. These framing theorizations can be vague in order to confer a 
‘flexible solution’ for the multiple actors involved. Maguire and colleagues (2004) also suggest that 
theorization can involve direct political bargaining and negotiations with community and industry 
representatives, during which new practices can be persuasively theorised as ‘…logical solutions to 
identified problems’ (p.671). In sum, the authors argue that the successful institutionalization of 
new practices relies upon ‘...attaching them to pre-existing organisational routines and by 
reaffirming their alignment with important stakeholder values on an on-going basis’ (p.672). This 
aligns with Rao, Monin and Durand’s (2003) use of theorisation to account for how individuals 
justify new identities in concordance with social movements by employing symbolic devices to 
connect new ideas to established cultural accounts.  
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Legitimacy and Rationality  
 
 ‘…what is rational depends on the institutional organisation of society’ (Townley 2008 p.97) 
Neo-institutionalism argues that the institutional environment informs what is accepted as rational 
and hence discursive strategies are likely to reflect how actors rationalise certain actions. Recent 
work on institutional rationality draws on Weberian theory in an attempt to move away from the 
older neo-institutional dichotomy between a rational technical environment and an ‘irrational’ 
institutional environment. Kalberg (1980) offers an accessible guide to Weber’s writings on 
rationality and argues that ‘…the “irrational” is not fixed and intrinsically “irrational” but results 
from the ideal-typical incompatibility of one ultimate constellation of values with another’ (p.1156). 
As Weber suggests, ‘…something is not itself “irrational”, but rather becomes so when examined 
from a specific “rational” standpoint’ (Kalberg 1980 p.1156 quoting Weber 1930). Kalberg identifies 
two central types of rationality; substantive and formal or instrumental rationality. Substantive 
rationality directly orders action into patterns on the basis of past, present or potential ‘value 
postulates’. As Biggart and Delbridge (2004) note ‘…actors often feel morally or emotionally bound 
to pursue the substantive goal’ (p.34). The alternative form of rationality often drawn upon is 
formal rationality which is based on means-ends calculations in reference to rules, laws or 
regulations and a rejection of distinct personalities. An action is formally rational if it is calculably 
determined to be the ‘best’ means towards an end and practically rational if it benefits self-interest 
and egoistic accomplishments (Kalberg 1980). More commonly found in the literature is the 
concept of ‘instrumental rationality’ which represents a combination of Weber’s practical and 
formal rationalities. Instrumentally speaking, an action is judged as rational when, upon the 
weighing up of all means, it is interpreted as the most practical and logical (Biggart and Delbridge 
2004 p.34).  
Institutional rationality has received scarce attention within recent institutional literature 
(Lounsbury 2007, 2008, Townley 2008). Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) initial neo-institutional thesis 
suggested that legitimacy was intrinsically linked to rational myths. So this begs the question, how 
does the institutional entrepreneurial project and concurrent legitimation relate to rationality? 
Initially neo-institutionalists maintained a separation between economic neo-classical rationality 
and an institutionally rational ‘irrationality’ (Townley 2008) whereby institutional isomorphic 
relationships led to ‘irrational’ passive adoption of practices and forms by those pursuing legitimacy 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1977). However, literature has moved on to an understanding that judging 
economical based action as ‘rational’ is flawed. As Lounsbury (2008) notes, Friedland and Alford 
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(1991) recognised that the dichotomy between the technical and institutional ‘…assumes an 
institution-free conception of interest and power, and maintains the materialist-idealist dualism in 
which actors have objective interests which can be understood independently of the actors’ 
understandings’ (p.352). Hence ‘…that which is ‘rational’ [is] determined by a wider institutional 
environment’ (Townley 2008 p.101). The institutional environment provides legitimating structures 
which, when taken-for-granted and institutionalised within a field, lead to the rationale of certain 
actions becoming lost. These actions subsequently appear as rational myths and are adopted 
because of their legitimacy rather than their efficacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Townley 2008).  
Nevertheless there is yet to be any clearly defined and accepted relationship between institutional 
logics, legitimacy and substantive or instrumental rationality within institutional theory, and only a 
handful of papers broach the subject directly. In 2002 Townley drew on Weber’s types of rationality 
to suggest that there are both multiple dimensions of rationality, as well as multiple domains in 
which they compete. She suggests that Weber’s ‘value spheres’ have their own normative 
obligations, patterns of action and ways of life defended as rational. These value spheres are 
relatively synonymous with institutional logics: ‘…the rationality of an action is thus conferred by 
its location within a broader institutional logic, and the framework of knowledge and belief sustains 
this’ (Townley 2008 p.97). Similarly, Glynn and Lounsbury (2005) propose that certain logics are 
more akin to certain types of rationality. In their study they argued that an aesthetic logic within 
the Orchestral world was predicated on a Weberian form of substantive rationality, whereas a 
market logic was more akin to the formal rationality of capitalist society (p.1037). Hence it seems 
the most prevalent approach is to argue that dominant institutional logics in a field prescribe the 
most salient dimensions of rationality. Therefore, institutional change as enacted through 
discursive battles or otherwise may bring to light the struggles between competing rationalities and 
contesting logics (Townley 2002). Indeed, Lounsbury’s (2008) conception that ‘…fields are 
comprised of multiple logics, and thus, multiple forms of institutionally based rationality’ (p.254) 
suggests that research on the creation of new organisational forms and new logics within a multi-
logic context could offer interesting insights into the development of different rationalities.  
Additional complexity was documented by Biggart and Delbridge (2004) who theorised that one 
societal domain or logic can comprise of multiple rationalities dependent on the actors creating it, 
which can lead to alternate ‘types’ of activity such as varying systems of exchange. Substantive 
rationality and instrumental rationality combine with universalistic and pluralistic types of social 
relations to create various ‘systems of exchange’ which typify alternate approaches to a market 
system. This approach suggests that ‘type of rationality’ is a characteristic of certain actor groups, 
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as are the social relations to be found in any group. Thus instead of seeing the rationality adopted 
by actors as a passive symptom of the institutional environment, it is possible to understand 
rationality type as an actor or field level predisposition which affects the way an institutional logic 
is operationalised and enacted. These rationality types are thus likely to be heavily reflected in the 
distinct institutional logics which guide the norms and conventions of discrete actor groups, which 
in turn could be identified by the discursive legitimation strategies employed by each group. 
Certainly it is thus plausible to suggest that institutional logics which reflect alternative forms of 
rationality may come into conflict if the multiple actor groups drawing on them come to be engaged 
in a single argument over the legitimacy of a contested practice. Hence ideas around the 
implications of contesting forms of institutional rationality seem to promise utility in understanding 
the underlying contradiction between institutional logics. Through close examination of an 
institutional logic, as made evident through material actions, symbolism and discourses, a 
researcher may unearth a prevalent rationality type embedded within its meaning structure which 
may help elucidate both its character and the reasons for why it may contradict another logic.  
Conclusion to Process Theories of Institutional Entrepreneurship 
 
In response to concerns that institutionalism provided oversocialised and structurally determinate 
accounts of organisational change, a wave of discursively orientated literature emerged offering 
theories pertaining to agency. Much of this work looked at how institutional entrepreneurs 
(DiMaggio 1991) both perceive of change from within institutionalised fields and pursue discursive 
strategies in order to legitimate and rationalise such change. Although useful for the analysis of text 
in particular, often process based studies focus on a single issue such as rhetorical appeals or 
legitimation strategies, and fail to give adequate explanation to the conceptual linkages between 
institutional concepts such as legitimacy, rhetoric and rationality. This review has tried to illuminate 
the often implicit relationships between the concepts. An understanding of each should facilitate a 
more thorough analysis of the theorisation and application of certain discursive strategies and how 
they relate to, and elucidate, contesting institutional logics. Nevertheless, although the literature 
reviewed above gives detailed accounts relating to the specifics of actor motivated institutional 
change it tends to focus on the ‘heroic’ institutional entrepreneur as the master of the change 
project. As such, it often fails to place its discursive strategies within a broader understanding of 
agency. Fortunately recent papers are engaging with the challenge of delineating broader theories 
of embedded agency and moving away from viewing the change agent as the hero battling against 
all odds.  
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Agents in Institutions 
 
There is a growing base of literature which understands the dialectic between institutional agency 
and structure as an on-going negotiation of institutional maintenance as well as change (Clegg, 
Courpasson and Phillips 2006, Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). There are three theoretical categories 
discussed here; translation, inhabited institutions and institutional work. The first recognises the 
role of multiple actors’ interpretations in the process of institutional change and places these actors 
in the centre of institutional analysis. The second concentrates on the continual negotiation of 
meanings within institutions, and begins to bring in actor knowledge, creativity and historically 
sourced knowledge. The third body of work recognises the role of actors in the maintenance, 
disruption and change of institutions, with a focus on creativity and intentionality. All approaches 
explored stress that ‘…institutions are not inert categories of meaning’ (Hallett and Ventresca 2006 
p.213) which structurally determine the daily lives of actors. Certainly this does not truncate the 
importance of previous literature, but reminds institutionalists that various actors may persistently 
negotiate, reinterpret or defend institutional rules consciously or otherwise. 
Translation 
 
Translation was brought into the realm of institutionalism most predominantly by Zilber (2002, 
2006). By diverting attention away from overly structural accounts, the approach conflates agency 
and structure by proposing that institutional logics are ‘carried’ by actors who may transform their 
meanings through interpretation, thus creating institutional change. More generally, the theory of 
translation is an inter-disciplinary concept which takes its influence from perspectives such as 
Actor-network-theory and related academics in the 1980s such as Serres, Callon and Latour (Brown 
2002). Early work by Serres focused on the passage traversed by a communication before it reached 
a ‘receiver’. This passage is subject to ‘noise’ which induces translatory effects (Brown 2002). 
Subsequently the focus moves to the receiver of institutionalised instruction: ‘Communication may 
be thwarted or betrayed by the medium through which it passes. But if we take the position 
downstream, at the point of destination rather than departure of the message, we may see this 
failure, this betrayal, as also the process of invention’ (Brown 2002 p.8). As such, the role of 
individuals as ‘institutional spectators’ (Lamertz and Heugens 2009) becomes empirically and 
analytically important. Authors within institutional theory have analysed the roles of many such 
spectators such as Securities Analysts (Zuckerman 1999), Culture critics (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005) 
and the popular press (Maguire and Hardy 2009). 
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There is also the recognition of continual institutional transformation. Czarniawska-Joerges and 
Sevon (1996) applied translation to institutional theory by looking at the transportation of ideas 
into action and institutions. Their proposition was that organisational change is continual due to 
on-going moments of translation. Translation occurs as ideas become quasi-objects, similar to social 
processes of objectification (Berger and Luckmann 1966), which then, if repetition occurs, may lead 
to action and the creation of institutions. A chain of translations occur as this image-idea-action-
institution process continually develops and consequently an idea becomes increasingly objectified. 
Interestingly, translation simultaneously creates variations as it reproduces social structures. To 
take from their example, fashion followers act differently in an attempt to act the same way. Others, 
such as Schultz and Wehmeier (2010) have alluded to the continual nature of translation which they 
argue is based on the constant struggle of actors to develop a more encompassing understanding 
of a concept such as CSR as a whole, while, at the same time implementing bits and pieces that they 
deem relevant.  
The ontological constructivism behind the theory of translation is the primary reason why its 
approach to agency is not adopted in this thesis. The constant nature of interpretation is certainly 
a valuable insight; yet recognising actors as carriers of institutional logics is problematic because 
they become undefinable and almost analytically fluid. In other words, by conflating agency and 
structure in this way the ontological purchase of institutional logics is lost and they become 
increasingly difficult to define as anything apart from interpretation. Literature on inhabited 
institutions provides more structural solidity upon which to base analysis.   
Inhabited Institutions 
 
Inhabited Institutions literature combines institutionalism with symbolic interactionism (SI) to 
explain micro level negotiations of meaning and institutional change. Hallett and Ventresca (2006) 
frame this re-engagement with interactionism as a response to the a-social micro level 
institutionalism which represented an ironic consequence of scholars attempting to ‘bring society 
back in’ via institutional logics. These authors note that institutional logics have been ‘…analytically 
removed from the more active struggles over meaning’ (Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch 2002). By 
drawing on Symbolic Interactionism the inhabited institutions approach illustrates how interactions 
organize social orders (see Hallett and Ventresca 2006) and engages more clearly with micro 
sociability and its links with institutions: ‘Organisations are not merely the instantiation of 
environmental, institutional logics “out there”, where workers seamlessly enact preconscious 
scripts valorised in the institutional environment… instead, they are places where people and 
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groups make sense of, and interpret, institutional “vocabularies of motive” and act on those 
interpretations’ (Binder 2007 p.551).  
Interestingly inhabited institutions literature considers the creative capacities of individuals with 
background knowledge and interests (Binder 2007, Levy and Scully 2007, Hallett and Ventresca 
2006, Scully and Creed 1997). Micro level social interactions are the arenas wherein such creativity 
is applied and thus where the meanings of institutions are constructed, albeit by agents drawing 
from institutional rules and norms which provide the raw materials and guidelines for such 
interactions. Consequently, ‘Institutions are not inert categories of meaning; rather they are 
populated with people whose social interactions suffuse institutions with local force and 
significance’ (Hallett and Ventresca 2006 p.213). This literature rejects that assumption that actors 
are ‘carriers’ of logics and instead suggests that they are active creators and adapters of practice 
(Binder 2007). For Binder (2007) actors are responsive to the institutional logics within their 
organisational spheres, and are thus embedded. But their derived ability to be creative with their 
institutional placement means that they can find themselves in an ‘institutional juncture’ (p.565) 
whereby the distance needed to play with the meanings of institutions creates an unsettled feeling 
of ambivalence towards what is considered appropriate. Her point is that actors are inventive within 
their contexts, and their institutional scripts are both guided by broader social systems as well as 
local meaning systems developed through political and meaningful interaction.  
Thus this perspective offers a novel means to understand and appreciate the role of micro level 
interactions within the socially defined contours of resource rich institutional logics. As Hallett and 
Ventresca (2006) note, ‘…a focus on inhabited institutions must not neglect the wider systems of 
meaning that provide, authorize and organize the elements of on-going activity’ (p.227). The focus 
on micro level meaning construction of both translation and inhabited institutions is certainly an 
important one and suggests that actor groups are prone to interpreting institutional structures in 
different ways. Additionally, the latter also holds agency and structure apart to recognise the 
structural boundaries facing actors. Delbridge and Edwards (2013) explored this facet by combining 
inhabited institutions theory with Critical Realism. They theorise that agents are reflexive in that 
they combine their past experiences with their assessments of situational circumstances. Past 
experiences are generated from exposure to and reflection on multiple institutional logics which, 
through social interaction, may lead to institutional variation and change. Interestingly, literature 
on institutional work has supplemented the insights from inhabited institutions literature by 
providing explanations for both unintentional and intentional change, and for institutional 
maintenance as well as change.  
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Institutional work 
 
In a reaction to the predominantly structural and hagiographic lens of institutional 
entrepreneurship, ‘Institutional work’ (Clegg et al 2006) looked to elucidate the day-to-day 
equivocal instances of agency with a focus on intentionality and effort (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 
2011). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) defined three broad types of institutional work; creating, 
maintaining and disrupting. Creating involves ‘political work’ whereby actors reconstruct rules and 
boundaries, reconfigure belief systems and alter abstract categorisations which in turn modify 
meaning systems. Disrupting involves work which disconnects rewards and sanctions from 
practices, technologies and rules in an attempt to disassociate practices from their moral and 
normative foundations by undermining the core beliefs and assumptions undergirding it. Finally, 
maintenance is achieved by continued adherence to rules and meaning systems and the ensured 
reproduction of existing norms and beliefs.  
The intentional dimension to institutional work implies that individuals actively engage in processes 
of institutional creation, maintenance and destruction in ways that speak to Emirbayer and 
Mische’s (1998) idea of ‘projective agency’. Actors may strategically and consciously reshape social 
situations when they are able to reflect on their embeddedness whilst acting within it and alongside 
it. Embedded actors thus retain a ‘…degree of latitude and choice in how they interpret the range 
of legitimate actions available to them’ (Lawrence et al 2011 p.54). In particular, institutional work 
as an agent-centric approach has been applied by academics studying the rhetorical and discursive 
strategies of institutional change. For example, Riaz et al (2011) found that emerging institutional 
work relating to the financial crisis was evident in broad rhetorical narratives which indicated the 
positions taken by actors. They suggested that actors’ application of rhetorical strategies depended 
on their positions as neutral, supportive of the status quo or in favour of change. Communicating 
positions is seen as a form of institutional work which can be geared towards creation, disruption 
and maintenance. Indeed, even rhetorical neutrality can be understood as a subtle form of 
institutional work in support of existing arrangements. Similarly Clegg et al (2006) argue that when 
creating change actors ‘use’ institutional logics to legitimate their own institutional projects by 
discursively linking logics’ cognitive and normative resources with the new practices they wish to 
legitimate. Such actions clearly relate to Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005) conception of 
theorisation types which involve the development of associations between new actions or practices 
and existing cultural templates. 
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It should be noted that a smaller body of literature has examined the types of institutional work 
involved in institutional maintenance (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, Zilber 2009). For example, 
Zilber (2009) theorises that an institution’s maintenance involves the reconstruction of an 
institutional order through story type narratives. Zilber states that forms of institutional work are 
used to carry, embed and translate societal meta-narratives into organisations and their members. 
In Zilber’s (2006) study of an Israeli rape crisis centre, institutional maintenance occurred because 
meta-narratives were ‘carried’ through recruitment and training practices which ensured that only 
certain institutions entered into the organisation. 
Institutional work also occurs at various levels of analysis (Lawrence et al 2011, Tracey et al 2010). 
Tracey et al (2010) outlined how institutional entrepreneurs carry out institutional work at the 
micro, meso and macro levels when creating and building new organisational forms (Table 1). Their 
study develops the concept of ‘bridging institutional entrepreneurship’ whereby actors pursuing 
institutional work combined aspects of two established institutional logics and their associated 
organising forms in order to create a hybrid logic which they then used to legitimate a new 
organisational form. Key dimensions of the bridging process represent various institutional work 
types at different levels of analysis: problem framing, counterfactual thinking [micro], building 
organisational templates, theorising those templates [meso], connecting with a macro level 
discourse and aligning with highly legitimate actors [macro] (p.5). Legitimating was predominantly 
carried out at the macro level; theorising of the organisational template distilled the ‘...essence of 
the organizational form to help actors used to operating according to different logics understand 
the new logic’ (p.13). Their framework therefore illustrates that a new logic cannot be developed 
and legitimated outside the sensemaking criteria of a priori incumbent logics. In other words, 
Tracey et al (Table 1) demonstrates that institutional work is bounded by and reliant upon the 
institutional structure in which actors are embedded. In particular, at the macro level institutional 
work involves re-articulating the new logic to embedded actors in ways which resonate with 
appropriate macro discourses, norms and conventions.  
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Table 1 Summary of a Multiple-level Institutional Work Framework 
Levels of analysis Institutional work Personal actions 
Micro Opportunity recognition, 
problematisations and 
framing: counterfactual 
thinking 
 Rooted in interest and experiences of 
institutional entrepreneur 
Meso Design new organisation 
form,  build an 
organisational template 
and theorise why it 
makes sense 
 Creativity and imaginations required – 
drew strategically on multiple logics 
Macro Legitimate new form, connect 
with appropriate macro 
discourse and align with 
legitimate actors 
Creative linguistic management needed 
Source: Tracey et al (2010) 
Tracey et al’s (2010) framework provides individuals with the theoretical capacity to transcend the 
totalising influence of institutions (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2011). Discursive strategies 
constitute the tools used to resist, challenge or conform to the pressures of the institutional 
environment. However, there is concern that this approach privileges the micro ‘bottom-up’ 
mechanisms of institutional change (Hwang and Colyvas 2011). Such a ‘reversal of causality’ (Hwang 
and Colyvas 2011 p.63) from earlier neo-institutional accounts may imply an under theorising of 
the interinstitutional context. In a similar vein Schildt, Mantere and Vaara (2011) suggest that ‘…a 
fuller understanding of institutional work requires analyses that link specific rhetorical strategies to 
broader logics of reasoning and prevailing discourses through which the abilities of arguments to 
stand out as justifications are established’ (p.83). They argue that the discursive manifestations of 
institutional work need to be considered more directly in the context of wider normative and 
cognitive restraints given that discursive work is a key part of institutional work. Additionally, 
Kaghan and Lounsbury (2011) claim that institutional work is too focused on agency and therefore 
suffers from methodological individualism. They advise institutional work theorists to consider 
insights from ‘…old institutionalism to inform a ‘methodological groupism’ approach which allows 
an understanding of the self and intentionality with reference to the ‘other’ and the ‘generalised 
other in which the acting individual is embedded’ (p.75). All criticisms above have a common 
reproach in that they recognise that an effort is still required to synchronise debates on 
intentionality and institutional work with the contextual accounts of institutional logics and 
‘…multiple social and technical structures at all levels’ (Kaghan and Lounsbury 2011 p.76). There is 
still a requirement to appreciate the linkages between all levels of institutional analysis so that 
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macro dynamics of the field are understood in conjunction with the lived experience and work of 
actors.  
Institutional Complexity: Connecting the Levels  
 
Recent fascination with discursive and rhetorical based approaches to understanding the micro-
processes of institutional change has led to a body of institutional literature which has disengaged 
somewhat from macro and structural considerations. This is perhaps symptomatic of an academic 
migration away from the older structurally centred models of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). The micro level focus of newer literature is not fundamentally 
problematic, but creates a literature gap for further research into the links between institutional 
work and the societal intra-institutional system. As Friedland and Alford (1991) note, agents ‘…live 
across institutions’ (p.42) and thus do not reside in a small fortified and isolated institutional 
domain. There is thus space for institutional literature to examine how broader and multiple 
institutional logics manifest within the more local worlds of actors. Indeed Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury (2012) suggest that field-level logics ‘…are both embedded in societal-level logics and 
subject to field level processes that generate distinct forms of instantiation, variation and 
combination of societal logics’ (p.148). Literature on institutional complexity has made some 
headway here. The term ‘complexity’ refers to the multiplicity of institutional pressures and logics 
enacting and interacting through actors engaged in their empirical context. Recent papers on 
complexity have highlighted the multivocal nature of institutional contexts and how actors affected 
by multiple logics tend to respond in different though patterned ways (Greenwood et al 2011, 
Delbridge and Edwards 2013). This section will first outline complexity before examining research 
which has considered the relationship between macro institutional structures and micro actions. It 
will conclude that an understanding of field or industry based ‘situated’ logics provides a means to 
understand the emergent and manifest outcome of the interactions between actors and societal 
logics.  
 
Greenwood et al (2010) provided a recent delineation of institutional complexity. The authors 
conducted a multiple level study which examined how the reaction of companies to an overarching 
market logic was mediated by historical state and family logics. The interactions of these logics at 
various levels led to community level idiosyncrasies which were important in understanding the 
motivations behind the resistance to or advocacy for institutional change. Greenwood and 
colleagues found that non-market logics of the state, religion and of family act at the community 
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level to affect business responses to market contexts. The findings illustrate that individuals who 
inhabit organisations are members of multiple institutional fields with many conflicting and 
coexisting institutional logics. Consequently, the legitimacy of an action is not only dependent on 
the dominant logic of a single field, but alternative logics from other fields have mediating effects 
which leads to institutional complexity. Although this stirs up questions regarding the construction 
and porosity of field boundaries, it begins to build a more complete and complex picture of the 
interactions between societal logics outside the field and those within it. Indeed studies in 
complexity work towards overcoming Delbridge and Edward’s (2007) concern that ‘…work at the 
micro level has struggled to locate and embed agency in the wider institutional and organizational 
contexts’ (p.193).  
This thesis draws certain lessons from the institutional complexity literature. Primarily it recognises 
that logics may mediate the implications of other logics at the field level, and that this mediation 
can seemingly create a degree of agency which may manifest as resistance (Greenwood et al 2010). 
Additionally it notes the need to explore not only logics identified within a field, but also those 
which exist externally but impact actors within that field nonetheless. Indeed, such ‘external’ logics 
have been identified as important by theorisation and legitimation literature which often points to 
the existence of ‘broader meaning systems’ to which new theorisations are linked.  
Field Externalities and Institutionalisation 
 
Literature on institutional work and entrepreneurship has shown that contradictory and contesting 
logics offer the resources needed for actors to begin discursively building comprehensible change. 
This comprehension comes from the alignment of new forms and practices with historically 
expected and embedded institutional arrangements. For example, actor theorisation draws on 
alternative logics to encode new criteria of legitimacy by connecting new forms to already accepted 
cultural templates. There are two streams of institutional literature which stand out as having 
offered ways in which to conceptualise institutional change as a result of the dynamics between 
societal logics and field level actors. The first is literature on the legitimating of new organisational 
forms, and the second is the literature on institutional change facilitated by social movements. Both 
rely on the assumption that ‘…Institutional entrepreneurs creatively manipulate social relationships 
by importing and exporting cultural symbols and practices from one institutional order to another’ 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008 p.115).  
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Researchers studying the emergence of new organisational forms often identify institutional ‘tools’ 
residing outside of a field to explain how actors can be both embedded and able to create new 
institutionally legitimate forms (Tracey et al 2010, Markowitz et al 2011, Rao and Giorgi 2006, 
Lounsbury, Ventresca and Hirsch 2002). These authors try to elucidate how institutional 
entrepreneurs conduct institutional work during a legitimation project through which they hope to 
combine meaning systems from internal and external social realities. For example, in their 2012 
book on institutional logics, Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury argued that cultural entrepreneurship 
can involve the ‘blending’ of logics through the segregation of ‘elemental categories of different 
institutional orders’ (p.107). Segregated elements of orders can then become blended with others 
to develop novel institutional forms (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). In essence, institutionally 
innovative behaviour works towards and is motivated by the recombination of institutional 
meanings whereby an ‘element’ of an institutional order may be isolated from its previous 
institutional moorings and transposed into a new institutional space (Thornton, Ocasio and 
Lounsbury 2012): ‘…individuals and organizations connecting segregated groups are influenced to 
a greater extent by alternative ways of thinking and behaving. This reveals opportunities to 
synthesise novel combinations of ideas and borrow ideas that may have been commonplace in one 
community for implementation in another context where they are more valued or valued in a 
different way’ (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury 2012 p.110)  
 
Additionally Rao and Giorgi (2006) studied how actors deployed pre-existing logics to forward their 
own institutional projects. They ‘…liken institutional innovation to code-breaking’ (p.270) whereby 
the code-like character of ambiguous cultural logics is challenged by both insiders and outsiders of 
a bounded social system who either exploit an existing logic or import an alternative logic from 
another social system. The possibility to re-institutionalise an institutional project also depends on 
structural factors such as political opportunity and the ability to mobilise resources. Markowitz et 
al (2011) builds on Rao and Giorgi (2006) to argue that institutional entrepreneurs are members of 
multiple fields and use existing institutional logics from various fields to legitimate themselves as 
innovators (p.3): ‘…if we conceptualise organisations as populated by individuals who exist in 
multiple organisations, then we view these individuals as accessing institutional logics from multiple 
fields’ (p.4). Hence actors are simultaneously inside and outside of an organisational field, rather 
than being in one or the other as implied by Rao and Giorgi (2006). Markowitz and colleagues (2011) 
propose that institutional entrepreneurs gain legitimacy in three consecutive ways; they draw on 
an existing logic by adopting its rational myths and ceremonies in order to delineate their general 
being; they then use ‘boundary framing’ to distinguish themselves from other actors in the field by 
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integrating outside frames and emphasising their commitment to these; finally, they use framing 
strategies of these ‘outside actors’ such as social movements, to motivate and mobilise those 
sympathetic to the outsider’s frames.  
 
Rao, Monin and Durand (2005) considered how a social movement affected the French fine cuisine 
movement. They examined how the institutional logics changed within French gastronomy by 
exploring how individuals identified with the Nouvelle cuisine social movement. They argue that 
social movements shift the dominant logic in a field by defining new roles and identities (Meyer and 
Hammerschmid (2006). Institutional contradictions caused by social movements therefore occur at 
the level of identity: ‘…social identity is the link between institutional logics and individual 
behaviours…our study shows how identity movements create institutional gaps by highlighting 
defects at the immediate and proximal level of identities rather than at the abstract and distal level 
of logics’ (p.835). Meyer and Hammerschmid’s paper shows how identity movements encapsulated 
within social movements oppose previous cultural codes, aspire for cultural change and thus 
promote new institutional logics. It is also interesting how the authors relate the nouvelle 
movement to the developing zeitgeist of post-revolutionary France and the societal change 
pervasive within the broader national context, including the literary and film worlds: ‘Nouvelle 
cuisine arose because an initiator movement exposed the mutability of the logic of classical cuisine 
and surfaced tensions between the logic of classical cuisine and the new logics that were being 
established in cognate fields such as literature, drama and film’ (p.808).   
 
More recently Sine and Lee (2009) have provided an environmentally focused institutional paper 
examining the role of social movements in propagating cognitive frameworks. They argue that 
societal level forces such as Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) can disrupt institutional 
arrangements by embedding their values into regulatory structures. In so doing they create new 
supportive contexts for entrepreneurial activity. The paper specifically studies the US wind energy 
sector between 1978 and 1992 and observes how a social movement attempted to overturn 
previous conceptions of wind technology as ‘expensive’ ‘uncertain’ and ‘risky’. Sine and Lee propose 
that the geographical variation in wind farm construction was not down to efficiency, but more 
attributable to the influence of SMOs in particular areas. SMO’s engaged in institutional work 
through problematizing issues and theorizing wind energy solutions, they then mobilised their 
membership to promulgate new frames whilst providing a social infrastructure through which 
information could flow. Via this process the SMOs created a ‘…coherent and resonant “renewable 
energy frame” that simultaneously delegitimated the use of oil, coal and nuclear fuels… and 
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valorised more benign inputs such as wind, photovoltaic, geothermal and biomass’ (p.135). Indeed 
this is a clear example of a societal environmental logic becoming embedded within a field 
previously unrelated. However, whilst implying that SMOs created specific frames for the US energy 
industry in their pursuit of legitimating wind power, Sine and Lee, as well as the previous scholars 
explored above (bar Rao, Monin and Durand 2005) pay little attention to how the process of field 
level manifestation impacts the nature of the institutional logic. Indeed this oversight may be 
symptomatic of a lack of theorising around the connections between actors, fields and societal 
logics. The following section looks to develop the conceptualisation of ‘situated logics’ which 
appreciates the relationship between processual and structural theories of agency discussed earlier 
and the more macro and societally focused literature explored here.  
Conceptualising  Situated Logics 
 
There is yet to be an accepted and clarified approach to understanding how societal logics come to 
be manifest within organisational fields. Although institutional research has moved away from 
oversocialised and structural determinate accounts of institutional change towards more agency 
based research agendas, there remains a tendency to understand field level logics as abstracted 
and isolated from ‘wider and higher’ institutional structures. By combining agency based theories 
such as institutional work and the processual accounts of institutional entrepreneurship with 
structural literatures which focus on the societal institutional context and the fractures and 
contradictions therein, it is possible to construct a view of embedded agency which recognises the 
interconnectedness of institutional levels of analysis.  
 
This thesis therefore proposes the concept of ‘situated logics’ to understand the dynamic between 
institutional levels of analysis. Actors are embedded within a societal level interinstitutional system 
(Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton and Ocasio 2008) but this environment does not scientifically 
diffuse (Zilber 2002) into organisational fields in a way which guarantees passivity and deterministic 
adoption of forms and practices. Actors are constantly engaged in institutional work, interpretation 
and creativity which affect the ways in which societal institutional logics become manifest within a 
field. Situated logics develop through the localised manifestation of those broader logics, either 
passively informing or offering the ‘tools’ for actors to actively reengineer how such logics inform 
practice and action within a given industry. Given that actors are embedded within fields as well as 
within societal institutional systems, their ability to perceive and mobilise institutional change is 
dependent on structural conditions, yet the form in which the logic manifests at field level is an 
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outcome of the meaningful conditions of the field and the interests of the actors engaging with 
projects for change. Such situated institutionalised values echo the unique historical and expressive 
characteristics of the field as understood by constitutive actors. There are likely to be multiple 
situated logics within a field, and their character is likely to mediate how external logics are 
perceived (Greenwood et al 2011) or, alternatively, come to be manifest within the field itself.  An 
institutional work framework (Tracey et al 2010) can be applied to understand the role of agency 
in the situating and manifestation of situated logics, as well as their maintenance and disruption. 
As such a ‘situated logic’ is defined as: 
 
The localised manifestation of a societal logic within a specific community of actors whose 
institutional context and history has implications upon the nature of the situated logic, and 
for whom the situated logic informs perspectives of legitimacy and delineates values, 
norms and conventions which align in some way with the societal logic from which it draws 
its coherence and ultimate purpose.  
In Summary 
 
The review has outlined the direction of institutional literature over the past few decades and has 
identified a number of shortcomings within institutional theory which are yet to be resolved. The 
body of work around institutional entrepreneurship has provided many fascinating insights into 
why and how embedded agency is enacted. Structural approaches which focus on logic 
contradiction, social position and embeddedness have illustrated that structural conditions provide 
opportunities for actors to recognise the possibility for change, but that they also must have the 
political power and the resources necessary to enact such change. More processual accounts have 
shown the micro-sociological detail of such enactment. Through discursive strategies and meaning 
based work agents may diffuse their own theorisations in order to rationalise and legitimate a 
change project. Theories such as translation, inhabited institutions and institutional work have 
provided broader agency based frameworks from which to study the discursive actions of agents. 
Whilst agent based literature has boomed there has also been a move towards understanding 
institutional complexity and the plurality of institutional logics. This body of work has revealed that 
multiple logics interact at various levels of analysis and may affect how actions are perceived at the 
field level. However, it remains unclear how findings from micro based studies fit with their field 
and societal level counterparts. There still seems to be little inclination for field level studies in 
particular to delineate the origins of their field level logics. Additionally there is a lack of research 
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which illustrates how societal logics external to a field come to be manifest within them as a result 
of agency (bar the social movement and new organisational form literature) .  
 
This literature review has forwarded the concept of a situated logic to overcome the shortcomings 
outlined above. As an analytical concept, situated logics provide this thesis with the tools necessary 
to unearth the relationships between embedded actors, field level logics and higher-order societal 
logics. Theory explicated within the literature reviewed throughout the chapter provides many 
accompanying resources to understand both discursive behaviour at the agentic level and structural 
opportunities at the societal level. Additionally institutional work (Tracey et al 2010) provides a 
broader framework from which to study the relationship between embedded agency and societal 
logics. As such, the research questions outlined below speak to both the research gaps highlighted 
throughout the chapter as well as to the ontological dynamic between agency and structure within 
institutional analysis. All research questions relate to the broader research objective of explaining 
the green paradox of nuclear power.  
 
Research Question 1 
 What is the relationship between institutional levels of analysis?  
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ provide insights into the interactions 
between agents, fields and societal logics? 
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ help explain the green paradox of nuclear 
power? 
 
Research Question 2 
 What role do actors play in the development of ‘situated logics’? 
o How can an institutional work approach be utilised to fully understand the role of 
agency in the construction and/or reinforcement of situated logics? 
o To what extent can processes of institutional entrepreneurship help elucidate the 
manifestation, elaboration and institutionalisation of situated logics? 
o How do the actions of actors contribute to the creation of a green paradox? 
 
A third research question will be developed in the following chapter which explores the utility and 
necessity of recognising a societal level environmental institutional logic as part of the 
interinstitutional system.  
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Chapter 3: An Environmental Logic 
An Environmental Societal Logic 
 
Organisational Theory (OT) has the potential to move beyond a conceptualisation of the natural 
environment as a purely objective resource. Sine and Lee (2009) suggest that ‘…the social and 
cognitive processes by which resources and products take on value are understudied…and much of 
contemporary organizational theory assumes that resources are objective realities’ (p.151) which 
may account for why the socially constructed element of the natural environment is rarely 
approached within OT. However, in the past decade there has been an increase in sociological 
theorising which extends a ‘social nature’ and encapsulates an understanding that nature is not 
merely a resource, but is also socially constructed by society in ways that lead to variety in 
perspectives and attitudes towards the environment (Egri and Pinfield 1996). This thesis argues that 
there is an opportunity for organisational scholars to adopt this movement in sociology and move 
away from the ‘…OS [Organisational Studies] ideas of organisational environment [which] are 
narrow, economistic, and anti-naturalistic’ (Jennings and Zandbergen 1995 p.711) and towards a 
more subjective understanding of the environment and its relationship with organisations and 
industries.  
 
In particular, institutional theory provides an interesting field in which to consider ‘social nature’, 
or rather the socialised and subjective understandings of nature, because of its interest in the 
division between material and institutional environments (Scott et al 2000). Considering a social 
dimension to the natural environment moves the conceptualisation of nature away from the purely 
objective and towards an approach which embraces its material, social and institutional 
characteristics. Understanding can be enhanced by accepting that perceptions of the natural 
environment should be considered as organised and informed by a societal logic which should be 
included within Friedland and Alford’s (1991) intra-institutional framework. This is in response to 
organisational theorists who demand a re-conceptualisation of the ‘...organisational environment 
in a way that gives centrality to the natural environment’ (Shrivastava 1994 p.705) and resonates 
with academics who promote the need to make ‘…environment’ a more inclusive signifier within 
organizational studies, particularly given that organizations are responsible for the majority of 
natural capital depletion (Jennings and Zandbergen 1995).  
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This chapter will examine the different paradigms defined within social science and how they 
provide different ways of analysing the human-nature relationship. Such descriptions will be used 
to understand why nature has been omitted for so long within organisational studies. Indeed, the 
construction of an environmental institutional logic is inherently a matter of nature’s epistemology; 
to what extent is nature a known objective entity and to what extent may it be construed as an 
institutional construct? It is argued that all human understandings of what is ‘nature’ are subjective 
and crucially mediated by social and cultural assumptions, practices and belief systems (Goldman 
and Schurman 2000). In other words, the natural environment is given a social form which 
recognises that understandings of nature are mediated by institutional rules and norms which 
denote what nature represents and thus what it is to be environmentally friendly. Examples from 
both institutional and sociological work will be presented in order to develop and justify a societal 
environmental institutional logic.  
Anthropological Beginnings: Objectifying Nature 
 
The lack of theorising around the natural environment within organisational theory prior to the 
1970s has in part been attributed to the anthropocentric bias of the social sciences (Shrivastava 
1994, Purser et al 1995). Anthropocentrism, as suggested by Purser et al (1995) is an ontological 
position which is founded on the perception that there is a fundamental polarization between 
organisations and the natural environment which generates a code of ethics towards nature that 
undermines its moral relevance. In other words, anthropocentrism marginalises the moral 
significance of the environment by ontologically distinguishing it from the central role of humankind 
and its organisations. During the 1970s sociologists Dunlap and Catton (see Dunlap and Catton 
1979) published a series of articles which examined why the natural environment was largely 
omitted from sociological inquiries. They contended that sociology was composed of ‘minor 
variants of the same paradigm; the ‘human exemptionalist paradigm’ (Goldman and Schurman 
2000 p.563). Much like the ‘dominant social paradigm’ wherein man is seen to have a ‘divine right’ 
to tame the chaos that is ‘nature’ (Egri and Pinfield 1996), this paradigm linked many theories by 
their common trait of anthropocentrism whereby humanity’s role is to maintain dominion over that 
which is earthly and natural. As Goldman and Schurman (2000) note, this common conception of 
the natural environment accepts a great divide between nature and society which treats nature as 
a discrete and external object of study.  
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The separation of human minds from the physical world within which they exist is a cornerstone of 
much social science theorizing given its basis in the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter (Egri and 
Pinfield 1996, Gladwin, James and Tara-Shelomith 1995): ‘...Led by Descartes, philosophers had 
begun to formulate a new conception of nature as intricate, impersonal, and an inert machine’ 
(p.39). Indeed, Goldman and Schurman (2000) understand the lack of ecological sociology, 
especially before the 1970s, as a consequence of 17th Century Enlightenment ontology which 
treated nature as ‘…primordial, autonomous and mechanistic’ (Goldman and Schurman 2000 
p.564). Purser et al (1995) further suggests that this dualistic thinking and anthropocentric 
tendencies have been reinforced by three sociological inclinations; linear vision perspectives, a 
‘camera theory of knowledge’ and, as mentioned, the socially constructed categorical separation 
between humans and nature. Briefly, the linear vision perspective was an artistic and scientific tool 
developed during the Renaissance whereby the observer viewed the world as if from a fixed 
vantage point. According to Purser et al (1995) this perspective was a precursor to scientific 
conceptualisations of the environment where the landscape became merely “geometry of the eyes” 
(p.1056) and actors located themselves at the centre of the natural world through a detached form 
of inquiry. The camera theory of knowledge followed the linear view and was evident during the 
Enlightenment when researchers were attempting to gather ‘truths’ about the environment 
through unobtrusive measurement and observation: ‘Behind the lens of the camera, a certain habit 
of mind was also formed – a detached, disembodied, and neutral observer – a recorder of events’ 
(Purser et al 1995 p.1057). The combination of these factors produced a spectator epistemology 
whereby the natural world became merely an ‘object of vision’ in accordance with the ‘hegemony 
of the eye’ (p.1056). Understandably these paradigmatic foundations have influenced the approach 
of organisational theory to the natural environment given its theoretical roots in sociology, 
psychology and economics.  
Organisational Theory and Nature  
 
Gladwin et al (1995) argues that the paucity of attention to the biophysical world in management 
theory makes it appear as if organisations lack any biophysical foundation, thereby disassociating 
them from the basic sources of life upon which they are reliant. Similar to their critique of sociology, 
Gladwin et al (1995) and Purser et al (1995) attribute this disassociation to management and 
organisation theory’s contemporary manifestations of anthropocentrism. Purser et al (1995) refer 
to these manifestations as ‘technoknowledge’ and ‘egocentric orientation’. The former privileges 
technological knowledge discourses in a way which emphasises utilitarian functionalism and 
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marginalises any subjective view of nature by dismissing it as mere sentiment. The latter expresses 
the ultimate purpose of nature as a natural treasure trove for exploitation and optimization. These 
manifestations may explain why much work on the environment tends to lead to the development 
of management strategies which base their success on definitions of progress such as profit 
maximisation (Shrivastava 1995).  
 
As such, research engaging with environmental issues within organisational and management 
theory tend to provide functionalist approaches which further the perception that organisational 
theory should be proposing strategies to control the natural resource environment. Consequently 
Newton and Harte (1997) note that ‘…at a theoretical level, writers on environmental strategy tend 
to simply rewrite the corporate strategy literature in environmental terms’ (p.87). Additionally 
academic papers provide methods through which companies can achieve sustainability through 
processes of adaption to the natural environment (Jennings, Zandbergen and Martens 2002). These 
environmental papers explicate guidelines which have transformed from specialised and situated 
programmes to rationalised and standardised practices for all organisations. For example, TQEM 
(Total Quality Environmental Management) and life cycle analysis are among the most common 
(Shrivastava 1995, Jennings et al 2002). As such, organisational theorists tend to treat the natural 
environment as a controllable system, reinforcing its objectivity and thereby hindering more 
epistemologically challenging research agendas. The following section examines the sociological 
movement away from these objectivist and resource-centric accounts of the environment and 
towards an understanding of nature’s socially constructed elements.  
Introducing an Ecological Paradigm 
 
The movement away from the ‘dominant social paradigm’ (Purser et al 1995 p.1054) has been led 
by a handful of sociologists who understand a distinction between theorists who externalise nature 
and comply with the metaphysical polarity between nature and humanity, and theorists who do 
not. This work has spring-boarded from Dunlap and Catton’s (1979) renowned call for an ‘ecological 
paradigm’ to overcome the chauvinisms of the one previous: ‘…the environment should not be 
introduced as just another new variable or theme, but as a radically new way of thinking about 
society’ (Goldman and Schurman 2000 p.564). Their request echoes the tensions between recent 
scholars who believe that nature and social organisation are inseparable and intertwined, and 
‘traditionalists’ who impose ‘…an enduring conflict between the logic and dynamics of natural 
ecosystems and those of industrialised society which prevent any meaningful synthesis at either 
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practical or theoretical levels’ (Egri and Pinfield 1996 p.460). The ecological paradigm implies that 
the inextricably intertwined nature of markets and ecosystems means that organisational actions 
have far deeper reaching consequences on societies: ‘…ecosystems support economies, not the 
other way around’ (Daly and Cobb 1994 quoted in Jennings and Zandbergen 1995 p.1015).   
 
However, this ‘ecocentrism’ is criticised as failing to adequately address social pathologies and 
therefore depreciates the importance of humans by subordinating them to nature (Gladwin et al 
1995). Additionally, ecocentric approaches may still consider the natural environment as an 
externality, meaning that the ontological conditions which have in the past been blamed for the 
marginalisation of environmental issues have not been reconsidered within the realms of 
organisational theory. Indeed, there is an ambiguity around what an ‘ecological paradigm’ means; 
does it mean functional consideration of the environment at all times, or does it represent a 
fundamentally new approach to considering the nature and human relationship? Castree and Braun 
(2001) answered this question by suggesting that both technocratic and ecocentric perspectives 
are non-social in their descriptions of nature and therefore the ecological paradigm continues to 
reinforce the functional consideration of nature: ‘…it is this notion of a non-social nature that 
underpins the familiar geographical vocabularies of societies ‘impacting upon’, ‘interfacing with’, 
or ‘destroying’ environments’ (Castree 2001 p.13). The basic assumption of ecocentric work is thus 
that ‘…alignment between environmental strategy and organizational culture, capabilities and 
competences in general are conducive to improved environmental performance’ (Etzion 1997). 
However, institutionalism offers scope to engage more fully with the concept of ‘social nature’.  
Institutionalism and Nature 
 
Institutional theory offers the means to contemplate themes often considered objective by 
understanding that the meanings of each are inscribed in institutional prescriptions that exist within 
the realms of an institutional environment (Scott 1995). For example, the concept of an objective 
market is problematised by understanding that a market consists of socially constructed 
institutional prescriptions of how it should be structured and enacted (Biggart and Delbridge 2004). 
Hence, there is scope to overcome the stifling externalisation of the natural environment by 
recognising that societies’ approaches to nature are prescribed by meaning systems residing within 
the institutional environment. However, in spite of the ubiquity of the natural world and its effect 
on the way organisations make sense of their surroundings ‘…current institutional theory does not 
focus much of its explanatory effort on the constraints imposed by the physical or natural world on 
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the construction of reality or instilling value (Jennings and Zandbergen 1995 pp.1041-2). 
Institutionalism is well equipped to deal with the social and normative character of the natural 
environment, but its roots within management science and sociology hold it to the approaches 
discussed previously. Indeed, the previous discussion has illustrated the dismissal of nature as 
something which lies ‘beyond’ social scientists. Hence, to allow for nature to become a part of the 
institutional environment the mind-set which separates nature from the social world needs to be 
problematised and overcome. 
 
This is not to say that institutional studies ignore the existence of the environment because of their 
ontological predisposition, but rather that the few studies that do contend with environmental 
issues refer to the environment in a way that implies its ‘otherness’. For example, Maguire and 
Hardy (2009) discuss the translations of problematisations involving the use of DDT brought about 
through environmental discourse surrounding issues raised in Rachel Carson’s (1962) book Silent 
Spring. However, they avoid any analysis of societal level changes in perceptions of the natural 
environment which may have precluded the deinstitutionalisation of DDT usage; perhaps 
institutional change regarding what was ‘environmental’ was affecting the legitimation of the 
emergent anti-DDT discourse and facilitating the survival of problematisations as they underwent 
translation. In other words, what did the voluntary abandonment of DDT say about perceptions of 
the environment? The paper side-lines any interest in the social understandings of the natural 
environment. Rather the environment is viewed as the stable scenery to the institutional change 
being viewed.  
Similarly Hoffman (1999) examined the development of an organisational field around the issue of 
corporate environmentalism and asked how field level research could illuminate the institutional 
origins of organisational approaches to the natural environment. For Hoffman, ‘…fields become 
centres of debates in which competing interests negotiate over issue interpretation’ (p.351). The 
meaning of corporate environmentalism was shaped by the social dynamics and debates found 
during processes of field-level reconstruction. The constituents of fields continually change as 
members join and leave, and as the field alters new institutions enter and are redefined to reflect 
the interests of the newly formed field. Thus, over the period 1960-1993 there was continual 
redefinition of corporate environmental practice within the US chemical sector. In both studies 
explored above the socially constructed element are the strategies pertaining to the environment, 
not the environment itself. As such, the legitimacy of management approaches in relation to the 
natural world are affected by institutional pressures, but that environment itself remains a fixed 
and taken-for-granted consideration.   
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Fineman (2001) argues that greening is adopted in light of strong societal surges despite its minimal 
rationality and attractiveness from an industrial point of view. The question he asks is whether or 
not ‘Greening’ is a management fashion and focuses on the ways in which moral entrepreneurs 
‘sell’ the rhetoric as pragmatic. Interestingly, the author draws on ‘environmentalism’ as a mentality 
inspired by ideals of harmonious human residence with natural systems, which resonates with an 
ecocentric mind-set and a conception that the strategies of ‘environmentalism’ represent a social 
view of how the environment should be understood. The author further mentions ‘other voices’: 
‘…the green wave in society is a broad one, and various professions and special interest groups 
tangle with each other to promote their different green ways’ (p.23) suggesting a variation in the 
social meaning of the natural environment. Fineman surmises that the societal surge in green 
awareness continues to become institutionalised in legal, Governmental and educational 
institutions, yet industrial sectors struggle to ‘…embrace more than the lighter trappings of 
greening’ (p.27). This study therefore suggests that organisations have a pragmatic and distant 
relationship with the natural environment and that the roles and actions of stakeholders and 
consultant ‘moral entrepreneurs’ steer them a safe passage through ‘green irritants’. However, it 
also implies that environmental ideas are varied and constructed by organisations in ways that may 
re-tune institutional structures. Interestingly, this illustrates the mediating role of organisations in 
re-organising what it means to be ‘green’ via displays of corporate power. Consequently, Fineman’s 
approach provides the closest example of an institutional understanding of the natural 
environment.  
Nature and the Institutional Environment 
 
The studies explored above illustrate an implied assumption that what is meant by 
‘environmentalism’ can vary between organisations within fields. This suggests that what is 
‘environmental’ is institutionally conditioned to some extent. However, this is often seen as a re-
engineering project by corporations or ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Fineman 2001) who employ 
pragmatic logics to re-frame a corporate environmental practice. As such, environmentalism is a 
practice whose meaning changes, not an institutionally conditioned way of thinking. To do the latter 
would be to imply its existence within the institutional environment and ontologically alter its 
current position, which is precisely the agenda of the following sections of the chapter. The aim is 
to recognise the socially constructed character of the natural environment in order to argue that 
this construction is informed by cultural and symbolic ‘rules’ which reside within the institutional 
environment. These rules are symptomatic of a higher order environmental institutional logic which 
informs actors and organisations on what the natural environmental represents and thus what 
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constitutes environmentally friendly behaviour. This is not about delineating an ecological 
paradigm, but rather to appreciate that the natural environment is mediated by institutionalised 
meaning systems. To begin theorising an environmental logic this thesis has drawn on a relatively 
new area of sociology which examines the possibility of ‘social nature’.  
Social Nature as Part of an Institutional ‘Environment’ 
 
‘The “needs” of the environment are never represented directly by the natural 
environment itself, but rather by different groups and collective entities, each with its own 
agenda and belief system. …Norms, beliefs, and actions in the organizational environment 
are…heavily influenced by the way actors-both within the organization and external to it-
perceive and understand the natural environment’ (Etzion 2007 p.650).  
In order to convincingly fashion the concept of an ‘environmental logic’ there needs to be a clear 
sense of what would constitute such a logic. That is, without a clear depiction of the social element 
of the natural environment it would be impossible to comprehensively argue that it resides within 
the institutional environment. Therefore this discussion moves on to incorporate sociological 
theorising from the domain of ‘social nature’ which considers that nature is represented by multiple 
connotations; ‘…nature is both a concept and all those physical things to which the concept refers. 
It’s a complex concept, not just because it refers to many different entities – from the weather 
through animals to human ‘nature’ and beyond – but because it also has multiple meanings’ 
(Castree in Castree 2001 p.5). Epistemologically it is argued that there are various perceptions of 
what ‘nature’ means and what we think we know about it. These are mediated through cultural 
lenses, and influenced by different social, political and historical factors (Palmer 2003).  
 
As discussed, nature is frequently taken to mean a totality of everything that appears not humanly 
constructed. Yet recent decades have witnessed a turnaround in the institutionalised division 
between society and nature within nature/geographically based disciplines specifically. Initially 
inspired by Margaret Fitzsimmons’ lamentation of the ‘peculiar silence on the question…of nature’ 
(Castree and Braun 2001 p.xi) developments have been made by researchers within the academic 
domains of radical geography (Fitzsimmons 1989, Castree 2001), environmental sociology (Greider 
and Garkovich 1994) and environmental history (Bird 1987). These scholars readdress the 
Enlightenment legacy which inculcated the ontological abstraction of the natural environment from 
the social world, by developing a social theory of nature. In doing so they propose that nature has 
no meaning in itself (Greider and Garkovich 1994) and therefore relies on the development of 
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socially constructed norms and values to infuse it with meaning. Similarly Castree (2001) argues 
that ‘Nature is both a concept, and all those physical things to which the concept refers’ (p.1). 
Indeed, the idea of ‘social nature’ is not new, and has inhabited distinct realms of Geography 
influenced by post-modernist theorizing (Castree 2001). These scholars ascertain that nature is 
unknowable as a pure objective and singular entity and that society must therefore construct its 
social dimensions. As such, the symbolic meanings and definitions of nature are sociocultural 
phenomena which become superimposed upon a physical nature (Greider and Garkovich 1994). 
Greider and Garkovich (1994) suggest that a ‘symbolic landscape’ is created which reflects the 
culturally defined self-definitions of the ‘observer’. Actors therefore reify natural elements by 
creating them from cultural symbols, meaning that ‘…various conceptions of the environment are 
created from different social and cultural contexts…[and] intersubjective definitions of the 
situation…constitute reality’ (pp.5-6) 
  
‘…nature is always something made…and its making is always about much more than just 
nature’ (Castree and Braun 1998 p.109).   
 
The literature on social nature provides an opportunity for the subjective knowledge of nature to 
conceptually reside within the institutional environment because it reaffirms that norms, values 
and cultural symbols are the tools for the natural environment’s social construction. From an 
institutional perspective these tools are institutional constructs which reside within an actor’s 
institutional environment. Given that the institutional environment is ultimately informed by higher 
level societal logics (Friedland and Alford 1991) it comes to pass that if environmental meanings 
cannot be explained by the organising principles of alternative logics, then a societal level 
environmental logic provides theoretical utility. The following section will examine in more depth 
the characteristics of institutional logics as defined by Friedland and Alford (1991) in order to build 
a higher-order environmental logic by combining institutionalism’s theoretical principles with those 
of the social nature theorists explored previously.   
Developing an Environmental Logic 
 
An institutional logic, as defined by Friedland and Alford (1991) is a ‘…set of material practices and 
symbolic constructions…’ (p.248) which form the central organising principles of the significant 
institutional orders of Western society. These institutional orders (also known as societal sectors 
by Thornton 2004) pertain to Christian religion, family, capitalism, democracy and bureaucratic 
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state (see previous chapter). Through continual enactment and reproduction the central logics of 
these orders accumulate a sort of anonymity and objectively structural worth (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967) which stabilise institutional practices for those embedded within their influential 
bailiwick. Thus, there befalls two distinct conceptual elements to demarcate an environmental 
logic. Firstly it is proposed that concerns pertaining to environmental welfare and informed by 
meaning systems relating to the natural environment are constitutive of a central institutional order 
within the Western world. Secondly, the characteristics of the environment logic which encapsulate 
the principles of this order are defined so that its central organising facets and their symbolic and 
material prescriptions are illuminated in line with those of the pre-defined logics (Table 2). Both are 
elaborated below.  
 
For environmental thought to be considered as an institutional order within the intra-institutional 
system the argument must be made that environmental consideration is a fundamental and 
societally accepted system of thought which is not fully informed by the existing institutional orders 
in the West. From the sociology literature above the former point has been argued; the natural 
environment is always mediated by social perceptions. These perceptions are influenced over time 
and may manifest in various forms, but they have key threads and themes running through them 
that conjoin them into a decisive institutional form. Indeed, for all institutional orders it is likely that 
the approaches to the material and symbolic subjects of each has changed; just like 
environmentalism has moved from ‘using God’s gift’ to ‘conservation and protection’ so the 
understandings of what is religious or constitutes a family unit has similarly transformed over time. 
However, all pertain to historically enduring relations such as the relations between humans and a 
deity, the relations between blood relations and the relationship between society and nature. And 
all have logics which provide relatively stable demarcations of how these relationships should be 
formed and enacted. As such, it is defendable that approaches to the relationship between man 
and nature are defined by the institutional environment, and that an environmental institutional 
order would represent a relatively stable structure from which these definitions emanate.  
Furthermore, it must also be considered to what extent other orders are able explain diverse 
understandings of nature. This chapter argues that an environmental institutional order assists 
institutional theorists in understanding why organisations interact with their natural environments 
in particular ways because no other institutional structure can fully account for such interactions. 
Organisational actions of environmental purpose are unconvincingly explained within the purview 
of alternative institutional orders. It is accepted that the environment is protected to some extent 
because companies want to make money by appearing environmentally responsible, because 
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religious individuals feel it is a divine practice or because family members may see it as their 
responsibility to protect future generations. However, Greenwood et al (2010) demonstrate how 
logics from multiple orders may influence a community’s approach to practices prescribed by 
another order, illustrating that although orders impact each other they only define and impede 
specific aspects of one another. For example, understanding that environmental protection is a 
divine expectation neither means that a religious logic provides a complete and comprehensive set 
of institutional rules to inform all environmental action, nor that an environmental logic does not 
exist to inform environmental meaning not proffered by the religious meaning systems. In light of 
Greenwood and colleagues (2008) findings it may be argued that environmental action is not 
informed by other orders completely, but may be affected by them depending on the extent to 
which those orders may consider the natural environment important in their own meaning systems. 
Fundamentally, the institutional structure of an environmental order fills a theoretical gap in the 
current inter-institutional system.  
Table 2 demonstrates the synchronisation of the environmental institutional order with the central 
characteristics of Friedland and Alfords (1991) previously accepted institutional orders. The details 
are taken directly from their 1991 work (pp.248-249). Each order is explained in terms of its central 
institutional logics. Those logics’ social relations are constituted both by symbolic and instrumental 
acts and are reinforced by rituals. The outcomes and implications of the institutional orders on 
wider structures are also explained. For an environmental institutional order, a central logic 
attempts to cultivate a collective rationality which encourages actor participation in pro-nature 
behaviours and psychologies. The characteristics of environmental logics mean that they are likely 
to come into tension with alternative logics – a probability accepted widely within institutional logic 
literature. The conversion of issues into environmental ones may problematise actions and 
practices in ways that disturb the status quo legitimated by another institutional order. For 
example, the destruction of natural resources and the pollution caused by big business means that 
organisations embedded within the opposing environmental and capitalist market logics come into 
direct tension. Additionally the ideals of private ownership within the capitalist order may come 
into contradiction with the environmental logic. For example, the selling of national forests to 
private firms by the UK Government became wildely criticised by environmental groups who saw 
capitalism as a threat to natural preservation.  
An environmental logic channels human activity towards participation in nature’s protection and 
conservation to ensure the future survival of ecosystems. Social relations informed by the logic tend 
to reinforce the importance of collective mobilisation and defensive guarding of the environment 
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and instil the mentality that environmental protection is for itself and therefore not for other social 
or economic goals. Environmentalism is then concretised through the enactment of rituals such as 
collective lobbying and environmental practices such as recycling. These practices are also highly 
symbolic and are often used in CSR and marketing to convey some sense of ‘environmentality’ to 
the public. However, environmental logics become most purely manifest within environmental 
social movement organisations which educate and diffuse environmental messages in an attempt 
to mobilise more ‘followers’. These organisations may be comparable to other institutions and 
organisations which reflect the manifestation of other societal institutional logics; for example the 
logic of Christian religion is manifest within and diffused by various forms of Church. Furthermore 
it is important to note that societal level environmental logics are likely to become evident in 
situated forms which will reflect the nature of the actors and their context, and therefore the 
environmental logic may inform numerous understandings of what it is to be ‘green’. In other 
words, although the environmental logic ushers action towards environmental protection, the 
actions and debates it informs at the level of micro-processes may vary significantly.  
 
In addition Table 2 provides suggestions as to how the environmental logic is likely to interact with 
alternative logics. Friedland and Alford (1991) noted that conflicts between logics should be 
expected given that they contain inherent contradictions. Certainly there are conflicts between 
actors informed by an environmental logic and those more dominantly informed by capitalism 
which are evident within society now. For example the tension between capitalism and the natural 
environment can be seen in the conflicts between frugal living and consumerism, natural purity and 
the creation of unnatural emissions during production. In fact there has been a rise in literature 
since the 1970s which has proposed a mutual exclusivity between nature and capitalist society: 
‘…”the end of capitalism” or the “end of the world”.’ (Kovel 2007 p.4). At a more local level of 
analysis, environmental logics and market logics, for example, may be able to coexist or  
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Table 2 Explanation of Societal Institutional Orders with Environmental Addition 
Institutional 
orders 
Central Organising Logic Social relations and 
[Rituals] 
Outcome  
Capitalist 
Market 
Accumulation and 
commodification of 
human activity 
Buying and selling of 
commodities  
[Signing of contracts] 
Conversion of all actions 
into buying-selling of 
monetarily valuable 
commodities 
Family Community and the 
motivation of human 
activity by unconditional 
loyalty to its members 
and their reproductive 
needs 
Marriage, divorce or 
lovemaking are all 
symbolic and 
instrumental practices  
[Marriages, divorces] 
Family brought into 
tension from market 
based forces, religious 
indifference, or universal 
bureaucratic rules 
Bureaucratic 
State 
Rationalization and 
regulation of human 
activity by legal and 
bureaucratic hierarchies 
Acceptance of symbolic 
and hierarchical roles 
geared to achieve State 
ends  
[The issuance of 
budgets] 
Converts individual 
situations into the basis 
for routine official 
decisions 
Democracy Participation and the 
extension of popular 
control over human 
activity 
democracy is 
concretized through 
voting  
[Voting , inauguration] 
Parliaments and electoral 
institutions convert a 
breadth of diverse issues 
into decisions which can 
be made by popular 
majority vote or 
consensus 
Christianity 
[religion] 
Truth, whether 
mundane of 
transcendental, and the 
symbolic construction of 
reality within which all 
human activity takes 
place 
God is found through 
prayer  
[Prayer, Christening] 
convert all issues into 
expressions of absolute 
moral principles accepted 
voluntarily on faith and 
grounded in a particular 
cosmology 
Environmental The channelling of 
human activity towards 
ultimate participation in 
nature’s protection and 
conservation for future 
sustainability.  
Acts of conservation 
and preservation – 
often collective acts 
involving mobilisation 
and demonstration 
[Lobbying, Recycling] 
Converts issues into those 
of environmental defence 
against forces appearing 
to threaten healthy 
development of natural 
ecosystems 
Source: Table adapted from Friedland and Alford (1991 pp.248-249) 
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hybridise to inform ideas around sustainability and CSR. In any case, the recognition of an 
environmental logic may provide institutional researchers with the necessary tools to shed more 
light on how and why organisations attempt (or not) to become greener. 
Conclusion 
 
The intention of this chapter was to provide a conceptual foundation from which to understand the 
constitution of a societal level environmental institutional logic. Sociological literature on the social 
dimension of nature has illustrated that the natural environment is not merely a physical ‘thing’ 
which resides in an objective material world. Instead there are multiple socially constructed 
meanings which surround the ‘natural environment’ and inform how actors understand the 
relationship between society and nature. As such, actors and organisations drawing from an 
environmental logic construct their ‘green’ actions based on institutionalised meaning systems 
which denote how the natural environment should be conceived of. In other words, the socially 
constructed character of the natural environment is informed by cultural and symbolic rules which 
reside within the institutional environment (Scott 2000). It is argued that the logics of Friedland and 
Alford’s (1991) original inter-institutional system (or the additional community logic added by 
Thornton et al 2012) are incapable of convincingly explaining environmental understandings, and 
therefore conceptualising a separate environmental logic provides analytical utility.  
In sum, the natural environment has maintained an objectivity which should be supplemented with 
a more socialised view if organisations’ behaviours towards environmental issues are to be more 
clearly studied by organisational theorists. In particular an environmental logic provides the means 
to examine the specific institutionalised rules which guide organisational behaviour towards the 
protection and conservation of the environment, in whatever form this may take. Indeed, the 
variety of forms offer interesting empirical domains as their variation is likely to be an outcome of 
logic interplay and complexity. More widely this research responds to the broader body of 
organisational behavioural literature which calls for a deeper engagement of organisational theory 
with the natural environment (Purser et al 1995, Jennings and Zandbergen 1995, Shrivastava 1994).  
Research Question 
 
The above discussion completes the arrangement of research questions for this thesis. Indeed, the 
agenda of this research is to contribute to the current literature on institutional theory by both 
examining the relationships between theoretical constructs as illustrated by the research questions 
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pertaining to the previous chapter, and by developing a new environmental societal institutional 
logic to aid the extension of Organisational Theory into environmental research domains. Moreover 
the theoretical developments outlined in this Chapter speak to the need for institutional academics 
to outline and justify their depictions of certain logics so that the discipline does not descend into 
a situation where everything can be defined as a ‘logic’ – fundamentally questioning the utility of 
the theory. Additionally the concept of an environmental logic is central to this particular research 
setting. The green paradox facing the UK nuclear industry provides an excellent opportunity to test 
the utility of an environmental institutional order and constitutive logic. Nuclear power’s 
environmental credentials have been the site of aggressive debates for over three decades and as 
such the application of an environmental logic should provide the kind of insight into the 
institutional character of the debate which can not be achieved by purely analytically applying the 
incumbent institutional orders defined by Friedland and Alford (1991). Hence the final research 
question is as follows: 
Research Question 3 
 How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic provide utility within an 
institutional research agenda?  
o How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic help explain the 
green paradox of nuclear power? 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Research 
Design 
 
In the following chapter the ontological assumptions underpinning this research agenda will be 
explored in relation to both institutional theory and the practical methods employed. First, the 
features of Critical Realist ontology (Bhaskar 1975) and its combination with institutional theory will 
be explored. It is argued that there are dimensions of compatibility between Critical Realism (CR) 
and institutional theory which provide utility for institutional analysis. Work by Leca and Naccache 
(2006) is drawn on to delineate the ontological status of institutional concepts. In line with the 
Critical Realist ontology a Retroductive methodology is applied (Houston 2010) which structures 
the research project and focuses it towards uncovering the nature of the institutional logics 
underpinning the green paradox of nuclear power. A discussion of the qualitative methods applied 
to the research process follow. A 60 year case study was constructed from four text based data 
sources: Government documents, The Times, The Guardian and the Daily Mirror newspapers. It is 
suggested that a historical document analysis aligns with the value placed on context, time and 
agency by Critical Realists (Archer 1995). Thereafter a detailed description of the coding process is 
provided. Documents were analysed for specific debates and discursive legitimating strategies 
which illuminated the nature of the situated institutional logics informing actors’ perceptions and 
arguments in relation to nuclear power.  The research questions are as follows: 
Research Question 1 
 What is the relationship between institutional levels of analysis?  
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ provide insights into the interactions 
between agents, fields and societal logics? 
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ help explain the green paradox of nuclear 
power? 
 
Research Question 2 
 What role do actors play in the development of ‘situated logics’? 
o How can an institutional work approach be utilised to fully understand the role of 
agency in the construction and/or reinforcement of situated logics? 
o To what extent can processes of institutional entrepreneurship help elucidate the 
manifestation, elaboration and institutionalisation of situated logics? 
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o How do the actions of actors contribute to the creation of a green paradox? 
 
Research Question 3 
 How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic provide utility within an 
institutional research agenda?  
o How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic help explain the 
green paradox of nuclear power? 
Introducing Ontology  
 
‘Every research tool or procedure is inextricably embedded in commitments to particular 
visions of the world and to knowing that world’ (Remenyi, Williams, Mone and Swartz 1998 
p.23) 
A clearly defined ontological standpoint provides a set of assumptions about the nature of reality 
and knowledge which underpin what researchers can say about the world. Thus, for a researcher, 
ontology is important because it has implications for the appropriateness of research methods, 
systems of analysis and claims of knowledge. Within the broad subject area of institutional theory, 
researchers have adopted a variety of ontological perspectives which define the ‘reality’ of 
institutional structures and have been evident in the ways in which they have understood the 
relationship between agency and social structures such as institutional logics. For example the work 
of Zilber (2002, 2006) on translation takes a social constructionist approach by proposing that actors 
are carriers of institutional logics. In doing so, Zilber conflates social structure and agency because 
logic change and variation is located in the mind of institutionalised actors. This is problematic 
because the social structure (the institutional logic) becomes increasingly difficult to define. 
Alternatively, authors such as Barley and Tolbert (1997) hold structure and agency apart to 
understand the dialectic between the two. This latter approach is more noticeable within 
institutional theorisation given the focus on institutional entrepreneurship and the paradox of 
embedded agency (Holm 1995, Boxenbaum and Battilana 2004, Dorado 2005, Mutch 2007). Leca 
and Naccache (2006) have suggested that CR delivers utility here as it provides an ontological 
framework which allows the researcher to conceive of embedded agency. CR provides an important 
ontological distinction between ‘the parts’ and ‘the people’ (Willmott 2000) which is needed if the 
interplay between the analytically distinct concepts of agency and structure is to be explored. As 
such, this research project applies CR because it is interested in the dynamic and dialectic 
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relationship between agents and their discursive efforts, and the institutional logics which both 
guide them and are changed by them. In particular, the CR of Bhaskar (1975) and Archer (1995) is 
explored below.  
Critical Realism 
 
The adoption and development of CR by scholars of Organisational Theory was part of a retaliation 
against anti-realists who claimed that realism was a naïve form of objectivism. Yet, CR proposes a 
way of combining naturalism and realism with a recognition that social worlds are constituted 
through actors’ sensory experiences and perceptions (Sayer 2000). A series of books by Roy Bhaskar 
(1975, 1993, 1998) is generally credited with the development and refinement of the CR approach. 
Bhaskar describes CR as a ‘transcendental realism’ whereby ‘…it is necessary to assume for the 
intelligibility of science that the order discovered in nature acts independently of men’ (Bhaskar 
1998 p.21). This is maintained by two integral principles of CR; the stratified ontology and the 
epistemic fallacy. The former distinguishes between the real, the actual and the empirical domains 
of reality. The real is regarded as ‘whatever exists’ (Sayer 2000 p.11) irrespective of whether it 
manifests as an empirical object available to us. Within the real ontological domain lie generative 
mechanisms (objects, structures and causal powers) which have capacities and tendencies to 
produce outcomes which may lead to perceivable events if triggered. Events occur in the domain 
of the actual and are experienced by actors in the domain of the empirical (Sayer 2000). Thus, 
actor’s perceptions of ‘actual’ events may not accurately reflect what is generating events because 
the ‘real’ mechanisms and structures which generate the actual world are conceptually mediated 
by subjective experience (Fleetwood 2005). The stratified ontology thus moves away from the 
simple dichotomy of ‘objectivism versus subjectivism’; at the empirical level CR appreciates actor 
subjectivity whilst also remaining recognisant that the world exists independently of this 
subjectivity. In this sense, CR provides a way to challenge the empiricist’s disbelief that the 
unobservable can exist and the constructionist’s refutation that the objective world can be known.  
The ‘epistemic fallacy’ component of the CR philosophy suggests that to observe and perceive 
makes us more confident about what exists, yet existence itself does not depend upon it: ‘…powers 
may exist unexercised, and hence what has happened or been known to have happened, does not 
exhaust what could happen or has happened’ (Sayer 2000 p.12). As Bhaskar also notes, ‘…there 
could be a world of events without experiences. Such events would be actualities unperceived and, 
in the absence of men, unperceivable’ (1998 p.24). As such the knowledge underpinning any 
analysis may never be complete. Hence, for CR researchers knowledge ceases to be an essential 
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predicate of things: ‘…we can allow that experience is in the last instance epistemically decisive, 
without supposing that its subjects are ontologically ultimate, in the sense that their existence 
depends on nothing else’ (Bhaskar 1998 p.28). This element speaks to the ‘realist’ ontology of CR; 
there are ‘real’ causal and generative mechanisms which exist outside of our perception, and which 
manifest in certain ways in certain contexts. Manifestations are then able to be perceived by actors 
who may project on them multiple meanings depending on their social understandings. Indeed, this 
latter emphasis on context reflects the importance of time and space (Archer 1995, 1998) to the 
Critical Realist who must understand the setting and circumstance of events in order to retroduce, 
as much as possible, the nature of the generative mechanisms at play.  
Critical Realism and Institutional Theory 
 
In the past decade a number of institutionalists have begun to explore the implications for, 
possibilities for and advantages of applying CR to institutional analysis. This section will look at two 
dimensions relating to the compatibility between institutional theory (IT) and CR: 1. CR’s agency 
and structure dualism allows us to understand embedded agency and 2. Levels of institutional 
analysis are compatible with CR’s stratified ontology. Both dimensions have helped institutional 
theorists to more clearly delineate the relationships between institutional structures at multiple 
levels of analysis and embedded agents (Mutch, Delbridge and Ventresca 2006). Such insights are 
important to this research project as they provide a framework against which to understand the 
reality of the institutional concepts applied. A clear grasp on the ontological properties of such 
concepts provide the means to more visibly conceptualise the dynamics between agents and 
structures which may ultimately create and explain institutional change. The dimensions proposed 
above will be explored in turn below.  
The Duality of Agency and Structure  
 
‘…human agency, in the form of reasons and motives, combines with unseen generative 
mechanisms to produce effects in a social world that is multi-layered, complex and at times 
pockmarked with ambiguous contours’ (Houston 2010 p.74) 
 
Compatibility between CR and IT can be found in the overlaying of CR’s concept of analytical duality 
upon institutionalism’s multi-level framework. As Delbridge and Edwards (2013) note, the 
conception of society as an inter-institutional system as proposed by Friedland and Alford (1991) 
presumes an ‘…integrated conceptual architecture that works at three levels of analysis… i.e. the 
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individual, the organisation and the societal’ (p.2). This multi-level approach provides a framework 
from which to understand micro-processes of agency within higher-order levels of analysis, and is 
therefore compatible with an ontological perspective which holds structure and agency as 
analytically distinct in order to understand the relational dynamic between them. Previous 
institutional research has often privileged and prioritised the role of structure over that of agency, 
thus providing a top-down model of action (Delbridge and Edwards 2013, Leca and Naccache 2006). 
Through the application of CR one may start to tease out the role and implications of agency with 
concern given to its embeddedness and its dialectical relationship with social structure (i.e. 
institutional logics) (Barley and Tolbert 1997, Mutch et al 2006, Mutch 2007).  
For example, Leca and Naccache (2006) apply CR in order to propose a non-conflating model of 
institutional entrepreneurship. They argue that the conflation of structure and agency leads to 
‘…the denial of either actor’s freedom or the constraining power of structures…[and] to remain 
coherent with institutional theory, a model of institutional entrepreneurship must provide a model 
of change in which actors can create and change institutions without disembedding from the social 
world.’ (p.628). By delineating the ontological status of structure and agency (i.e. their distinctive 
emergent properties, relative autonomies, previous existences, and causal efficiency), CR proposes 
that actors are not merely passive but can shape social structures (Bhaskar 1975). For Leca and 
Naccache (2006) institutional entrepreneurs are actors who use the causal powers of pre-existing 
structures to create new institutions or challenge existing ones. The emerging properties of 
structures imply that institutional entrepreneurs can use institutional logics by developing a 
practical knowledge of them without being fully aware of all their causal powers. Unintended 
consequences are likely as it is impossible to predict entirely how causal powers will operate in 
context. Similarly, Wry (2009) argues that actors within the domain of the empirical react to 
patterns of action through practices which reinforce or challenge institutions, and in so doing may 
induce change at the structural level of institutional logics. Given that multiple logics exist within 
the social world, actors can draw on multiple logics to imagine new institutions and justify divergent 
practices (although they are unlikely to be fully aware of those structures’ causal powers).  
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Stratified Ontology 
 
The above illustrates that CR’s approach to holding apart structure and agency provides 
institutionalists with the means to understand how agents may relate to, and ‘use’ social structures 
in order to alter them. This dualism is reinforced by the application of CR’s ontology to the levels of 
institutional analysis. By applying a combination of IT and CR proposed by Leca and Naccache (2006) 
in particular, this research accepts a specific understanding whereby institutional logics and their 
ontological properties exist in the domain of the real. To reiterate, in the domain of the real lie 
social structures which serve as ‘… “generative mechanisms” which give rise to action, manifest not 
in the form of deterministic outcomes but rather as empirical tendencies’ (Delbridge and Edwards 
2013 p.8). Additionally, these exist prior to human action so that structures of social reality are 
always pre-existing givens to present actors. Leca and Naccache (2006) argue that institutional 
logics correspond to structures located in this domain because they cannot be reduced to 
institutions, yet they have generative mechanisms which, when activated within particular contexts 
for particular reasons, will unfold in the domain of the actual as institutions. Moreover, institutional 
logics pre-exist actors and as Bhaskar (1998) notes, the pre-existence of social forms establishes 
their autonomy as possible objects of investigation and their causal powers establish their reality.   
Leca and Naccache argue that institutions must be considered in the domain of the actual because 
actors may or may not perceive of them yet they exist regardless. Actors may not be perceptive of 
certain institutions because they may be so taken-for-granted as to be cognitively invisible and 
unperceivable as institutions. Nevertheless, researchers with training may be able to access them 
and reveal their nature. To do so, researchers must try to uncover them via the domain of the 
empirical. However, actors who are within the empirical domain are more than mere recipients of 
higher level logics. Indeed, institutional structures are intrinsically social and thus ‘While logics have 
the power to impede or facilitate the action of different actors, the activation of such powers is 
contingent upon those agents who conceive of and pursue what might be possible’ (Delbridge and 
Edwards 2013 p.5). Importantly, this is in no way in support of methodological individualism. In line 
with Bhaskar (1998) ‘…societies are complex real objects irreducible to simpler ones, such as 
people’ (p.208). However, agents both perceive of and interpret institutions and may activate the 
causal powers of real social structures whilst maintaining or attempting to change them – although 
the activation itself may be unconscious, unintended and uncontrollable.  
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Situated logics 
 
These dimensions lead to some interesting questions regarding the ontological standpoint of 
situated logics as defined in the literature review and later in the findings and discussion. Indeed, 
CR institutionalism is a developing field of theorising and there is still much to be understood about 
the implications of the former on the latter. However, a provisional suggestion would be to suggest 
that situated logics represent a specific configuration of logics’ causal powers which represent the 
context of a specific industry or organisational field at any given time and space. At a given time of 
inquiry, certain situated logics may be pre-existent whilst others may be emergent. This reflects the 
idea that logics have causal powers but the activation of these powers is contingent: ‘…the way 
structures’ causal powers will develop, or not, will depend on the contextual conditions’ (Leca and 
Naccache 2006 p.631). As a meaningful configuration of the generative mechanisms of certain 
higher-order logics, situated logics do not reside within the domain of the real, yet represent the 
manifestation of higher order ‘real’ logics within context. These logics inform the maintenance and 
creation of institutions within the domain of the actual yet are neither synonymous with institutions 
nor reducible to them. Perhaps for now it is better to understand them as an analytical concept to 
explain a certain configuration of generative mechanisms than it would be to provide any concrete 
ontological property. Indeed, their ontological status is open for debate, as is the ontological status 
of all institutional constructs. Partly this is because of the difficulties in demonstrating the ‘realism’ 
of social worlds. The following section will attempt to delineate how CR tackles this issue.  
Implications of a CR Social Structure  
 
‘People do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition 
for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices 
and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist 
unless they did so’ (Bhaskar 1998 p.216) 
Archer (1998) notes that CR ‘…accepts the challenge of ontological difference between physical and 
social reality’ (p.190). She argues that social reality differs ontologically from natural reality because 
there is no methodological means to enclose order in society – because it will always be inhabited 
by actors able to engage in creative and reflexive thought. Additionally, society cannot be reduced 
to its constituent parts in the fashion of individualism, because ‘...designating properties special to 
persons all presuppose a social context for their employment’ (Archer 1998 p.191). Thus, when 
applying CR to the social world one must recognise the stable yet mutable and corrigible properties 
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of the social context and its institutional structures such as logics; they cannot be reduced to their 
parts, yet they can be creatively adjusted or maintained by them. This is because social actors 
perform a double function in that they both make social products and make the conditions of those 
products’ making (Bhaskar 1998 p.218). Similarly Archer (1998) argued that cultural systems have 
‘…the same temporal priority, relative autonomy and causal efficacy vis-à-vis socio-cultural actions 
as do structural properties’ (p.198). These cultural systems are the intransitive objects of the social 
sciences which predate ‘current agents’ who can maintain and transform them, and become shaped 
and reshaped in their attempts to do so (Archer 1998). So although society is a necessary condition 
for any intentional human act: ‘Society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the 
continually reproduced outcome of human agency’ (Bhaskar 1998 p.215).  
Recognition of a duality of agency and structure which considers both conscious production and 
often unconscious reproduction of the conditions of society (Archer 1998) brings to light questions 
regarding the corrigibility of institutional logics. Indeed, the latter is conceptually plausible only 
when the nature of agency is established. In order to better understand the dimensions of agency 
this research borrows from Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) relational sociology and their focus on 
projective intentionality. The authors suggest that there are different constitutive elements of 
agency: ‘iterative’ refers to behaviour which is often habitual and unelected in nature, ‘projectivity’ 
refers to the future, and ‘practical-evaluation’ refers to the capacity of agents to’… contextualize 
past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment’ (p. 962). Institutionalism 
has a pre-occupation with the ‘iterative dimension’ and therefore limited attention is paid to ‘…the 
way in which social actors relationally engage with those pre-existing patterns or schemas’ (p.975). 
However, Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) ‘projective’ dimension of agency can explain actor 
propensity for institutional work because actors are considered ‘…the inventors of new possibilities 
for thought and action’ (p.984). Actors are capable of distancing themselves from habit and 
schemas which constrain their social identity and institutions: ‘…immersed in a temporal flow, they 
move “beyond themselves” into the future and construct changing images of where they think they 
are going, where they want to go, and how they can get there from where they are at present’ 
(p.984).  
Such projective agency is relational in that agential intentionality is not an ‘…a prior causal force or 
mechanism’ (Delbridge and Edwards 2013 p.9) but is rather an outcome of the relationality of 
structure and agency over time. In other words, agency is somewhat historically conditioned. This 
conditioning does not determine an outcome but provides an insight into the generative agency 
which creates it. The disparity in actors’ histories, personal characteristics and relational position 
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means that actor’s actual experiences of structures (and their emergent properties) are not 
uniform. Variation in actors’ perceptions has implications on the reproduction of social structures 
and may explain why reproduction is never fully stable (Delbridge and Edwards 2013). Actor 
positions within a social setting (a relational position) implicate them within different personal 
projects which affects how a logic facilitates or constrains their action. Therefore, within realms of 
institutional complexity and multiple logics, actor reflexivity has many possible outcomes 
(Delbridge and Edwards 2013, Wry 2009). These insights are significant because they show the 
importance of understanding the historical context of actors in order to appreciate the creative, 
intentional or purely routinized agency of actors and their interactions with social structure.  
Conclusion to Critical Realism 
 
This research is concerned with uncovering ontologically deep institutional logic structures, 
evidenced at the ‘empirical level’ of the day-to-day, which may help explain the ‘green paradox’ of 
nuclear power. Critical Realism is concerned with the nature of these structures and how they 
interplay with agents to create actual and empirical phenomena. A number of institutionalists have 
applied CR (Leca and Neccache 2006, Wry 2009, Delbridge and Edwards 2013) because the 
ontological status which it lends institutional analytical concepts provides a framework from which 
to examine embedded agency and institutional change. Institutional logics, considered as deep and 
‘real’, have generative mechanisms and causal powers which can be activated intentionally or 
otherwise by actors and come to be manifest in the form of events (such as institutions) within the 
domain of the actual. Researchers may observe and delineate the nature of these deep logics by 
understanding how actors subjectively understand, produce and reproduce institutions within the 
domain of the actual. The difficulty lies in the application of CR to a methodology in a way that 
combines an ‘…account of process on the one hand with one of the enabling context on the other, 
without collapsing one into the other’ (Mutch et al 2006 p.622). To do so a CR methodology known 
as retroduction (Houston 2010) is adopted which aims to identify recurring patterns of action and 
to postulate logics that, if they were to exist, would provide a causal explanation for such patterns 
of actions. Such postulations are then subject to empirical scrutiny (Ekstrom 1992, Sayer 2000, Wry 
2009).  
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Implications of Critical Realism: Applying Retroduction 
 
Critical Realist research is compatible with a wide range of methods but is most commonly 
associated with a methodology of retroduction (Sayer 2000). Retroduction aims to explain events 
by ‘…postulating and identifying structures and causal powers that are capable of generating them’ 
(Sayer 1992 p.107). Social structures such as institutional logics must be inferred from recurring 
patterns in the domain of the actual, which may or may not be consciously apparent. Therefore 
researchers must understand their role as ‘readers’ of action and institutions. At the level of the 
empirical they must attempt to ‘read back’ that which is not visible from that which is (Wry 2009). 
The means to do so is provided by a Retroductive methodology which is more specifically garnered 
to the character of CR than inductive (observe and generalise) or deductive (Hypothesise and test) 
methodologies (Houston 2010); 
‘Whereas deduction refers to the inference from the general to the particular and induction 
refers to the particular to the general, retroduction, which is adopted by Critical Realism, 
refers to the inference from a description of some phenomenon to a description of 
something that produces it or is a condition for it…’ (Houston 2010 p.82) 
This thesis applies Houston’s (2010) stages of retroduction (see Table 3) which specifies the 
construction of the research questions and the role of the methods. Firstly Houston suggests that 
the research questions should be of a transcendental nature. Because this research project is 
curious as to how the ‘green paradox’ of nuclear power arose, the first research question asks what 
institutional logic configurations (domain of the real) must be in place for this to have occurred. 
Secondly, Houston argues that to answer transcendental questions the researcher must construct 
an a priori hypothesis to explain what has been observed ‘…drawing, through logical inferences, on 
a knowledge of in-depth theory from the range of domains that shape the social world’ (Houston 
2010 p.83). This stage constructs theoretical hypotheses to depict how elements within the social 
world are expected to relate and predominantly involves the application of institutional theory.  
Thirdly evidence is sought by the researcher to confirm, deny or modify the hypothesis. This 
evidence is observed in the empirical domain and relevant methods are employed to recognise the 
workings of generative mechanisms. In this stage qualitative research is important (Houston 2010) 
so that researchers may access actor’s meanings, reasons, and justifications and intentions given 
that these areas of agentic action have causal properties in their own right (Bhaskar 1998). Fourthly, 
the researcher looks to reaffirm the earlier hypothesis in order to answer the transcendental 
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questions. Explanatory hypothesis may be refined, redefined or completely reformulated and then 
further evidenced to the point where there is a ‘…robust connection between the hypothesis and 
the patterns of social activity observable in the empirical world’ (Houston 2010 p.85). Finally, the 
critical element of CR involves the instigation of emancipatory action to counter any oppressive 
mechanisms exposed by the retroductive process. It should be noted that this research does not 
have a strong emancipatory agenda, yet it retains interest in exposing mechanisms which may not 
be visible but nevertheless create conflict. Perhaps, through exposure, some element of this conflict 
previously hidden may lead to a more ethical outcome; i.e. actors involved in the nuclear debate 
may be more aware of their institutionalised understandings of the environment and morally 
evaluate them.  
The following section outlines how this research has followed the retroductive steps proposed by 
Houston (2010). The first two steps are related to the research questions, whereas the latter are 
provided through a detailed exploration of the methods used.  
Table 3 Steps of Retroduction 
Step One Asking a transcendental question 
Step Two Developing hypotheses to address the question in terms of: (a) the generative 
mechanisms at play (b) the  role of ‘agency’, ‘time’ and ‘context’ 
Step Three Seeking evidence of hypotheses by looking for the effects of mechanisms and 
their interplay with ‘agency’, ‘time’ and ‘context’ 
Step Four Refining, confirming, falsifying or reworking hypotheses and seeking more 
evidence 
Step Five Instigating emancipatory action to counter oppressive mechanisms and 
activating enabling mechanisms 
Source: Houston (2010 p.83) 
 
Step One: Transcendental Questions 
 
All research questions (RQ) pertaining to this research project speak to the nature of structural 
entities and their dynamic with agency. The first RQ ponders how societal logics in the realm of the 
‘real’ come to manifest in specific ways within specific organisational fields. The second considers 
how agency is understood within structural boundaries. The final research question is concerned 
with the extent to which the current ‘accepted’ intra-institutional societal structure is able to 
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provide researchers with a comprehensive toolkit for understanding organisational approaches to 
the natural environment. As such, all research questions try to get a grasp on deep level structural 
forces, how their causal powers affect lived experience and how the causal powers of agency both 
maintain and inform social structural manifestations (Houston 2010). 
Step Two: Development of Hypothetical Relationships among Theoretical Concepts  
 
The first two research questions can be taken together. They relate to the relationship between 
societal and situated logics and the role of agency in the ‘situating’ of societal logics. Situating was 
proposed in the literature review as a useful concept from which to study the interaction between 
institutional levels of analysis. From a CR perspective societal level logics have generative 
mechanisms which are configured in certain ways at lower levels of analysis to create and maintain 
situated logics. However, actors activate those generative mechanisms, and thus it is hypothesised 
that institutional work within a specific context (time and space) may trigger the causal implications 
of societal logics’ generative mechanisms. Nevertheless, their contextual and historical 
embeddedness is likely to mediate the configuration of the generative mechanisms so that the 
‘situated’ result is of a specific nature. This is not to say that the nature of this can be pre-defined 
and built to match, but rather that agency, context and time have an impact on the local 
manifestation of causal mechanisms and their actual and empirical outcomes. The third research 
question asks whether an environmental societal logic contains generative mechanisms which 
explain institutions and practices at the levels of the ‘actual’ and ‘empirical’ which cannot be 
explained by other societal logics. Its utility is therefore hypothesised to be in the possibilities it 
grants institutional researchers to explain societally constructed understandings of nature which 
impact organisational behaviour. To seek evidence of the nature of these theoretical and 
hypothesised relationships the methods will be explored below.  
Step Three: Seeking Evidence: Qualitative Method 
 
Step three for Houston (2010) involves seeking evidence of the hypothesised interplay between 
agency, time and context as defined by the transcendental research questions. A qualitative 
methodology is applied in order to focus the research on uncovering the construction and 
negotiation of meaning pertaining to the green nuclear debate. A historical case study was 
constructed which covered the period from the inception of the UK civil nuclear programme in the 
1950s to the confirmation of a new nuclear programme in 2010. The contested nature of nuclear 
power throughout the 60 years meant that data on the topic was abundant and often rather 
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animated. Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) called MAX-qda was used 
to code all documents. These codes both informed the case study construction and aided the 
identification of discursive legitimation strategies which were considered illustrative of situated 
institutional logics.  
The Retroductive Process  
 
In applying retroduction this thesis has undertaken elements of both induction and abduction; this 
can be understood as the ‘inductive-abductive process of analysis’ (O’Mahoney et al 2013). A 
retroductive method is a mode of inference which requires the researcher to “…identify the 
circumstances without which something (the concept) cannot exist” (Meyer and Lunnay 2013 p.1), 
and thus works well with an abductive approach (Sayer 1992) which “…is a means of forming 
associations that enable the researcher to discern relations and connections that are not otherwise 
evident or obvious” (Meyer and Lunnay 2013 p.2). This can often involve analysing data that appear 
to fall outside of existing theoretical frames. However, this does not mean that the researcher must 
face the data with no a-priori knowledge of theory. Indeed, abduction assumes that the researcher 
has prior theoretical knowledge and will engage in an iterative process through which empirical 
data is induced into coding frameworks which are then compared to existing theories (Ketokivi and 
Mantere, 2010, Suddaby, 2006). Additionally, the application of abduction as part of a retroductive 
approach can lead to the formation of new conceptions and theoretical frameworks (Danermark et 
al 1997). This is because abductive and retroductive inference provided opportunities for 
elaboration and exploration of the explanatory power of given theories during the analysis of data. 
This might mean concluding that one theory, in comparison to competing theories, describes the 
necessary conditions for the event under study in a more complete and comprehensive manner. 
The following paragraph will detail more specifically how this thesis’s research process applied retroductive 
and abductive inference.  
The research began as an institutional project because the primary point of interest was the concept 
of an environmental institutional logic. The coding framework was therefore developed by the 
researcher who had a-priori knowledge of the institutional literature. This remains in line with 
abduction and retroduction which acknowledges that observations and interpretations are theory-
laden (Meyer and Lunnay 2013). The initial activities undertaken are denoted as inductive (see 
Table 4) because they took a ‘bottom-up’ approach to data analysis, exploring the data as a means 
to uncovering higher level causal mechanisms that may explain their existence. The specifics of the 
coding approach are detailed later in the chapter, however it is important to note here that the first 
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stage of research involved the open-coding of all data in chronological order in an attempt to 
explore, describe and organise its key debates, events and issues. The second round of coding 
explored these events, debates and issues in more depth, and focused specifically on unearthing 
the justificatory discourses and arguments surrounding them. Such discursive contestations and 
legitimations are understood as indicators of higher order institutional structures (see p.35). 
Following the coding, two steps were taken simultaneously: a case study was written up in order to 
provide a comprehensive reference for the research which kept all the data contextualised and 
chronological. At the same time, the coded findings were compared with a variety of existing 
theories of knowledge, and the theories that appeared to best explain them were chosen. The final 
stages, as shown in the table below (Table 4), were iterative. A number of complementary yet 
analytically varied theories were applied to help explain the results obtained from the coding 
phases. The final choice of theories applied in the thesis was a result of continuous iteration 
between the data and the literature.   
More detail will be provided in the following sections that explore and appraise each of the methods 
employed throughout the research project. Firstly, the qualitative method is explored, justified and 
evaluated.  
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Table 4: The Inductive-Abduction Process of Analysis 
Activity: Induction Coding of all data to identify central debates, issues, tensions and 
contestations over the historical period. Primarily exploratory and 
descriptive.   
First order codes Descriptive codes relating to both the wider energy industry and the 
nuclear industry specifically (see Appendix 3 for coding framework).  
 
For example: Ownership, Economic Viability, Climate Change, Health, 
Technological Advancement, Disarmament/non-proliferation 
Activity: Induction Development of second-order codes to identify themes relating to key 
justifications, arguments and emphases in areas of debate highlighted 
by the first-order coding activity.  
Second order codes Justificatory codes relating to nuclear power (see Appendix 3 for initial 
coding framework) 
 
For example: Mastery over nature, New Challenges of Tomorrow, 
Nuclear as Lesser of Two Evils, Impact on Communities. 
Activity: Case Study Coding informed the construction of a detailed historical case study  
Activity: Abduction Comparison of case study data and second order codes with existing 
theories of knowledge (e.g. institutional logics theories, systems of 
exchange, translation, institutional vocabularies) 
Result Selection of theories of knowledge which appeared to best match 
events and justificatory codes identified previously 
Activity: comparison 
of themes with 
theory 
Categorisation of second order themes in line with selected theory. 
Assessment of theory applicability. 
 
Result: theory 
development 
Institutional development: Situated Logics, assertion that an 
Environmental logic is a useful construct 
Activity: Iterative 
process 
Reworking theoretical framework based on the commensurability 
between selected theories of knowledge and the development of 
understanding pertaining to the events and justifications identified. 
Table structure taken from O’Mahoney et al (2013 p.214) 
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Qualitative Methodology and Data Collection 
 
‘…unfettered from the pursuit of transcendental scientific truth, inquirers now feel free to 
resituate themselves within texts, to reconstruct their relationships with research 
participants in less constricted fashions, and to create re-presentations that grapple 
openly with problems of inscription, re-inscription, meta-narratives and other rhetorical 
devices that obscure the extent to which human action is locally and temporally shaped.’ 
(Lincoln and Guba 2003 p.272) 
CR ontology resonates convincingly with a qualitative methodology which is underpinned by an 
assumption that actors subjectively mediate the social and natural worlds. The dynamic between 
agency and structure has previously been explored, yet it is important to remember that the only 
means to gain an understanding of real structures and their generative mechanisms is by 
deciphering the nature of the actual events which are perceived and given meaning by actors. Thus 
institutional logics fundamentally imbibe certain social rules and organising principles which may 
only be understood by accessing the understanding of actors involved in their reproduction, 
defence or transformation. Thus, it is through qualitative research that a CR researcher may begin 
to build a picture of subjective understandings and start to broach their transcendental research 
questions. Qualitative data provides a depth and richness which cannot be gained from a more 
positivist and quantitative research agenda. Stake (1995) suggests that this form of data aligns with 
the qualitative researcher’s appreciation of explanation and understanding as purposes of inquiry 
and the construction rather than the discovery of knowledge. It stands epistemologically apart from 
quantitative research due to the centrality of interpretation and an understanding that a researcher 
within a field exercises subjective judgement and should be reflexive of their own consciousness 
(Stake 1995). Consequently there tends to be an emphasis on actor’s intersubjective experiences 
and how these impact and illustrate the symbolic and ideational aspects of the social environment. 
As mentioned, the qualitative methodology in this project involved the analysis of media and 
Government documents via the construction of an historical case study – the particularities of 
which will subsequently be discussed.  
Case Study Creation 
 
The case-study research design is a common qualitative approach because it aids the examination 
of both the holistic case and the particularities within (Yin 2003). Because qualitative researchers 
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place emphasis on the unique characteristics of individual cases a single case study, defined by 
Stake (1995) as a ‘bounded system’ or ‘integrated system’, is suitable because it provides the 
researcher an object of study which can be leveraged open to provide in depth understanding of 
particularity. Furthermore, Yin (2003) suggests that case studies should be the preferred method 
when research questions asking ‘how’ or ‘why’ are offered, when the researcher has little control 
over the events and when the focal point of the research is on ‘…a contemporary phenomena with 
some real-life context’ (p.1). Indeed the research outlined in this thesis meets these requirements 
because it asks why an apparent green paradox exists in relation to nuclear power, is based on 
events which have mostly already taken place and exists in ‘real life’. Moreover, given the historic 
approach of this research the holistic promise of a case study is valuable in that it affords the 
researcher recognition of coexisting happenings and chronologies rather than simple cause and 
effects (Stake 1995). In sum the case study method resonates comfortably with the nature of this 
research project.  
Case studies have been increasingly utilised within institutional theory research. The move towards 
theorising around radical and non-isomorphic change has brought with it studies that have used 
particular cases to illustrate the dynamics between individual and organisational levels of analysis. 
For example, Delbridge and Edwards’ (2008, 2013) research into the beginnings of the Super yacht 
industry adopted a single case study approach which covered the movement from the yacht design 
of the pre 1960-70s era to the newer revolutionary designs offered by Jon Bannenberg. Similarly 
the seminal study by Greenwood et al (2002) on the recomposition of the health care field in 
Alberta, Canada used a case study that covered the 20 year period in which the profession 
underwent major change (1977-1997). Although these are but a few of the case studies now 
published in the field, they do highlight an important reason for the adoption of the case study 
technique; case study analysis works well with the assumption of historical contingency within 
institutional theory, especially in the institutional logics approach (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). 
Indeed, as Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) note in their study on the big five accounting firms, 
‘…the analysis involved historical processes and such dynamic events are best analysed through the 
use of inductive techniques by which event sequences are clarified and overlapping causal forces 
disentangled’ (p.29). Ultimately, the case study method allows authors to trace how larger 
environments affect individual and organisational behaviour over time and thus appreciate the 
historicity of institutional actions rather than merely treating them as points of incidence (Yin 2003). 
Indeed their character resonates with more recent movements in institutional analysis towards 
institutional biographies (Lawrence et al 2011) and logic constellations (Goodrick and Reay 2011).  
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Nevertheless, it has been suggested that case studies may allow for equivocal evidence which can 
direction findings and conclusions in ways that help confirm pre-conceived theory (Yin 2003). 
Furthermore, case studies provide no firm basis for scientific generalisation as their particularising 
nature inhibits this. Similarly, Bryman (1989) proposes that there is a misguided view that case 
studies are selected from a pool of similar cases, and that this is assumed to allow a degree of 
generalisation. However, this research agenda recognises that the UK nuclear power industry is a 
unique research site and thus only wishes to offer some degree of theoretical generalisability. This 
resonates clearly with the nature of the transcendental research questions. As Stake (1995) 
maintains ‘…we do not choose case study designs to optimise production of generalisations’ (p.8) 
but instead use them to modify and enhance existing theory. Ultimately the capacity to generalise 
need not be taken as a benchmark for the method’s value, and in this research the case study 
method is understood to resonate well with the nature of the research questions and the 
ontological framework applied. 
The Case Study 
 
A case study of the history of the nuclear energy industry and the environmental debate 
surrounding it was constructed from four data sources: three newspapers (The Guardian, The Times 
and the Daily Mirror) and a mixture of published public documents (such as white papers and green 
papers) and confidential or unpublished Government documents (such as parliament minutes, 
memos, policy document drafts). In the construction of the case study comprehensive time-lines 
and summaries for each data source were developed in order to garner a detailed understanding 
of the opposing political allegiances of the different newspapers and their idiosyncrasies in terms 
of focus and coverage. The wider energy context was also important in understanding the various 
debates surrounding nuclear power and as such supplementary reports were often referred to such 
as those published by Friends of the Earth (FOE) or by international energy organisations such as 
the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Authority). The aim of the case study was to cover all 
identifiable justifications and legitimations relating to the support or rejection of nuclear power, 
and to understand each in historical context and from the divergent perspectives of each data 
source.  
However, it should be noted that the collection of data for coding did not include the integration of 
diverse sources of secondary literature such as histories of the period and published memoirs. 
There were two primary reasons for this. Firstly, it was decided that the case study should purely 
reflect the perspectives of the specified (Government and Media) data sources. Therefore the 
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configuration and variety of data sources (such as those with differing political motivations or 
different audiences) was crucial to ensure that they would provide a comprehensive and relatively 
complete picture of the events. By doing so it was possible to keep in mind and recognise more 
explicitly the differences in opinions between the various media sources and the Government. 
Indeed, the construction of the case study was not only about building a comprehensive story, but 
it was also an analytical process that aimed to explore how various actors interpreted and 
understood nuclear power. By bringing in secondary voices, the central interests and perceptions 
shown within the articles pertaining to each data source may have become impossible to isolate. 
However, it is noted that by not bringing in additional literature, certain issues, events and 
perspectives may have been overlooked. Nevertheless, effort was put into additional reading 
outside of the case study parameters and therefore events that were not noted in the data were 
recognised as meaningful omissions by the researcher. Secondly, and more practically, the time and 
word constraints of the thesis limited the size of the case study and decisions were made in terms 
of when to stop developing and elaborating.  
Historical Study  
 
The specific configuration of institutional logics within an industry at a given point in time is not a 
temporally isolated event but is symptomatic of context and history. Theoretical movements within 
institutionalism towards complexity (Greenwood et al 2010, Delbridge and Edwards 2013) and 
logics constellations (Reay and Goodrick 2012) illustrate that institutional research appreciates 
these concerns. For instance, Greenwood et al’s (2010) paper on complexity argues that applicable 
cultural lenses can only be gained by the consideration of ‘appropriate historical linkages’ (p.26). 
The authors found that the legitimation of actions from a managerial logic was dependent on a 
community’s regional identification, which had its origins in history; regional identification is 
‘…symbolically associated in Spain with rejection of a state logic imposed following an earlier and 
bitter civil war’ (p.26). Indeed these researchers suggest that it is necessary to understand the 
arrangements of institutional logics as part of a historical context to hypothesise why they converge 
in particular ways to create institutional transformation at given moments. A historically sensitive 
analysis of institutional change and transformation is pursued in this thesis because the ‘green 
paradox’ of nuclear power is merely a present moment embedded within the complexities of the 
past.   
Ontologically CR researchers have shown the importance of context (Leca and Naccache 2006 
p.631). Houston (2010) argues that time is very relevant in shaping social outcomes because 
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individuals face constant challenges throughout history. He draws on Archer’s (1995) 
morphogenetic approach to emphasize this temporal aspect because she highlights how social 
structures are reproduced as part of history. Overall, according to Houston, the CR approach to 
context is ‘…congruent with Marx’s (1973 p.146) famous utterance: ‘The tradition of the dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living’ (2010 p.76). As such the Critical 
Realist researcher must consider that any social outcome is the product of context, generative 
mechanisms and, importantly, time. The physical limitations of the research project meant that a 
relatively modest history was built over the 60 years of the UK nuclear energy programme. Although 
additional insights may have been developed from a more extensive history, it was felt that historic 
understandings of civil nuclear power from the point of its implementation had a particularly 
important part to play in understanding the present opinions and attitudes towards the technology. 
To help the reader through the complex history of the case study a timeline is provided before each 
of the findings chapters. These timelines provide a chronological overview of the key events which 
occur over the subsequent chapter and a brief overview of their implications. It is felt that these 
timelines offer a useful reference point for the reader to quickly review the key events within each 
of the findings chapters. Additionally, although each chapter covers a distinct period of time, the 
way they are structured means that they often go forwards and backwards in time throughout each 
period. The timelines therefore provide a backbone to temporally re-orientate the reader if needed.  
Documents 
 
The case study was constructed from newspaper articles sourced from online archives and a variety 
of Government databases. In the collection of Government documents most official white papers 
(and their drafts) and policy statements were sourced from the National Archives in Kew, London 
(via either their online portal or from their headquarters). A small number of documents were 
inaccessible from the Archives and hard copies had to be purchased from alternative sources. For 
example the 1995 white paper ‘The Prospects for Nuclear Power’ (Department for Trade and 
Industry) was purchased from Amazon marketplace. The National Archives permitted searches for 
numerous parliamentary documents relating to ‘nuclear power’, ‘nuclear energy’ or ‘atomic 
power/energy’. These searches brought up commons minutes, committee minutes, select 
committee reports and confidential memos. All sources pertaining to nuclear power were collected 
and considered in case study construction. Additionally, special reports such as the Flowers Report 
(1970) were accessed via the National Archives or their respective Government Departments. More 
recent white papers and report were downloaded directly from the Department for Energy and 
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Climate Change (DECC), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the 
Environment Agency (EA) websites. During the reading of all these sources additional reports were 
often mentioned which were then searched for and accessed when available. Certain Acts were 
also included in the data analysis if related to the Energy Industry. For example the 2008 Climate 
Change Act had implications on the legitimation of nuclear power.  
Table 5 Document Sourcing 
Data Source Owner Political 
Orientation 
50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 00s Database 
The 
Guardian 
Scott Trust 
Ltd 
Centre-left, 
2010 Liberal 
Democrat 
supporter 
15 34 14 59  37 115  1950-2000 
Guardian Digital 
Archive 
 
2000+ Guardian 
Online  
The Times News 
Corporation 
Centre-right, 
2010 
Conservative 
supporter 
52 52 78 124 56 118 1945-1985 Times 
Digital Archive 
 
1985-2010 Times 
Online 
Daily Mirror Trinity Mirror Social 
Democrat, 
2010 Labour 
supporter 
12 7 9 21 10 26 1957-2010 
UKpressonline 
Database 
Government   26  63 10 21 51 59 National Archives, 
Government 
Department 
Websites 
Other 
sources 
International Atomic Energy Authority (UN) reports, Friends of the Earth (1976) 
response to influential Flowers Report by the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution, Nuclear Energy Authority (OECD) reports.   
Table showing the data sources used, their political orientation and the number of articles sourced per decade. 
To collect newspaper articles for each paper their respective archives (Table 4) were searched using 
the same terms ‘nuclear power’ ‘nuclear energy’ and ‘atomic energy/power’ either in the title, 
abstract or main body of the text. These searches brought up hundreds of hits which were 
individually read to ensure relevance. For example, some articles mentioned ‘nuclear power 
station’ passively whilst reporting on something unrelated and were thus discarded before deeper 
analysis. Each database provided results which covered each decade as expected given the major 
events and themes within each. For all three papers, a much larger number of articles were 
accessible in the 2000s due to the increase in digital media articles. Similarly, the 1950s have a 
relatively small number of articles partly because the civil programme began in 1956, and partly 
because the newspaper articles were often shorter and concise. Additionally, the historical reach 
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of the databases differed given the archiving of each of the papers (see Table 4). The three 
newspapers were chosen due to a number of similarities and differences. They are all daily papers 
which increased the likelihood of large data sets and they all predated the UK civil nuclear industry. 
Conversely they have different owners and political orientations, thereby ensuring that together 
they provide a comprehensive view of the diverse political perspective which influenced, informed 
and interpreted the nuclear power debate. Given the time and space constraints of the thesis it was 
considered that articles from additional newspapers would create a dataset of an unmanageable 
size. It should additionally be noted that the omission of page numbers in the article references is 
because the online databases from which the articles were sourced often showed only the text 
excerpt and therefore the page numbers were not available.  
Theoretical Considerations when using Text 
 
This thesis draws from scholars who have focused on the use of textual data and discourse analysis 
within a CR framework. An overview of the associations between discourse and institutionalism is 
provided in the literature review (pp.27-34). What are important to delineate here are the ways in 
which texts can be theoretically understood within a CR framework; that is, what do texts allow the 
CR researcher to do and what do they represent as a data source? Importantly, for CR researchers, 
language does not reflect the ‘true’ nature of reality but may provide key insights into the nature 
of events and institutions in the domain of the actual. The researcher may then ‘read back’ (Wry 
2009) to surmise the character of institutional logics in the domain of the real via inference. Leca 
and Naccache (2006) have noted that researchers can ‘…render actors’ subjective view of the world 
by mean of discourse analysis’ (p.632). In other words, the analysis of documents aligns with the 
CR assumption that the researcher should uncover actor’s understanding and perceptions because 
it provides a window to deeper level acuities.  
Primarily this thesis has taken methodological instruction from the discourse-historical method of 
Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as developed by Fairclough 
(2005) and Wodak and Meyer (2009). Van Leeuwen and Wodak’s (1999) discourse-historical 
method is applicable because it shares two interests with this thesis; historical context and 
discursive legitimation strategies. The method has three dimensions – the content of the data, the 
discursive strategies employed and the linguistic realisation off these contents and strategies. 
Additionally, history is important because ‘discursive “events” are embedded’ (p.91). As such the 
method focuses both on specific texts and the wider environment, including national demographic 
and political trends. They point to how legitimation is central in texts: ‘…representation always 
91 
 
involves some measure of legitimation or of de-legitimation, critique, opposition. It always seeks to 
construct new social practices, to perpetuate, justify or transform existing practices, or to destruct 
practices which no longer serve their purposes’ (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999 p.98). Overall their 
methods point to the importance of recognising both historical context and broader contextual 
variables in order to understand the purpose of discursive legitimation strategies within textual 
data.  
In terms of institutionalism the recurrence of discursive legitimation strategies pertaining to events 
and institutions are understood to elucidate certain situated manifestations of higher order (and 
ontologically deeper) institutional logics. Of course, actors writing texts are not always aware of 
existing institutions and therefore it is the job of the researcher to iterate between empirical 
tendencies, context and established theory to qualify an institution or the activated generative 
mechanisms of an institutional logic (Leca and Naccache 2006). Nevertheless the difference 
between text and behaviour must be noted. There are certain behaviours which are made invisible 
if one purely focuses on text. For example, Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) idea of ‘decoupling’ shows 
that if a researcher focused purely on organisational texts to account for adoption rates of 
institutionalised practices the decoupling between textually noted compliance and physical non-
compliance based on actual implementation would be rendered invisible. As such, the researcher 
may miss important data that might better show the extent of generative mechanisms at play.  
However, it is hoped that the wealth of documents from multiple political and journalistic 
perspectives and sources will build a case study which is rich and detailed enough to cover both 
attitudes and actions relating to the green nuclear debate and its context.  
This thesis also draws from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough 2005) which adopts a 
position of analytical dualism in line with CR. In so doing CDA understands a ‘…dialectical 
relationship between discursive events and situations/ institutions/ social structures which frame 
them’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009 p5). As such, the realist view of discourse analysis centres on the 
‘…tension between process and pre-structured objects’ (Fairclough 2005 p.918). Consequently, 
discursive strategies (and language in general) are seen as social practices which are integral to the 
study of action and interaction because they mediate the relationship between events and 
structures (Wodak and Meyer 2009, Fleetwood 2005). With this in mind, discursive legitimation 
strategies are understood as a form of social practice which may both support and transform 
institutions depending on the reflexivity and intent of embedded actors. However, CDA also 
includes detailed semiotic analysis of textual data which is highly time-consuming. Unfortunately 
the time constraints of this research have meant that a detailed CDA of the linguistic characteristics 
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of each text was unachievable. Indeed Van Leeuwen and Wodak’s (1999) discourse analysis only 
focused on seven texts because of the depth they went into for each. Nevertheless, elements from 
the analytical-dualist emphasis of CDA and the discourse-historical approach (Van Leeuwen and 
Wodak 1999, Wodak 2009) are combined in this thesis because they provide useful insights into 
the ontological properties of texts and the ways in which they may be utilised in retroduction.  
More generally texts are beneficial for the construction of historical case studies because articles 
and policy documents written in the past may be accessed. As such they are not retrospective as 
might be the case with interview transcripts relating to the past, and may therefore provide more 
‘reliable’ information on events and public attitudes relating to issues which span multiple decades. 
Nevertheless, it is important to access meanings and understandings of said events and therefore 
the researcher has to be conscious of the types of textual data gathered. For example, newspaper 
articles were chosen in this thesis because they illustrate various attitudes and understandings 
pertaining to highly publicised debates. Additionally both Government and media texts attempt to 
justify their positions within those debates and will therefore present legitimation strategies. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that CR researchers must be reflexive in their construction of past 
texts in present terms. CDA researchers are self-reflective of their own research process and should 
be aware that their own work is driven by social, economic and political motives and that they are 
not in a superior position (Wodak and Meyer 2009). The types of text utilised in this research will 
be considered in more detail below.  
Media 
 
Newspaper articles are not often part of the data cache of institutionalists, although lately they 
have been employed in the related fields of rhetoric and legitimacy literature (Kuronen et al 2005, 
Vaara et al 2006, Riaz et al 2011). Kuronen and colleagues (2005) suggest that the media is a domain 
of journalists’ rhetorical constructions which tend to confirm the existing presuppositions held by 
the audience and carry out an essential part of the legitimisation and naturalisation of ideas and 
ideologies. As such the rhetorical constructions identifiable within media texts reflect the interests 
of the audience and may thus reflect and reproduce widely held assumptions of a practice or idea. 
Consequently this research recognises the ability of media legitimations to echo wider societal 
understandings. Nevertheless, the media has also been understood as a set of actors which have 
some degree of agency and may undergo some level of transformative institutional work. Vaara 
and colleagues (2006) consider journalism as ‘institutional work’. For example, the rationalistic 
discourses embedded within journalistic projects may have intentions to convince an audience of 
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the legitimacy of a contested idea. Therefore the media are an important, although not well known 
‘legitimating arena’ (Vaara et al 2006 p789) for organisational practice because they ‘give sense’ to 
phenomena. Because journalists act as gatekeepers and editors of messages they have influence 
over what issues to raise and what to ignore, what perspectives to take, whom to give voice to and 
who to leave silent (Vaara et al 2006). Riaz et al (2011) agree that the media undertakes institutional 
work: ‘…the media itself engages in institutional work through the process of framing’ (p.188). Here 
framing refers to ‘making sense of’ events and issues and relates to the agentic intentional and 
unintentional construction of legitimating arguments for a purpose.  
Government 
 
A number of different Government documents were utilised in order to acquire a consistent 
representation of data over time; for example, white papers are infrequent and therefore draft 
white papers, independent committee reports and parliamentary minutes are useful 
supplementary sources of information detailing energy policy justification and action.  Careful 
coding and filing ensured that the type of document used, its ‘writer’ and its purpose were not lost 
in the analysis. For example, the findings explicitly distinguish between quotes from white papers, 
arguments made by Ministers in parliamentary sessions and recommendations made by certain 
politically motivated sub-committees. As such, each text and its legitimating strategy are 
considered alongside the context of their creation. Aside from these complexities much of the 
Government data have a similar agenda to that of the press – to convince society of its perspective 
by legitimating certain proposals whilst delegitimating others. Additionally the media often relayed 
the legitimating strategies of Government publications. Given these similarities both media and 
Government documents are coded and analysed in terms of the same institutional logics and their 
signifiers.  
Analysis and Coding 
 
This process is part of Houston’s (2010) fourth step which compels the researcher to elaborate, 
refine, and falsify the research findings through analytical robustness. The hypothetical 
assumptions underlying the research questions should be confirmed or reworked during this stage 
so that the findings can reflect the most persuasive and comprehensive answer to the research 
agenda available to the researcher. For the analysis both media and Government data sets were 
analysed using a CAQDAS (Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software) called MAX-qda. 
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Media and Government data sets were analysed in different ‘document systems’ to limit the 
complexity involved within having too many documents in one ‘system’. However, both were coded 
under the same emergent coding categories to ensure consistency between the analyses of the 
data sources. 
CAQDAS is often critiqued because it is assumed that the richness of qualitative research is lost 
when the systematic nature of the software alienates the researcher from the data (Fielding and 
Lee 2002). However, Kelle (2004) defends the use of CAQDAS and argues that the techniques used 
in qualitative analysis software are newer versions of the traditional methods of coding, indexing 
and cross-referencing. Additionally scholars using CAQDAS are forced to make their use of the 
software transparent to avoid such criticisms. Indeed, throughout this research there was a highly 
conscious effort to avoid the alienation of coded segments from context. The memo function was 
used to annotate every coded segment with article subject, context and any apparent position on 
nuclear power. Ultimately CAQDAS was used minimally as a technique for simple coding to avoid 
the estrangement of contextual richness from specific quotes. Given the electronic format of much 
of the archival based data it provided a straightforward alternative to coding the data in paper 
format.  
Coding was of particular importance during the analysis given the large quantity of textual data (see 
Appendix 3 for coding framework). The initial round of coding set to unpick key events, issues and 
debates from the data and make the mass of text more approachable for a deeper analysis. As such 
the codes developed were predominantly descriptive in nature and related to both the wider 
energy industry and the nuclear industry more specifically. The second round of coding explored 
these events, debates and issues in more depth, and focussed particularly on unearthing the 
justificatory discourses and arguments surrounding them. In line with Kelle (2004) this second 
round of coding was loosely informed by the institutional literature; the justificatory and 
legitimating discourses provided insight into the higher-level institutional structures and the ways 
in which their conjunctions led to observed events.  
Following the coding process an abductive analysis (see Table 4) was undertaken. A case study was 
written based on all the codes previously explored and the analysis looked to understand the 
dynamics of the debates with reference to wider literature. A number of theories of knowledge 
which best seemed to explain what was happening were applied and then developed where 
necessary in order to better explain the phenomena. For example, relationships between coded 
sets were explored and it as noted that the set of institutional logics denoted by Friedland and 
Alford (1991) would provide an appropriate framework from which to analyse the data. 
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Additionally, it was felt that the contestation evident between certain parties matched the Systems 
of Exchange theory posited by Biggart and Delbridge (2004). Additionally a number of legitimation 
strategies unpicked from the cases appeared to match previous literature in the area (Vaara et al 
2006, Vaara and Tienari 2002). Where existing theories of knowledge lacked explanatory power, 
possible new theories were proposed such as ‘situated logics’ (p.52). Moreover, the development 
of the concept of an environmental logic was an aim of the research and the coding which spoke to 
its nature was emergent and fully informed by the data. The coding and analysis process did not 
appear to contradict the possible utility of an environmental institutional logic. As such the 
environmental institutional logic developed in Chapter 3 was used in the same way as the 
institutional logics of Friedland and Alford (1991) during analysis.  
The selection, elaboration and development of appropriate theories of knowledge was an iterative 
process. A number of theories which first appeared to match the data were later discarded, and 
new theories were applied as the analysis of the data deepened. Although it is believed that the 
thesis applies the best means to explain the data explored, it should be noted that future theory 
development and alternative disciplines/perspectives might lead to a better explanation of events.  
Conclusion of Methods 
 
This chapter has detailed how the CR methodology of retroduction has been applied to this research 
and has clarified the specifics of the research method. The chapter has examined the characteristics 
of CR and how it resonates with neo-institutionalism’s key theoretical and analytical concepts; with 
particular attention paid to how institutional logics can be conceptualised from the CR ontological 
viewpoint. Houston’s (2010) stages of retroduction have been used to structure both the research 
questions and the research process. Initially the transcendental research questions were presented. 
Each question spoke to the nature of social structural entities and their dynamic with agency (i.e. 
how institutional constructs such as logics may interact as a result of micro-level processes). 
Secondly, the hypothetical relationships among theoretical concepts were developed in order to 
illustrate how the thesis approached generative mechanisms, context, time and agency.  
The use of qualitative methods and the construction of the case study were explained. A historical 
case study was constructed from newspaper articles and Government documents which provided 
a comprehensive story of the UK nuclear power industry and the environmental debates 
surrounding it. Given the CR perspective taken these texts were not understood as illustrating 
‘truth’ or objective reality. Instead they were considered as the creations of actors who were 
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attempting to discursively persuade others to agree with their assessments of nuclear power’s 
legitimacy. The discursive strategies provided in these media and Government texts provided 
possibilities for the nature of institutional logics to be retroduced. Moreover the methods of 
analysis applied elaborated the hypothesised relationship among theoretical concepts as suggested 
by Houston’s (2010) fourth stage of retroduction. MAX-qda software was used to code the data 
both for theoretical insights and to aid the organisation of the data into debate themes. The latter 
process helped contextualise the former and the two could be cross referenced. The analytical 
system was structured around pre-determined concepts from the literature, but remained flexible 
to allow new concepts and themes to emerge from the data. Constant movement between the 
literature and the empirical findings ensured that the analytical process remained iterative so that 
the development of the findings was always done with prior theory in mind.   
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Table 6 Overview Timeline for Chapter 5: Introducing Nuclear Power 
Covers the period 1940 to 1970 
Date Key Event Details 
1945 The Atomic Bomb Committee recommends the 
building of one or more nuclear reactors 
 The first sign that the UK is to have its own civil 
nuclear programme 
1946 Launch of the Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment  
Construction begins immediately on non-commercial 
nuclear power reactors. 
1947 Windscale chosen as the site for the first 
commercial nuclear reactors (Cumbria) 
  
1952 The first reprocessing facility begins 
construction on the Windscale site  
Allows the UK control over much of the nuclear fuel 
cycle and lessens dependence on other countries for 
nuclear power development 
1952 Britain has its first testable atomic weapon and 
launches Operation Hurricane 
 UK begins to catch up with the American Manhattan 
Project to fortify its place as a nuclear ‘superpower’ 
1953 USA President Eisenhower’s speech to the UN 
entitled 'Atoms for Peace'  
 Clear example of attempts to conceptually distance 
nuclear power development from nuclear weapons 
1953 Government announce the UKs civil nuclear 
programme to the public 
 Until 1953 all development had been in secret. 
1954 The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority is 
established to take over the responsibility of 
nuclear power operations from the Ministry of 
Supply 
 Move hoped to speed up nuclear development 
1955 Britain launches its second nuclear weapons 
test programme called Operation Mosaic in 
Australia  
 UK adamant in nuclear weapons development 
1955 Suez Crisis threatens to constrain the 
transportation of fuel from the Middle East to 
Europe 
Concern over security of supply played a major part 
in legitimating the move from purely research based 
reactors to a fully commercial nuclear programme 
1955 A White Paper called 'A Programme of Nuclear 
Power' outlines the first official nuclear power 
programme.  
The paper outlined a ten year plan for the 
construction of twelve MAGNOX reactors of British 
design 
1957 Britain tests its first Hydrogen bomb   Brings the UK in line with Russia and the USA in 
terms of nuclear weapons development 
1957 The commercial programme is expanded  Construction is going better than expected and more 
stations are added to the schedule   
1957 Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
established by the Energy Act 1957 
Financially minded operators of all power stations in 
the UK. Given authority to tender and authorise all 
new station builds 
1957 Environmental opposition to the first nuclear 
programme occurs throughout 1957 and 1958, 
during which a number of inquiries are set up to 
discuss issues arising from local development 
Most concern focussed on the impact of the stations 
on the amenity value of the countryside in which 
they were to be installed  
1957 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) is 
established and is primarily concerned with 
atomic weapons 
CND and the Daily Mirror begin linking nuclear 
weapons escalation with the nuclear power 
programme 
1957 The United Nations International Atomic Energy 
Agency is established to disseminate the 'Atoms 
for Peace' message 
The UN challenged the CND by proposing that 
nuclear power represented the peaceful 'version' of 
nuclear power 
1958-
1959 
Fuel stocks which were threatened by the Suez 
Crisis have recuperated  
The Central Electricity Generating Board came into 
conflict with the Ministry for Power and UKAEA 
given the high costs of nuclear power and the 
lowering costs of fossil fuels  
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1959 A controversial inquiry over the Dungeness 
nuclear site ends in a Government report 
justifying the build 
The inquiry Illustrated the way in which the 
Government rejected environmental consideration 
as of secondary importance to financial and resource 
security concerns  
1960 The White Paper 'The Nuclear Power 
Programme' by the Ministry of Power re-phases 
and slows the nuclear development 
The Ministry of Power and CEGB agreed that nuclear 
power costs were too high to maintain expansion in 
light of dropping fossil fuel costs (Post-Suez crisis) 
1960 Indecision over next reactor type slows next 
programme  
Cost and efficiency issues with the first MAGNOX 
type reactors lead to reconsideration over reactor 
designs 
1962 Nassau Agreement sets up NATO Cold War intensifies  
1964 A new Labour Government under Harold Wilson 
wins the election  
Labour neither disarms the UK nor halts the nuclear 
power programme despite their manifesto pledging 
disarmament 
1964 Labour publishes the White Paper 'The Second 
Nuclear Power Programme'  
Confirmed a second civil programme with the new 
British designed AGR type reactors – expected to be 
more cost efficient than MAGNOX. 
1967 Labour releases the White Paper 'Nuclear 
Power: Britain’s Chance is Now' which justifies a 
new nuclear programme despite past struggles 
The AGR had proven difficult to construct and the 
White Paper hoped to rally support for a third 
programme 
1967 Following the White Paper, the Select 
Committee on Science and Technology 
recommends that construction be hastened  
A third nuclear programme is outlined for the late 
1970s 
1970 A new Conservative Government comes into 
power  
 
The new Government had less enthusiasm for a new 
nuclear programme given that the AGR reactors 
were proving troublesome. A review of reactor 
choices was initiated 
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Chapter 5: Introducing Nuclear Power 
Introduction to the Case Study 
 
The social history of nuclear power and its relationship with the natural environment is a lengthy 
and complex one. Since the initial construction of the UK’s civil nuclear programme in the mid-
1950s the environmental credentials of nuclear power have been a subject of impassioned debate. 
In the early decades nuclear power was considered by some as a threat to countryside amenities. 
Over time societal perceptions have transformed and nuclear power has been understood as both 
a fundamental threat to nature and as a celebrated green technology with potential to rescue the 
nation from impending climate change. Throughout the 60 years within which these altering 
perceptions of the environmental merits of atomic energy progressed, the nuclear power industry 
has had to fight for legitimacy in an energy industry which has faced considerable contextual 
turbulence. Throughout the case study four central contextual themes impacted institutional 
variance and salience within the industry: volatile international energy markets, militant national 
trade union pressures, technological and scientific advancements and a move from nationalised 
industry to privatisation. As a highly controversial technology, nuclear power’s continuation given 
such contextual commotion is fascinating. An institutional perspective is particularly useful in 
uncovering and explaining the story of a technology which appeared to mean many things to many 
different people; both marketable and financially suicidal, secure whilst also inestimably 
dangerous, and as both an environmental saviour as well as an apocalyptic certainty. The 
institutional approach is analytically equipped to explore the tensions and contradictions which 
uphold such polarisations in perspective.  
Analysis of textual data from both the Government and the newspapers provided insights into 
institutional value structures within and external to the energy industry. Such structures are 
referred to as situated institutional logics which represent the localised manifestations of societal 
institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991). In particular the energy industry’s decisions over 
energy options seemed informed initially by societal level Capitalist Market logics and the 
Bureaucratic State logic. These were manifest in the form of national-market and state-resource 
situated logics respectively. Initially, an environmental institutional logic was not manifest within 
the energy industry. Actors external to the energy industry were originally concerned with the 
effect of nuclear generators on the amenity of the countryside. As new and emergent meanings of 
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‘environmentalism’ blossomed, informed by cultural imports from an American environmental 
social movement, increasing pressure was exerted on the energy industry to base energy policy 
decisions on environmental grounds. However, it was not until the late 1980s that the energy 
industry began to differentiate between energy options by considering their environmental 
credentials. However, the nature of what could be considered a ‘credential’ was defined by a 
situated target-based environmental logic which became progressively institutionalised within the 
energy industry. This situated logic valued a quantitative understanding of environmentalism which 
reflected the instrumental rationality of the energy industry. This logic predominantly informed 
arguments supporting green nuclear power and thus riled the environmental social movement 
lobby who continued to recognise nuclear power as a fundamentally ecologically damaging 
technology. By the end of this case study in 2010 nuclear power represented a ‘green paradox’; it 
was understood as both the saviour and destroyer of civilisation and nature.  
This chapter sets up the parameters of the energy industry and examines its inception. It also 
delineates the institutional structure of the industry to understand how a nascent nuclear energy 
industry was propelled forward and legitimated to the public. Situated logics within the energy 
industry, although sometimes in tension, entrenched decision makers within value structures 
against which nuclear power was discursively legitimated. Such legitimation was often pursued by 
a pro-nuclear lobby within both Labour and Conservative Governments and tended to draw on the 
wider economic and political context of the industry. Given the lack of environmental knowledge 
in the public domain the nuclear energy industry rapidly expanded in the 1950s. This chapter 
suggests that an amenity approach to environmentalism was taken by the public due to a lack of 
education regarding the implications of nuclear installations on local ecology. Environmental 
ignorance was reinforced by the Government and media’s discursive strategies which aimed to 
distance nuclear energy from nuclear weapons and normalise it so that its legitimacy could be 
judged on the same institutional norms as all other energy options. 
The UK Nuclear Power Programme 
 
‘… it is not too much to say that the exploitation of nuclear energy may come to be regarded 
as the most important step taken by man in the mastery of nature since the discovery of 
fire’ (Paymaster General 1953 p.5) 
War is a powerful impetus for innovation, especially in the field of technological weaponry. The 
power of splitting an atom (fission) to release energy was part of this technological push towards 
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increasingly more devastating arms during the Second World War. This created an important 
pretext for nuclear power; civil uses of fission were born from atomic bomb development. The 
power released from nuclear fission was discovered in 1938 when Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls 
revealed that a fissile atom (an unstable isotope), once bombarded with neutrons, splits and 
produces free photons, neutrons and a large amount of energy. By the early 1940s MAUD, a 
committee inspired by Frisch’s findings, was formed under the UK’s Air Ministry department to 
work out the basic principles of fission bomb design and uranium enrichment. In 1941 Britain’s first 
atomic bomb began construction under the code name ‘Tube Alloys’. In the same year a special 
division called the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research was established to take 
responsibility for early nuclear technological development. During the following four years the UK 
dispatched scientists to aid the US based Manhattan Project which was tasked with creating the 
world’s first atomic bombs. Two bombs were built by the project and were detonated over the 
Japanese Cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (‘little boy’ and ‘fat man’ respectively) in August 1945. 
In a memorandum on nuclear to his cabinet the British Prime Minister Clement Atlee commented; 
‘There is now a weapon of transcendent power against which there can be no real defence. 
Its use in war can only lead to mutual destruction and the collapse of civilisation…The only 
hope for the world is that we should all lay aside our nationalistic ideas, and strive without 
reservation to bring about an international relationship in which war is entirely ruled out’ 
(Cabinet 1945 p.1) 
Merely a year later the first general assembly of the United Nations met in London in January to 
establish the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission charged with the task of eliminating all 
weapons of mass destruction. Instead of convincing the world to abandon nuclear arms, American 
ownership of atomic bombs had only spurred armament in other nations including the UK. In 1946 
the responsibility for the UK’s nuclear weapons programme was transferred over to the Ministry of 
Supply signalling the beginning of a post-war nuclear programme. The UK Government officially 
decided in 1947 that the country would go ahead with the development and acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, but this was not announced publicly until 1953.  
Although the nuclear bomb had taken much of the nuclear development interest, nuclear power 
for civilian uses became an important possibility in the latter half of the 1940s. In August 1945 
Clement Atlee convened a secret cabinet committee on atomic energy to establish nuclear policy 
under the code named GEN.75, also known as the Atomic Bomb Committee. An advisory group 
called the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy (ACAE) was also established to consider the UK’s 
nuclear power options. GEN.75 convened in December to consider the reports of the ACAE and 
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recommended the building of one or more nuclear reactors, marking the start of the UK civil nuclear 
power programme. 1946 saw the launch of the first Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) 
directed by John Cockcroft. The AERE was based in Harwell and became the site of the UK’s first 
non-commercial nuclear reactors nicknamed BEPO (Britain Experimental Pile 0). BEPO went on the 
grid in 1948 and was the first large reactor outside of the USA. Early reactors such as BEPO were 
vital to the development of the civil power programme, but were primarily for producing materials 
for the expanding nuclear weapons programme.  
Meanwhile, the development of a commercial and civilian nuclear power programme continued. In 
1947 an atomic site in Windscale was announced and the two Windscale piles (small reactors) went 
critical (activated) in late 1950 and mid-1951. By 1952 a reprocessing facility had been installed on 
site to produce fuel and plutonium in-house for the reactors. It was not until 1953 that the 
Government dropped the wall of secrecy and officially announced that a civil nuclear programme 
was in progress. Soon afterwards an additional four larger reactors were commissioned at the 
Windscale site. The slow speed at which the Ministry of Supply was progressing on the nuclear 
programme frustrated the Government and led to a transferral of responsibility for the entire 
nuclear programme to a newly created United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in 1954. 
The non-departmental UKAEA was presumed to be more flexible when researching and developing 
the ‘…frontiers of knowledge’ (Paymaster General 1952 p.3). Nuclear innovation was developing at 
pace and enticed a higher degree of optimism in its practicability: ‘…however crude and primitive 
our first nuclear power reactors may appear to future generations, we can look forward with 
confidence to the time when industrial power from the atom will be a major factor in the world's 
economy’ (Paymaster General 1953 p.5).  
The first official civil nuclear programme was announced in a 1955 Energy White paper labelled ‘A 
Programme of Nuclear Power’ (Ministry of Fuel and Power). Intended for public consumption, the 
paper enthusiastically outlined a ten year plan for the construction of twelve nuclear power stations 
at an estimated cost of £300 million, and suggested further developments thereafter. Construction 
of two gas cooled MAGNOX reactors was to start in mid-1957 (to be operational by 1960-61) 
followed by two further stations 18 months later. Additional stations were anticipated with perhaps 
four more to begin construction in 1960 and then a further four starting 18 months later, although 
the reactor type for these remained unspecified. Initial nuclear capacity of between 1,500 and 2,000 
Megawatts (MWs) would be equivalent to roughly five million tons of coal a year by 1965, 
alleviating stresses on coal production and substitutive fuels. Reactors were to be designed and 
built by private industry for the nationally owned Electricity Authorities and would be funded via 
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public financing. By February 1957 a memorandum by the Minister of Power suggested that 
progress on the MAGNOX reactors had been considerably more rapid than expected and as such 
the programme was expanded further: ‘I am advised by the Atomic Energy Authority that, in the 
light of the technical progress that has been achieved since February 1955, it would now be 
reasonable to plan for a nuclear capacity of 6,000MWs…would include the commissioning of 
nineteen nuclear stations on sixteen different sites before the end of 1965’ (Ministry of Power 
1957). The white paper offered little scope for hesitation, making clear that nuclear power’s 
progression should be unhindered: 
‘This formidable task must be tackled with vigour, imagination and courage. We must not 
be put off by setbacks or uncertainties. The stakes are high but the final reward will be 
immeasurable. We must keep ourselves in the forefront of the development of nuclear 
power so that we can play our proper part in harnessing this new form of energy for the 
benefit of mankind.‘ (Ministry of Fuel and Power 1955) 
Increasing Government spending on the nationally owned nuclear industry’s civil practices 
developed it as a key player within the wider energy Industry. Freed from its isolated role as a 
military research industry, nuclear power was rapidly transforming into a recognisable force and 
gaining comparability to incumbent electricity options.   
The Nuclear Industry and the Energy Industry 
 
It is important to consider the nuclear energy industry as an integral part of a wider energy industry 
in the UK. Isolating it and analysing its development without consideration of alternative energy 
industries would have little utility given that the legitimacy of nuclear power was continually 
dependent on its perceived relative ‘value’ when compared against energy alternatives. These 
values are denoted by the institutional logics to be discussed. Of interest to this case are the energy 
industry actors which engaged in a direct relationship with the nuclear energy industry. Thus when 
the ‘energy industry’ is referred to as the main unit of analysis it is predominantly referring to those 
actors and organisations which deliberate over energy choices and the constitution of the energy 
mix. The nuclear industry is also referred to specifically and is a general term for actors and 
organisations involved directly in the development and operations of atomic energy.  
Actors involved in nuclear power within the energy industry can be presented in five categories: 
Decision-makers, Regulators, Researchers, Constructors and Operators (see Table 6). Decision-
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makers are responsible for decisions over whether nuclear facilities are constructed. These actors 
are central in the energy industry as they determine energy mix proportions and control which 
energy technology will receive funding. Regulators are related to the nuclear industry directly 
through their specialisations in nuclear safety for example, and operate for the State whilst 
remaining primarily independent. This category also includes short-term independent committees 
established to inform key decisions on issues such as waste disposal and environmental effects. 
Researchers include specific nuclear establishments which focus on the research and development 
of nuclear power generators. For example, the UKAEA was set up in 1954 as a non-departmental 
organisation independent of the Ministry of Supply to take over nuclear research and development 
(as well as fuel procurement, fabrication and processing). These actors remain state owned for a 
lengthy period of the case study. Constructors have undergone many changes. Initially they were 
amalgamated into numerous consortia which would take on whole plant builds tendered by the 
CEGB. They have been closely controlled by the State for many decades. Finally, operators 
represent the companies formed to run nuclear power after the dismantling of the CEGB.  
A focus on nuclear energy within the context of the broader energy industry also brings into view 
alternative energy generating technologies which compete with nuclear power for investment and 
Government interest. Given contextual oscillations within the energy markets, during different 
periods the nuclear power industry finds itself struggling against various other energy options. For 
example, the National Coal Board and energy based unions such as the National Union of 
Mineworkers enter debates around nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s when the programme 
for nuclear energy appeared threatening amidst mine closures. This illustrates the debates around 
nuclear energy should always be considered within the context of the wider energy industry. 
Nevertheless, all industries are typically understood as aiming to at least appear legitimate against 
the same institutional criteria embedded within the mind-sets of decision-making actors, and thus 
the situated logics of the energy industry as a whole will affect the arguments encouraging or 
challenging all industries. Hence at the level of the energy industry a distinct set of institutional 
logics is harboured, against which all industries attempt to appear  
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Table 7 Actor Categories within the Energy Industry 
 Decision-Makers 
(the first two span 
multiple energy 
industries) 
Key Regulators (national) Researchers Constructors Operators 
Nationalised 
1950-1996 
Department of 
Power, Ministry of 
Defence (with 
guidance from both 
ministerial and 
independent task  
based committees) 
 
Central Electricity 
Generating Board 
(CEGB) 
 
 
Health and Safety 
Directorate and its 
Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (HSE &NII  
created by the Nuclear 
Installations Act 1965) 
 
National Radiological 
Protection Board (NRPB 
created in 1970 - present) 
 
 
 
UKAEA (UK Atomic Energy 
Authority accountable to the 
Department for Trade and 
Industry) 
 
AERA (Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment aka Harwell – as part 
of UKAEA) 
 
AWRE (Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment founded in 1950 by 
the Ministry of Supply. Transferred 
to UKAEA in 54, and production 
capacities transferred to BNFL in 
71. In 73 the remaining parts of 
AWRE were transferred to the 
Ministry of Defence) 
Formed 1955-57:  
Nuclear Energy Company, (NEC) 
British Nuclear Design and Construction Ltd 
(BNDC) 
Atomic Energy Group (AEG) 
Nuclear Power Plant Co (NPPC).  
Atomic Power Constructions (APC)  
 
1960, NEC and NPPC joined to create The 
Nuclear Power Group (TNPG), and AEG and APC 
joined to make the United Power Company 
leaving three surviving consortia 
 
By 1970 only BNDC and TNPG were operating  
 
In 1973 the National Nuclear Corporation (NNC) 
was set up to make a single construction entity, 
and controlled a subsidiary called the Nuclear 
Power Company (NPC) that would design and 
construct stations. NNC would be held by the 
GEC,  UKAEA and the British Nuclear Associates – 
7 companies left from old consortia 
 
 
Stations operated at plant level but 
accountable to the CEGB and the 
Department of Power.  
 
During energy privatisation the plants were 
split into separate companies who then 
operated the plants.  
 
Nuclear Electric (set up in 1990 after CEGB 
was disbanded. Nuclear stations initially part 
of National Power which was to be 
privatised were withdrawn and held in public 
ownership in Nuclear Electric.) 
 
Fuel reprocessing plants were operated by 
the UKAEA and then BNFL, and research 
establishments were operated by the UKAEA, 
all on behalf of the Government.  
Post nuclear 
privatisation 
1996 + 
Government – 
makes overall 
strategic direction 
(retains power to 
vary attractiveness 
of industries) 
private industry 
chooses how to 
Nuclear 
Decommissioning 
Authority (NDA) 
 
Environmental Agency 
(EA) 
 
HSE & NII 
NDA (research into waste disposal) 
AWRE and AERE research centres 
continue 
 
Nuclear research is shared 
internationally with more detailed 
public and private research 
occurring abroad rather in the UK.  
Private companies construct plants. Within the 
UK it is highly likely that all plants to be 
constructed in the future will be done so by 
foreign public or state owned companies.  
 
Private companies operate owned plants 
 
BNFL dissolved 
 
Public owned DNA responsible for running 
MAGBOX reactors until end of lifespan, and 
then to decommission them. All other plants 
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 Decision-Makers 
(the first two span 
multiple energy 
industries) 
Key Regulators (national) Researchers Constructors Operators 
meet Government 
goals 
 
 
 
UK Safeguards Office 
(UKSO  works closely with 
the IAEA) 
 
Office for Civil Nuclear 
Security (OCNS) 
 
The Office for Nuclear 
Regulation (ONR) was 
created in 2011 as a 
merger of the above 3 
regulators) 
 
 
UK based research is not as 
necessary as new reactors will be 
of foreign design 
 
The UK works on an international 
scale to develop nuclear Fusion 
with both CERN (the European 
organisation for nuclear research) 
and with the EFDA (European 
Fusion Development Agreement) 
with which the UK is home to the 
Joint European Torus (JET) 
experimental laboratory.  
are the full responsibility of the companies in 
ownership  
 
British Energy (1995 – a merger of Nuclear 
Electric and Scottish nuclear, minus the old 
MAGNOX reactors. Was then sold to the City) 
 
Magnox Electric was founded in 1996 to 
manage the MAGNOX reactors and remained 
in public ownership (combined with BNFL in 
98 and then acquired by US company Energy 
Solutions when BNFL was split and sold off) 
Relation with 
energy industry 
Initially CEGB and 
Government 
departments span 
energy industries. 
During and after 
privatisation 
decision-makers 
also operate.  
Government 
controls energy 
targets 
Specific to nuclear 
industry. All accountable 
to the Government 
though not all have 
statutory rights 
Specific to nuclear industry -  
focuses only on atomic research 
Specific to nuclear industry – specialised in 
nuclear construction (makes them vulnerable to 
low levels of orders) 
Specific to nuclear industry during 
nationalisation, more integrated during 
privatisation as operators can now choose… 
International 
context 
 
The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM from the EU EURATOM treaty 1957 – present, set up to ensure all countries in the EEC have means to pursue nuclear power) 
 
The International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA, set up in 1957 to ensure the international peaceful uses of nuclear power. Enforces safeguards on dangerous materials upon member 
states. Monitors material storage and transport across country boundaries) 
 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA is an agency within the OECD and assists development of nuclear power through sharing and cooperation in scientific and technological fields. Exchanges a 
broad array of information and reports on regulation and policy) 
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legitimate. It is beyond the scope of this research to understand the individual logics of the various 
energy industries as they may stand isolated. However, the situated logics of the energy industry 
as highlighted by the debates and negotiations surrounding the legitimation of nuclear energy will 
be discussed below.  
Situated Logics 
 
In responding to calls in the literature to locate the study of organising in its meaningful context, 
this thesis applies the concept of ‘situated logics’ (defined on p.42) to differentiate between 
institutional logics as generic underpinning norms and conventions grounded in the societal orders 
as defined by Friedland and Alford (1991), and ‘situated logics’ which develop through the localised 
manifestation of those orders, either passively informing or offering the ‘tools’ for actors to actively 
reengineer (depending on their awareness and motivation) how such orders affect practice and 
action within given industry. These findings suggest that the idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
energy industry and its dominant values, norms and conventions were reflected in two principle 
‘situated logics’. Such situated institutionalised values echo the unique historical and meaningful 
characteristics of the industry as understood by industry level actors, thus combining the abstract 
meaning structures of institutional logics with the physicalities and practicalities of the industry.  
 
Identifying Situated Logics 
 
Throughout the case study actors debating the appropriateness of nuclear power judged its 
legitimacy by drawing from capitalist market and bureaucratic state societal institutional orders and 
their concomitant central logics; the local manifestations of which are labelled the national-market 
and state-resource situated logics (see Table 7) These industry level manifestations of societal level 
institutional structures provide contending norms and values which inform how actors engage in 
political struggles and visualize their perceived favourable outcomes. Situated logics also inherit 
certain rationality propositions from the actors who situate them. In other words, their 
‘situatedness’ implies that they are products of the actor groups who construct, enact and recreate 
them. Given that these actors are themselves embedded within the institutionalised systems of the 
particular industry, they exhibit rationality types which will likely be reflected in the nature of any 
existing or emergent situated institutional logics. Discursive legitimating strategies within textual 
data illustrate the vacillations in nuclear power’s perceived instrumental or substantive rationality 
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and how each may relate to a specific actor group engaged within the nuclear debate. In the 
following paragraphs the thesis will look more closely at the origins of the situated logics which 
informed various pro and anti-nuclear arguments throughout the case study. Although distinctive 
in their delineation of value and their translation of meaning, they appear in tandem throughout 
the case study both in competing and complementary relations.  
National-Market Logic 
 
Until the mid-1990s the nuclear power industry primarily resided under national control. Only the 
construction consortia were constituted by private enterprise. Consequently the legitimating 
discourses and actions of key decision makers such as the Department for Power and the CEGB 
appeared to reflect the values of a market infused with the idiosyncrasies of the Public sector. 
Accumulation of wealth and private ownership as central values and conventions of the capitalist-
market institutional order (Friedland and Alford 1991) were less visible in the situated value 
structures of energy industry actors. Both the CEGB and the Government wished to develop an 
affordable and financially rewarding energy industry, but they pursued such with a level of flexibility 
that was afforded them primarily through their differences from the private sector. Neither of these 
actors were fundamentally dislocated from the values imbued by the societal level capitalist market 
logics; but the sheer size and extent of resources which adorned the nationalised industry offered 
them a context whereby there was scope to financially legitimate nuclear power even if immediate 
commercial figures did not lend themselves to its development. An imperative of short-term 
financial gain and the immediate accumulation of profit were often absent in Government 
discourse which accepted that nuclear power’s financial legitimacy lay in its likely technological 
development in decades to come. In sum, within the nationalised industry, the norms and 
conventions of the societal capitalist-market logics became somewhat suppler, offering discursive 
space for actors to legitimate nuclear power through recourse to market values whilst 
acknowledging that nuclear was showing neither financial stability nor economic improvement. 
The industry level nationalised market logic is understood throughout the thesis as a ‘national-
market situated logic’ because it represented a manifestation of broader capitalist market logics 
within a more localised nationalised setting. Comparisons between energy options clearly reflected 
the values of the capitalist market such as profit accumulation and efficacy of investment as the 
Department for Power defended its nuclear decisions based on export market potential and cheap 
energy production. The discursive legitimation of nuclear power by the Department of Power in 
particular only became prominent in the data once the secrecy surrounding civil nuclear power had 
subsided when Britain’s first reactor opened in 1956. The newness of the civil nuclear programme 
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created ambiguity around the costs of nuclear power, making predictions neither forthcoming nor 
reliable. Instead, the belief in technological advancement meant that those prepared to defend 
nuclear power did so based on its assumed potential to offer great amounts of energy for very little 
cost. When compared to the expectations of other industries, nuclear power’s anticipated 
technological trajectory suggested opportunities which could not be expected from the incumbent 
energy industries. Indeed, this may account for why other energy industries were less likely to be 
legitimated in the same way as nuclear. Whereas nuclear power’s instrumental rationality lay in its 
future possibility, coal and oil energy production were understood to have reached their 
developmental peak. Comparatively then, from a long-term national-market perspective and an 
instrumentally rational one, nuclear power was proposed as the most legitimate energy option in 
this early period.  
 
Table 8 Societal and Situated Institutional Logics between 1950 and 1965 
Societal level 
Logic 
Capitalist market Bureaucratic state Environmental welfare 
Institutional 
characteristics 
Accumulation of 
wealth and private 
ownership 
 
Rationalisation and 
regulation of state 
through accountable 
bureaucracies 
Protection of the natural 
environment regardless 
of benefactor 
Situated level 
Logic 
Nationalised 
market 
State-resource Amenity 
Institutional 
characteristics 
Public ownership 
Profit relative to 
priority of national 
goals 
 
Regulation and control of 
energy resources 
reinforce state 
invulnerabilities 
Protection of nature 
insofar as the amenities 
it provides for its public 
Level Nationalised 
energy industry 
Nationalised energy 
industry 
Often local communities 
resisting nuclear builds 
Actors involved Department of 
Power, 
CEGB 
Department of Power 
UKAEA (push for British 
designs  
Local community 
groups, 
Small national groups 
 
Fantasising the Market 
 
Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s the instrumental market rationality of nuclear power 
was supported and conveyed to the public audience via discursive strategies which relied on 
futuristic market assumptions. Official Government white papers were the primary sources of 
information for the press at this time, and thus both Governmental documents and media texts 
displayed similar expectations regarding the future nuclear marketability. Comparisons between 
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energy options were based on future market fantasies, against which it would have been difficult 
for other energy means to compete. The use of the term ‘fantasies’ refers to the imaginative 
conceptualisation by actors of extravagant and sometimes wondrous future rewards which would 
come from immediate investment in nuclear power.  Although initially expensive to build and 
operate, it was assumed that the early costs of nuclear reactors would be recuperated once the 
‘first of a kind’ costs had subsided and the reactors were delivering abundant and efficient energy. 
Uncertain Financial Fantasies 
 
‘…the economic virtues of all this are plain. In round numbers, a decade from now the 
annual cost of generating the country’s electricity will be £10 million less’ (Maddox 1964b) 
Initially nuclear power was not an economic endeavour. The Government assumed that nuclear 
power would only, if built and operated faultlessly to schedule, generate electricity at a slightly 
lesser cost than traditional fossil-fuel plants run at continuous baseload capacity. Unsurprisingly, 
for a 'first of a kind' endeavour, the first stations at Bradwell and Berkeley cost three and a half 
times as much to build as a conventional coal burning station of the same capacity (Ministry of 
Power 1957). These costs were projected to be offset by the relatively low cost of running the 
stations, although low operational costs were yet to be proven on a commercial scale. During the 
mid-1950s the Minister of Power and the Chairman of the CEGB were frequently quoted in the 
media as expectant of an unprecedentedly cheap atomic industry which would eventually generate 
electricity at a cost much lower than the lowest pounds per Kw/h (kilowatt hour) to date. As long 
as the industry was allowed to develop and expand, low cost expectations would be met through 
continual technological developments which would steadily reduce fuel and operating costs. 
Consequently market legitimacy relied on technological optimism and expectations of progressive 
change: 
‘…developments moved forward so rapidly that already their forecasts of a year ago had 
been overtaken by events. “Indeed the power of creative technology is to-day so great that, 
given a clear goal and no political impediments, progress is certain to be more rapid than 
can be foreseen or guaranteed. I believe that nuclear power will be making a major 
contribution to Britain’s economy a decade from now…addressing members of the Istituto 
di Studi in Rome yesterday, [Sir John Cockcroft] said that the million-kilowatt nuclear power 
station “is not far off”.’ [The director of the UKAEA, Sir. Cockcroft, as quoted in The Times] 
(Special Correspondent 1956 p.11) 
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Immediate cost deficiencies were not to impinge on the continual development of the civil 
programme: 
 ‘An estimate can be made of the cost of electricity produced by the two types of reactors 
likely to be in commercial use in the next ten years although it must be subject to a wide 
margin of uncertainty’ (Ministry of Fuel and Power 1955 p.16) 
‘The exact lines of future development in nuclear energy are uncertain, but this must not 
deter us from pressing on with its practical application wherever it appears promising’ 
(Ministry of Fuel and Power 1955 p.21) 
Uncertainty opened up space for optimism and fantasising. Fantasising strategies refer to the 
discursive development of favourable future scenarios based on unproven and possibly unrealistic 
trajectories of development. Such fantasies were neither verifiable nor refutable but nevertheless 
constructed a seductive vision of an idyllic future based on the priorities of the present. To 
encourage public acceptance of nuclear power, the Government and the UKAEA developed 
idealistic notions that atomic energy would provide an unlimited and cheap source of electricity by 
the millennium. Fantasies were supported by the previously mentioned robust belief in the 
continuing momentum of technology and science – a belief engrained within the psyche of those 
actors pushing nuclear power forward not just as an industrial endeavour, but as a scientific one; 
‘Britain expects in eight years to be producing more electricity from nuclear power stations 
than the country’s total consumption at the outbreak of the Second World War. This was 
stated by Sir John Maud, permanent secretary to the Minister of power… [who] said that 
the British nuclear power industry would have achieved in less than a decade what had 
taken the conventional electrical industry more than 60 years…when fusion could be 
commercially exploited, Sir John Maud said, it should be possible to provide ample power 
for everyone…’ (Energy Correspondent 1958 p.6) 
‘The official justification for the nuclear power programme is that nuclear technology must 
be kept moving. And a nuclear power industry kept ticking over until 1970. By then the 
generating costs of nuclear power stations are expected to break even… diminishing rapidly 
over the following decade’ (Anon 1962) 
Fantasising strategies were particularly evident in texts which hoped to reinvigorate interest in a 
second programme of nuclear plants after the slowing of the first programme’s extension in 1960. 
The new British Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR) technology was to constitute the second 
programme and provided an opportunity for the Government to dispose of scepticism caused by 
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the disappointment of the MAGNOX fleet, and focus attention on the new exciting financial 
possibilities of the AGRs – the UK’s most likely export design: 
 ‘Sir William Penney, leader of the United Kingdom delegation to the conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, said in his address today that nuclear power was 
entering a new phase where it could be competitive with conventional power…looking 
ahead, there was no doubt about the important contribution nuclear power would make 
in adding to the energy available to all countries’ (Energy Correspondent 1964 p.17) 
 ‘The UKAEA member for reactors told me that there was full confidence in the new design. 
He thought there would be no need to go through an intermediate stage in design, and that 
the first commercial station based on the AGR principle…could produce power for the grid 
at less than a halfpenny a unit’ (Special Correspondent 1963 p.5) 
The values and conventions of a national-market logic within the energy industry meant that 
nuclear power’s instrumental rationality could be evaluated by the Department of Power based on 
expected future scenarios which they themselves often constructed with help from the UKAEA. 
However, the scenarios were only comprehensible in light of the surrounding scientific and 
technological discourses which promoted an expectation of continual change and development, 
and were backed by the UKAEA when justifying its huge research and development subsidy (over 
90 per cent of all British energy research money).  
State-Resource logic 
 
‘Our civilisation is based on power. Improved living standards both in advanced industrial 
countries likes our own and in the vast underdeveloped countries overseas can only come 
about through the increased use of power….The coming of nuclear power therefore marks 
the beginning of a new era…’ (Ministry of Fuel and Power 1955 p.3) 
Interest in nuclear power was also predicated on its ability to enhance the interests of the sovereign 
state. Nuclear power was often supported because of its potential for reinforcing State control over 
energy resources and guarding against international energy supply vulnerabilities. Informing these 
arguments was a situated version of Friedland and Alford’s (1991) State Bureaucracy institutional 
logic. According to the authors, this institutional logic values the bureaucratic form in ensuring 
effective state control over a public. The material and symbolic content of the bureaucratic state 
logics include the rationalisation and regulation of activity, structural hierarchies for control and 
the conversion of micro level issues into mass consensus – the enactment of which reinforces the 
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definition of the State as director and administrator of national plans and activities (Thornton et al 
2012).  
At the industry level, the security of energy resources through invulnerable supplies of both 
electricity and its constituent fuels would allow for stricter regulation and rationalisation by the 
Government, thus reinforcing the rituals of the bureaucratic state. The Government and media, to 
varying extents, appeared to take for granted that an energy option’s viability rested on its potential 
to alleviate state liabilities, with such immunities leading to opportunities whereby the state could 
appear self-sufficient whilst bettering the standard of living at an acceptable rate. Nuclear power 
in particular appealed to such interests because it represented large scale technocratic and 
centralised energy sourcing. Within a context of international fossil-fuel ownership and importation 
liability, nuclear energy had the potential to deliver the largest sum of electricity from the smallest 
possible amount of fuel. Additionally Uranium for reactors was imported from friendly countries 
such as Australia or Canada, or from the UK via technology developed to refabricate new fuel 
elements out of reprocessed ones. Hence, the situated form of the bureaucratic state logic is 
understood here as manifest as a ‘state-resource logic’ of the energy industry; it represents an 
overarching understanding that energy options should strengthen the energy sovereignty of the 
State and reduce vulnerabilities to energy control. As such it implies instrumental rationality in the 
sense that options should be quantitatively compared in order for the most ‘secure’ energy choice 
to be chosen; and substantive rationality in that the logic places high value on nationalism and 
sovereignty as overall guidelines of action.  
Reacting to Resources 
 
‘…since the war the production of coal from deep mines has increased from 175 million 
tons in 1945 to 214 million tons in 1954. But the demands of our expanding home industries 
have been rising even faster…the increasing demand for fuel cannot be met without 
exploiting to the full any new and economic technique’ (Ministry of Fuel and Power 1955 
p.11) 
After WWII the growth of home industries meant that conventional resources were progressively 
unable to cover the energy requirements of the UK. As coal mines closed, causing heavy economic 
and social impacts on communities, the importation of fuel began to form the basis of a growth in 
international exchange. The UK was rapidly becoming a net importer of energy generating fuels 
which meant that the threat to the availability of oil caused by the Suez Crisis in the mid-50s had a 
profound effect on the Government’s approach to energy sourcing. After a series of international 
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political contestations over allegiances and Egyptian investments the President of Egypt, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, announced his plans to nationalise the Suez Canal in 1956. Nationalisation of the 
canal would severely constrain the transportation of fuel from the Middle East to Europe which 
prompted British forces (along with France and Israel) to invade Egypt. Britain pulled out quickly 
after international disapproval but thereafter serious questions were raised about the reliability of 
Middle Eastern oil supplies. It was in response to this crisis that the UK Government established the 
Nuclear Power Working Party which recommended the expansion of the nuclear programme. 
A year after the Suez crisis a memorandum by the Minister of Power advised that it would be 
reasonable to triple the 1956 planned nuclear capacity by the end of 1965. In the following white 
paper entitled ‘Capital Investment in the Coal, Gas and Electricity Industry’ the increase in nuclear 
build to between 5000 and 6000 MWs was made official and was to be met by the commissioning 
of nineteen new stations on sixteen different sites. The white paper stressed that a full years 
operation of the now intended 6000MWs would save 18 million tonnes of coal, lessen the reliance 
on imported oil and stabilise the supply of energy. Nuclear fuel would come from politically stable 
countries such as Australia, America and Canada thereby lessening worries over energy fuel 
dependence from increasingly hostile Middle Eastern territories. Immediately a new fleet of 
MAGNOX power stations were ordered at Berkley, Bradwell, Hunterston, Hinkley Point, and 
Trawsfynydd (about 2000 MWs in total). Government white papers exhibited little mention of 
financial imperatives for nuclear power, instead imbuing a sense of urgency through claims of 
necessity for nuclear power to strengthen indigenous electricity supplies. The CEGB appeared 
content during this period to accelerate the speed at which tenders were submitted and accepted, 
and much of the media appeared supportive of such actions. However, by the early 1960s the 
urgency for nuclear power had dissipated and the media were far less kind in their reminiscing. 
Retrospective media texts were now sceptical of an industry which appeared a ‘knee jerk’ reaction 
to a supply crisis in a previous decade:  
'Then in 1957, shaken by Suez, expecting an oil crisis, and deluded by rosy visions of a world 
[of] British-made nuclear power stations, the Government announced a dramatic 
programme to install 6000 megawatts…and industry was prodded into forming a massive 
consortia to build nuclear power stations’ (Anon 1962) 
‘…far from there being a fuel crisis, coal stocks were soaring, oil prices were dropping, and 
the gap between nuclear and conventional power costs was, if anything, widening’ (Anon 
1962)  
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An unexpected move by UK industry to oil after the Suez Crisis led to large coal stocks in the UK. 
Thereafter resource based arguments were absent in the legitimating discourse for nuclear power 
put forward by both the media and the CEGB. Coal in particular was enticing to the CEGB who saw 
it as a cheap alternative and who recognised no reason to continue nuclear tenders given such a 
scenario. Clearly state-resource and national-market logics were intrinsically linked given that 
supply vulnerability drove up prices of traditional fuels in short supply which allowed nuclear power 
to come across as relatively affordable. Once vulnerabilities dissipated, the costs of these fuels 
declined and nuclear appeared increasingly expensive. Whereas nuclear power had been legitimate 
as an expensive yet necessary reaction to supply shocks, it was now emerging as both unnecessary 
and more expensive than originally hoped. In response to the instrumental irrationality of nuclear 
power as it now came to pass, the Government and pro-nuclear media redirected their legitimating 
discourse to its future market promise based on the development of a successful British nuclear 
industry; an amalgamation of future market and nationalistic values.  
Nuclear power as a Relative Industry 
 
Throughout the data set nuclear power is always discussed as one energy option of many. 
Government energy investment decisions were based on the alignment of an energy option, 
relative to that of another, with legitimate characteristics informed by values and meaning systems 
denoted by the industry’s institutional logics. The prominence of pro-nuclear discursive legitimating 
strategies pertaining to the values of one situated logic rather than another is an outcome of both 
context and the potential for that context to provide a means to view nuclear power as the most 
appropriate energy option. The political incentives to keep nuclear power legitimate with the public 
by the Department of Power in particular led to tensions within the industry.  In contextual 
conditions of cheap and accessible fuels such as coal, the Department was in conflict with the CEGB; 
the former was politically vested in the continuation of nuclear power but was struggling to 
legitimate it in line with the aforementioned situated values, and the latter saw little reason to 
continue the expansion of the programme. Ultimately this section highlights three key points that 
re-emerge throughout the case study: Legitimacy is fragile and needs constant ‘work’ to sustain it, 
the sources (or discourses) of legitimacy fluctuate given internal and external contexts, and 
legitimacy of an option within the energy industry is always in comparison to others. To further 
demonstrate this point, coexistence and tension between situated logics will be discussed below.  
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Situated Logic Coexistence and Tension  
Coexistence 
 
The situated logics identified above manifested in tandem in the mid-50s during energy concerns 
of both an internal (low coal stockpiles) and external (balance of payments) nature. During the 
initial push for public acceptability of the civil nuclear programme the UKAEA and the Conservative 
Government reinforced much of the utopian belief in nuclear power by conveying atomic energy 
as an unlimited source of electricity, demonstrating that an aspect of nuclear power’s legitimacy 
rested on state-resource institutional values. Even though atomic power plants were fuelled by 
finite sources of imported uranium, those drawing from the state-resource situated logic 
championed nuclear fuel as invulnerable to international control. Contextually, Britain at this time 
was suffering from a concerning mix of energy demand increases, unsustainable coal mining and 
limits on the provision of miners. Moreover, the Suez crisis in 1955-56 highlighted the country’s 
dependence on international oil supplies. For the standard of living to continue its escalation in the 
post war era, despite fuel supply threats, the energy choice had to combat immediate security of 
supply issues. State regulation and control over resources became highly valued. In particular, those 
actors deeply embedded in the nuclear industry and subsequently alienated from the wider energy 
industry (such as the UKAEA) vocalised a belief in nuclear power as the most ‘secure’ energy option: 
 ‘If we cannot get coal for all the power our industry needs, cannot afford oil for it, and 
cannot make fuel economies on a sufficient scale, then we must find some other way…we 
used our coal resources lavishly, and we now have reached the time when they will no 
longer sustain further increases in the “creation of our riches”…in atomic energy there is a 
new world to conquer, a world in which the scientists and engineers concerned are already 
rapidly expanding the frontiers a community in which there is no despair, only confidence’ 
[This was written by UKAEA chairman in The Times (Plowden 1956 p.ii)] 
Supply vulnerabilities created the possibility for what the Government called ‘energy gaps’. That is, 
where the available supply of fuel needed to generate enough electricity to meet demand was 
either not secure enough to ensure that forecasted demand would be met, or not sizable enough 
to supply future expected demand increases. At a time when neither coal nor oil could be relied on 
to fuel continuous electricity production, nuclear power offered a solution to the ‘impending energy 
gap’: 
‘…it is imperative that we should do everything possible to slow down the rate at which this 
energy gap is widening, and to start to reduce it at the earliest possible moment by the use 
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of nuclear’ … ‘the increased security which a nuclear programme offers the economy when 
compared to dependence on the availability of growing quantities of oil or coal from 
abroad’ (Ministry of Power 1957 p.2) 
Legitimation based on a national-market logic also appeared to value endogenous electricity 
generation namely because it aided a more settled balance of payments for Britain. Fuel 
importation was a key element of energy generation in the UK, but excessive importing not only 
increased vulnerabilities but meant large sums of money were being spent abroad. By utilising less 
tonnage of fuel than generators running on coal or oil, a full year’s operation of the extended 1957 
programme of 6000MWs could save the importation of around 18 million tons of imported coal 
(Ministry of Power 1957) whilst running in most cases on fissile material already owned by the UK 
from the weapons programme. Again, the institutionalised values of the market within the energy 
industry were exposed by official publications during this period: 
 ‘…supplies of indigenous fuels cannot be increased sufficiently to meet these growing 
requirements which will therefore involve rapidly increasing dependence on 
imports…nuclear power can eventually make a very appreciable contribution towards 
improving the balance of payments.’ (Ministry of Power 1957 p.11) 
This small example illustrates that within the energy industry the situated logics identified coexisted 
and were also important in actors’ comparisons of legitimacy between energy options. Together 
the alternate logics denoted the rational myth that energy should be nationally secure for both 
economic and state welfare reasons. However, Friedland and Alford (1991) note that institutional 
logics are also fundamentally in tension. In the example below institutional conflict is clearly 
evident, and the opposing arguments constituting the debate illustrate the contradictions between 
the different logics being drawn on.  
Logic Tension  
 
As illustrated above, the Ministry for Power argued that the nuclear industry offered potential to 
generate affordable energy within secure national boundaries. For other actors in the industry such 
as the CEGB, nuclear power’s inability to provide the best option for financial investment was a 
cumbersome impediment. Fossil-fuel stocks had recuperated after the Suez crisis and nuclear 
power appeared relatively superfluous to the management of the CEGB. Amidst the buzz around 
nuclear power in the mid-1950s the CEGB had been noticeably absent in its advocacy. Allowing the 
Government to publicly enthuse over nuclear, the CEGB discretely distanced itself from the official 
hysteria relating to nuclear possibilities. Comparatively, the Ministry of Power had enthusiastically 
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associated itself with nuclear power and was thus reluctant to publicly humiliate itself through 
admittance of unviability. As the 1950s drew to a close, the CEGB problematized the financial 
viability of nuclear power and convinced the Minster of Power to lessen the pace of the nuclear 
programme. Contextual factors paired with nuclear power’s comparative costs to other energy 
industries meant that the Government struggled to legitimate continued nuclear expansion on 
market grounds, and instead defended nuclear development on state values.  
Loss of Marketability versus State Values 
 
The CEGB in particular was concerned that nuclear power was not living up to its economic 
expectations, and became increasingly inclined to tender and build fossil-fuel energy plants over 
new nuclear in the post-Suez crisis era. The CEGB were imbued with a market-centric approach to 
energy judgements and in times of low supply vulnerability, would evaluate energy choices based 
on cost. They were created as part of energy nationalisation from the Energy Act 1957 with a role 
to ‘…oversee the operation of electricity generation and transmission facilities and all related 
investment decisions’ (Energy Act 1957). They were the main operators of nationally owned power 
stations; autonomous enough to offer tenders for new power plants but still obliged to conform to 
the Government’s policy decisions. They were also bounded by political ties. In 1957 the CEGB were 
committed to contracts with oil companies to increase their total use of oil generation plants 
(Ministry of Power 1957) as well as limited by Government imposed protectionist tariffs which 
obliged them to continue coal fired plant construction and remain a key customer to the NCB. 
Expansion of the nuclear industry would further restrain the choices of the CEGB, committing a 
substantial portion of their budget to nuclear power and restraining their freedom to structure the 
energy industry around market returns. In an attempt to overcome the contradiction between 
CEGB market interests and nuclear power’s high costs, Lord Hinton (previously of the UKAEA) had 
been made the first Chairman of the CEGB in 1957. Possibly it was hoped that he would be 
predisposed to find a compromise between the instrumentality of the CEGB’s energy judgements, 
and the Department of Power’s keenness to develop nuclear power further.  
Nevertheless, in 1957 Hinton demonstrated his unease regarding the expansion of the MAGNOX 
fleet and expressed his concerns to Sir Percy Mills, the Conservative Minster of Power at the time. 
As a result the time-scale of nuclear expansion was revised and announced three years later in a 
1960 white paper to avoid losing ‘political face’. In 1960 the white paper ‘The Nuclear Power 
Programme’ (Ministry of Power) admitted that the programme was unnecessarily large and that 
there were plentiful reserves of conventional fuels that would allow power costs to be 25 per cent 
less than nuclear costs. By 1960 it appeared that both the CEGB Chairman, Lord Hinton, and the 
119 
 
Minister for power then Mr Richard Wood, were in consensus that nuclear power no longer offered 
the most economically attractive option. Recession in the late 1950s had caused rising inflation, 
which was now to be countered through Government imposed capital investment restrictions. 
These involved the re-phasing of the extended nuclear programme and the prolonging of the 
deadline for the completion of the first programme from 1965 to 1966. 
”…it is because the point at which nuclear power generation breaks even with conventional 
power generation is going to be farther in the future than was first expected – that is the 
sole reason for the change I have announced”, said Mr Wood.’ (Political Correspondent 
1960a p.8) 
The concomitant ‘recession in nuclear power‘ (Energy Correspondent 1959 p.10) was based on two 
interlinked contextual and institutional factors: Concern over the security of energy supplies 
lessened after the British and French forces pulled out of the Suez Canal in 1956. In the following 
years, texts which drew meaning from a state-resource logic became much rarer in the data set, 
and instead there emerged an increasing number of texts in the media which questioned the 
market feasibility of nuclear energy. In other words, legitimacy based on supply security 
characteristics had become subordinate to that based on national-market values. The shift in 
sources of legitimacy within the industry, as a response to lessening supply anxieties, meant that 
the Government could no longer convince the financially minded CEGB that large scale nuclear 
expansion was necessary. Subsequently, the CEGB expressed its eagerness to tender cheaper forms 
of energy: 
‘…the white paper is expected to express frank recognition that the economics of power 
production have changed in recent years against the nuclear station and in favour of 
conventional stations. Whereas in 1955, then the programme was first announced, there 
was a persistent shortage of coal, the main preoccupation of the Ministry and the National 
Coal Board now is to find an outlet for the huge stocks of coal which have been building up’ 
(Political Correspondent 1960b p.12) 
 ‘…the placing of contracts for the construction of conventional nuclear power stations had 
slowed down somewhat. This was mainly due to a large-scale switch of industry from coal 
to oil which had resulted in a temporary surplus of coal’ (Energy Correspondent 1959 p.10) 
However, the Minister of Power for the Conservatives, Mr Richard Wood, was keen to suggest that 
this was only a minor revision, and did not reflect a permanent declining interest in nuclear power: 
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‘Mr.Wood seemed taken aback by the roar of laughter which greeted his account of what 
was being done. “rather than this being a cut-back”, he declared, “it is a deferment of the 
acceleration which was planned in 1957”.’ (Political Correspondent 1960b p.12)  
The Conservative Ministry of Power recognised the role of nuclear power in recovering national 
pride after the Suez Crisis and the loss of British colonies after WW2. Additionally, the successful 
development of a nuclear reactor design was believed to have the potential to excite international 
interests as it would trigger the development of a lucrative and growing British nuclear industry. 
With such nationalistic values in mind, the Government and UKAEA began considering the 
development of a new ‘type’ of nuclear reactor in the late 1950s that could offer the CEGB a more 
competitive product. Lord Hinton and the CEGB were compelled towards the cheap and proven 
North American CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) or HWR (Heavy Water Reactors) designs. 
The Ministry for Power illustrated their wider and more substantive goals by wishing to keep the 
reactor type British to lessen international vulnerabilities whilst boosting British design and 
construction consortia. As such, the Government eventually backed the UKAEA’s Advanced Gas-
cooled Reactors (AGR) which were to be tendered, designed and constructed in the UK 
Summary of Coexistence and Tension 
 
The two sets of circumstances explored above illustrate the dynamics between actors complying 
with two central situated logics embedded within the energy industry. As the exogenous context of 
the industry altered and shifted, industry level actors went from collusion to conflict. The Suez crisis 
initially meant that, comparatively speaking, nuclear power appealed to both the values of the 
state-resource logic and those of the national-market. However as the crisis drew to a close 
alternative energy options began to fulfil the criteria of supply security with lower costs than 
nuclear power. With oil and coal stocks no longer under threat, nuclear power’s legitimacy as the 
correct energy option for the UK was under contention by the CEGB.  
So far the Chapter has analysed institutional structures and the ways in which they have played out 
within the energy industry. However, there were broader societal concerns which were often 
mobilised by external actors who hoped to impact the choices of the industry. In particular, the 
environmental repercussions of nuclear power’s expansion were the cause of anxiety within the 
public. Early environmental concerns implicating the nuclear energy industry will be discussed in 
the following section.  
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Nuclear Power and the Natural Environment 
 
‘Lord Chorley, honorary secretary of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, put 
the matter as vividly as anyone. England, he said, still gaped with the sores inflicted by the 
first industrial revolution, and the damage inflicted by this new revolution might be even 
more serious. If this programme went on in the way people feared, Lord Mills and his 
department might finally toll the death knell of England’s green and pleasant land.’ 
(Parliamentary Correspondent 1957a p.7)  
Aside from aforementioned internal industry actors, there were also external actors with additional 
conceptions of how the energy industry should conduct itself. During the initial two decades of the 
civil nuclear power programme in the UK, concerns regarding the relationship between nuclear 
generators and their natural settings were minimal within the Press. Environmental apprehensions 
voiced by these actors were typical of an ‘industry versus countryside’ mentality. Natural settings 
were celebrated for their amenity which was considered under threat from all types of large 
industrial development including nuclear stations. The protectionist values of an environmental 
societal logic informed debates over the legitimacy of nuclear power much in the same way as it 
did for all other large developments outside of industrial centres; the beauty of the public’s 
countryside amenities should be protected insofar as the look of the natural setting should appear 
untouched by industry. This chapter notes that the environmental values and conventions of the 
dispersed group of actors questioning the environmental legitimacy of nuclear power from outside 
of the industry constituted and represented a situated environmental amenity logic.  
Environmental Concern 
 
The media provided a platform upon which debates surrounding the relationship between nuclear 
power and nature could unfold.  Whilst the first civil nuclear programme took shape, the press 
broadcasted the public’s environmental anxieties which concerned the expansion of the national 
grid and its connection to nuclear plants primarily constructed in isolated and rural areas. The 
tension between Government and an environmentally concerned public centred on the latter’s 
frustration that neither the CEGB nor the Department of Power had consulted communities 
neighbouring the new plants. Many of these communities were reluctant to welcome a large and 
cumbersome nuclear construction onto their local landscape: 
 ‘There is great disturbance on grounds of amenity regarding the siting of these stations. It 
looks to be very much as though the National Parks Act is being torn up…Lord Lucas of 
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Chilworth asked for “some far better machinery to listen to the legitimate complaints of 
citizens against the destructive nature of the erection of the huge grid’ (Parliamentary 
Correspondent 1957b)  
‘…the prospects of a £25m power station in this quiet Essex area and especially an atomic 
one with all the construction work involved, has stirred over 400 objectors’ (Special 
Correspondent 1956 p.7) 
Primarily, concerns relating to nuclear power and its impact upon the environment were founded 
on a dislike of Government siting choices. Objectors mobilised against designated nuclear sites at a 
secular local level. Their opposition was often met with formal local inquiries into new stations. 
Interestingly, they argued that nuclear power stations should be located within established 
industrial sites and not scattered throughout the British countryside: 
‘…there seemed little doubt that Lord Mills, Minister of Power, had failed to-day to satisfy 
those peers who are deeply worried about the effect of the siting of new atomic power 
stations on the amenities of the countryside…the question posed by Lord Lawson was why 
the stations should not be placed within the industrial areas which they were chiefly to 
serve. Why choose unspoilt tracts of countryside and the few remaining coastal areas?’ 
(Parliamentary Correspondent 1957a p.7) 
The above quote illustrates that the public was naïve to the unique risks posed by nuclear power in 
comparison to traditional industries. Those concerned with nuclear station siting were not anxious 
because it threatened the biodiversity or ecological systems within the countryside, but because it 
threatened to ‘spoil’ its natural attractiveness. Evidently, new reactors posed an unpopular physical 
impediment to the perceived objective beauty of the countryside. The following quote relates to 
the environmental concern around Hinkley Point in Somerset: 
 ‘Somerset County Council were clearly concerned mainly to have some guarantee that the 
Central Electricity Authority would give proper regard to the amenities of Bridgwater 
Bay…when the project was announced a newspaper reporter telephoned a local farmer 
and sought to discover whether a place of beauty was to be sacrificed on the altar of nuclear 
power. What, he asked, did Hinkley Point look like? The farmer considered how best to 
describe the district, and then said: “well, if you were here now, you’d say you were lost”.’ 
(Special Correspondent 1958 p.5) 
Bradwell, Berkeley and Hinkley point stations were primarily objected to on the grounds that 
nuclear stations lessened the amenity value of the countryside by spoiling its tranquillity. 
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Conversely, the most contentious site from an environmental perspective was the planned 
MAGNOX station at Dungeness in Kent because of its distinctive effect on natural geology. If built 
the reactors would impinge upon a geologically important shingle structures on the Dungeness 
coastline. For this particular siting the environmental backlash was not purely based on amenity, 
but also over the conservation of a known area of natural significance:  
‘…physiographically, there seems to be no possible compromise which will avoid the 
sacrifice for all time of by far the most important feature of the most important single 
structure in the British Isles and probably in Europe, which is of world-wide significance for 
the study of coastal physiography’ (Special Correspondent 1958 p.3) 
‘The Lord President said that Dungeness was a unique geological feature, the scientific 
study of which would be adversely affected by the construction of a nuclear power station. 
It was also a favourite area for bird watchers. Nevertheless, on general grounds, he also 
supported the proposal to give consent for the project’ (Cabinet Conclusions 1959 p.5) 
Conservationists’ efforts were countered by a Commons meeting in 1959 in which MPs supported 
the siting at Dungeness. A follow up 1959 Government report published the justifications for the 
Dungeness plant. It argued that the characteristics of the site (bar the shingle structure) made it 
more appealing than alterative locations, and that the majority of the shingle structure would 
remain untouched by the development. The Common’s refusal to cancel projects on the grounds 
of amenity and conservation complaints rested on its low prioritisation of the kind of environmental 
complaints it was receiving – it was not the role of the energy industry to make sure the country 
looked pretty, but to ensure that it had sufficient supplies of power: 
“…everything that can be done to protect our countryside and the life of individuals is being 
done. If it is decided that we go forward with this programme I think we shall have to put 
up with the fact that there are so many more power stations in the country and we cannot 
just have blue skies with nothing in them” [CEGB Chairman quoted in The Guardian 
(Parliamentary Correspondent 1957a)] 
Amenity versus Industry 
 
‘An expansion of the nuclear power programme on the scale proposed (1957) would 
probably involve considerable disturbance to the amenities of the countryside’ (Cabinet 
Conclusions 1957a p.4) 
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Coverage of the developing tensions between concerned community actors and the Government 
in regards to the appropriateness of rural sites for reactors illustrated an emerging understanding 
of the relationship between the environment and nuclear power; one which borrowed from the 
traditional polarisation between natural amenities and industrial progress. Any damaging 
interactions between atomic power specifically and the natural environment were either muted or 
simply not within public consciousness. Rather, trepidation was grounded on the possibility that 
industrial extension and its technological development would forever continue without 
consideration of natural amenities: 
‘… although they [nuclear plants] had a long and useful life ahead and further 
improvements could be made in them, would be fairly soon superseded by more advanced 
developments. [the public] do not want to see some of the most beautiful parts of the 
countryside littered with the decaying carcasses of these leviathans’ (Political 
Correspondent 1961 p.6) 
There seemed an institutionalised acknowledgment that the environment should be protected, but 
what was to be protected was based on a rather anthropocentric understanding of ‘nature’; that 
one must protect those elements of the environment which provide the most services and comforts 
to mankind. Thus, an environmentally orientated societal institutional order manifested within 
groups of actors concerned with the connection between nuclear and nature in a way which 
emphasised and valued environmental amenity. As such, throughout the thesis this approach to 
nuclear power will be understood as informed by a situated amenity-environmental logic (see Table 
7). 
Minimal public knowledge of nuclear power processes and outputs meant little occurred to 
elaborate on the situated amenity environmental logic. Both nuclear power’s secrecy and newness 
contributed to environmental anxieties which fundamentally failed to affect the nuclear plans of 
the State. Solutions to most amenity complaints were neither unmanageable nor intolerable, and 
resolutions were often settled without need for a siting rethink. For many contentious stations 
solutions involved local landscaping to hide the installation. At Dungeness, the shingle structure 
near the plant was (for decades) maintained by trucks which moved the shingle after it had naturally 
drifted north, back south to near the plant. Indeed, the relationship between nuclear power and 
the environment as posited by the ‘amenity logic’ did not produce any qualms with the fundamental 
nature of nuclear power.   
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No Worries Nuclear 
 
‘…after twenty years in which the atom had been feared as a weapon of war the world 
was beginning to know its hope as a powerhouse of peace’ (Geneva Correspondent 1964 
p.7) 
Supplementing the pro-nuclear discourses of the energy industry was a series of more implicit and 
subtle legitimating strategies. Nuclear power as a typical energy industry was a concept maintained 
by strategies which downplayed its uniqueness and dangerous characteristics. Limited public 
education on the technology provided an opportunity for nuclear advocates to generate a sense of 
normalcy which surrounded the atomic industry, as well as a feeling of distance from its original 
position as a weapons technology. These findings are integral to further sections of the case study 
because they protected nuclear power from scrutiny until the 1970s when the environmental 
movement finally challenged them. With their dismantling came a period of societal fear around 
nuclear power and its legitimacy became severely questioned in light of transformed and intensified 
environmental public values. For now however, the strategies maintained a relatively innocuous 
amenity based environmental anxiety within the public.   
The Ordinary Atom 
 
‘…society may now be able to regard atomic power as commonplace’ (Maddox 1964b) 
As the Conservative Government endeavoured to convince the public of the requirement and 
promise of the nuclear industry, it also hoped to assure them that nuclear power was a typical 
technology. This was vital if nuclear power’s legitimacy relative to other energy options was to be 
based solely on its future financial promise or its immediate supply security. A problematic 
uniqueness would create additional variables against which nuclear power could be irrationalised 
by undecided or opposing actors such as those defending their interests in regards to other energy 
industries. To eradicate apprehensions concerning the particularity of nuclear power, the 
Government and pro-nuclear media attempted to normalise it. Normalisation for Vaara et al (2006) 
is a discursive legitimation strategy through which a practice is rendered as something normal or 
natural. In regards to nuclear power, normalisation strategies manifested as technology based 
arguments referring to nuclear power as having become, or being in the process of becoming 
commonplace: 
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‘…nuclear power had become a subject on which ordinary conferences will be held, 
ordinary commercial plans will be made – and ordinary answers will be expected’ (Editorial 
1955 p.7) 
‘…the advent of nuclear power had become so much commonplace that it was easy to 
overlook the speed at which science had advanced’ (Energy Correspondent 1957 p.10) 
From the perspective of those employing this brand of technological normalisation nuclear power, 
although new and strange at conception, was just another machine: 
‘By the end of the century it will be no great surprise is as much as a quarter of the nation’s 
energy is obtained from nuclear power…the only certainty is that nuclear power stations 
will be as familiar as are internal combustion engines now’ (Maddox 1964b) 
‘…there are some cheerful signs that society at large has learned to live with civilian nuclear 
power. A reactor is no longer a piece of magic’ (Maddox 1964a) 
With little public education and few knowledge sources to convey nuclear details, normalisation 
numbed fears and misgivings about nuclear technology. It appeared to do so successfully as there 
was an evident lack of nuclear criticism in the newspapers which could not be countered by amenity 
based solutions. Such discursive strategies were necessary given growing unease on an 
international scale regarding nuclear 'power' in its rawest sense. Thus an additional ‘distancing’ 
strategy emerged within the discourse of both the Government and the pro-nuclear media. 
Distancing strategies used narrative mechanisms to develop a conceptual separation between 
nuclear energy and a more fearsome nuclear power witnessed in 1945 at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
 
The Peaceful Atom 
 
As Britain began its first serious venture into harnessing nuclear power the industry became 
increasingly frustrated with its own pace of progress, and was concerned with advancements 
witnessed in other ‘super power’ nations. During the final year of WWII the UK had sent its key 
nuclear scientists to America, effectively concluding most of the nuclear research based in the UK. 
Additionally the American Government had made a decision not to share weapons technologies 
and thus the new UK atomic weapons programme represented an almost completely fresh start 
(Paymaster General 1953). Seven years after the war and three years after the Russians had tested 
their first fission bomb the UK had yet to test an atomic explosive. It was not until 1952 that the 
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British had a testable atomic (fission) bomb. They subsequently launched Operation Hurricane (aka 
the Montebello tests) in Australia. By this time the United States had already detonated the world’s 
first Hydrogen (fusion) bomb, a far more developed and colossal nuclear weapon, during a series 
of tests at the Marshall Islands. In 1955 the UK conducted its second Australian test with TOTEM 
bombs at Emu Field in the Great Victoria Desert, and in 1956 a series of atomic tests in Maralinga 
in Australia christened ‘Buffalo’ were part of a series of Australian tests nicknamed Operation 
Mosaic. Eventually, in 1957 Britain tested its first hydrogen bomb. In the same year the Prime 
Minister at the time, Harold Macmillan was quoted as saying: 
‘We have made a successful start. When the [nuclear] tests are completed, as they soon 
will be, we shall be in the same position as the United States or Soviet Russia. We shall have 
made and tested the massive weapons. It will be possible then to discuss on equal terms’ 
(Ministry of Power 1957 p.10) 
Increased international nuclear development and heightening political tensions between the US 
and Russia had initiated the Cold War. Additionally the United States feared the imposition of 
Communism which further encouraged them to keep pace with Russian progress. The threat of 
nuclear war was steadily and globally increasing, and nuclear power was once again quietly lingering 
in the shadow of its explosive parent. Nuclear energy generation had begun as a by-product of the 
nuclear weapons establishment, with the first ‘civil’ power station at Calder Hall only producing 
electricity as a side-effect of its primary function as producer of weapons grade uranium. As 
international tensions rose between the nuclear armed super-powers, there was a growing public 
fear and distaste of nuclear weapons. Controversially, at the outset of the UK nuclear programme 
when commercial nuclear plants were mere ideas, the Prime Minister Anthony Eden had made very 
clear that nuclear development would go ahead unhindered by fear of weapons proliferation: 
‘…no attempt should be made to restrict the development of atomic energy by any country, 
in view of the impossibility of effective control’ (Cabinet 1945 p.4) 
Initially it was suggested that in post Suez times the H-bomb was detonated to rally the British 
people after a post-war belittlement of the British Empire (Special Correspondent 1945). The 
Government had believed that a signal of nuclear standing would excite the public and reignite a 
fading belief in the strength of Britain. Nonetheless, media responses showed that the opinions of 
the public were erring more towards caution than pride. This cautiousness manifested in early 
opposition to weapons testing, as noted by Cabinet papers in the late 1950s which concluded that 
the public should not be 'reminded' of the tests: 
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‘The Foreign Secretary said that the more extreme elements of public opinion, both at 
home and abroad, appeared to be mobilising in opposition to the next nuclear weapons 
test’ (Cabinet Conclusions 1957b p.3) 
‘The Foreign Secretary said that the central office of information had sponsored the 
production of a film of the recent United Kingdom thermo-nuclear tests in the South-
Pacific. It would be inopportune, however, to release this film for public exhibition at this 
time’ (Cabinet Conclusions 1958 p.10) 
The media reflected a gradual public conflation of nuclear power and nuclear weapons 
technologies. The concern was that any progress in nuclear technology would simultaneously mean 
progress for weapons equipment. In particular, The Daily Mirror encouraged conceptual linkages 
between nuclear power and nuclear war. The paper acted as a soap box for the organised group 
'Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament' (CND) which had been established in 1957. The CND and the 
Daily Mirror supported the oppositional Labour Party who had used the concern over nuclear 
weapons and its international proliferation to demarcate its anti-nuclear position for the upcoming 
election. Labour claimed that Britain could not remain an independent nuclear power, and that 
British defence policy should instead be revised so that Britain contributed to Western defence 
(NATO) through traditional arms. Throughout the 1950s the paper was embarrassed by Britain’s 
obsession with nuclear armament and unrealistic multilateral disarmament hopes: 
‘How ridiculous we must look to everyone except ourselves as we struggle along, far, far 
behind the Russians and Americans to build a little pile of British H-bombs…we are ruining 
ourselves economically by our effort to compete in the race of the two Super States for the 
ultimate weapon’ (Crossman 1957 p.4) 
As worries over nuclear weapons capabilities rose, questions concerning the relationship between 
the destructive capacities of nuclear weapons and the properties of the nuclear power processes 
began to emerge: 
‘The history of the development of nuclear energy has made everyone aware of its 
destructive possibilities and it would be natural to ask whether there were any special 
dangers associated with nuclear power installation…’ (Ministry of Fuel and Power 1955 p.5) 
‘…nuclear power was not yet accepted by the people as a friend: it was connected with 
sinister happenings of the past and it must therefore serve a period of probation’ (Cabinet 
Conclusions 1957b p.3) 
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If the civil nuclear programme was to continue being judged on the same playing field as other 
energy industries, the Government needed to conceptually distance nuclear power from its 
historical role as a destructive capacity. The Times, in support of the Conservative Government, 
reassured its readership that alarm over nuclear energy was irrational. It stressed that fear of 
nuclear energy was a misconception and that nuclear constituted the ‘peaceful’ form of nuclear 
technology: 
‘Nuclear energy is the energy of the future. Although we are still only at the edge of 
knowledge of its peaceful uses, we know enough to assess some of its possibilities…the 
peaceful applications of nuclear energy now demand attention’ (Ministry of Fuel and Power 
1955 p.6) 
‘Just a decade had passed since the first awful use of atomic power. But now there are clear 
indications – even hard figures – to support the fact that scientists and engineers; notably 
in Britain, the United States, and Russia, have succeeded in harnessing the atom in the 
interests of humanity’ (Industrial Correspondent 1955 p.xvii) 
A developing discourse began to polarise nuclear power and nuclear weapons; the former 
represented a new international cooperative which was united through technology, and the latter 
represented an increasingly powerful yet unnecessary threat. The affirmative approach to nuclear 
power was backed by an internationally supported discourse of ‘atoms for peace’ ("Atoms for 
Peace" was the title of a speech delivered by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the UN General 
Assembly in New York City on the 8th December 1953) which was adopted as the principal slogan 
for the 1957 UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which itself represented the ‘Peaceful 
uses of Nuclear Power’. The IAEA was a key actor in conceptually distancing nuclear power from 
nuclear weapons from a supra-international level, and was formed specifically to persuade nations 
to reconsider nuclear power as a peaceful and passive technology. Those working in the nuclear 
industry began to vocalise the differences between atomic power and its related weapons: 
‘…nuclear power stations like Bradwell are absolutely safe. The very word nuclear seems to 
terrify people, who always immediately associate it with bombs and explosions. This, Mr 
Weeks emphasised, is a misconception. “I could not blow this place up if I tried”, he said, 
“In the event of abnormal conditions obtaining the result would be for the plant to shut 
down, not explode”.’ (Special Correspondent 1962 p.6 quoting Mr Weeks, Manager at 
Windscale) 
130 
 
In 1964 the Labour Government won the election and was under pressure to carry out its pre-
election promise to bilaterally disarm the UK and re-configure the 1962 Nassau Agreement which 
had contracted the UK to arm itself with nuclear based deterrents as part of its role in NATO. The 
new Harold Wilson Government did not disarm as first promised and continued its predecessor’s 
favouring of nuclear power. By the mid-1960s the Wilson administration was under heavy criticism 
for its unexpected nuclear armament but was able to continue with the nuclear energy programme 
in relative peace despite heightened public concern over the Cold War because nuclear power 
continued to be understood as an essentially separate industry. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter delineated the institutional structure of the energy industry within which those who 
supported the nuclear power competed against alternative energy choices for relative legitimacy. 
In debates over the legitimacy of nuclear power, both the media and energy industry actors drew 
on the situated national-market and state-resource institutionalised logics of the energy industry. 
In doing so, these actors also had to consider the oscillating energy contexts and fashion their 
arguments accordingly. An example was given which showed that when resource anxieties lessened 
after the Suez Crisis, the CEGB became more concerned with the financials of the industry and 
pushed for cheaper forms of electricity production such as coal. The Ministry of Power had to fight 
back with claims that a new round of AGR reactors would strengthen UK industry and resource 
invulnerability.  
During the 1950s and 1960s there was a limited number of knowledge sources which the media 
could draw from to convey opinions that differed from that of the Government’s official line. 
Consequently, much of the press rhetoric drew on the nationalised market or state-resource logics 
to legitimate nuclear power and hence echoed the Conservative (and later the Labour) 
Government’s future market fantasies or their immediate concerns over state energy resources. 
The Times and The Guardian in particular were in support of the Conservative Government of the 
1950s and appeared keen to relay the Government’s discursive distancing and normalising 
strategies to nullify the fear of nuclear power. These strategies permitted nuclear power to 
compete with other energy industries for public and industry support purely on its perceived 
resource and market potential.  
The actors embedded within the energy industry did not consider environmental problems to be a 
hindrance to the continuation of the nuclear energy programme. Instead, external actors drawing 
from an environmental societal logic problematized the industry on amenity grounds. Interestingly, 
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the discourse vindicating nuclear power may be seen to aid the industry’s detachment from more 
perturbing environmental concerns. For example, market fantasies rested on the expectation of 
continued technological development, possibly rendering concern over environmental outcomes 
as trivial and as glitches likely to be solved in the near future. Additionally, technological 
normalisation challenged the mysticism of nuclear power, basing its reality in mechanics and 
industry, and thus developing its conceptual identity as similar to other accepted industries. 
Normalisation texts represented nuclear energy as no different in environmental effect than any 
other large scale enterprise, and thus, relatively speaking, nuclear power was no less legitimate on 
environmental grounds than any other energy generating technology. Similarly, distancing 
strategies enabled the perception of a difference between nuclear power pollution and nuclear 
bomb (testing) pollution. Overall, environmental priorities were unable to encroach on embedded 
industry understandings of what was considered appropriate and necessary because nuclear 
power’s unique risks were unknown to a larger public. Thus the legitimation of nuclear could be 
achieved by vested actors through recourse to the traditional market and state expectations of the 
industry.  
This chapter ends in the mid-1960s during which the Government was consulting with the CEGB 
and the UKAEA on the specifics of the next nuclear programme: 
‘…the question has been under review for several months, but it has now become urgently 
necessary to know the scale on which nuclear power will be exploited in the immediate 
future in Britain. Already the last contract in the current phase has been let…Already the 
manufacturers, not to mention the CEGB, are anxious to know what is now expected of 
them’ (Maddox 1964a) 
In 1964 a Labour Government white paper entitled ‘The Second Nuclear Power Programme’ 
confirmed 5000MWs of new plants to be built between 1970 and 1976. This number increased to 
8000MWs by 1965. New plants were to be the more efficient Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor design 
(AGR), the new standard for the UK nuclear fleet favoured by the UKAEA. To aid and sustain the 
industry’s growth a reprocessing plant was opened at Windscale with the dual purpose of producing 
plutonium for nuclear weapons and for developing enriched uranium for fast breeder reactor fuel 
from previously used reactor fuel. The technology and expertise put into the nuclear energy 
programme in the UK was of a high standard and became a key export product by the mid and late 
1960s. The export market for nuclear goods, equipment and knowledge grew as UK began sharing 
their nuclear developments with countries such as Japan, Italy, Sweden, Israel, Taiwan, West 
Germany and Australia, and with cooperation also being discussed with Argentina, New Zealand, 
Spain, Finland, Greece, Austria and South Korea (Ministry of Power 1960). Consequently the UK 
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Government was embroiled in a large international nuclear market and was making millions on 
nuclear fuel reprocessing and export contracts. However, public disenchantment with the industry 
had been growing since the early 1960s: 
 ‘…so clumsily has the Government fumbled its policy on atomic energy that the white paper 
published yesterday is not the joyous proclamation of success it might have been, but 
rather a kind of ambiguous apology. …. In particular, it will tend to be forgotten that the 
White Paper is in its firm belief that atomic energy will be competitive with conventional 
electricity in the early seventies, and cheaper after 1975. Thereafter the growth of this 
industry will be still more rapid’ (Maddox 1964b) 
Dissatisfaction with nuclear power was to continue and further intensify into the coming decade. 
The following chapter will examine a period in which the environmental effects of nuclear power 
became the primary force behind calls for its abandonment. Amidst the intensifying public distaste 
for nuclear energy the industry and its vested actors fought to push a new programme forward 
despite minimal market successes and an increasingly growing and vigilant anti-nuclear lobby.  
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Table 9 Overview Timeline for Chapter 6: Nuclear Power and the Environmental Movement 
Covers the period 1970 to 1980 
Date Key Event Details 
1969 Friends of the Earth is founded Established as an anti-nuclear organisation 
1970 Conservatives win the election 
under Edward Heath 
  
1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty is signed Puts limits on the international production and trading 
of fissile material. Aim to stop any other country from 
developing nuclear arms. 
1970+ An American Environmental 
Movement begins to gather 
influence in the UK 
  
1971 Greenpeace is founded. The 
Organisation questions the UKs 
energy mix 
Both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth educated the 
public of nuclear power’s links with radioactive waste 
and arms proliferation 
1972 The National Union of Mineworkers 
rejects the Government's proposed 
pay increase and calls a strike 
The strikes lead to interruptions in power and fuel 
deliveries. A national state of emergency and a three 
day week is announced. The strikes highlight the 
dependence of the UKs energy mix on coal and point to 
a need for a more diverse energy mix 
1972 Landmark UN conference on the 
Human Environment takes place 
The conference reflected increasing international 
recognition of the relationship between economic 
growth and the degradation of nature 
1973 The OPEC oil crisis places a strain on 
oil supplies from the Middle East 
The values of crude oil escalated and production was 
slashed leading to a UK energy crisis. After the crisis the 
Government showed an increased interest in energy 
production technologies which would reduce reliance 
on imports 
1973 The Government commissions a 
report by the Royal Commission on 
the Environment to explore the 
effects of nuclear power on nature 
Increasing environmental awareness and knowledge of 
the nuclear power generation progress puts pressure 
on the Government to explore the implications of 
nuclear power 
1973 A reprocessing plant called THORP 
is announced as a possible 
installation at the Sellafield 
(Windscale) site pending inquiry 
The possibility of THORP creates tensions between 
environmental groups and the energy industry. The 
former see THORP as contributing to global 
proliferation and pollution, whereas the latter see 
THORP as a means to make money from lucrative 
international reprocessing contracts 
1974 The National Union of Mineworkers 
strike a second time  
Another state of emergency and three day week is 
announced 
1974 Conservative Heath Government 
call for an unexpected general 
election which is subsequently lost  
A new Labour Government under Harold Wilson was 
established and acceded to the demands of the 
mineworkers 
1974 The new Labour Government 
establishes a Department for 
Energy  
The new Department was tasked with developing 
strategies which were less vulnerable to national and 
international fuel supply conditions – In light of the the 
strikes 
1975 The Daily Mirror begins its series of 
'Doom Watch' articles on nuclear 
power, THORP and nuclear arms 
Fears over the escalation of the Cold War enhanced 
concerns that expanding the nuclear programme and 
THORP in particular would aid proliferation of nuclear 
arms. Environmental awareness pertaining to the 
effects of nuclear substances added to the anxiety.  
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1976 The Royal Commission on the 
Environment releases their report 
on Nuclear Power and the Natural 
Environment (The Flowers Report) 
The report reconfirmed concerns over the relationship 
between nuclear power, THORP and arms proliferation. 
Focussed more on nuclear arms than environmental 
considerations  
1977 Energy 2000 is established by 
Arthur Scargill and Union colleagues 
to argue against the expansion of 
nuclear power  
Energy 2000 argued that nuclear power threatened the 
coal industry and that new plants should be coal and 
renewables. The group use their links with the Labour 
party to convince key politicians to abandon nuclear 
power 
1977 The Government  publishes its 
response to the Flowers Report 
entitled 'Nuclear Power and the 
Environment' 
The Government argues that the Flowers Report was 
generally favourable to more nuclear power as long as 
more safeguards were introduced to mitigate the risk of 
the UK aiding global proliferation 
1977 The Government allows the THORP 
plant to go ahead and  
The energy supply security from nuclear power, as well 
as the financial gain from the technology and 
reprocessing contracts legitimates the continued 
running of nuclear power programme. Environmental 
concern is barely audible in Government nuclear 
legitimation  
1978 Strategy Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT II) falter and fail to be ratified 
by President Carter, USA 
Increased media attention on a possible nuclear war 
ensues. Concern that the UK would be in the centre of a 
‘limited’ nuclear war 
1979 Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
Government comes into power  
The new Government prepares to introduce a new 
American style PWR reactor into the UK along with a 
more significant AGR based programme 
1979 Three Mile Island accident, 
Pennsylvania, US 
A PWR style reactor suffers a catastrophic failure but 
there is no escape of radioactive material. America 
halts all nuclear builds and never restarts 
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Chapter 6: Nuclear Power and the 
Environmental Movement 
 
This chapter addresses an increasing intensity in the relationship between an emerging 
environmental social-movement and the UK energy industry. A social-movement often labelled as 
‘new environmentalism’ by scholars (Deudney and Matthew 1999, Torsello 2012) gained 
momentum in the UK during the 1970s. It presented a revamped, mobilised and intensified version 
of a previously more sedate and less organised environmental lobby. The ‘new environmentalists’ 
pressed for a dramatic rethink of nuclear energy and its relationship with the natural environment. 
The ordinariness of nuclear power was deconstructed by environmentalists who began to publicize 
the particularities of the nuclear energy process and re-emphasise its links with nuclear weapons 
and proliferation. Social-movement organisations in particular provided the media with critical, 
prepared and educated knowledge which countered the previously Government-centric rhetoric of 
the industry. As a result the 1970s witnessed heightened social awareness of air pollution from both 
fossil-fuel wastes and radioactivity caused by energy industries. To large social-movement 
organisations (SMOs) such as Greenpeace and FOE, the abandonment of nuclear power was a 
central part of their manifestos. For the first time the energy industry experienced tension between 
its embedded institutionalised logics which informed energy legitimacy, and the developing 
external institutional pressures questioning the limited nature of these values in the selection of 
energy options.  
Informed by the social-movement’s substantive and ethically focused environmental logic, public 
debates emerged which problematised aspects of nuclear power previously admissible. These 
debates centred on issues of radioactive-waste and proliferation; the former represented a 
breakdown of nuclear normalcy, and the latter illustrated a strengthening suspicion of the 
conceptual distance between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In the context of the escalating 
Cold War these issues stirred public outrage and political protests across Europe. In 1973 the 
Conservative Heath Government gave in to pressure from the environmental movement and 
commissioned an independent report to be carried out by the Royal Commission on the 
Environment on the effects of nuclear power on nature. The report was overseen by Sir Brian 
Flowers (previously a member of the Atomic Energy Authority and the president of the Institute of 
Physics) and became widely known as the Flowers Report once published in 1976. Whereas the 
social-movement organisation FOE saw the findings from the report as an unequivocal reason to 
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abandon nuclear generation, the Government interpreted it as a list of concerns which could be 
mitigated through advisory boards and emissions monitoring. Their unwillingness to stop nuclear 
generation should be understood in the country’s wider energy context. A series of economically 
crippling mining strikes and threats to energy supplies led Tony Benn and the Labour Government 
to fully support the escalation of the UK nuclear programme despite its environmental implications. 
This section will first discuss the nuclear concerns of the 1970s. It will then detail how, throughout 
this turbulent period, the energy department continued to legitimate nuclear power with some 
success and media support. Despite pressure on the industry to become ‘green’, the lack of 
alternatives meant that nuclear power was considered by the Government as a legitimate energy 
option.  
Nuclear Power’s Turbulent 70s 
 
‘Britain’s nuclear power station builders and planners have learnt to live with sporadic 
barrages of criticism. Many of the harsh words have been justified. The nuclear power 
station building programme, hailed in the 1950s as the break-through into an era of cheap 
electricity, has failed to live up to its expectations’ (Vielvoye 1972 p.23) 
Controversy over nuclear power must be set within a context of Cold War escalations and industrial 
indecision. The late 1960s witnessed a resurgence in nuclear optimism in response to the nearing 
completion of the first programme and completion of the new AGR designs which were to gradually 
take a dominant share of the energy mix: ‘..There is very little chance that a conventionally fired 
power station will ever be built again for base load operation’ (Editorial 1967 p.25). A 1967 Labour 
Government report entitled ‘Nuclear Power: Britain’s Chance is Now’ gave a confident forecast for 
the industry, suggesting that although it had suffered a tough ride after the first rush of rather 
excessive enthusiasm it was now able to be truly competitive (Rippon 1967 p.1). Later that year, 
the Select Committee on Science and Technology (which had been drafted in during the late 1960s 
to provide advice on the future of the programme) recommended that construction should be 
hastened and outlined a third nuclear programme for the late 1970s to add some 25,000MWs to 
the 1975 generating capacity of 13000MWs. However, a new Conservative Government took office 
in 1970 and was slow to make decisions given that AGR reactors were proving more troublesome 
to construct than initially thought. This slowed the second programmes development considerably 
(please see Appendix 1 for a detailed overview of the decisions regarding a new nuclear reactor 
design).  
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Essentially similar arguments to those which characterised the late 1950s and early 1960s were 
playing out in the 1970s. Both the Labour and Conservative Power Ministers were striving to buffer 
a fragile British nuclear industry by backing the new UKAEA designed reactors (SGHWR), and then 
the old AGRs when plans for the former fell through. With few threats to security of supply the 
choice between reactors boiled down to the CEGB’s cost focus versus the Government’s will to 
retain State dominance over energy resources; a British designed SGHWR nuclear reactor would 
‘...give the country an indigenous capability in all fields of energy’ (Anon 1974 p.17). Further 
legitimacy of a nuclear programme lay in the market and resource possibilities of a future Fast 
Breeder Reactor (FBR) programme which was exciting the press; it would be exportable, efficient 
and would minimise importation fuels. However, as the 1970s progressed the industry became 
increasingly pressured to respond to escalating concern that nuclear power had unique 
environmental implications. Judgements based solely on energy supply or market considerations 
were becoming problematised.  
Nature versus Nuclear: Energy Becomes Public 
 
A detrimental relationship between the energy industries and the natural environment was evident 
in news articles which vocalised the perspectives of environmentalists who criticised energy 
generating practices on the grounds of ecological degradation. Environmentalism was central in a 
broad counter-culture movement which reconsidered the old reliance on technology as saviour, 
was sceptical of centralised and technocratic governance and felt discomfort with global inequality 
whilst often promulgating strong anti-capitalist rhetoric (Deudney and Matthew 1999). A landmark 
UN conference in 1972 on the Human Environment (UNCHE) illustrated the political impact of 
emerging global concern regarding the relationship between economic development and nature. 
Specifically, international recognition of air and water pollution from continued industrialisation 
established a strong connection between the environment and the energy industries, as did 
increasing concern over the depletion of natural resources. In an echo of the American 
environmental movement which blossomed in 1962 after Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’ uncovered 
the impacts of the chemical industries, those pursuing the reformation of the energy industry in the 
UK recognised parallels between the nuclear and chemical industries and their effects on nature. 
The very essence of nuclear technology and its pollutant by-products infuriated an international 
environmental movement. Their tactics were more militant than seen previously, and as such their 
novel and confrontational rallies attracted media coverage which aided the diffusion of their anti-
nuclear and anti-industrial discourses to wider and less combative audiences throughout the UK: 
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‘If there is a common theme it is that of distrust: distrust of a technology that is big, new, 
complicated and potentially dangerous; and distrust of the centralised, technocratic 
institutions that have developed and promoted it. For many, nuclear power has become a 
symbol of what is most frightening, and intimidating about modern industrial systems’ 
(Anon 1978) 
Organised Environmentalism and the Media 
 
Key to the diffusion of environmental concerns was the organised nature of the environmental 
movement (Deudney and Matthew 1999). In the early 1970s influential environmental movement 
organisations (EMOs) began operating in the UK having emerged out of the burgeoning social-
movement already gripping America. Both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, two EMOs often 
referred to in both press and Government data, began life with a fundamental understanding of 
nuclear technology as an environmental misdemeanour. In 1971 Greenpeace sailed into existence 
as a group of people on a small boat lobbying against nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific Ocean. 
Friends of the Earth was founded in America by David Brower in 1969 after he split from the Sierra 
Club (of which he was a founding member and executive director) partly because they were 
reluctant to confront the construction of atomic energy stations in the US. As such, an anti-nuclear 
stance was engrained in the mantra of the most prevalent EMOs. Although their ideals were 
predominantly imported from the American movement of the 1960s, they were the largest green 
organisations in the UK with substantial and growing national support (Deudney and Matthew 
1999). These EMOs captured the interest of the media because they provided coherent, compelling, 
and unique contestations which challenged energy policy and which constructed and reflected a 
growing public anxiety towards nuclear power. As these organisations attempted to discursively 
delegitimate nuclear power on their own substantive grounds, the media further facilitated the 
dissemination of their nuclear concern.  
Consequences of an Environmental Movement 
 
EMOs inculcated an institutional framework against which nuclear was to be understood as 
illegitimate. This framework appreciated that environmental protection and conservation were not 
purely to protect the amenities of rural UK but were to fundamentally guard fragile and complicated 
natural eco-systems against the damaging nature of an industrial and capitalist society. These 
values implied that any damaging dynamic between nuclear power and its natural environment 
could not merely be dealt with through landscaping or conscientious siting. Nuclear power was 
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perceived as illegitimate because of its intrinsic process; its fuel and wastes were radioactive to the 
point of being perilous, its stations were cumbersome and leaked radiation and its development 
represented the epitome of environmentally ignorant centralised and technocratic industrialism. In 
other words, it explicated that no environmental compromises between nature and industrial 
development were permissible. Table 9 illustrates the new emergent meanings pertaining to what 
it was to be ‘environmental’ which emanated from what can be referred to as a situated social-
movement environmental logic.  
 
Table 10 Extended Societal and Situated Institutional Logics 
Societal 
Institutional 
Logic 
Capitalist market Bureaucratic 
state 
Environmental   
Institutional 
characteristics 
Accumulation of 
wealth and private 
ownership 
Rationalisation 
and regulation of 
state through 
accountable 
bureaucracies 
Protection of the 
natural environment 
for its own sake 
 
Situated Logics National- market State-resource Amenity Social-movement 
Institutional 
characteristics 
Public ownership 
Profit relative to 
priority of 
national goals 
 
Regulation and 
control of energy 
resources 
reinforce state 
invulnerabilities 
Protection of nature 
insofar as the 
amenities it provides 
for its public 
guard natural 
systems against  
capitalist industry 
and humanity 
Level Nationalised 
energy industry 
Nationalised 
energy industry 
Often local 
communities 
resisting nuclear 
builds 
Societal level – 
informing social-
movement 
Actors involved Department of 
Power 
CEGB 
Department of 
Power 
UKEA 
Local community 
groups 
Global social-
movement 
organisations to 
local community 
groups 
Source: Table 7 (p.85) 
 
Environmental actors and their sympathetic societal cohorts problematised both the normalcy and 
peacefulness of the nuclear programme and began pressurising the Government to internalise a 
more environmentally responsible set of values and conventions. The following section will explore 
the specific environmental problems of the nuclear industry as identified by the environmental 
social-movement.  
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Public Debates: Radioactivity and Waste 
 
The uniqueness of the nuclear industry and its methods of pollution were being dissected for public 
inspection by the environmental lobby in a bid to challenge the pro-nuclear defence of the 1950s 
and 1960s. Normalising and distancing discursive strategies of previous decades had minimised 
public dissent towards nuclear power by framing it as an energy option like any other –  the 
strategies had maintained a ‘level playing field’ upon which nuclear could be compared with other 
energy options on market and resource grounds. However, environmentalists contended that 
nuclear power was fundamentally unalike from other energy options because of two key and 
interlinking considerations: its radioactive-waste production and its links with nuclear armament. 
These considerations represented the centrepieces of two public debates regarding nuclear power. 
The first was particularly focused on the radioactive nature of nuclear waste and its impact on the 
environment. The second addressed the links between nuclear power proliferation and nuclear 
weapons given their similar requirement in technology and materials. They were linked because 
radioactive-waste could be used for nuclear armament. Both debates represented the ethical 
apprehensions of the environmental movement. As these public debates challenged normalising 
and distancing discursive constructions, factions of society sympathetic to the environmental 
movement became aware of the contradictions between an environmental logic and the criteria of 
legitimacy within the energy industry. The public were prompted to reconsider both the 
acceptability of nuclear power and of the energy industry’s legitimation criterion.  
Public anxieties over the relationship between Industrial progress and nature resonated with the 
unique problems of the nuclear power industry – primarily, uncertainty over what to do with its 
waste. Environmental awareness in respect to clean air, pollution and early concerns over chemical 
and pesticide contamination (Carson 1962) had reinforced anxieties over the implications of nuclear 
waste’s radioactive properties. Whilst environmental social-movement organisations publicised the 
dangers of radioactive-waste through their own campaigning, newspaper texts demonstrated 
emotive appeals against radiation. For example, The Times published several articles in 1970 which 
drew quotes from an American book clearly antagonistic to nuclear energy. The book was called 
‘The Perils of the Peaceful Atom’, and its use in the media reflected the public’s negativity towards 
nuclear waste: 
 ‘…meanwhile millions and millions of gallons boil furiously inside their frail tanks, tanks 
whose seams groan under strains metal was never meant to bear, and men go on building 
power plants to feed ever more of this corrosive ichor into its nuclear garbage dumps…’ 
(Herbert 1970 p.10) 
141 
 
The issue was shown with particular gusto in the Daily Mirror which raised concerns over the 
volume of foreign nuclear waste present and planned for in the UK. Windscale Reprocessing 
facilities (THORP: Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) were planned to be constructed by BNFL 
during the second nuclear power programme and were designed to separate the Uranium and 
Plutonium from radioactive-wastes in order to reprocess the former into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel 
for MAGNOX reactors. The latter would be stored on-site given that no long-term solution for either 
storage or disposal of radioactive substances had been established. This process had been in 
practice at the site since the 1960s, but the proposed plans significantly expanded the operations 
in order to attract international business. Newspapers were cynical of the Government’s attitude 
towards waste and its THORP solution, labelling it ‘archaic’ and claiming that it ‘…showed 
management to be out of touch with modern environmental awareness’ (Wright 1977 p.2). 
Speculation over international contracts being formed between the UK and Japan and the US for 
nuclear waste reprocessing enraged the Daily Mirror in particular, who used it as a chance to 
mercilessly criticise the environmental stresses that radioactive-waste management was imposing 
on the UK: 
‘By 1982 – if the 4,100 ton contract gets the go-ahead, a total of 750 tons will have come 
to Britain through the Tokio Electric deal…our ships have already become the free world’s 
nuclear dustcart fleet. Besides bringing waste to this country we are carrying more for 
France to deal with’ (DM1975doomwatch) [titles of articles from the DM included ‘Britain 
World’s Nuclear Dustbin’ as part of the ‘Doom watch’ series…’do we really want Japan’s 
dirty washing’ (Anon 1975 p.2) 
‘There are fears that Britain is fast becoming the nuclear dustbin of the world. The Japanese 
want to send us 4000 tons of lethal waste – because their own laws do not allow them to 
treat it. But many top men in Britain’s nuclear industry are totally opposed to the plan 
because the waste is so dangerous’ (Bonnett 1975 p.1) 
Central to waste arguments were the generational issues presented by the prospect of long-term 
waste management. Longevity of radioactivity threatened not only those obtaining the benefits of 
atomic energy in the present, but those many centuries into the future who would still have to 
contend with the waste created: 
‘The problems they [radioactive-wastes] create have interested the more philosophically-
minded of nuclear engineers since the first piles started operation 30 years ago, but have 
never been allowed to ruffle the surface of official optimism…whether a society has the 
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right to saddle its descendants with dangerous materials it does not itself know how to 
dispose of is a question that permits no simple technical answers’ (Hawkes 1975) 
 ‘In nuclear waste, man has stumbled on a kind of immortality. Unlike any other human 
product, the ashes from nuclear power stations will survive for a time which stretches 
beyond history and into the realms of geology. In a million years, today’s wastes may be 
declared safe; but whether mankind will still be around for the ceremony is a question with 
no certain answer...’ (Hawkes 1975) 
No other energy option made wastes that would threaten the environment and humanity for such 
an inconceivably long time. With no plans as to how disposal of nuclear wastes might work, the 
nuclear power industry could provide no solution to the problems outlined by environmentalists. 
The only option was storage, which posed persistent risks to storage sites.  
The Loss of Normalcy 
 
Apprehensions regarding radioactive-waste implied a concerning uniqueness to atomic energy; no 
other energy production technique created a by-product which could cause severe illness from 
mere proximity and environmental harm for such long periods of time. The normalising legitimating 
strategies identified in media accounts during the early years of nuclear power were being 
questioned by an environmental mentality which examined the raw properties of nuclear processes 
and their interactions with the natural environment. Newspapers stopped disseminating 
Government messages of nuclear normalcy and instead began to apply critical environmental 
perspectives. A cynically presented cocktail of uniqueness and human imperfection framed nuclear 
power as a risk to society and its environment: 
‘…nuclear power creates unique risks which cannot be assessed, let alone overcome, 
according to a report published in London yesterday by Friends of the Earth…the safety of 
nuclear technology is ultimately limited, not by care, ingenuity, dedication or wealth, but 
by inescapable human fallibility.’ (Lovins 1974 p.20) 
Any commonalities found in the relationship between nuclear power and its conventional fossil-
fuel counterparts were eroded by continual reminders of the unparalleled substances utilised by 
the nuclear industry. Consequently, the technology and the science which undergirded nuclear 
power was questioned: was the UK really advanced enough to deal with the nuclear problems it 
had taken on, especially in terms of protecting the environment? (Lovins 1974). It was becoming 
increasingly stated within the press that nuclear power could not be considered under the same 
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criteria as traditional energy industries because its complexity complicated its legitimacy. These 
considerations were far removed from those of state-resource or national-market viability, and as 
such were distressing for a Government who had previously not had to defend its energy choices 
on such grounds. Issues around nuclear power’s wastes were beyond the established arguments of 
the energy industry. Compounding apprehensions were the concerns over the safeguarding of 
nuclear wastes amidst an escalating Cold War. Public debates surrounding wastes were linked to 
proliferation because of the radioactive properties of the high level wastes (HLWs) which if taken 
could be used to fashion primitive nuclear bombs.  
The Proliferation Threat 
 
‘...how to expand nuclear power without simultaneously perpetuating the spread of 
nuclear weapons. This problem seemed manageable in the relatively stable international 
climate of the fifties and sixties…but the transition in the seventies to a more fragmented 
and insecure world order made the management of nuclear affairs much more difficult…’ 
(Walker and Lonroth 1980) 
As concern regarding the outputs of nuclear generation intensified, the ability of those within the 
nuclear lobby to sustain a conceptual distance between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy 
diminished. By 1973 the Conservative Heath Government gave in to environmental pressure and 
commissioned an independent report - officially the 6th report of the UK Royal Commission on the 
Environment, but previously referred to as the Flowers Report. Its objective was to examine the 
relationship between the natural environment and the nuclear industry. The report was expected 
to concentrate on the immediate and direct implications of nuclear power on natural systems. 
However, the conclusions were particularly important in the delineation of linkages between 
nuclear generators and nuclear war. There were three central strands of proliferation concerns 
highlighted by the report which will be discussed below. First, the Flowers Report developed the 
concept of a ‘plutonium economy’ which problematised the use of FBR reactors. Secondly, the 
context of the Cold War reminded society that nuclear power generally was borne from the nuclear 
bomb. Thirdly, commentators were concerned that the THORP reprocessing plant placed the UK as 
a central facilitator of international proliferation of fissile material.  
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Fast Breeder Reactors & the Flowers Report 
 
‘Over the last few years there have been signs of increasing  anxiety in many countries about 
projected  growth in nuclear power and about the environmental  risks that this might imply 
for the future. Early in 1974 we decided that this was a fitting subject for us to investigate 
and we announced the terms of a study of radiological hazards with particular reference to 
the development of civil nuclear power’ (Flowers 1976 foreword) 
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution began their report, under the leadership of Sir. 
Brian Flowers, into ‘Nuclear Power and the Environment’ in 1973 under the Conservative 
Government as a response to escalating environmental apprehensions related to nuclear power. It 
was presented to the Labour Government in 1976. It aimed to examine the relationship between 
the natural environment and the continuation of the UK’s nuclear programme at a time where it 
seemed to the commission that the UK was on the threshold of increased nuclear investment 
without a full appreciation of social, environmental and ethical issues (Flowers 1976 p.4). The 
concluding report published a multitude of concerns. The Commission suggested that ‘Nothing 
would be more disruptive to the environment than nuclear warfare and we feel bound to comment 
on the spread of civil nuclear power in relation to the proliferation of nuclear weapons’ (Flowers 
1976 p.74). They proposed that civil nuclear expansion would lead to global dispersal of nuclear 
technologies: 
‘Our conclusion [is] that the spread of nuclear power will inevitably facilitate the spread of 
the ability to make nuclear weapons, and, we fear, the construction of these weapons’ 
(Flowers 1976 p.67) 
The report feared that a programme of reprocessing and FBR reactors in particular would result in 
a ‘plutonium economy’ wherein the prevalence of plutonium would threaten national security and 
demand constrictive safeguarding to avoid ‘plutonium terrorists’.  Security could not be passive and 
would be required to carry out ‘clandestine operations’ (Flowers 1976 p.82): 
‘…A belief that the necessary  vigilance and continuity could not be adequately guaranteed  
in any normal organisation led Alvin Weinberg to postulate a "nuclear priesthood"; this 
would be a dedicated, self-perpetuating body of people forming a technological elite which 
would  be entrusted  through the generations with the task of safeguarding society  from 
the hazards of nuclear power. The idea of such a ”priesthood" may seem untenable, but it 
is an indication of the extent of the anxiety felt by some responsible people about the 
hazards’ (Flowers 1976 p.82) 
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Such measures, the commission argued, would lead to gradual but inexorable infringements on 
personal liberties. The report was concerned that the Government so far had not considered the 
management processes of safeguarding such materials, categorising it as ‘just another problem…as 
one which can certainly be solved’ (Flowers 1976 p.85). Conclusions from the report emphasised 
that nuclear fission should not continue to go ahead unchallenged, and that there should be 
evidence that there is no ‘…reasonably certain economic alternative’ (Flowers 1976 p.85). 
Abandonment of nuclear power was not the ultimate conclusion, and the economic benefits of 
nuclear power were duly noted; but until all the issues had been fully appreciated and weighed in 
light of wider public understanding, the commission believed that there should be no commitment 
to a large nuclear programme. The commission recommended that the FBR programme be delayed 
for as long as possible, and that investment be redirected towards alternative sources of energy 
whilst issues of waste management were resolved. Evidently nuclear power’s claim to represent 
the ‘peaceful use of the atom’ (IAEA) was challenged by a troubling reality that the fundamental 
materials used in nuclear power fuel-cycles could be facilitative of irreparable global ecological 
damage. Resultantly nuclear arms and nuclear power were becoming conceptually conflated: 
‘…the connection between civil and military uses of nuclear power is obvious; there is the 
possibility that great expansion of civil use would make more difficult the eventual 
acceptance and introduction of measures to secure disarmament’ (Flowers 1976 p.82) 
 ‘…There is a wide growing feeling, not only in Great Britain but throughout the Western 
world, that this drift into the plutonium economy not only involves a danger to civil liberties 
but could involve a drift into the dangers of nuclear war’ (Secretary of State for Energy 1974 
p.13) 
Implications of a Cold War 
 
The Commission’s publication skewed a concern with the relationship between the environment 
and nuclear power into a report focused on the connection between nuclear energy and armament. 
This likely reflected societal unease as the fragile equilibrium between nuclear-laden global 
superpowers induced increasing levels of anxiety. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 
required all non-nuclear weapons states to sign up to IAEA safeguards, yet still tensions between 
the heavily armed Russia and the US did not ease. Press articles referred to the state of continual 
weapons development as a balance based on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). That is, the 
maintenance of peace was dependent on the belief that an offensive would be suicidal because all 
nuclear power capabilities between hostile countries were alike. Consequently any counterattack 
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would be deadly for the aggressor. However, in 1978 President Carter failed to ratify the SALT 
(Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) II treaties and the détente between East and West faltered. It was 
feared that the break down in relations would manifest in what was termed a ‘limited nuclear war’ 
played out in Europe whilst the Superpowers tested each other’s resolve (Pilger 1978 p.1). The UK 
hosted a number of US missile sites which bolstered anxieties that the UK represented a prime 
target for the Communist states: ‘Britain has been called “America’s unsinkable aircraft carrier” 
(Mirror Report 1980 p.1). Moreover, nuclear technology was spreading to new nations who were 
either pushing or altogether ignoring the non-proliferation measures taken in previous decades. 
The media claimed that the UK’s nuclear progress had been integral to this predicament, reflecting 
public concern that the atomic energy industry was only adding to Cold War hostilities: 
‘…confidence in existing, internationally agreed, non-proliferation measures collapsed in 
the wake of the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, and the Germans and French agreements 
in 1975-6 to supply “sensitive” nuclear technologies to Third World countries that were 
considered proliferation risks…meanwhile the worst acts of weapons proliferation are 
being committed by the five existing nuclear weapon states (not least the UK), which 
continue to expand and modernise their nuclear arsenals’ (Walker and Lonroth 1980) 
 ‘Controversy over nuclear power never seems to die. The fears connected with its 
development, and the knowledge that, however peaceful a modern power station appears, 
the process by which it is making electricity was first developed as an instrument of war 
bringing terrible destruction to property and human life have ensured a level of public 
disquiet and official vigilance not seen elsewhere’ (Hirst 1980 p.iv) 
The public debates explored above were very much interlinked. Their interwoven nature can be 
illustrated most vividly in the way arguments around the building of the nuclear THORP 
reprocessing plant at Windscale (renamed Sellafield in 1981) were framed in the media. The plant, 
as previously discussed, would facilitate international contracts for reprocessing and would either 
keep the wastes or transport some or all back to the exporting country. However, the struggle 
between the nuclear industry and environmental groups over the THORP build highlighted the 
overriding vales of the energy industry and its rejection of environmentally grounded anti-nuclear 
debates. Politically, the Government sought the financial gains from international contracts, 
regardless of the environmentalists’ views that it constituted state profiteering irrespective of 
environmental consideration.   
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THORP: Fear and Loathing  
 
Disputes over the nuclear reprocessing facility at Windscale provide an explicit illustration of the  
tensions between anti-nuclear argument and the interests of the Government. In America concerns 
over a plutonium economy and the role of reprocessing in its making led the Administration to 
abandon nuclear reprocessing altogether. President Carter called for an international halt of all 
reprocessing activities until an International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (IFCE) had taken place to 
determine the extent of proliferation facilitated by the process. Controversially the UK Government 
chose not to restrain until the IFCE and against US wishes continued to plan the construction of the 
THORP facilities. In March 1976 the Minister of Energy Mr Tony Benn announced that BNFL would 
accept more overseas reprocessing work. BNFL then made an official submission for a planning 
application to Cumbria council for the THORP works. Unexpectedly, the Council referred the matter 
to the Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr Peter Shore who called in the THORP proposals 
for his own inspection and a public inquiry. The inquiry was likely a result of the press uproar after 
the formal BNFL submission became known publicly in late 1976. The quotes below are from a 
Government report explaining the need for the Inquiry: 
‘There is legitimate and growing public concern over the reprocessing of uranium oxide 
fuel…it is essential to make an early announcement that the Windscale application will be 
the subject of an inquiry. This will enable the environmental and safety issues at stake to 
be properly and responsibly considered’ (Secretary of State for the Environment 1976 p.9) 
‘Unless the public can be provided with some real reassurance about the nature and safety 
of the proposed development at Windscale, opposition to nuclear programmes will 
increase to a point where there may be strong political pressure against further 
developments of any kind… but I nevertheless believe it is the right course’ (Secretary of 
State for the Environment 1976 p.9) 
The Windscale Inquiry was chaired by Mr Justice Parker and decisions to proceed on the project 
would ultimately be decided by Parliament. The inquiry was attended by BNFL who accounted for 
the majority of proponent ‘air time’, and numerous objectors including the Town and Country 
Planning Association and FOE. It was the longest running Inquiry of its kind in UK history and hosted 
a lengthy battle between the State owned BNFL and both local and global environmental 
organisations. Justice Parker’s report concluded with the advisement that BNFL’s proposals created 
no significant increase in radiological risk, that the security risk was not unmanageable and that 
environmentally it offered a better option than mere storage. Additionally, the report suggested 
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that the reprocessing of foreign fuel would not run counter to proliferation prevention efforts and 
international policy. The final decision was made by parliament in a 1978 debate opened by Peter 
Shore. Two parliamentary debates ended in favourable voting towards the construction of THORP. 
Construction was hastily convened amidst concerns that any further delay to the proposals would 
put the contract for the reprocessing of Japanese Uranium oxide fuel (of which the Japanese were 
banned from performing after WWII) at risk, thereby damaging the UK’s international reputation 
(Secretary of State for the Environment 1976). In 1978 the concluding Windscale inquiry report 
(Parker 1978) was published, officially outlining the THORP justifications.  
The Daily Mirror in particular remained sceptical of the effects of THORP on proliferation. In 
pursuing its construction, the Labour Government had argued that the international presence of 
plutonium would be lowered and concentrated within the UK, thus abetting disarmament. For the 
Daily Mirror, THORP would instead place Britain in the centre of international proliferation, 
facilitating the spread of nuclear weapons via the production of their environmentally unsound raw 
materials and the shipment of reprocessed fuel back to exporting countries. The UK would then be 
left with the wastes of this process earning it the title ‘nuclear dustbin’: 
‘…the report maintains that unless Britain goes ahead with Windscale, other countries 
might produce their own plutonium…And if it works, Windscale will be the world’s first – 
making Britain not only a “nuclear dustbin” but a major supplier of the means of making 
the atomic bomb’ (Pilger 1978 p.1) 
Disapproval of the Windscale report was also aired by the environmental organisations in 
attendance. A 1978 report by Walter Patterson, Friends of the Earth’s (FOE) primary energy 
specialist (1972-1978) responded to the official Windscale report with a scathing review of the 
Government’s ability to praise itself for handling the civil nuclear dispute via a flawed and biased 
public inquiry. FOE was frustrated that BNFL had not only got everything it asked for, but that the 
means by which the debate had been handled additionally meant that the Secretary of State for 
Energy was able to make a ‘special development order’ to hasten the plant’s construction. 
Patterson argued that the inquiry was blatantly plotted as a means to accept the THORP 
construction in a way that facilitated the bending of usual planning protocol, rather than as a means 
to promote fair public debate. In his acceptance of the THORP proposal, Justice Parker had rejected 
each point made by the environmental opponents. As such, Patterson argued that the FOE 
perspective was not considered and that Parker’s suggestion that nuclear power was 
environmentally sound was grossly misplaced - one among many ‘absurdities’ posed by the report. 
BNFL had argued that concentrating reprocessing in the UK would be ‘greener’ than leaving it to be 
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stored around the world. FOE fervently rejected this supposition and began mobilising support for 
anti-nuclear rallies in response: 
‘Objectors in the meanwhile are organizing what may be the largest Trafalgar Square rally 
about nuclear policy since the heyday of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament nearly 20 
years ago. The aftermath of the Windscale Inquiry Report may well jolt the British 
Government rudely out of its nuclear complacency’ (Patterson 1978 p.4) 
Implications of Public Debates 
 
First and foremost the public debates initiated by the environmental movement undermined the 
normalising and distancing legitimation strategies of the pro-nuclear lobby. By challenging the 
legitimacy of nuclear power from its own substantive concerns the environmental movement 
created space for the public to problematise nuclear power on the grounds of its unique 
environmental threats and relationship with nuclear weapons. Nuclear power could no longer be 
considered as ‘just another’ energy option. Instead it demanded additional consideration given its 
environmental dangers. Consequently pressure was mounting on the Government to consider 
environmental values when making energy choices:  
 ‘Decisions should not be taken simply on the basis of technological or economic advantage 
and the assumed necessity of securing steadily increasing energy supplies. The social and 
ethical issues involved are real and important, and should be widely appreciated and 
discussed’ (Flowers 1976 p.83) 
Despite the growing environmental anxiety within the public domain, and from the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution and the press, the energy industry ultimately appeared to 
reject the concerns. At best one could suggest that a compromise was made whereby the 
Department of Energy introduced a number of advisory boards and committees to satiate the 
demands of the environmentalists. This move illustrated that the Energy Department remained 
unwilling to compare energy options on the basis of environmental credentials, but would instead 
monitor the pollution and emissions of plants once installed to ensure that pollutant levels 
remained satisfactorily low. The following section will explore this ‘greening’ of the energy industry 
post-Flowers Report.  It will argue that the structural changes made merely reflected the passing of 
responsibility to organisations which continued and possibly even exacerbated the State’s 
ignorance of the values and rationalities of the environmental movement.  
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A Post Flowers Era: Has Nuclear Gone Green? 
 
‘Lord Sherfield, opening a debate on the sixth report of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution on nuclear power and the environment, said the commission 
found relatively little to criticise about the development of the nuclear industry in all its 
aspects up to the present’ (Anon 1976 p.6) 
In late 1977 the Labour Government printed its official response to the Flowers Report in the white 
paper entitled ‘Nuclear power and the Environment’. It stated that the Royal Commission had 
concluded that ‘…In many respects the reports endorse[d] existing practices or activities’ (p.4). In 
regarding the report as a green light for nuclear continuation, the Government interpreted the 
Royal Commissions’ worries over nuclear power’s social, environmental and security effects as 
concerns relating to insufficient regulation. A principal recommendation by the report was that 
nuclear waste should be handled away from the ministerial department with vested nuclear 
interests. The Secretary of State for the Environment, Peter Shore, reflected in a commons sitting 
that the Government reaction should be to develop a long-term strategy for nuclear waste 
independent of the energy department. Subsequently, the Department of the Environment was to 
take over responsibility for regulating and monitoring all nuclear waste from both the Department 
of Energy and the UKAEA. Additionally, a Nuclear Waste Management Advisory Committee 
(NWMAC) was endorsed by the Royal Commission and was to be established at a later date pending 
the decision on whether it would have statuary powers or not.  A Nuclear Waste Disposal 
Corporation was also recommended, although the Government did not see the need to make a 
decision on its formation immediately. Ultimately the environmental implications of nuclear power 
were to be closely supervised and controlled through safeguards and advisory structures: 
‘Will a “plutonium economy” damage the fabric of our society? No, it will not because it 
will not be allowed to. Plutonium will not be stolen from the plutonium store because that 
is as secure as we choose to make it”.’ [Quote by the AEA chairman Sir John Hill in The 
Times (Hill 1976 p.12)] 
‘The Government agree with the commission’s conclusion that the risk of serious accident 
in any single reactor is extremely small, and note their view that hazards posed by reactor 
accidents are not unique in scale, nor of such a kind to suggest that nuclear power should 
be abandoned for this reason alone…overcome the security problems consideration would 
be given to proliferation possibilities at the design stage of nuclear installations: ‘designing 
security into nuclear systems’ (Secretary of State for Energy 1977 p.11) 
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Nevertheless, the media illustrated public distrust in the strength of the regulation and maintained 
deeper concerns over the morals and environmental ethics of atomic energy. It seemed that the 
Government had failed to encapsulate the environmental anxieties of the public in its restructuring.  
Just Not Getting It: Rising Distrust of the Industry 
 
‘…their [the Government’s] cleverness was apt to outrun their wisdom. Like precocious 
children they gave themselves expensive toys and started them up without reading the 
instructions. Then we are surprised when they go wrong and are lucky if they do not blow 
up our own faces’ (Anon 1976 p.6) 
Conversely, the media did not interpret the Flowers Report as a general ‘go ahead’ for nuclear 
power. Primarily they had apprehensions surrounded the capabilities of new regulatory bodies in 
controlling the nuclear machine. For example, The Times (which backed the oppositional 
conservative-liberal coalition at this time) focused on an interpretation of the report which 
problematized national safety. Its journalists questioned whether safeguards could be 
operationalized successfully given the requirements of the nuclear industry. Nuclear power’s 
‘uniqueness’ was conjuring up all kinds of apprehensions which questioned how much society and 
industry actually knew about atomic processes. Nuclear power was framed as an uncontrollable 
and uncontainable technology; one which the Government had yet to truly understand given its 
failures in recognising the plutonium and waste problems endemic in nuclear electricity generation: 
 ‘…man’s inability to foresee all the failure mechanisms that could lead to a serious incident 
makes it impossible to introduce appropriate safeguards. Reactor technology is complex 
and man is fallible, and with such potential hazards of failure an acceptable level of safety 
cannot be guaranteed’ (Wright 1976a p.4) 
To inform its perspective The Times drew extensively from the FOE report published in 1976 as an 
alternative response to the Flowers Report. The quote below was one of many directly cited by The 
Times from FOE which re-emphasised concerns of the Flowers Report and queried the 
Government’s ability to face the issues satisfactorily: 
‘They pose questions of a different kind. How could the Government prevent thefts of the 
plutonium so essential to a nuclear programme using fast breeders? What security 
measures might prove necessary? What impact might such measures have on political and 
civil liberties to which we are all accustomed? (Wright 1976b p.4) 
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In defence of the industry, MPs in support of the Minister for Energy’s advocacy for the Windscale 
THORP plant criticised the media for distorting the reality of atomic energy and instilling anxiety 
into society from an ill-informed and inconsistent perspective: 
‘Very little was said by the critics of nuclear energy against reprocessing until fairly recently. 
Much of the opposition started when one of the newspapers – I think it was the Daily Mirror 
– referred to the possible winning of the Japanese contracts and the bringing here of 
Japanese spent fuel as turning this country into a nuclear dustbin. That was the start of the 
recent strong agitation against Windscale’ (Commons Sitting 1978 p.20) 
‘In one Sunday newspaper…In an authoritative article it said that, by the year 2000, there 
would be 1 million reactors in the world, and that, because of the probability of accident 
was postulated at one million to one, it was therefore probable that there would be one 
reactor accident every year. If the public are served with that sort of ludicrous and 
misleading information, it is no wonder that there is concern’ (Commons Sitting 1978 p.10) 
The Government and the UKAEA believed that the anti-nuclear pervasiveness within the press was 
an example of sensationalist journalism, and framed it as so in their attempt to avoid any direct 
confrontation with troublesome public debates. Indeed, responding to the concerns of the 
environmental lobby was no longer as easy as some well-placed landscaping or chimney 
minimisation. The nuclear industry would need to accept a whole new range of regulators that 
perhaps did not share their enthusiasm for atomic energy. The Department for the Environment, in 
particular, became heavily involved in the energy industry, taking responsibility for monitoring and 
enforcing safe waste management. Their new found centrality to the operations of nuclear energy 
generation forced operators to concede to practices consistent with the agency’s environmental 
norms and values. Whether this was enacted with a genuine alteration in mentality or just 
ceremonially to appease the Environmental Agency is unclear. Indeed, the creation of regulators 
with environmental priorities, values and conventions did not appear to mean that decisions over 
energy choices would deliberate environmental implications; there was little to suggest that 
decision-making actors within the energy industry had internalised the environmental movement’s 
values, as they instead relied on the coercive regulatory powers of the new actors to enforce 
environmental considerations upon them, alleviating them from the need to adopt the mentality 
themselves. Decisions made relating to the energy mix by the Minister of Energy remained focused 
on market and resource considerations, with the environmental bodies there to ensure that these 
decisions were then enacted in a way that fitted the regulations.   
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Conversely, the Press interrogated the possible efficacy that could be gained by such regulators. 
They argued that something as unknown and potentially volatile as nuclear power could never be 
fully fortified. It seemed that the energy minister had failed to grasp society’s environmental 
conscience. Regulation did not make the fundamental nature of nuclear power environmentally 
friendly; it did not turn radioactive-waste into something less toxic, nor did it deplete the 
explosiveness of plutonium isotopes when bashed together. In sum, the Flowers Report had 
recommended a number of independent committees and advisory boards to monitor and regulate 
the nuclear industry’s methods of waste and proliferation management. However, the instigation 
of these bodies failed to appease environmentalists who felt that they represented a biased 
compromise and would act in the interests of the nuclear industry. 
Nevertheless, the nuclear industry managed to continue throughout the 1970s with a number of 
new stations from the second programme going online, as well as the THORP plant. Although the 
environmental movement had been able to generate public apprehensions over nuclear power 
leading to both a substantial THORP inquiry and an influential Royal Commission report, it appeared 
that nuclear power was still considered valuable in relation to the institutionalised expectations of 
the numerous energy ministers over the mid and late 1970s (Labour under Wilson; Eric Varley 1975-
76, and Labour under Callaghan; Tony Benn 1976-79). Increasingly it became evident that pressure 
on the Department of Energy to modify its institutionalised principles to include environmental 
concerns as key rationalising conditions appeared unlikely to lead to the abandonment of nuclear 
power. Below, the chapter will discuss how actors within the energy industry continued to 
legitimate nuclear power despite its declining favour within the public and environmental spheres.  
Continuity of Nuclear: Strikes and Crisis 
 
The above sections have focused primarily on the environmental values of a social-movement 
which problematised the nuclear industry and its relationship with nature. However, the political 
landscape of the energy industry during this period was not without its own dramas. The following 
section will explore how the political climate of the 1970s contributed to the continuation of nuclear 
power despite its environmental criticisms. Importantly the decade was characterised by a number 
of crippling strikes by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which demonstrated the 
nationwide vulnerability to an energy mix dependent on coal. Additionally, the UK was suffering 
manufacturing and economic decline with industrial protests erupting around the country in 
response to Government spending cuts. As such, the energy industry was placed within a national 
context which warranted the instigation of an energy mix which offered financial potential and 
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immediate solutions to energy supply susceptibilities. Legitimation of nuclear power by the Minister 
of Energy and the CEGB came from its relative perceived necessity as aligned with the National-
market, and predominantly, the State-resource situated logics within the energy industry. 
Conventional Fuels Fight Back 
 
‘…even with the promise of nuclear energy to back up the hard pressed conventional 
 sources of power, a major energy crisis is possible well before the year 2000’ (Anon 1972a 
p.15) 
The Conservative Heath Government in the period of 1970-1974 displayed a fascination with 
nuclear energy, but struggled to provide an efficient nuclear programme given the difficulties 
presented by the AGRs. Energy policy at the time was expressed as ‘COCONUKE’ which stood for 
conservation, coal and nuclear. However, the period was to test the accepted energy mix and its 
dependency implications. In January 1972 the National Executive Committee of the NUM, following 
months of negotiation with the National Coal Board (NCB), rejected the Government’s proposed 7-
8 per cent pay rise. Miners from all over Britain not only picketed at their coal mines but disrupted 
activity at many types of power station and fuel mobilisation hubs. After a month, the lack of power 
generation from coal partnered with interruptions in fuel and material transportation led to the 
announcement of a national state of emergency and a three day working week to conserve energy. 
It was not until mid-February that NUM and the Government came to an agreement and the 
picketing ceased with Miners securing a significant pay rise. Mining strikes highlighted the fragility 
of the UK’s energy mix and its economic dependence on the coal industry. Consequently, the 
Government turned to the nuclear industry in the hopes of diversifying the energy mix. However, 
the MAGNOX stations were beginning to suffer from corrosion and a reduced operating efficiency, 
and the follow up AGR programme was inundated by cost overruns, technical problems and delays: 
 ‘Britain led the world in the introduction of nuclear power in the 1950s, but recently, while 
other major industrial countries, not least in the European Economic Community, have 
been installing unclear plants on a large scale, our own experience has been very 
disappointing both at home and abroad’ (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 1972 
p.5) 
 ‘…the British consortia that build the reactors are in disarray and the morale of their staff 
is probably at its lowest ebb. This is partly because the groups are only just learning to live 
with the failures of the first and second generations of nuclear power stations to achieve 
their much publicised targets or to sell British designs overseas’ (Anon 1972b p.25)  
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Given that the settlements between NUM and the National Coal Board (NCB) were viewed as a 
significant victory for the mining unions, little further trouble was expected (Kershaw 1972) and the 
Government began to slowly restructure the construction side of the nuclear industry. However 
respite was not to last as a year later the OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
oil crisis placed strain on oil supplies from the Middle East. During the Yom Kippur War between 
the Arab States and Israel, Arab members of OPEC refused to transport petroleum to nations 
(including the UK) seen to be giving support to Israel. Consequently the value of crude oil escalated 
and production was slashed leading to a UK energy crisis and a push for national energy production. 
After the crisis both media and Government texts demonstrated an increasing interest in changing 
the configuration of energy sources; incorporating new technologies such as gas and revamping 
and expanding the nuclear energy contribution: 
‘…the era of cheap oil is past, and the development of alternatives will be costly. Gas, 
however, has been an important source of energy in the developed countries and the oil 
price crisis can be expected to spur further exploration… by 1985, it is estimated nuclear 
power will account for half, followed by coal (30 per cent), natural gas (9 per cent), oil (8 
per cent) and hydroelectric (3 per cent)’ (Owen 1974 p.iii) 
The rampage against British energy supplies continued with another miners strike in 1974. Tensions 
between the Conservatives and trade unions had escalated since 1972 due to pay-freezes aimed at 
aiding the failing economy. Additionally, the 1973 oil crisis created a strong bargaining context for 
the coal union by increasing both the cost of coal as well as its fossil-fuel alternatives. In February 
1974 NUM called another strike over pay which led to another state of emergency and shorter 
working weeks to limit national power consumption. The Edward Heath (Conservative) 
Government called a sudden General Election in the early months of 1974 asking the public to use 
their votes to show the mining unions their frustrations. Unexpectedly the general election led to a 
hung parliament and after numerous disagreements over a possible coalition Government Harold 
Wilson was able to form a Labour Government to take over leadership. Two days after the Heath 
Government was voted out, the new Government appeased the NUM and ended the month long 
strike. It was another resounding victory for the miners as they received nearly twice as much as 
they would have under the Heath Administration (Winterton and Winterton 1989). Nevertheless, 
the strikes had left a sour taste by displaying to Government and society a politically volatile and 
‘selfish’ (Hawkes 1974) side to the coal industry which detracted investment: 
‘…companies…will not spend money converting plant to coal burning…so long as there 
remains the threat of further disruptive industrial action’ (Editorial 1974 p.17) 
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The official Labour response was to establish a Department for Energy to take over energy 
responsibilities from the Department of Trade and Industry and to develop energy strategies which 
were less vulnerable to national and international fuel supply oscillations. In June 1974 the NCB 
issued ‘The Plan for Coal’ which outlined a template for massive coal investment and infrastructure, 
duly committing the Department of Energy to create additional mining capacity to cover that which 
was being lost (Derek Ezra, Chairman of NCB). The boost for coal was coupled with calls for nuclear 
power to supplement and diversify energy supplies. As fossil-fuel reserves continued to both 
dissipate and become internationally and nationally politicised, the press began to argue that 
nuclear power was necessary to take over the main burden of electricity generation from coal and 
oil during the coming decades. Indeed, within the press nuclear energy’s legitimacy appeared 
contradictory considering the continual criticisms of disappointment, environmental concern and 
uncertainty regarding its marketable achievements. However, although increasingly alarmed by the 
environmental implications of nuclear power, the press also illustrated an attraction to atomic 
energy’s supply security in relation to alternative energy options. With the Government struggling 
to adequately control the supplies of fossil-fuels, particularly given climbing energy demand in the 
UK, reinvestment in nuclear power seemed the only ‘rational’ option:   
‘…why, then, do leaders of the electricity industry, as well as energy planners, persist in 
advocating nuclear power as the only source of fuel that can bridge the energy gap that 
could emerge towards the end of the century? The answer is simple. There is no real 
alternative’ (Anon 1974 p.15) 
‘…taking into account the relatively abundant fossil-fuel resources of the United Kingdom, 
there was still a gap between supply and prospective demand, which nuclear fission offered 
the only practical possibility of filling’ (Wright 1975 p.5) 
The Government’s reorganisation of the industry continued in a bid to strengthen the construction 
consortia into a single entity that would collaborate in the design of a single British reactor. It was 
hoped that this would not only strengthen and protect the companies within the consortia by 
minimising competition, but would develop a coherent organisation which could develop a reactor 
type which would be competitive overseas. Such work was in anticipation for a third nuclear power 
programme which was expected to be announced in the later years of the 1970s:  
‘By 1985 it is estimated nuclear power will account for half, followed by coal, natural gas, 
oil and hydroelectric…we need nuclear capacity and we should like to see it coming into the 
system from the new programme of nuclear development in 1980 and onwards.’ 
 (Owen 1974 p.iii) 
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It should be noted that The Times seemed to offer contradictory accounts between the 
environmental opposition shown previously and the current pro-nuclear stance. This change may 
be attributed to the paper’s Conservative support during 1970 and 1974.   
The coal industry fought back against the instigation of nuclear power. Indeed it was not purely 
environmental groups developing a dislike of nuclear power. Interestingly, in the latter part of the 
1970s the coal lobby were one of the first groups to suggest that renewable technologies could 
replace the need for ‘dangerous’ nuclear power.  
An Unlikely Alliance: Coal and Renewables 
 
The Department of Energy’s push towards nuclear power in reaction to coal and oil threats incited 
anti-nuclear action from the miners’ union in particular. Aside from industrial decline and issues 
surrounding miners’ remuneration, nuclear power threatened the influence of the coal union by 
lessening the proportion of UK energy production that coal would supply, thus decreasing the 
union’s bargaining power. In 1977, central members of the National Union of Mineworkers, namely 
Arthur Scargill, coordinated the creation of a group called 'Energy 2000' from the North of England 
which set out to prove that dependence upon nuclear power would be both unnecessary and 
economically damaging (Kershaw 1977 p.14). Energy 2000 represented the first organisation from 
within the energy industry to align itself both with the interests of a specific energy industry and 
the values of an environmental lobby in a bid to oust nuclear power: 
 ‘An all-party group of MPs yesterday opened an early-day motion calling for measures to 
prevent Britain from becoming committed to an “unacceptable” degree of dependence on 
nuclear power. The first 14 signatories to the motion came after a lobby of Parliament by 
more than two hundred leading scientists, members of conservation and environmental 
groups…they gathered under the label Energy 2000’ (Wright 1977 p.4) 
Energy 2000 hoped to further the economic interests of the coal miners by aligning their concerns 
over nuclear dependence with anxieties about the dangers associated with the plutonium economy 
(Wright 1977 p.4) as well as radioactive-waste disposal and storage issues. In particular, Energy 
2000 was significant because it represented one of the first anti-nuclear organisations to seriously 
suggest that renewable energy production could offer a substitute to nuclear power. With the 
backing of scientists and environmental group representatives, Energy 2000 favoured a mix of coal 
and renewables to constitute Britain’s future energy mix: 
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‘….The motion had called for a halt to all future nuclear development other than for the 
safe disposal of waste from existing works; for spending more money on saving energy; for 
an energy policy that recognised that oil and coal reserves were finite; and for more 
research into wind, wave and solar energy. It stated that it was criminal to jeopardise the 
future of children with the unknown dangers of radioactivity’ (Anon 1977 p.4) 
Using Energy 2000 as a vessel from which to dispute nuclear power, key members of NUM exploited 
their trade union’s political ties to try and influence both the TUC and the new Labour party to 
support the abandonment of nuclear power. Drawing from the environmental social-movement 
and piggy backing on the environmentally grounded anti-nuclear sentiment stewing in the public 
domain, Energy 2000 challenged the idea that only nuclear energy could 'fill the energy gap'. As a 
nascent and untested technology, renewables were yet to offer a serious alternative in the eyes of 
many; but for the members Energy 2000 they provided a much less threatening route towards 
securing national energy supplies than the instigation of numerous baseload nuclear plants. They 
also offered a means to attract and associate the coal lobby with the snow balling environmental 
lobby. Nevertheless, although it attracted print space in both The Guardian and The Times, Energy 
2000 failed to have the required political success. Their suggestions were rejected by a sceptical 
TUC and further fell on deaf ears once the pro-nuclear Thatcher Government came to power in 
1979. Although not successful in its initial attempts to stop the nuclear industry, Energy 2000 sowed 
the seeds for the ‘nuclear versus renewables’ debate which would come to flourish in later decades.  
No Choice but Atomic Energy 
 
The values and conventions of the energy industry’s state-resource logic were clearly evident in the 
discursive advocacy of nuclear power during the 1970s. Given the troublesome supply context of 
the energy industry and because nuclear power was generated within the UK and dependent upon 
fuel supplies from friendly countries, it became prevalently legitimated by ‘energy crisis’ discourses. 
Additionally, the idea of an energy crisis with its associated ‘energy gap’ was vital to the incitement 
of state-resource rationales, and for international leaders it had cemented the importance of 
nuclear power. The world leaders (of the US, Japan, France, Germany, Canada and Italy) who met 
at the Downing Street Summit conference on 7th May 1977 (also known as the 3rd G7 summit) to 
discuss a number of international issues, including the implications of the Flowers Report, agreed 
that nuclear power was necessary both for the stabilisation of the world economy and to buffer the 
energy shortages likely in the future: 
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‘Unless the energy gap was bridged, the world economy would lack confidence. The 
development of nuclear energy in the interim was the answer’ (Commons Sitting 1978 p.7) 
‘How bad is the present situation? If we go on at the present rate of oil consumption then 
I think long before the end of the century there will not be enough oil left to meet our 
demands…do you consider nuclear power inevitable? Yes.’ (Mirror Report 1980 p.4) 
However, it is important to note that such press interest constituted the minority of media coverage 
related to nuclear, and illustrated that the supply side celebration of atomic power by the 
Government was often in direct tension with a mobilising environmental movement. In a bid to 
defend themselves against the environmental lobby, those espousing nuclear powers legitimacy in 
regards to its supply security began to directly confront the environmentalists. They believed that 
their bases of legitimacy were far more important to consider than the problematisations of the 
environmental movement. A number of publications began to reject the legitimacy of 
environmental arguments against nuclear – shunning them on the grounds of irrelevance and 
triviality given the larger energy debate. In sum, for its supporter’s nuclear power did not have to 
be environmentally friendly, it was required merely to provide secure energy at a ‘reasonable’ price.  
Energy Policy and the Utopian Environmentalists 
 
The battery of criticism regarding nuclear power brought out a journalistic army of pro-nuclear 
supporters hoping to legitimate it given the contextual conditions of the era. Specifically articles 
which centred on the issue of an ‘energy crisis’ tended to imply that the arguments of 
environmentalists were ‘irrational’. Indeed although the environmental movement appeared 
ubiquitous throughout society, by the closing years of the 1970s there were numerous articles 
which criticised the movement for its unrealistic, illogical and utopian ideals. Such criticism 
manifested in discursive struggles between actor defined ‘rationality’ and idealism; apparent in 
arguments between the self-proclaimed realistic nuclear-lobby, with its legitimation based on the 
institutionalised principles imbued by the conventional logics of the energy industry, and the 
accused ‘idealistic’ notions of EMOs with their perceptions of an energy situation which could not 
exist. Whereas the environmentalists had directly problematised the processes of nuclear power, 
the pro-nuclear lobby were more focused on questioning the values of the environmental 
movement – perhaps they accepted the material problems, but were frustrated that the morally 
armed critics gave no workable solutions. Most noticeably pro-nuclear lobbyists labelled the 
environmental agenda an emotional response to the problems of nuclear power, not able to keep 
a ‘…sense of proportion about nuclear hazards’ (Parker 1978 p.40) 
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 ‘…what is certain is that any rational assessment of nuclear risk makes it clear that civil 
nuclear power poses a far lesser risk in terms of death of injury than do activities we hardly 
question, like driving cars, building and construction, and mining. It is still to be proven that 
a single death in this country derives from the civil nuclear programme’ (Waldergrave 1979) 
 
‘There are, of course, a minority among the objectors, who, faced with the dilemma – the 
menace and the benefit inseparable and inherent in nuclear power – that I described at the 
beginning, will say “no” to all new development. Logically they would wish to close down 
the nuclear installations that we already have and they are-quite courageously- prepared 
to accept the immense economic consequences of such an act of self-denial…But I believe 
the majority of our peoples….will take a different view, and they will approve – perhaps 
with reservations – the open and cautious approach that we have adopted. They will have 
confidence – but not blind faith – in the skills and integrity of our scientists and engineers. 
They will be fully conscious – but not paralysed by – the great risks as well as the benefits 
that increased nuclear power can bring’ (Commons Sitting 1978 p.9) 
‘I was brought up to believe that our natural environment was of paramount importance. 
But even with this background, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the current exaggerated, 
if not maniacal, attitude of some people towards our environment is very damaging to our 
future well-being. Zero growth, the econuts’ panacea, won’t bail out anybody’ (Rothschild 
1978 p.14) 
In addition to anti-nuclear activists and their ‘idealist’ environmental cause, those defending 
nuclear power in the public media drew on the anti-capitalist nature of their sentiment. In 1979 
The Guardian published an article by energy committee backbencher and Conservative William 
Waldergrave who gave two reasons why people may have been against nuclear power. The first 
was that those opposed to nuclear power were ‘catspaws’ of the Soviet Union, wishing for 
increased soviet power as an outcome of a weakening energy supply in the West. Secondly, 
Waldegrave argued that a dislike of nuclear power tended to be presented by those who held 
antipathy towards the basic nature of industrial society. Such sentiment, also found in a number of 
other less brash articles, framed anti-nuclear individuals as opposed to Western capitalist values 
and progressive industry. For Waldergrave and his sympathisers in both the press and in 
Government, nuclear power represented more than just electricity provision. It reflected the 
sovereign values of industrial progress and western culture. It would ensure reliable energy for the 
continuation of state development and maintain, if not escalate standards of living. For a pro-
nuclear lobby which had emerged to defend the industry, the rationality of nuclear power lay in its 
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appeal as a ‘solution’ to an energy crisis which reflected nationalist goals and industrial progress. 
Those who did not understand the importance of such notions, and who criticised nuclear on 
emotive grounds without offering any real solution to energy issues were framed as ‘irrational’ anti-
capitalist ‘hippies’ (James 1979).  
The above illustrates the intensifying division between the value sentiments of environmentalist 
sympathisers and actors who supported the Government in its pursuit of nuclear energy. For 
decision-makers within the energy industry the solutions to environmental contestations were 
already dealt with through regulatory pressures on the industry which were implemented after the 
Flowers Report. Nevertheless, these bodies reacted to the ecological threat of nuclear through 
monitoring and coercion and as such environmental values remained dislocated from the decisions 
made between energy options. In other words, the fundamental question of what process should 
be generating Britain's energy paid little homage to the environment, instead basing legitimacy 
primarily on reinforcing coordination and control within the Government and likely future cost 
comparisons: 
 ‘…the supporters of nuclear energy believe in a society dedicated above all to the 
production of wealth, in which efficiency, cost effectiveness and the needs of industry are 
the touchstones of policy. If the environment takes a knock or two, or if society takes some 
calculated risks, then this is the price we pay for the pursuit of the greater good’ 
 (Rothschild 1978 p.14)  
An Overview: Heading into the 1980s 
 
‘The dilemmas in the search for new sources of energy are many. But none as emotive as 
nuclear power. The hopes and fears for the future lie happily and dangerously within it. Hope 
because along with oil, it is THE only developed alternative to producing electricity. Fear 
because of the dangers of radiation, the problems of disposing of nuclear waste and the spread 
and misuse of the atom bomb’ (Mirror Report 1980 p.5) 
The nuclear power industry had certainly been set aback by escalating concern over the natural 
environment during the 1970s. The years following the Flowers Report was characterised by low 
industry esteem, drastic attempts at restructuring, the cancellation of a proposed SGHWR 
programme and an only half finished second programme of AGR’s which were plagued with 
unforeseen and expensive complications. EMOs implicated themselves in the business of energy 
production by rethinking and diffusing new ideas regarding ways in which the environment and 
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industry related to one another. The nuclear industry epitomised all that the environmental 
movement despised including centralised, technocratic and environmentally risky electricity 
production. Via the 'soap box' of the media the movement educated society on the unique 
processes and materials involved in nuclear power production that were previously not common 
knowledge. However, neither radioactive-waste nor proliferation could be 'fixed' by the industry 
through mere siting compromises and ‘fixing’ amenity threats.  
Nevertheless, within a context of industrial decline, international energy supply vulnerabilities and 
trade union strikes nuclear power managed to remain legitimate to the energy department. The 
Government sustained a rhetorical battle between ‘idealism’ and ‘rationality’, arguing that 
environmentalism contradicted the rational goals of economic prosperity sand energy security, 
particularly given that it provided no attainable alternative to meet supply and economic needs.  
More specifically the Government finally decided that the NNC’s recommendation that CEBG and 
SSEB (Scotland) should go ahead in 1977 with a number of AGRs and PWRs (Pressurised Water 
Reactors) rather than any other designs (SGHWR). The last of the seven AGR stations were ordered 
for Heysham and Lancashire to complete the 8000MW programme that made up the previous 
(second) nuclear programme. Indecision over nuclear power’s future appeared to be over by 1979 
when the pro-nuclear Margaret Thatcher came to Government as Prime Minister for the 
Conservative Party. In that same year her new Energy Minister David Howell delivered a statement 
to the House of Commons encouraging the CEGB to consider the possibility of ten new PWRs in a 
bid to reinvigorate the dying industry and quell concern over the 'energy crisis'. Two years later the 
Government published a slightly less ambitious yet still enthusiastic (third) white paper on nuclear 
power which announced a slightly smaller build of five PWR stations. Thatcher's new Conservative 
Government had inherited from its predecessors an agreement to submit any proposed PWR to 
examination at a public inquiry. As such, the Sizewell inquiry was initiated in 1983 to publicly and 
transparently assess the arguments behind the building of the first PWR at Sizewell. The inquiry 
illustrated the Government’s eagerness to establish more nuclear power plants against a 1980s 
backdrop of escalating Cold War tensions and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster which was seen as 
‘proving the environmentalists right’ (Anon 1986d). Of particular interest in the following chapter 
is the way in which the Government were able to claim that nuclear power was ‘green’ during the 
latter years of the 1980s in a bid to revitalise some public support for the (eventually approved) 
Sizewell development.  
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Table 11 Overview Timeline for Chapter 7: The Environmental Defence of Nuclear Power 
Covers the period 1980 to 1990 
Date Key Event Details 
1983 The Sizewell Inquiry is initiated by the 
Conservatives to discuss the planned PWR 
reactor for Sizewell 
The Government owned BNFL argue in favour of 
the plant based on positive economic and supply 
arguments. They meet significant environmental 
opposition 
1984 A group of miners break away from the 
NUM and strike as a response to 
accelerated pit closures. They are defeated 
and the unions begin to go into decline 
Nuclear power was used to mitigate some of the 
impact of the strikes and was hailed for 'keeping 
the lights on'. Growing frustration with the strikes 
aided the Government's defence of nuclear power 
1986 A PWR reactor in Chernobyl (USSR) suffers 
a full-scale melt-down and releases 
radioactivity  
The accident provides a real life demonstration of 
the environmental implications of nuclear reactors, 
as well as proving the fallibility of the reactors 
themselves 
1987 Sizewell Inquiry report is finally published a 
year behind schedule 
The Sizewell PWR is accepted on financial and 
resource grounds despite global PWR accidents  
1987 Arthur Scargill's bill for nuclear 
abandonment is defeated at TUC 
conference 
The TUC chooses to review the nuclear option for 
another year before taking a firm position 
1987 The International-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty eliminates long-distance, ground-
launched missiles 
Progress is made in calming Cold War tensions 
between the USA and Russia 
1987 A general election is won by the 
Conservatives and Thatcher remains in 
power 
The Labour Party take a strong position against 
nuclear power in the run up to the elections but the 
Conservatives win and continue their nuclear 
expansion plans 
1988 The first concrete for the PWR is poured 
into the new Sizewell plot  
  
1988 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) is established by the UN and 
World Meteorological Organisation 
Tasked with assessing the magnitude of the Climate 
Change problem. Illustrates that Climate Change is 
beginning to gain international recognition 
1988 International Downing Street Conference 
on Climate Change  
The Conference sets non-binding target for the 
reduction of greenhouse gasses, proving that the 
Conservative are serious about carbon reduction 
1989 Soviet Union and USA sign the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty  
In December the Cold War was declared over by US 
President G. H. Bush 
1989 Margaret Thatcher's UN speech on 
Greenhouse Gasses and the nuclear 
solution 
Margaret Thatcher clearly stated that the UK would 
use a programme of nuclear power to mitigate 
carbon emissions 
1989 Energy Privatisation begins but nuclear 
privatisation fails. Nuclear stations are then 
formed into a public owned company 
called Nuclear Electric  
It becomes evident that nuclear power is unable to 
compete in the new energy markets and is halted 
pending a five year moratorium and review 
1990 Moratorium on nuclear power begins and 
all new construction is halted bar the 
Sizewell PWR 
  
1990 Electricity Act introduces the Non Fossil-
Fuel Obligation and the Fossil Fuel Levy  
The aim is to raise money to cover the newly 
discovered costs of nuclear power. In particular, it’s 
decommissioning costs. 
1990 IPCC publishes its first assessment report 
on climate change which becomes the 
main basis for the following second world 
climate conference in Geneva  
 Confirms that Climate Change is a serious threat 
and provides figures to be used in the creation of  
carbon limits 
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Chapter 7: The Environmental Defence 
of Nuclear Power  
 
The following chapter seeks to understand how nuclear power began to be championed as a ‘green’ 
technology by the end of the 1980s. Previous decades had witnessed an intensifying hostility 
between an environmental social movement and the nuclear power industry. Nevertheless, the 
energy industry’s differentiations between energy options and their legitimacy in comparison to 
one another continued to centre on the taken-for-granted assumptions that energy choices should 
satiate the norms of the national economy and, as much as possible, reinforce the stability of the 
State as an independent entity by lessening vulnerability posed by fuel importation. Nevertheless, 
as the institutional structure of the energy industry remained relatively stable, the press 
increasingly pulled away from accepting the conventions of the energy sector. The intensifying Cold 
War and a number of high profile nuclear incidents during the 1980s reinforced to the public that 
nuclear power was neither isolated from atomic weapons nor provided a ‘normal’ energy option. 
Instead nuclear power posed risks which warranted its evaluation on very different value criteria 
compared to the alternative energy options.  
In 1988 an opportunity to rebuild the public image of nuclear power presented itself when Climate 
Change was recognised by the UN. Key members within the Conservative’s energy department 
began to promote nuclear power as ‘green’ in a bid to re-popularise the technology. By claiming 
nuclear power was green the Thatcher Government promoted an understanding of 
environmentalism which was based on the quantifiable measurement and monitoring of certain 
properties such as carbon.  Resultantly a situated target-based environmental logic began to 
emerge within the energy industry which instilled the idea that fundamental decisions between 
energy options should consider the environment, albeit from a calculable perspective. Future 
commitments to carbon mitigation became enforced and embedded within the industry through 
the development of regulative pillars which were negotiated within international and scientific 
communities. This supported the logic despite the financial collapse of nuclear power during a failed 
nuclear privatisation attempt in 1989. Afterwards renewable energy options began to be discussed 
and the liberalisation of gas markets allowed for cleaner gas turbines. Nevertheless, the target-
based environmental logic continued to influence discussions over future energy options, but 
nuclear power was not considered as legitimate by the Department of Energy because of its 
economic problems up until the mid-to-late 2000s.  
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The initial part of this chapter will examine the key issues facing nuclear power during the 1980s: 
the Sizewell Inquiry, the Cold War and the Chernobyl crisis. These created a political context in 
which anti-nuclear sentiment prospered and dominated the Press. As a result a widening rift 
occurred between the values of the Conservative Government and the public in relation to the 
legitimacy of energy options. Throughout the 1980s the Government continued an inquiry into a 
new PWR reactor, and thus the second part of the chapter will dissect the defence of nuclear power 
and how the controversial battle for a PWR was justified whilst visible opposition remained 
unrelenting. The chapter will thirdly discuss the emergence of a situated target-based 
environmental logic within the energy industry and its application in bridging the opposing value 
structures of the public and State. This situating formed the basis of the ‘green paradox’ of nuclear 
power which became increasingly evident in discursive struggles over whether nuclear was 
environmentally friendly. The final section will examine the decline of nuclear power after 
privatisation and the instigation of a more liberal-market logic which drove the nuclear industry 
into decline. The chapter ceases at the beginning of the 1990s when nuclear power entered its five 
year moratorium after a humiliating period of cost revelations and industry confessions. In sum the 
four parts of the chapter come together to provide discussion of how the pro-nuclear Conservative 
Government attempted to legitimate nuclear power, eventually on environmental grounds, despite 
continued contestation and political turbulence. 
Sizewell Inquiry: A Statement of Intent 
 
In the 1980s nuclear power was set to be the cornerstone of the Conservative’s energy policy. 
Margaret Thatcher was a well-known advocate of the role of science and technology in furthering 
the prosperity of the nation. Enthusiastic for a new PWR reactor, Thatcher established the 
leadership of the energy industry to forward her goals of increased nuclear power generation and 
to combat the power of the miners trade unions (Winterton and Winterton 1989) Nigel Lawson, 
appointed as the Energy Secretary in a reshuffle during 1981 (replaced David Howell) was a core 
Thatcher radical (Political Correspondent 1983) and was tasked with developing an energy strategy 
which included nuclear power and could be introduced to market forces by the end of the decade. 
Additionally, his support for nuclear power was also political; he wanted to demonstrate that coal 
was no longer fundamental to the economy (Political Correspondent 1983). Lawson was also pivotal 
in the appointment of pro-nuclear Charles Marshall (after the protracted miners’ strike in 1984, he 
was rewarded with a peerage for ‘keeping the lights on’ and he became Lord Marshall of Goring) as 
the Chairman of the CEGB in 1983 after his stint as chairman of the UKAEA from 1982. As a leading 
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theorist in atomic properties and a firm supporter of nuclear power he was ideally suited to 
instigate Thatcher’s PWR programme. Marshall’s initial task was to get the first PWR built in Britain. 
To allow public discussion and appease anxieties the CEGB launched the Sizewell public Inquiry in 
1983 to be headed by a planning lawyer, Sir Frank Layfield. The chief executive of the CEGB, John 
Baker, was assigned to lead the PWR case at the inquiry on behalf of the CEGB.  
The inquiry was centred on four main topics: whether the PWR would secure fuel supplies whilst 
lowering the cost of procuring fossil-fuels; whether there was a need for the capacity CEGB sought 
(especially if the boards predictions on coal and oil were unreliable); whether a PWR be safe 
considering it was a PWR that partially melted in the Three Mile Island incident in 1979; and 
whether it could maintain UK coastline to an acceptable standard. Thus it attempted to integrate 
the financial and resource interests of the Government with wider societal and environmental 
concerns aired by actors such as Friends of the Earth and local planning councils around the Sizewell 
area. Regardless of appearing inclusive those opposing the Government’s plans were required to 
organise and fund themselves. They were also denied access to the CEGB plans in advance of 
preparing their cases. Nevertheless, many objectors found a platform in the media and numerous 
articles were published on the unfeasibility of the Sizewell PWR. Environmental organisations such 
as Greenpeace contended that the finances earmarked for the development of nuclear power could 
be better spent on renewable development and conservancy (Barnaby 1983). A group called the 
Committee for the Study of the Economics of Nuclear Electricity, comprised of scientists, 
economists and environmentalists challenged the CEGB’s proposed spending plans arguing that 
accounting techniques had made nuclear look more promising that it was. It seemed the CEGB’s 
supposition that a PWR would offer the cheapest and most efficient solution to energy needs was 
not attracting widespread backing.  
Whilst the PWR inquiry played out, gradual and radical events in society exposed the negative 
environmental effects of atomic energy and reinforced public apprehension. Firstly, the gradual 
escalation of the Cold war generated apocalyptic images in the press which linked nuclear 
technology with scenes of burned and barren destruction. Secondly, an unprecedented accident in 
a nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, USSR (Ukraine) illustrated to society exactly how nuclear fallout 
could endanger both humankind and nature. The latter was responsible for delaying the outcome 
of the Sizewell report even further into the late years of the 1980s as the Government struggled to 
rebound from the accident’s implications upon their PWR plans.  
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The Cold War: Going from MAD to NUTS 
 
‘….they are the worst thing that has ever happened to the planet, and they are man-made, 
and mass-produced, and not expensive. They distort all life and subvert all freedoms. Not 
a soul on earth wants them, but here they are…The mushroom cloud above Hiroshima was 
a beautiful spectacle, even though it owed its colour to a Kiloton of human blood…The 
Soviet strategic force alone could destroy six planets. But we only have one…Human beings 
are unanimous about nuclear weapons. Human institutions are not.’ (Amis 1985) 
The 1980s witnessed intense nuclear war anxieties due to a mixture of proliferation and stifled 
international cooperation which tempted thoughts of due atomic conflict. The non-proliferation 
treaty (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards were primarily instigated to dampen the hostilities between 
the US and USSR out of concern for the stability of East and West relations, and as such they 
provided limited control over the North-South expansions of nuclear trade which had occurred 
during the 1970s. Perpetual proliferation and continued unwillingness by new nuclear nations to 
sign the NPT discouraged civil nuclear progress and excited a now well established environmental 
movement which had close links with the disarmament movement. To appease the public pressure 
weighing upon their decision for nuclear armament, the Conservative Government voluntarily 
acceded to the IAEA safeguard procedures conventionally enacted by non-weapons states. 
However, the UK continued to develop its own nuclear capabilities throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
given the escalating belief that the US were considering the possibility of a ‘winnable war’: 
‘American policy was shifting gradually from the doctrine of deterrence to the thesis that nuclear 
war can be fought and won’ (Barnaby 1992). The change in mentality was referred to by the media 
as a move from MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) to NUTS (Nuclear Utilisation Targeting Strategy). 
According to the Press, America now believed that missile targeting advances tipped the suicidal 
balance of nuclear missile power between East and West in their favour. Hence during the mid-
1980s there was a high volume of emotive articles which focused on the environmental fallout of 
nuclear war. Even a small nuclear exchange, the papers argued, would lead to an uninhabitable 
wasteland in which humans would be unlikely to survive. This scenario was dubbed the ‘nuclear 
winter’ and meant that life would be unsustainable until the Earth recovered from the damage of 
nuclear radiation: 
‘The phenomenon of a “nuclear winter” could well cause, through freezing and starvation, 
as many ultimate casualties as the immediate war itself, while the long-term environmental 
injury, especially in terms of our capacity to feed ourselves, could readily prove equally 
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critical…nuclear winter would mean an end to civilisation in the northern hemisphere, if 
not throughout the world’ (Myers 1982) 
Furthermore, the modernisation of nuclear technology continued to produce more flexible and 
accurate missiles which were changing the face of the Cold War by allowing either side to 
specifically target each other’s strategic weapon positions (thus NUTS). For the UK many of its 
missile sites were American owned thus reinforcing the worrisome concept of a ‘limited nuclear 
war’ occurring on British turf. In such a scenario, a war between the US and the USSR would 
primarily devastate the British Isles. Hence the public were bombarded with armament updates 
which located Britain in the centre of nuclear catastrophe.  As fear over nuclear weapons escalated 
so too did reservations over the relationship between a civil programme and armament. With the 
Sizewell Inquiry illustrating Government interest in continuing a nuclear programme, the press 
became concerned that additional atomic stations could only worsen proliferation of nuclear 
materials for armament. The conceptual conflation of nuclear weapons and nuclear power was due 
to assumptions of technological similarity (such as the use of centrifuges to refine uranium for 
reactors and missiles) and the understanding that radioactive damage to the environment 
generated by one would not be dissimilar to that generated by the other: 
‘The connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly 
clear. Since the technology for bomb building is widely available, the only impediment to 
nuclear Ayatollahs or Irish Republican Armies is the lack of fissionable material. Nuclear 
power erodes this impediment’ (Shuman 1985) 
‘…nuclear power had never been conceived as a cheap energy source but as a convenient 
spin-off from the weapons programme. Every nuclear power station had the potential to 
produce weapons grade plutonium which was exported to the USA and found its way back 
to Britain in Cruise Missiles…”let us demonstrate that we understand and reject the whole 
nuclear cycle. We cannot dis-invent it but we can immobilise it’’ (Lewis, Linton and Hencke 
1986) 
Given the continuing anxieties relating to nuclear energy and weapons, and with the Sizewell 
Inquiry ticking along in the background, the Press questioned whether it was appropriate to 
contribute to the development of any nuclear technology in light of international nuclear tensions. 
The Government countered by arguing that a PWR would not accelerate the arms race or jeopardise 
the delicate balance of MAD because all nuclear materials would be safeguarded within the UK. 
However, in 1986 the concept of the ‘nuclear winter’ and related imageries were somewhat 
substantiated by a nuclear accident of unseen proportions in Chernobyl, USSR. The accident 
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illustrated that radioactive fallout from a nuclear power station could devastate an entire town and 
negatively impact the environment on a global scale.   
Has Chernobyl Proved the Environmentalists Right? 
 
The Sizewell Inquiry had initially come to a close in 1985 and the Government were awaiting the 
concluding report which was expected by the end of 1986. Before the report was issued an old PWR 
reactor in Chernobyl suffered an almost full-scale core meltdown (when the central vessel holding 
the fuel rods melts and can no longer enclose the core’s radioactivity) causing it to explode 
radioactive chemicals. The incident was on a much larger scale to that of the 1979 Three Mile Island 
(TMI) ‘partial meltdown’ (no radioactive release) in Pennsylvania USA which had attracted relatively 
little media attention in The Guardian, The Times or the Daily Mirror. Unlike TMI, the Chernobyl 
incident killed plant workers and released radioactivity which travelled thousands of miles via 
weather systems. Chernobyl not only questioned the perceived infallibility of atomic technology 
and its safety systems but highlighted the massive environmental destruction possible from human 
error within an atomic station. Its huge geographical scope and long-term effects were problematic 
for the Government’s nuclear intentions as they occurred before any official ruling could be made 
on the Sizewell PWR. Delays on the inquiry’s decisive report followed given that safety protocols 
required reconsideration. Concern in the press focused on whether environmental organisations 
had been correct in their perception of risk and that perhaps the technology had gained undue 
attributions of infallibility: 
 ‘…With Chernobyl, the inevitable accident that the environmentalists had been warning 
about had indeed happened. Public opinion across Europe was jolted into a radical 
reassessment of the virtues of nuclear power’ (Quayle 1986) 
Chernobyl was a severe blow to the international nuclear industry, particularly in Western Europe 
as the incident was the first example of radioactive release on a global scale from any power reactor 
in the world. It became apparent that radiation was not only a threat from local stations but from 
those hundreds of miles away. The Guardian’s foreign correspondent noted that radiation was now 
evidently ‘boundaryless’ (Steele 1986) as well as uniquely invisible and intangible. For the UK public 
the threat appeared close and personal despite occurring on the borders of the USSR: 
‘…It might be argued that the British Nuclear industry had an outstanding safety record, but 
that alone was not enough. Nuclear power, by its very nature, involved intangible hazards. 
It frightened people and that had to be recognised’ (Anon 1986c) 
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 ‘…in every country in the heart of Europe, except France, a ban on the sale of milk and leaf 
vegetables has brought the crisis into every home’ (Steele 1986)  
The most significant consequence of the accident upon the environmental reputation of nuclear 
power was the emerging attribution of uniqueness in terms of both the properties retained within 
the shell of the plant and the mechanics of the plant itself.  When exposed the reactor’s properties 
were unalike any others used in energy production. Ordinary and traditional power stations created 
pollutants which were often visible, known and expected. Alternatively, nuclear power created 
pollutants that could infect nature with no noticeable traces and which could remain deadly for 
generations. Indeed, the environmental movement had previously problematised the process, 
output and materials used but they had seemingly adhered to a belief in nuclear power’s inability 
to blow up – shown by no apparent media coverage of plant explosion anxieties throughout the 
1970s. Chernobyl, and to a lesser extent TMI, supplemented the anxieties over process with an 
apprehension regarding the machine itself: 
 ‘…what Three Mile Island did for the American Power utilities, Chernobyl has done for the 
whole of nuclear science. It has toppled it from its high horse. It has compelled the nuclear 
community to communicate down-to-earth stuff. And for the first time nuclear engineers 
have conceded that their “million-to-one infallibility” depended not upon their superb 
science but upon the continuous reliability of less exotic things like pumps, simple 
electronics and concrete vessels’ (Atkinson 1986) 
 ‘…for a large proportion, if not all, of the nuclear industries in the West, the accident at 
Chernobyl is a swingeing body blow. No matter that type of reactor involved is peculiar to 
the Soviet Union. Public opinion will inevitably perceive nuclear power in less favourable 
light, if only by recognising the possibility of nuclear related accidents’ (Jamieson 1986) 
For those sympathising with anti-nuclear environmentalists, nuclear power had always represented 
some level of risk be that through waste leakages or material proliferation. For the Department of 
Energy the safeguards installed through policy, regulation and monitoring were always assumed 
enough to mitigate those risks. Chernobyl had illustrated a more fundamental risk to the 
environment; that the technology was only as competent as those who operated it and that human 
error by those operators could have catastrophic consequences for the environment; or as The 
Times noted ‘…imperfect technologies and imperfect persons’ (Michaels 1986). This reaction did 
not bode well for the planned Sizewell plant as newspapers expressed concern that a British PWR 
may commit the UK to its ‘own Chernobyl’ (Michaels 1986): 
171 
 
‘…Now, with public opinion moving more firmly against nuclear power, the CEGB fears that 
the planning inspectors forthcoming report on the proposed Sizewell B nuclear station in 
Suffolk will be delayed. Like the Russian station involved in Monday’s accident, Sizewell B 
would be a pressurized water-cooled design.’ (Young 1986a) 
Whereas the escalating Cold War confirmed that nuclear power and nuclear weapons were not as 
distanced from each other as previously suggested, the Chernobyl incident confirmed that nuclear 
power was also dangerously distinctive. Throughout 1986 and 1987 the press continued to propose 
that nuclear should bow out of the energy race and hang up its uranium rods altogether. Indeed 
the Cold War and the Chernobyl accident had highlighted the way in which environmental values 
and nuclear risk were tightly interlinked. Nuclear proliferation as facilitated by the processes and 
materials of nuclear reactors could lead to an atomic war which would devastate all ecology; and a 
similar outcome could result from human error and plant melt-down. The public debates outlined 
in the previous chapter broke down perceptions of normalcy and peacefulness surrounding nuclear 
energy but were essentially proven in the 1980s. What was predominantly an environmental anti-
nuclear case built on speculation and possibility was now bolstered by actualities 
‘The Chernobyl tragedy showed that nuclear power is bigger than we are. We can’t tame 
the monster so we should terminate its existence before it terminates ours’ (Dodd 1986 
p.2) 
The response to the Chernobyl disaster by the media reflected public concern over the extension 
of the nuclear power programme. Whilst the CEGB continued to support a new PWR at Sizewell, 
the Daily Mirror (DM) in particular published an extensive barrage of anti-nuclear news which 
reflected the general fear of nuclear processes. The paper argued that the sinister and mysterious 
activities occurring in Sellafield were representative of the Government’s approach to the entire 
nuclear programme. Suspicion justified a move away from reliance on sources of knowledge from 
actors such as the Department of Energy and the CEGB who they believed were either hiding the 
truth or in denial of the industry’s troubles: ‘…after nearly thirty years of lies and cover-ups, how 
can the nuclear industry authorities expect us to swallow what they say now?? The truth is that 
they know far too little about this awesome power’ (Foot 1986 p.6). During the post-Chernobyl 
period DM focused intently on the Sellafield nuclear site after news of small leakages at the plant 
in 1986 and reported on local citizen’s lives in ‘…the shadow of fear’ (Callan 1986 p.4): 
‘”The Nuclear” is how the locals refer to the trouble prone Sellafield Nuclear Plant – the 
huge shadow that hangs over their community…They are used to seeing alarming steaming 
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activities around the great domes – and, more suspiciously, men in pin-stripe suits who 
pass by in the night in big Daimlers.’ (Callan 1986 p.4) 
Many of their stories during this period rejected the official legitimation of the CEGB (to be 
discussed later) and instead focused on the local lives of residents living near nuclear station. For 
example, DM turned its focus to stories from families with health concerns for their children: 
‘A Mother’s anxiety flowed over as Sue Wilson lovingly threw her arms around her 12-year-
old son, and hugged him to her… “I never used to mind the boy playing in the stream” she 
said “But I do now. Who knows what poison is in that stream”.’ (Callan 1986 p.4) 
‘Little Gemma fights for her life to beat the “curse” of Sellafield…as a suspected victim of a 
deadly nuclear timebomb. Six year old Gemma has Leukaemia and yesterday it was 
revealed that her nuclear worker father may have been the unwitting cause.’ (Crowther 
and Hughes 1990 p.1) 
The focus of DM was symptomatic of the politics surrounding nuclear power at the time. DM’s 
sympathies lay with the Labour party in the run up to the 1987 general election. The Wilson and 
Callaghan Labour Governments in the 1970s had been supportive of nuclear power and had been 
central in the completion of the second nuclear programme over that period. However, Labour’s 
interests in unilateral disarmament had illustrated the party’s dislike of nuclear weapons and by 
1986 Labour (headed by Neil Kinnock) had become the only political party to pledge a gradual end 
to nuclear power production in Britain. The news was seen as an integral step towards Labour 
winning office in the coming election: ‘Mr Scargill and other supporters of the nuclear fade-out 
policy claimed It will secure the key to Downing Street for Labour leader Neil Kinnock’ (Pattison 
1986 p.2). The fact that nuclear policy became a key part of party manifestos illustrated just how 
contentious the issue had become.  
Politics: Chernobyl, the Left and Scargill 
 
‘As a result of the Chernobyl disaster, nuclear power has become a more important political 
issue than ever before’ (Kettle 1986)  
A general election in 1987 brought the subject of nuclear power into the fore of political debate. 
Within days of Chernobyl Labour ministers had circulated a model resolution designed to stiffen 
the anti-nuclear stand of the party. Subsequently, Labour pledged the gradual elimination of all 
Magnox and AGR reactors, the cancellation of the Sizewell PWR, scrapping of the FBR research 
project and an end to waste importation (although THORP would be completed) (Kettle 1986). 
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Labour’s nuclear denunciation was echoed by a strong anti-nuclear lobby within the trade unions 
movement. In 1986 the Trade Union Congress (TUC) leadership was constituted by a number of 
hard-line anti-nuclear power unions pushing for the TUC to strengthen their stance against nuclear 
power. In particular the NUM was fully opposed to any new nuclear builds, as was the Firemen’s 
union and the National Union of Seamen. Famously NUM leader Arthur Scargill argued that ‘Britain 
was an island of coal set in a sea of oil and had one of Europe’s longest coastline with its potential 
for wind wave and coastal power…there was no need for nuclear power’ (Anon 1986d). NUM was 
not suggesting dependence on coal alone, but rather advocated a mix of fossil-fuels and renewables 
(echoing Energy 2000). They pushed that the only reason nuclear was continuing was because 
Thatcher wished to diffuse and defeat the Transport and General Workers union and the NUM in 
any industrial dispute (Poole 1986a). The anti-nuclear sentiments of these Unions were backed by 
both Greenpeace and FOE who preferred the use of fossil-fuels and an increased interest in 
renewables over the continuation of the nuclear programme: 
‘The Greenpeace environmental group yesterday demanded that all Britain’s atomic power 
stations should be closed between 1988 and 1992...It advocates increased use of coal, oil, 
gas and energy conservation’ (Wright 1986) 
‘This is a welcome sign but I expect a far more fundamental shift after Tuesday's debate, 
much further progress and a much stronger final anti-nuclear policy." [says My Boyle FOEs 
energy campaigner] FOE launches a major campaign against nuclear power next week in 
which the message will be: support nuclear power and you will lose votes’ (Young 1986b) 
However, although Labour policy reflected an evident nuclear unease in society there were also 
events which had affected the popularity of anti-nuclear figures such as Scargill. As will be discussed 
below, Scargill was involved in the eventual defeat and subsequent decline of the NUM in the mid-
1980s. One could suggest that the pro-nuclear debate benefitted from the failure of the miners’ 
strike and the consequent distrust of Scargill and his political motives. Scargill had done 
considerable damage to the way the Unions were received by the electorate and it may not have 
been seen as politically expedient to follow the line spun by him. Strong associations between the 
unions and the Opposition parties may well go some way to account for the fact that Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government won the 1987 election despite their pro-nuclear stance. Moreover, at 
the 1987 TUC Scargill suffered further defeat when the delegates voted overwhelmingly against 
committing unions to shutting down the nuclear industry. Instead the TUC leadership agreed that 
although they would not support new builds their nuclear review would consider the controversial 
issue for another year. The recognition that a pro-nuclear Government continued despite nuclear 
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power’s political and public opposition leads this chapter on to a more detailed discussion of 
nuclear power’s legitimation and defence throughout the 1980s.  
Defending Nuclear Power 
 
Sir Frank Layfield’s Sizewell report was delivered in December of 1987. In agreement with the CEGB 
it concluded that the PWR was likely to be the least cost choice for a new generating plant. The 
energy secretary Peter Walker was tasked with facilitating the build and the first concrete was 
promptly poured in Sizewell B in July 1988. Although the press had predominantly portrayed a 
public scared of nuclear power and its expansion their anxiety did not seem enough to topple an 
overtly pro-nuclear Conservative Government from leadership. The following section will examine 
the pro-nuclear argument which based a belief in nuclear legitimacy on three key arguments; the 
necessity of nuclear power given supply vulnerabilities posed by the unions, problems relating to 
an ‘energy crisis’ and to the need to consider economic benefits to the state such as profitable 
export potential and cheap power. Such legitimations clearly drew from the instrumental rationality 
of state-resource and national-market logics and reflected the typical historical legitimations of the 
Department of Energy and CEGB during the Conservative years as seen in the previous chapter.  
The following section will examine how and why nuclear power was legitimated over the 1980s. 
The initial discussion will examine the legitimations which drew from the state-resource logic; that 
nuclear was necessary to suppress the detrimental power of the unions and that it was the only 
means to avoid a major energy crisis. Due to the political nature of the struggle between 
Government and the Labour/ the Unions, the majority of supportive nuclear accounts drawing on 
the union debacle comes from the pro-Conservative Times newspaper. The last section discusses 
legitimation drawing on the values of the national-market which tended to relate to the Sizewell 
Inquiry and the CEGB’s future projections of PWR cost savings. As will be shown, during this period 
environmentalism was firmly associated with the anti-nuclear argument, and was in no way 
considered in nuclear power’s justification.  
Suppressing the Trade Unions  
 
The early 1970s (see Chapter 6) witnessed a series of crippling miners strikes, influencing the 
Conservative Government’s eagerness to reduce the vulnerabilities found in their dependence on 
the coal industries. With strong expectations for a positive outcome to the Sizewell Inquiry the 
Government felt more comfortable in challenging the NUM in the knowledge that nuclear power 
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would be available to take up the slack in supply if the coal industry was to shrink. In 1984 Arthur 
Scargill called for a national strike without a ballot as a quick response to an accelerated closure 
programme by the Conservatives. Striking without a ballot had been outlawed earlier that year 
leading to a number of regions refusing to strike - including the pivotal Nottinghamshire miners. 
Subsequent energy secretaries (Lawson and Walker) had built large coal stocks in preparation and 
as such the non-striking coal fired power plants were able to produce electricity during the 1984 
winter. Additionally, over the past decade there had been a movement of industry away from coal 
and towards both oil and gas and so neither industry nor energy production was as vulnerable as it 
had been during the 1970s strikes. The striking miners were defeated and returned to work in 1985. 
Non-striking miners eventually tore away from the NUM and thereafter the unions went into steep 
decline. With the coal workers demoralised by their awareness of the failing power of their unions 
Thatcher now had space to make more controversial decisions over future energy supplies without 
facing the reactive wrath of the NUM. Consequently she continued her pursuit of a nuclear powered 
future and defended her decision by proposing that it represented the cheapest way for the UK to 
avoid an energy crisis.  
 
Averting the Energy Crisis 
 
‘The chairman of both British Coal and the CEGB have said that without nuclear power, 
present levels of electricity supply could not be maintained even if new coal fired plants 
were built’ (Young 1986b)  
The 1980s had begun with growing concern regarding the decisions of OPEC to put up oil prices 
which jeopardised crucial oil supplies to the European Economic Community (EEC). This was a 
Europe wide issue and had left the UK with a choice to make between two reactions: A Parliament-
backed boost in research on alternative energy sources such as renewables and the stabilising of 
consumption at present levels through energy conservation, or an investment into nuclear power 
which would offer ‘abundant and cheap’ energy in comparison to traditional fuels (Anon 1981 p.6). 
Additionally the CEGB had advised that ‘even on modest assumptions’ it would need to order at 
least one new nuclear station a year in the decade from 1982 (a programme of 15000MWs over 
10yrs) to meet rising energy demands whilst lowering the dependencies on OPEC countries for oil. 
Indeed the CEGB in particular recoiled back to the justification that without nuclear power the UK 
would face an immediate energy crisis (Anon 1986b). Whilst the legitimacy of nuclear power was 
facing a harsh battering on environmental and safety grounds the Government and the CEGB in 
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particular hoped to prove that there was little alternative and that a mood of nuclear acceptance 
was required to avoid a national decline in living standards: 
 ‘The West will face a severe recession if it abandons nuclear power, the Secretary of State 
for Energy, Mr Peter Walker, said yesterday. For the first time in man’s history, a world 
crippled by a shortage of energy had become a possibility…the eradication of nuclear 
energy has dangers that cannot be met. The third world could not enhance its living 
standards; the developed world would plunge to lower living standards’ (Poole 1986b) 
‘The lights would go out all over Britain if nuclear power stations were closed…Lord 
Marshall, Chairman of Central Electricity Generating Board, said yesterday…Commenting 
on the Labour Party’s plan to phase out older nuclear stations and to close Sizewell B, Lord 
Marshall said: “If a future Government instructed us to close down all nuclear power 
stations within a short period of time, we could not maintain secure supplies of electricity 
to the nation. The lights, literally, would go out”.’ (Townsend 1986) 
In addition to the heady warnings offered by those concerned over impending and crippling energy 
crisis, the nuclear lobby had to further argue that there was no other cheaper alternative to this 
supply gap. The Sizewell Inquiry was principally pre-occupied with this question as the PWR 
represented a significant investment in energy infrastructure, and thus needed to be able to justify 
itself on comparative cost grounds. The inquiry required the Government, represented by the CEGB, 
to demonstrate the criteria against which they considered a PWR reactor legitimate. Without the 
necessary proof of marketability it would be likely that the independent inquiry would rule that the 
relatively less expensive option be chosen, complying with both resource and market conventions 
within the energy industry.  
Improving the Industry 
 
‘Uncontrolled nuclear power has the potential to destroy the world. Controlled and safe, it 
would be a blessing to mankind…it is the cleanest and cheapest for an industrial nation.’ 
(Pattison 1986 p.2) 
The CEGB’s financial forecasts for the industry showed that in comparison to alternative energy 
options nuclear power offered the most economical means of generating electricity (although the 
CEGB’s forecasting methods were severely criticised in terms of their estimations by opposition at 
the inquiry). CEGB forecasts indicated to the Inquiry that a PWR would cost less than the AGRs 
based on the assumptions that it would be built to cost and would run efficiently, as had been the 
177 
 
case in America. Belief that the entire PWR project would prove to be an economic success lay in 
two key supporting financial arguments. The first was that a PWR station would, over the long term, 
be the most cost effective option. Although expensive to build, it generated electricity at a 
substantially lower cost when compared with alternative generating technologies especially when 
spread over its projected 40 -60 year lifespan: 
‘…the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and the Government is now taking the 
first step in a strategy which would largely displace coal by nuclear power in the first years 
of the next century…The CEGB argues that the PWR will provide cheaper electricity than 
any existing or alternative power station…electricity prices would be almost the same as 
with a coal station.’ (Gudgin and Fothergill 1984) 
Secondly, its fuel costs were unlikely to increase at the rate of fossil-fuels because there was no 
shortage concerns of fissile materials expected in the near decades. Industry experts contended 
that new reserves would likely be found in the foreseeable future as nuclear production continued 
to increase. Additionally, fuel could come from the dismantling of nuclear weapons thus offering 
the UK its own sizeable personal stock. Such arguments linked to the former argument; without 
nuclear power alternative fuels would become immediately more expensive given the increased 
demand, as well as gradually more expensive over time given their natural depletion. This latter 
argument contended that an energy mix which failed to diversify into nuclear energy would become 
increasingly expensive: 
 ‘Without a growing nuclear contribution the price of power would rocket, the ability to 
compete overseas would suffer, as would living standards and unemployment.’ (Anon 
1986a) 
Conclusion of Nuclear Contestation 
 
Repressing union power, avoiding energy crises and endeavouring to benefit from cost savings 
undergirded the legitimation of nuclear power for the Energy Department during the Sizewell 
Inquiry. This was echoed in the press coverage of The Times in particular given its political allegiance 
to the pro-nuclear Conservative party during the 1980s. The discursive legitimation of nuclear 
power had clearly changed little since the previous decade. Moreover, although the Chernobyl 
accident had made nuclear a central political theme and increased awareness of its dangers, 
concerns over nuclear power began to lessen during the latter years of the 1980s. The Cold War 
threat reduced as the Soviet Union redirected resources away from nuclear armament and towards 
economic reform. Additional Soviet political and economic concessions relieved tensions between 
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international nuclear states, leading the Reagan administration in America to renew disarmament 
talks. By 1987 the International-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty eliminated long-distance ground-
launched ballistic missiles and by 1989 the Soviet Union and the USA had signed the START 1 arms-
control treaty. By December 1989 the US president George H. W. Bush declared the Cold War over 
at the Malta Summit. As the fears regarding a nuclear war subsided Labour altered its pre-election 
approach to nuclear power and withdrew the policy to completely dismantle the UK nuclear 
programme. 
The political ‘cool-off’ surrounding nuclear should not be seen as fully representative of the public’s 
approach to nuclear power. Many factions of the public remained fearful of the possibility that 
additional nuclear power would advance proliferation into other hostile countries and further 
exacerbate environmental problems associated with nuclear radiation (Callan 1986 p.4). 
Environmental concerns were yet to be overcome by a nuclear industry primarily legitimated on 
energy supply and market grounds. The following section will discuss the means by which key 
members of the pro-nuclear lobby within the energy industry utilised an opportunity presented by 
the discovery and ratification of climate change in the final years of the 1980s to develop a scenario 
in which nuclear power could be considered environmental. 
Situating an Environmental logic: When Nuclear went Green 
 
‘The greenhouse effect was the only good thing to happen to nuclear power’ (Radford 
1988) 
During the 1980s climate change science was developing at pace and claimed links with both the 
environmental movement and the energy industries. Climate change (CC) stipulated that processes 
such as energy production created emissions such as carbon and methane which could develop an 
atmospheric greenhouse effect and cause irreparable CC. Not merely an artefact of the 
environmental movement, the findings were more accountable to an international scientific 
community specialising in global climate. The beginnings of the climate change movement have 
been traced to the late 1950s (IPCC). Nevertheless, a lack in scientific agreement and a paucity of 
clear causal links meant that it was not until 1979 that the world’s first major conference on climate 
change was assembled. This led to the creation of A World Climate Programme, steered by the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), International council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) 
and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). In 1985 UNEP, WMO and ICSU jointly 
instigated a conference on the ‘Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and other Greenhouse 
179 
 
Gases (GHG) in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts’. The conference concluded that 
significant warming was anticipated and sparked a number of further international conferences and 
the initiation by the WMO in 1988 of the InterGovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
supported by the United Nations. The IPCC was tasked with assessing the magnitude of climate 
change and triggered worldwide interest, essentially validated CC.  In 1990 the IPCC published its 
first assessment report on climate change which became the main basis for the following second 
world climate conference in Geneva (November 1990). The conference led to the establishment of 
an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(INC). The INC finalised its convention in time for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in which 
150 countries signed the UNFCCC, thus implementing the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention (COP) as the convention’s ultimate authority. It was COP 3 (3rd meeting) in 1997 which 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol, the first agreement to set individual and legally binding targets for 
industrialised countries on their emissions of CO2.  
By isolating specific atmospheric contaminating properties, CC discourse pointedly implicated the 
energy industry as both the problem and the solution; very few industries develop in their life cycles 
as many carbon based gasses as the energy industry and its related activities. In reacting to CC the 
Conservative leadership began to connect the practice of nuclear generation, which produced very 
little carbon output, with the environmental legitimacy of CC goals. That is, the relationship 
between CC and environmentalism offered an avenue by which nuclear power could appear as 
environmentally favourable and thus publicly legitimate on such grounds. Over the following years 
the cleaning up of energy generation became an increasingly important axis upon which energy 
options were compared and contrasted and thus significantly altered how the UK Government 
legitimated the components of its energy mix: 
‘…major changes are underway in the energy field, and measures to control CO2 emissions 
could give rise to substantial further changes. Given the reduced concern about energy 
scarcity and the increased importance of environmental issues, it is likely that few of the 
assumptions which originally determined the present allocation of the Department’s 
budget remain valid’ (Energy Committee 1989 p.6) 
This following section details how a type of environmentalism which focused on mitigating 
ecological damage through emissions targets began to influence the allocation of legitimacy during 
energy choice comparisons in the very late 1980s. Thatcher in particular worked to legitimate 
nuclear power and subsequently instilled an environmental logic into the energy industry which 
became increasingly embedded throughout the 1990s and 2000s. More specifically a situated 
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target-based environmental logic emerged in tandem with climate change discourse which 
narrowed and concentrated understandings of what it meant to be green in a way that facilitated 
the legitimation of nuclear power under the banner of ‘environmentally friendly’. First the actions 
of key individuals in crafting the new situated logic will be explored.  
The Climate Change Movement 
 
Previously the UK had only set emissions limits on Sulphur Oxide and Nitrous Oxides under the 
Clean Air Act (1968) during earlier concerns over general air quality and acid rain. Limitations now 
on carbon dioxide came after a 1988 Downing Street Conference attended by international leaders 
in November which set a non-binding target for a reduction in greenhouse gasses by 20 per cent of 
present levels by 2005. The emitting of carbon dioxide was particularly prevalent in the process of 
producing electricity from burning fossil-fuels, and as such nuclear power was of special interest to 
the UK Government: 
’Mrs Thatcher has recently expressed strong concern about environmental problems, two 
of which – the “greenhouse effect” and acid rain – have been associated with fossil-fuelled 
power stations. For the Prime Minister, such concern is compatible with an enthusiasm for 
nuclear power’ (Fairhill 1988) 
Fundamental to the push by both the Government and the media towards nuclear acceptance on 
environmental grounds was the conduct of key actors in the energy industry. As mentioned 
previously, in 1979 the Chairman of the CEGB (Lord Marshall of Goring) and the Energy Minister 
(David Howell) had been selected specifically because of their nuclear backgrounds and were tasked 
with driving forward the PWR programme. Nigel Lawson took over Howells post in 1983 given his 
advocacy of Thatcher’s privatisation policy, followed by Peter Walker (1983-1987) who successfully 
won out against the Miners in the strikes of the early 1980s and who approved the application for 
Sizewell B in 1987 following the inquiry. Peter Walker had previously shown support for nuclear 
power in 1973 during which he was central in the establishment of the NNC as Secretary for Trade 
and Industry. Lord Marshall of Goring came to the post of CEGB Chairman from previous posts as 
the chairman of the UKAEA and AERE. Additionally in 1987 core Thatcher supporter Cecil Parkinson 
was made energy secretary and was keen to both enforce competition on electricity and preserve 
nuclear power. What this overview illustrates is the consistent construction of a pro-nuclear energy 
elite within high bureaucratic posts in the energy industry. By the late 1980s individuals in key 
positions within the industry were predominantly nuclear advocates who recognised and acted on 
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the opportunity to associate the values of an environmentally conscientious public with carbon 
objectives and nuclear power. Thatcher and her Government essentially reinforced a relationship 
between nuclear energy and the mitigation of climate change. Although not in itself proving that 
the energy industry had adopted any sort of environmental mentality, it illustrated that the 
Government could continue nuclear power due to reasons of resource supply and market potential 
whilst projecting an image of ‘greenness’ to the public. Without binding targets the consideration 
of the environment remained an obligatory grey area but nevertheless it was the beginnings of an 
opportunity to fabricate a new environmental image for the industry: 
 ‘In recent weeks there had been a debate about the importance of safeguarding the 
environment, initiated by the PM in her Royal Society speech. There was an overwhelming 
case for nuclear power. It provided the best ‘environmental’ method of generating 
electricity’ (Political Correspondent 1988) 
One of Margaret Thatcher’s most explicit and visible attempts at relating environmentalism with 
nuclear power was her landmark speech in 1989 to the UN on greenhouse gasses (GHG) and the 
use of energy policy to stop the continuing damage of carbon release. In her speech Thatcher 
posited that the UK would be applying mixed energy methods including nuclear power to aid the 
national decrease of GHGs and carbon emissions: 
 ‘Mr President, the evidence is there. The damage is being done. What do we, the 
International Community, do about it? ...I am thinking of the use of nuclear power which – 
despite the attitude of so-called greens – is the most environmentally safe form of energy’ 
(Thatcher 1989 speech) 
 ‘With regard to energy, we already have a £2 billion programme of improvements to 
reduce acid rain emissions from our power stations. We shall be looking more closely at the 
role of non-fossil-fuel sources, including nuclear, in generating electricity’ (Thatcher 1989 
speech) 
More than merely projecting and marketing a ‘green image’ for nuclear power, Thatcher had begun 
to demarcate an environmental dimension to energy decisions. As the reduction of carbon became 
enforced, certain environmental pre-requisites were instilled into the industry. For the first time 
considerations between energy options were partially guided by environmental concerns. 
Interestingly the environmental movement and its EMOs were not expected to recognise 
Thatcher’s form of environmentalism: ‘….In a move that may lose her the support of many greens, 
Mrs Thatcher says greater use of nuclear power would have spared Britain many of its 
182 
 
environmental problems’ (Oakley 1988). In other words, there were signs that the rationalities 
within and informing the broader environmental movement were in tension and contradiction with 
the values underpinning the Government’s approach to environmental responsibility. Bridging the 
values of the environmentally anxious public and the Government could thus never be fully 
achieved because the energy industry was selective in their environmental concern; adopting all 
facets of environmentalism would have led to the demise of the nuclear industry on a number of 
grounds. Nevertheless politically supportive papers such as The Times sympathised with Thatcher’s 
philosophy, arguing that there was now ‘…an overwhelming case for nuclear power…To oppose 
nuclear power would only be to advocate conventional pollution’ (Political Correspondent 1988). 
Similarly, The Guardian accepted that although nuclear power had many problems, it was ideally 
suited to counteract climate change, and that such considerations could overcome all other issues. 
This was the first time nuclear power had been advantageously discussed on environmental 
grounds: 
 ‘…they haven’t been able to demonstrate that fission is invariably cheap, or efficient, or 
safe. But its worst enemies concede that the nuclear reactor does not contribute in any way 
to global greenhouse warming, or for that matter the stripping of the ozone layer, or the 
pall of acid rain’ (Radford 1988)  
‘With increasing environmental restrictions on the generation of electrical power by means 
of fossil-fuels, nuclear energy would become a much more viable alternative. For that 
reason alone, development should continue in the private sector’ (Anon 1989b) 
‘The principal British source of the main greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, is electricity 
generation by burning coal in power stations. Of the options for reducing it, most emphasis 
was being put last night in Whitehall on nuclear power. Government sources pointed out 
that while carbon dioxide was increasing by 0.5% worldwide every year, the additional 
radioactivity that would be produced even if all Britain’s electricity were generated from 
nuclear power was so small as to be “totally trivial”’ (McCarthy 1989) 
Target-Based Environmentalism 
 
For nuclear power to be considered as green a number of concessions would need to be made 
regarding what constituted ‘environmental’ action. Since the issues of radioactive-waste had yet to 
be overcome one can assume that certain environmental issues did not require resolution for 
nuclear to be considered as an environmental energy option by those proposing ‘green nuclear’. 
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Indeed the limitation of carbon release was at the heart of the energy industry’s environmentalism 
which reflected an understanding that measuring and monitoring the release of discharges from 
different energy industries (and subsequently organising the energy sector around those with the 
lowest releases) would lead to an environmentally responsible energy mix. Such an understanding 
represented an industry level manifestation of the broader values and norms of a societal 
environmental logic which reflected the nature of the industry itself. Because of its focus on the 
setting and meeting of measurable ‘environmental’ objectives, the situated and emergent 
institutional structure being shaped and embedded into the industry is termed the target-based 
environmental logic. The concept of ‘target’ is central because it represents the pragmatic and 
instrumental nature of the situated logic’s values, and speaks to how the target-based 
manifestations of environmentalism melded into the industry through their alignment with its 
incumbent conventions. In other words, the situated target-based environmental logic did not 
manifest independent of the other situated logics within the industry, but was aligned with the 
historical normative expectations of the industry precisely because of its measurable character. 
Being able to ‘measure’ levels of environmentalism was more amenable to the processes of 
industry based decision-making which were already accustomed to judging the legitimacy of energy 
options with referral to objective measurements such as statistics relating to energy recourses or 
economic evaluations and market projections. 
Centring a concept of environmentalism on emissions targets clarified that the situated logic 
rejected the decentralised, anti-capitalist agenda of its broader environmental movement 
counterpart. Environmentalism as manifest within the energy industry was brought out of the 
broad ambiguity found in the wider social movement and transformed through actor 
understandings into a clear and precise notion that energy industries could be valued as 
‘environmental’ if they met emissions goals. In other words, for the energy industry in particular 
the substantive rationality behind the broad environmental movement was stripped away as 
environmentalism was transformed into an instrumental endeavour. By the latter half of the 1980s 
neither the national-market nor the state-resource logics were particularly salient in the 
legitimation discourse of the Government because there were few threats to resource security or 
to the market viability of nuclear power; the PWR inquiry had recently quietened down any such 
resistance by concluding that nuclear power was necessary to quash any supply crisis, and was the 
cheapest option to do so. The most ubiquitous concerns were therefore those of safety and 
environmental welfare. Hence the resistance to ‘green’ nuclear power predominantly focused on 
such issues.  
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The Green Resistance 
 
“…the nuclear industry has an abysmal record of achievement. They are the very last 
people one would choose to save the world from disaster” (Radford 1988) 
Values and conventions of a target-based logic were not in themselves opposed by the 
environmental lobby. The problem was that the Department for Energy was able to legitimate 
nuclear power based on their judgement of what constituted ‘environmental’ precisely because of 
the substantive environmental concerns the situated logic disregarded. Instrumental rationalities 
represented by the target-based logic were also not inherently predisposed to nuclear power, even 
though they had initially been heftily applied to the defence of nuclear technology. Its target-centric 
values could also be applied in support of renewables and other such carbon neutral technologies; 
what mattered was which option met the targets practically and efficiently. However, because the 
target-based environmental logic did not infer the consideration of man’s moral obligation towards 
protecting all aspects of nature, it held the potential to legitimate a method of energy production 
which created ethically contentious waste products and which slowly irradiated its local 
environment. In other words, the environmental lobby was not against the target-based values as 
such because their enactment was still geared towards environmental ends; but rather, they 
opposed some of the technologies it was able to legitimate because of its focus.  
Consequently, the question of what should be classed as ‘green’ and whether nuclear power 
constituted an environmental misdemeanour appeared to split environmentalists. In particular, the 
utility of nuclear power in meeting carbon targets came into tension with environmental concerns 
at the level of local and community nuclear sites prone to leaks and increased levels of radioactivity. 
Those rejecting a ‘conversion’ to the doctrine of green nuclear power continued to put emphasis 
on the public debates discussed in the previous chapter. They argued that quantifiably limiting 
carbon via nuclear did not overcome the fundamental environmental issues of nuclear generation. 
In particular many anti-nuclear lobbyists were quick to restate the continuing lack of solutions to 
radioactive-waste storage/disposal problem: 
“…there remains no solution to the radioactive-waste problem…so far as the general public 
are concerned they are dealing with something unknown, invisible, intangible, but deadly 
and there is also a public distrust of clever scientists”.’ (Political Correspondent 1988) 
To advocate nuclear power as an environmentally friendly technology was to ignore the local effects 
of nuclear life-cycles. Parameters within which radioactivity was considered safe had already been 
set and targets were not allocated for nuclear waste production because there remained an 
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expectation that technology would eventually provide a solution to safe and secure disposal: ‘…it is 
industry which will inevitably find the means to treat pollutants and make nuclear waste safe’ 
(Thatcher 1989). Concerns of the environmental lobby continued to be dealt with via regulatory 
mechanisms which were enforced upon the nuclear industry by institutions such as the 
Environment Agency. In many ways the target focused approach was an extension of the ways in 
which the environment had historically been treated by the energy industries. On the other hand, 
it differed because it was not enforced upon them by periphery actors but instead represented a 
key value criterion against which to judge legitimacy within the industry. In any case the 
environmental considerations reflected in the target-based logic did not imbue the kind of values 
which necessitated any new forms of response to wastes or local pollution as long as they adhered 
to legal limits. Thus, a tension arose between the two approaches to environmentalism: 
‘… increasing Britain’s reliance on nuclear power is likely to meet bitter hostility from the 
growing environmental movement, much concerned with the risks attached, not least in 
the storage of nuclear waste’ (McCarthy 1989)  
“Nuclear energy is an inherently dangerous, wasteful and expensive way of generating 
electricity, which carries with it enormous environmental costs, such as the generation of 
waste which we don’t know what to do with it…’ [Quote from the Director of Greenpeace 
in The Times (McCarthy 1989)] 
Paradoxically nuclear power was seen as bofth environmentally necessary and ecologically 
detrimental. Press accounts certainly illustrated an animated battle between those who agreed 
with the Government and those who refused to consider nuclear power an environmental given its 
previous ecological convictions. Both sides founded their approaches to nuclear power on 
environmental values but with differing approaches to, and understandings of the society and 
nature relationship. Articles opposed to nuclear power often alluded to society’s moral obligation 
towards the protection and conservative of nature with little room for compromise or 
environmental sacrifice. Those advocating ‘green nuclear’ understood the environment as 
measurable; certain properties of nature could be monitored and ranked in terms of impact and 
importance. Mitigation of the most damaging properties would likely require compromise which 
was justifiable on environmental grounds. In other words there exists a stark difference between 
the strong instrumental rationality of those actors who accept green nuclear and the substantive 
beliefs of those who did not.  
With the green argument for nuclear power slowly taking shape a financial breakdown during a 
failed privatisation attempt in 1989 was exceptionally disruptive for the nuclear lobby. Nuclear 
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power’s subsequent economic illegitimacy was enough to seemingly destroy the future of the 
atomic industry and provided the perfect opportunity for the environmental lobby to back 
renewables as the alternative. Privatisation both exposed the financial weaknesses of the nuclear 
industry and heightened the salience of market values in the determination of energy industry 
legitimacy. As a result, nuclear power suffered a significant blow.  
An Era of Privatisation 
 
The Conservative agenda for energy market liberalisation in the late 1980s was to allow industries 
to compete almost purely based on comparative costs. It was hoped that by 1990 the private sector 
would, with the help of certain policy mechanisms, invest and own all energy generators and would 
ultimately determine the UK’s energy mix. The movement of responsibility over energy choices 
from the public to the private sector had a profound impact on the criteria of legitimacy used to 
discern between those choices. In particular the national-market values which were archetypal of 
the nationalised industry were surpassed by a new liberal-market agenda which had a stronger 
focus on profitability and short-term economic viability. Policy mechanisms such as subsidies and 
grants would ensure that the social objectives of the Government which included carbon targets 
and security of supply would be adhered to. However, the transferral of nuclear stations to the 
private sector was fraught with difficulties. To attract private investment the CEGB and Department 
of Energy were required to construct and publish a comprehensive financial assessment of the costs 
associated with nuclear. The accounts showed that the industry had very little knowledge of past, 
present or future costs. Whilst other energy industries were sold to private enterprises the nuclear 
industry remained in National hands. Previous reliance on future market ‘fantasies’ to legitimate 
nuclear power had led to a paucity of figures and those originally interested in purchasing nuclear 
stations soon realised that the cost of nuclear power was highly ambiguous and much higher than 
expected.  
Privatisation of nuclear stations was initiated in 1989 with the dismantling of the CEGB into National 
Power, Powergen and the National Grid which were to be sold. Nevertheless, in March 1990 the 
nuclear division of National Power was withdrawn from privatisation and placed into a new state 
owned company named Nuclear Electric (NE) (in Scotland, the nuclear assets of the South of 
Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) were placed into Scottish Nuclear in April 1990 and in the following 
year, the non-nuclear parts of SSEB was privatized as ScottishPower). Consequently, all 
development bar the PWR was halted and the industry began a five year moratorium whilst the 
Government underwent an inquiry into how the industry had failed report accurately on its true 
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cost. With the responsibility for new builds officially handed over to the private sector, and with 
nuclear power residing within the protective walls of the State it seemed unlikely that any new 
builds would be forecast for the coming decade. The key objective was to get nuclear stations sold. 
Nuclear power’s ‘green’ credentials became obscured by an increasing dedication to delineating 
the legitimacy of energy options via cost. Incidentally, the environmental concerns once outlined 
as problematic by the environmental lobby now represented the most significant financial woes of 
the industry; nuclear’s environmental issues now became its financial ones: 
‘…nuclear power fell spectacularly from grace as the real costs became more fully known, 
fuelled by City concern at the cost of dealing with radioactive-waste and decommissioning’ 
(Milne 1990) 
Privatisation: The Nuclear Unknown 
 
‘During the 1980s when it was in the interests of the nationalised electricity industry to 
make it appear that nuclear power was the cheapest form of power available, the estimate 
for decommissioning costs…was low. Come privatisation….and suddenly the costs shoot up 
by nearly 100 per cent. The threat of privatisation is removed…Nuclear Electric have 
reduced the estimates of privatisation costs. Really is this not a case that the Department 
is treating decommissioning costs and the amounts involved in the same way as humpty 
dumpty treated words: they mean what you want them to mean?’ (Committee of Public 
Accounts 1993a p.10) 
Prior to privatisation the Department of Energy had confidence in the nuclear costing figures of the 
CEGB which offered little grounds for concern during the 1980s. Private sector firms were expected 
to continue the expansion of the nuclear programme by investing in new stations across the 
country, and thus any disruption to the development of a third PWR nuclear programme was 
unanticipated (Department of Trade and Industry 2003b). Problems began to arise when the CEGB 
were required to develop realistic figures detailing the likely costs of future nuclear operations, 
specifically decommissioning plants and storing the wastes. Since no station had yet been 
decommissioned the costs previously provided by the CEGB had been left ill-examined with an 
expectation that new technologies would allow a determination of cost at a later stage to be more 
accurate. Nevertheless, speculative private investors were keen to identify the current estimated 
costs of decommissioning given that the first Magnox reactors were soon to be coming to the end 
of their productive lives. As the CEGB’s accounts were reviewed the ambiguity saturating the CEGB’s 
estimations for liability costs became obvious. By mid-1989 both the Secretary for Energy Cecil 
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Parkinson and Lord Marshall Goring of the ex-CEGB were under fire both by Ministers and the press 
for their inattentive accounting and their propensity for deceit when it suited them: 
‘…only as the first commercial nuclear station to be built is closed for decommissioning are 
the real costs of nuclear power emerging…This hidden cost to the consumer, the existence 
of which was persistently denied, is now made explicit as the industry prepares to enter the 
private sector…the bodies principally responsible for these costly mistakes are the CEGB 
and the Department of Energy’ (Anon 1989a) 
 ‘…the requirements of producing a prospectus had forced a revision of the figures which 
had long been concealed within the nationalised industry. No one had ever 
decommissioned a Magnox station, it was pointed out, but when those concerned were 
asked to put a figure on doing so, all the sums changed’ (Young and Oakley 1989) 
In response to the lack of detailed costing of nuclear and subsequent media uproar, the entire 
process of nuclear privatisation was cancelled in November 1989 by the new Secretary of Energy 
John Wakeman (July): 
‘Mr John Wakeham, the Energy Secretary, has seen the accounts, but refused to elaborate 
yesterday to the Commons Energy Select Committee. However, he did say it was only on 
October 11 that he learned the full costs of the nuclear industry and this information led 
him to withdraw the entire nuclear network from privatization on November 9. He said the 
prices he was given reflected the City’s view of the costs of nuclear power, and because the 
timetable for privatisation, he was forced to take the nuclear stations out of the 
programme’ (Young 1989) 
The failed privatisation of the industry was an embarrassment both publicly and politically to a 
Government which had invested so much effort in reinvigorating the enthusiasm for nuclear power 
throughout their term. The catastrophic and highly public way in which the privatisation attempt 
had flunked accentuated the problems of the industry and the deceit of its leaders: 
‘My Tony Blair, the shadow energy secretary, condemned the decision as “ignominious” 
and told Mr Parkinson, to loud Labour cheers, that his privatization plans were now a 
“humiliating farce”’ (Webster 1989) 
Condemned as part of a Conservative nuclear ‘conspiracy’, traditional proponents of nuclear power 
were held as misleading disciples of a nuclear power ‘cult’ (Callan 1989) blinded to the possibilities 
of anything other than the infallible science of fission. The press constructed a vision of a 
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Government which supported nuclear power no matter the cost to tax payers. A Commons Energy 
Select Committee began compiling a report on the cost of nuclear power and came to a similar 
conclusion. In February 1990 the Committee’s Minutes of evidence were published and suggested 
that both Cecil Parkinson and Lord Marshall of Goring were facing criticism and persecution: 
 ‘Parkinson is facing being censured…for failing to determine the true costs of building 
Sizewell B nuclear power station and for mishandling electricity privatisation in a report to 
be published by the Tory-dominated Commons energy committee’ (Gunn 1990)  
‘…the report will criticize “the muddle” made by the Department of Energy under Mr 
Parkinson, and the CEGB, for failing to monitor, and admit to, the rising costs of nuclear 
power.’ (Gunn 1990b) 
What to do with Nuclear? 
 
‘The nuclear industry was to be privatized but subject to no competition; sent to market 
without market forces. The consumer would have to buy a fixed amount of electricity from 
nuclear sources and yet, for the privilege of being so shackled, would have to pay an 
additional special tax on bills’ (McCarthy 1989)  
In 1990 the energy committee called for a moratorium on the construction of all new nuclear power 
plants in Parliament until more realistic figures could be published and a review on the industry had 
been completed. To avoid outlaying publicly unacceptable levels of state money into NE the 
Government introduced the ‘fossil-fuel levy’, also referred to many times in Government 
committee minutes as the ‘nuclear levy’. This levy was paid by suppliers of non-renewable energy 
to generate money for the Non Fossil-fuel Obligation (NFFO) which required companies to purchase 
a proportion of their electricity from nuclear in return for monetary rewards. Both measures were 
introduced under the Electricity Supply Act (1990) to provide financial support for nuclear 
generators as they attempted to reconfigure themselves into competitive entities. These market 
mechanisms were solely to ensure that expensive nuclear power was bought to keep NE afloat so 
that it could eventually be subject to another privatisation bid. The energy industry’s new neo-
liberal and competitive approach to judging the legitimacy of energy options evoked in the 
Government an understanding that nuclear power stations were unlikely to be a legitimate option 
in the future. This was not perceived as problematic by the State as their social and economic goals 
could be met by the burgeoning alternatives of gas and renewables. Additionally, carbon targets 
did not require immediate satiation because of a paucity of binding targets. For the first time in five 
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decades the costs of nuclear power had crippled the industry and neither its low carbon 
characteristics nor its uniqueness in securing stable electricity supplies could pull it out of its 
moratorium. 
Nuclear at a Crossroads 
 
‘Nuclear power now stands at a crossroads”, he said [Chairman of AEA Mr. Maltby] 
yesterday. To regain confidence, it must be demonstrated that nuclear power is “safe, 
environmentally clean, and economic”. A more favourable attitude to nuclear power was 
emerging around the world, he said. “we hope it will come to this country as well”.’(Tieman 
1990) 
The lack of binding emissions targets meant that nuclear power’s contentious ‘green’ credentials 
fizzled out of sight and the liberal-market began to delineate the most dominant values of the 
energy industry. State-resource and environmental target concerns remained within the value 
structure of the Government and constituted the foundations of their social objectives. However, 
given that there were no binding targets set for emissions or immediate threats to security of 
supply, there was sufficient time to test nuclear alternatives such as renewables. Overall nuclear 
power’s long-term fate lay with the degree of priority given to climate change and the GHG effect 
in the coming decades and whether the alternatives could prove to offer enough baseload 
electricity with low carbon levels: 
‘Against these issues must be set the Greenhouse effect, of relatively recent concern. As a 
main source of non-fossil-fuel energy, nuclear power stations do have the unique 
advantage over fossil-fired competitors that their operation does not involve the emission 
of sulphur, nitrogen or carbon. Nevertheless, nuclear power will always harbour inherently 
greater potential for harm than fossil-fuels…If nuclear power stations could be dispensed 
with, they would be phased out. Consequently if the greenhouse effect is not shown to be 
important, then even the greater dependence…on imported fossil-fuels…might be an 
insufficient argument to prevent the phase out of the technology’ (Malpas 1991) 
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Table 12 Overview Timeline for Chapter 8: Target-Based Environmentalism and the Nuclear 
Renaissance 
Covers the period 1990 to 2010 
Date Key Event Details 
1993 The Committee of Public 
Accounts publishes a report 
called 'The Renewable Energy 
Research, Development and 
Demonstration Programme' 
The report suggested that the future energy mix 
should look to renewables to generate its clean 
electricity given the financial problems of the nuclear 
power programme 
1992-4 The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change is 
established 
Opened for signatures at the United Nations 
Conference on the Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro. Entered into force in 1994 with climate 
change commitments and instruments of ratification 
1995 Energy privatisation almost 
complete 
Regional Electric Companies disbanded and almost 
complete electricity market liberalisation was in place 
1995 A White Paper entitled 'The 
Prospects for Nuclear Power in 
the UK' is published at the end of 
the 5 year moratorium on nuclear 
power 
It declared that Nuclear Electric would be re-
structured so that the seven AGRs and the PWR could 
be privatised in 1996 under a newly formed company, 
British Energy, without the Magnox stations. 
Importantly it announced that the energy mix would 
focus on renewables. Additionally it promised no 
more nuclear would be built without a solution to 
waste management 
1996 British Energy becomes privatised  Nuclear power is successfully privatised 
1997 The Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (hereafter 
referred to as the Kyoto Protocol) 
is adopted  
Supplemented the 1992 framework convention on 
climate change and was the first agreement to 
commit member countries to reducing Co2 levels 
within a specific time limit. Did not mention nuclear 
power  
1997 New Labour Government comes 
into power, led by Tony Blair    
Their manifesto continued to denounce nuclear on 
financial grounds and supported the mitigation of 
carbon through renewable technologies  
1998 Nuclear Energy Agency of the 
OECD responds to Kyoto Protocol 
The Agency produced a report arguing that nuclear 
power could be effective in meeting carbon targets 
2001 Rules of the Kyoto Protocol are 
established in the Marrakesh 
Accord 
Implementation procedures were outlined  
2002 Renewables obligation replaces 
the fossil-fuel levy 
The obligation signalled a move towards a system 
which incentivised suppliers to buy from renewables 
2002 British Energy faces bankruptcy  
and requires a State bailout  
BE was forced to restructure. The debacle led to 
speculation over whether nuclear power could 
operate without state subsidies 
2002 A White Paper called 'Managing 
the Nuclear Legacy - A Strategy 
for Action' was published   
Provided limited clarity regarding the waste 
management programme given that no long-term 
solution was proposed. Waste continued to be the 
main element of anti-nuclear environmental concern 
2003 A White Paper called 'Our Energy 
Future: Creating a Low-Carbon 
Economy' 
Supported renewable technologies based on financial 
and resource security considerations. Ruled out future 
subsidies for nuclear power, effectively abandoning 
any possibility of another nuclear programme. Nuclear 
waste was too problematic, decommissioning was too 
expensive, and renewables would meet carbon 
targets.  
2005 UK becomes net importer of 
energy 
Concerns rise over energy security 
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Date Key Event Details 
2005 Kyoto Protocol enters into force UK under pressure to put in place a low carbon energy 
mix 
2006 An Energy Review is established 
after considerable backlash to the 
2003 Energy White Paper 
The Energy Industry was concerned that the 2003 
policy was unachievable and would disadvantage 
necessary traditional electricity generators. 
Additionally, the Press were beginning to reconsider 
the role of nuclear power given escalating climate 
change concerns and a slow renewables development 
2006 The Stern Review and Report Assessed the economic impacts of climate change. 
Concluded that the economic effects of global 
warming outweighed the costs of low carbon nuclear 
– as long as the carbon price was established 
2006 European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme vision statement 
is published.  
Hopes to reduce cost of producing low carbon energy 
2007 The European Council agrees to a 
common European strategy for 
tackling climate change  
The emissions trading scheme is agreed to 
2007 A White Paper entitled 'Meeting 
the Energy Challenge' is released 
and outlines the conclusions of 
the 2006 Energy Review 
The report relayed that anticipation for a great British 
renewables industry had been over optimistic and 
that, given supply concerns with oil, gas and coal as 
well as the prospect of net importation, nuclear 
power was now integral - based financial appraisal of 
nuclear on the emissions trading scheme (carbon 
market) 
2008 The Climate Change Act is 
established 
Makes it the duty of the Secretary of State for the 
DECC to ensure that all Kyoto agreements are met by 
2050 
2008 A White Paper entitled 'Meeting 
the Energy Challenge: A White 
Paper on Nuclear Power' is 
published 
Private industry was to be allowed to build and 
operate new nuclear power plants given the long term 
benefits of carbon neutral electricity, and the fairly 
minimal consequences of radioactive-waste in 
comparison 
2008 Government announce a 'Nuclear 
Renaissance' 
Announcement that the Government would be 
looking for private forms to build new nuclear 
2008 A White Paper entitled 'The Road 
to 2010: Addressing the Nuclear 
Question in the 21st Century' is 
published 
The Paper set out the guidelines for site assessments 
and necessary administrative tasks required by 
companies proposing nuclear plans.  
2009 A White Paper called 'UK Low 
Carbon Transition Plan' is 
published 
It assured that the early stages of the carbon pricing 
system was expected to continue into the foreseeable 
future as the central part of Britain’s long term 
decarbonisation plan - it ensured that the positive 
financial forecasting of nuclear remained possible 
2009 A National Policy Statement on 
nuclear power is published 
Private investors would not have to identify their own 
suitable sites, but would instead buy or lease the sites 
already approved for the nuclear purpose. This 
shortcut the planning process as sites would come 
pre-environmentally approved. Impacts on the natural 
environment were justified under Imperative Reasons 
of Overriding Public Interest which implied that the 
local implications on nature were of secondary 
importance to climate change  
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Chapter 8: Target-Based 
Environmentalism and the Nuclear 
Renaissance 
 
This findings chapter details the oscillating legitimacy of nuclear power during 1990 and 2000 
amidst an intensifying concern for emissions targets and a continuing debate between renewables 
and nuclear power. Previously shunned by the private sector, the nuclear power industry was in 
decline as it entered into the 1990s. With the PWR representing the industry’s sole development, 
Nuclear Electric was fully focused on reducing costs in preparation for later attempts at privatisation 
rather than planning growth. To replace future energy needs previously expected to be met with 
nuclear power, both gas and renewables benefitted from heightened investment into the 1990s. 
The former offered a cleaner fossil-fuel than coal and oil and involved minimal structural change 
(old fossil-fuel plants could often be converted to burn gas). Renewables offered the green energy 
alternative to nuclear power but required investment for long term gain. With the eventual 
privatisation of nuclear in 1996 under the company title of British Energy it became increasingly 
evident that private industry held little desire to build new nuclear plants. The Government 
promised that no subsidies would be provided to the industry and although market mechanisms 
remained in place to ensure that British Energy would not collapse without the crutches of 
Government funding, State R&D began to be siphoned off to renewable and green technologies. 
Hopes around renewables were so great that in 2003 the UK Labour Government announced a low 
carbon energy policy that centred on renewable generation and negated any new nuclear builds.  
Nevertheless, as emissions targets became increasingly compulsory within international 
communities such as the EU and UN some high status Ministers, scientists and journalist began to 
question whether renewables represented a realistic option through which to reduce emissions. By 
the mid-2000s nuclear power was once again being positively reconsidered by both the 
Government and a growing volume of newspapers as the most plausible green option given the 
realities of the renewables industry. Consequently the target-based environmental logic became 
increasingly dominant in the discursive legitimation of nuclear power Interestingly privatisation had 
caused a rift between the State’s social goals (supply security and environmental goals) and 
economic objectives of private enterprise. With the Government’s environmental goals becoming 
increasingly dependent on the characteristics of low carbon nuclear power a ‘carbon price’ was 
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introduced to align the needs of private ownership with the environmental needs of the 
Government; according to the Government a ‘nuclear renaissance’ (White 2008) was afoot. 
Conversely EMOs argued that only renewables represented the environmentally responsible option 
given nuclear power’s local level impact on ecosystems and biodiversity. By 2010 there continued 
to be disputes over the environmental credentials of nuclear at the community level, but at the 
national level there appeared little room for more debate – nuclear power was on the agenda and 
progress towards its development was increasingly rapid. The Labour Government declared nuclear 
power as necessary and all local environmental disputes were lost to nuclear’s ‘Imperative Reasons 
of Overriding Public Interest’ (Department for Energy and Climate Change 2009). 
This Chapter will first detail the decline of nuclear power and the rising acceptance of its 
alternatives. As the degeneration of nuclear power became more and more inevitable, the Chapter 
will clarify why the Government conducted a policy U-turn in 2006 towards a more favourable 
nuclear policy. The Chapter will conclude by examining the ways in which the Government justified 
its nuclear policy with regards to both nuclear’s ‘greenness’ and how it aligned with the economic 
values of the private sector. There are three key elements of this chapter: how the nuclear versus 
renewables debate was maintained by the opposing understandings of environmentalism by the 
State and the environmental movement; how an amalgamation of supply values and the target-
based environmental logic provided the foundations for a re-emergence of nuclear popularity; and 
how the target-based environmental logic was able to coexist with the neo-liberal market logic after 
the initiation of the carbon price and market.  
Nuclear Retirement 
 
Throughout the 1990s the energy industry underwent significant changes. Energy supply 
liberalisation began in 1990 with the opening up of the market to large electricity buyers (please 
see Appendix. 2 for a detailed overview of the privatisation process). By 1995 Regional Electricity 
Companies had been disbanded and complete electricity liberalisation was more or less in place. 
Privatisation and deregulation of gas markets prompted a ‘dash for gas’ aided by new and 
economical gas technologies (Combined Cycle Gas Turbine: CCGT). As private industry expanded 
the energy production portfolio of the UK, the onus of the nationally owned nuclear industry was 
to prepare for future privatisation by seducing private investors. For this purpose the Conservative 
Government under the new leadership of John Major (1990) provided a liabilities fund which would 
eventually cover the decommissioning costs of the previous programmes’ reactors. Its reserves 
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were protected by the non-fossil-fuel obligation which continued to give nuclear power a protected 
share of the market by enforcing the fossil-fuel levy which, by 1994, was raising significant funds 
from licensed suppliers – 97 per cent of which was going towards the new fund.  
Although installing funding mechanisms to absorb future costs, the Government did not display any 
expectation of future nuclear acceleration. Instead, in 1993 the Committee of Public Accounts 
published a report called ‘The Renewable Energy Research, Development and Demonstration 
Programme’ (1993b) which suggested that the future energy mix should look to renewables to 
generate its clean electricity. The programme referred to in the report’s title had been initially 
established in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis to develop diversity in energy supply. The decision to 
resolve these supply threats with nuclear power capacity had made the renewables programme 
dormant. However, it was now applicable in the context of failing nuclear and ensuing international 
emissions targets. The report suggested that renewables should add 1500 MWs (5% of total 
electricity generation) to the grid. With each turbine producing 3-400KWs the country would need 
to install around 5000 wind turbines to meet the clean energy targets.  
Nonetheless within the context of the regulated electricity market, Nuclear Electric (NE) was able 
to gradually rejuvenate profits. Its competitors were forced to react to the fluctuations in fuel 
markets whilst nuclear was ensured sales regardless of uncompetitive prices. Hence whilst 
companies such as PowerGen were forced to raise their prices in response to energy shortages, 
NE’s prices were able to remain stable and were thus not as uncompetitive as first expected. All this 
meant that NE began to generate sufficient revenue: 
‘Since 1989 and the exclusion of nuclear power from privatisation, the industry has 
performed remarkably well. Nuclear Electric’s productivity has increased by 53%, and it’s 
market share by 26% “it’s now only a matter of time before Nuclear Electric overtakes 
PowerGen to take second position in the generator league”, NE’s chairman, John Collier, 
boasted recently’ (Hawkes 1993)  
‘Privatisation is the best thing that never happened to Britain’s atomic power stations. For 
it was the transfer of rival coal and oil plants to the private sector that sparked nuclear’s 
performance revolution’ (Tieman 1994)  
In response to NE’s accomplishment the 1995 review White Paper entitled ‘The Prospects for 
Nuclear Power in the UK’ announced the Conservative Government’s intention to privatise part of 
the nuclear generation industry. It declared that NE would be re-structured so that the seven AGRs 
and the PWR could be privatised in 1996 under the company British Energy (BE) without the older 
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and financially unappealing Magnox stations which were close to decommissioning (refer to 
Appendix. 2 for details on privatisation). In July 1996 BE was floated and the Government pledged 
that no more public money would ever subsidise a nuclear project. In a decisive move away from 
nuclear power the official 1995 energy plans declared a programme of large scale renewable 
investment. Importantly privatisation not only led to the withdrawal of new nuclear plans, but 
fundamentally altered the values informing choices between energy options. The following section 
examines the altering institutional structure of the industry resulting from energy market 
liberalisation.  
Privatisation and the Liberal Energy Market 
 
In the post-privatisation era the energy industry was split between public sector interests which 
primarily included energy diversity and the meeting of carbon targets; and the market interests of 
the energy companies who were expected to meet the financial interests of their shareholders. In 
short, if the Government wished to encourage a particular electricity generation industry it needed 
to incentivise the growth of that industry in a way that would make it appear viable to a commercial 
and competitive entity. Given that the Government withdrew support for nuclear power in 1995 
there was little optimism regarding the possibility of new builds. The 1995 review made it clear that 
Government departments intervening in the mechanisms of the market (beyond that of the fossil-
fuel levy) could only be detrimental to the interests of the tax payer, highlighting the prominent 
neo-liberal values of the Government at that time: 
 ‘The Government recognises the significant contribution that the existing nuclear power 
stations make towards meeting the UKs current commitments regarding the limitation of 
emissions. The Government concludes however, that there is at present no evidence to 
support the view that new nuclear build is needed in the near future on emissions 
abatement grounds’  …the Government concludes that there is currently no case for 
intervention in the market…The Government concludes that providing public sector funds 
now for the construction of new nuclear power stations could not be justified  on the 
grounds of wider economic benefits, and would not, therefore, be in the best interests of 
either electricity consumers or the taxpayer’ (Department for Trade and Industry 1995 
pp.3-4) 
The previous situated national-market logic had been surpassed; its generosity in legitimating 
nuclear power based on ambitious and optimistic future market predictions facilitated by the 
197 
 
flexibility of the State budget was now unacceptable. Private ownership within the energy industry 
fostered a context in which the constitution of the UK’s energy mix rested on considerations of a 
more short-term and financial nature. This was reinforced by the Government’s confidence that 
independently regulated competitive energy markets were the most cost-effective and efficient 
way of delivering energy objectives.  
The societal institutional logics notably manifest within the energy industry had not themselves 
altered; the Government was still concerned with the diversity of supply which related to the values 
regarding the sovereignty and autonomy of the State; the target-based environmental logic was 
still evident in the Government’s intentions to subsidise the renewables industry; and the market 
logic was of course still vividly applicable, albeit a manifestation which encapsulated neo-liberal 
market values over those of a national-market (which had taken its conventions from a welfare-
state). Given a national lack of concern over energy supplies, economic and market values had 
become the most salient in discursive legitimations of energy options, as had environmental 
targets. In 1997 the new Labour administration’s manifesto continued an interest in 
environmentalism and the denouncement of nuclear on financial grounds. The party believed that 
renewables would provide new green technologies and attract international business: 
‘…we are committed to an energy policy designed to promote cleaner, more efficient 
energy use and production, including a new and strong drive to develop renewable 
energy sources such as solar and wind energy, and combined heat and power. We see no 
economic case for the building of any new nuclear power stations.’ (Labour 1997) 
Nevertheless, for the pro-nuclear lobby the most important change during the 1990s was the 
intensifying commitments to carbon targets which reinforced the legitimacy of low carbon 
technologies. Although the new Labour Government (1997) seemed uninterested in rekindling the 
nuclear industry, international pressure from the IAEA and NEA, international carbon targets and 
an increasingly vocal community of nuclear supporters kept an undercurrent of nuclear advocacy 
flowing, albeit at the margins of the press. Their advocacy was primarily founded on the discourse 
of CC and they based their ‘greening’ of nuclear power on the values of the target-based 
environmental logic. Essentially CC discourse provided a means to associate the values of an 
environmental societal logic, as reflected through CC’s substantive goals, with low carbon emitting 
energy techniques. As carbon targets became increasingly binding, pro-nuclear arguments rose in 
prominence and the nuclear versus renewables debate reached an intensity not previously 
witnessed. The following section outlines the regulatory reinforcement of carbon goals during the 
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1990s which supported the emergence of the target-based environmental logic by enforcing a 
quantitative approach to environmental protection.  
Intensifying Targets 
 
Whilst the conclusion of the Government appeared to be that nuclear stations were an illegitimate 
option given the priorities of the energy sector, a target-based environmental logic was also 
becoming more salient in energy debates. In 1997 regulatory foundations of the target-based logic 
solidified as emissions targets became binding and challenging time limits were set for participating 
nations. With increasingly coercive international pressure the arguments over which technology 
could best meet the environmental needs of the energy industry intensified. The 1997 Labour 
Government were under pressure to provide a subsidising or financing framework for either 
renewables or nuclear given the financial needs of each; the former required R&D investment and 
the latter required subsidies to operate without loss. Indeed during the 1990s nuclear and 
renewables were perceived as mutually exclusive because without State intervention the market 
could not support either, and with it, could not support both. For those in support of renewables 
such as social movement organisations the meeting of carbon targets were part of a much larger 
system of substantively rational environmental values which rejected nuclear power on multiple 
grounds. Nevertheless, for those rejecting the priority systems of the renewable lobbyists and 
concerned over the trajectory of renewables development, nuclear power could still provide an 
environmentally friendly solution to the carbon problem. The history and characteristics of the 
carbon targets will be discussed below before a more in-depth look at the environmental case 
against nuclear power and Labour’s move towards a comprehensive policy based on renewables. 
The unexpected recovery of nuclear then follows.  
‘…there has indeed been a reassessment. Although the original concern about security of 
supply…is no longer of concern to us, new factors have come into the picture, most 
important of all the concern about global warming’ (Committee of Public Accounts 1993b) 
The first UN Earth Summit in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro convened to address urgent problems of 
environmental protection and socio-economic development. The primary outcome of the Rio 
summit was the United Nations Framework convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and The 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) which was to monitor and review the 
implementation of the Earth Summit agreements. 1997 marked the first five year review by the CSD 
of Earth Summit progress conducted by the United Nations General Assembly meeting, as well as 
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the 1997 Kyoto Protocol which was to supplement the UNFCCC adopted at Rio. It was at the Kyoto 
summit that binding emissions targets were set for 37 industrialised countries and the EC (European 
Community) for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). These targets were informed by the 
data collected over the preceding five years. The Kyoto Protocol was the first agreement to commit 
member countries to reducing Co2 levels within a specific time limit. Its rules were established in 
the Marrakesh Accord by COP 7 (7th conference of the parties) in 2001, and it officially entered into 
force in 2005. The protocol, although having a major impact on international (member country) 
energy policy, only explicitly mentioned ‘new and renewable forms of energy’ as ways to tackle 
GHG emissions – nuclear power was  not expressly mentioned.  
The response from nuclear advocacy organisations associated with the UN and OECD was to 
propose that nuclear power offered a plausible solution to the carbon conundrum. In 1998 the 
Nuclear Energy Agency (specialised agency within the OECD) produced a nuclear report in response 
to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol arguing that nuclear power could be a resolution to the emissions 
problem: 
‘…new and renewable forms of energy are mentioned explicitly in the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, one important option that is essentially carbon-free, nuclear energy, is not 
specifically mentioned…the nuclear variants discussed in this paper, as well as results from 
a number of other studies, show that technically and economically feasible nuclear 
development paths could contribute significantly to alleviating the risks associated with 
global climate change’ (Nuclear Energy Authority 1990 p.4) 
According to the NEA nuclear power was practically carbon free, currently available and 
competitive in a number of countries and sustainable for large-scale deployment since its fuel was 
naturally occurring and plentiful. This struck a chord with those within the press who believed there 
was a necessity for a new and clarified energy policy in the UK at the end of the 1990s (Hawkes 
1998). The energy infrastructure of the UK was heavily weighted towards coal and CCGT gas 
electricity production. But as coal mines closed, gas became harder to acquire from local sources 
and older Magnox stations came to the end of their generating lives whilst the demand for energy 
failed to waver. Supply worries once dismissed in the early years of the 1990s began reasserting 
themselves as the media became anxious that the UK was due a new energy plan. By 1997 and the 
instigation of temporally binding emissions targets the renewables industry was beginning to 
concern commentators. Around 97 per cent of the non-fossil-fuel levy continued to go to nuclear 
power to cover its forecasted liabilities and the new Renewables Obligation (announced in the 
March 1999 budget, and implemented on the 1st of April 2001) to replace the non-fossil-fuel 
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obligation in 2002 and funded by the climate change levy which was a tax on energy used by 
businesses). The mix of binding targets and financially stunted renewables development in a climate 
of future energy supply concern turned the focus of a minority of commentators in The Times and 
Guardian back onto nuclear power: 
‘…nuclear power has long been a main target of environmental campaigners…The green case 
is poor Nuclear power is the cleanest form of mass energy generation, producing no 
greenhouse gasses. Costs are falling as reactor design and waste disposal technology improve. 
And dependency on non-renewable fossil-fuels is reduced’ (Anon 2001) 
 
‘It is highly unlikely, by contrast, the Mr Blair and his successors will manage to meet their next 
objective of reducing greenhouse gas discharges by 20 per cent of the 1990 rate in 2020, let 
alone a 60 per cent cut by 2050. Thus quest would become far more credible if nuclear power 
were placed back into the energy equation’ (Anon 2004) 
 
The reinforcement of carbon targets in the latter part of the 1990s, paired with a deficiency in 
renewables development due in part to low levels of state investment created the first few 
murmurs of nuclear legitimacy dependent on the target-based logic. As the pro-nuclear argument 
grew the renewables lobby unrelentingly delineated nuclear power as anti-environmental given the 
debates surrounding atomic waste in particular. Radioactive-waste was a central pillar of the 
traditional environmental criticism of nuclear power and hindered any attempt to convince the 
environmental organisations that nuclear could be recognised as ‘green’ despite its low carbon 
emissions.  
Radioactive-waste: The Pillar of Anti-Nuclear Sentiment 
 
The new Labour Government commenced a considerable push to clean up the ‘nuclear legacy’ in 
the late 1990s. Radioactive-waste storage and/or disposal represented a large segment of the 
previous Government’s 1995 review which re-examined the process of waste removal to 
understand the costs involved. The review concluded that a site for waste storage was vital. NIREX, 
the public organisation established back in the early 1980s to search for a storage and disposal site 
for wastes, had been working against considerable public aggression. By March 1997 only 13 sites 
had been shortlisted by NIREX for disposal with only Sellafield facing actual exploratory work. A 
public inquiry for a Rock Characterisation Facility at the site was established by the Environmental 
Secretary John Gummer in 1995 after planning permission was refused by the council. Compelling 
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technical cases against the facility by EMOs led John Gummer to cancel the geological test site. By 
the time Labour had come into power NIREX had failed to identify a single site for disposal since its 
conception in 1985. A review by the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 
was thus initiated to explore issues of waste management. The committee’s report was published 
in 1999 and provided a framework for a new management policy, but it failed to supply a 
comprehensive management strategy for intermediate level wastes (ILW – levels refer to level of 
radioactivity) or high level wastes (HLW). Eventually the white paper ‘Managing the Nuclear Legacy 
– A Strategy for Action’ (Department for Trade and Industry 2002) was published to provide some 
clarity to the waste management programme. It set out to ensure ‘Environmental Restoration’ 
which, it stated, required careful consideration now older plants were beginning to close and be 
decommissioned. Good intentions aside, the White Paper failed to detail any concrete waste 
management plan and merely recognised the need for a plan: 
‘…the plain fact is that whatever nuclear’s future might be, we have to deal with the 
consequences of the past. Doing nothing is not an option’ (Department for Trade and 
Industry 2002 p.8) 
Although there was no programme for long-term disposal of wastes, there was action towards 
controlling those processes already in place for shorter-term storage. In 1996 the Environmental 
Agency was created tasked with the monitoring and environmental regulation of nuclear power 
facilities. The newly created Agency was ultimately intended to become the ‘one stop shop’ for 
authorising licenses related to radioactive-waste disposal. One could interpret such actions as an 
attempt to coerce the industry to finally respond to the environmental movement’s waste concerns 
by making it accountable to actors with more substantive environmental objectives. However, 
monitoring and careful licensing was not a solution but a damage limitation strategy. During the 
1990-1995 review the Conservative Government had promised that no nuclear would be built 
without a solution to nuclear waste management. The following Labour Government took the same 
stance and as such there was little prospect for more nuclear power in the coming years. The media 
echoed radioactive-waste concern by illustrating how nuclear power’s environmental credibility 
continued to centre on its waste: 
‘…at the heart of the problem is the failure of the industry and successive Governments 
over 50 years to deal with nuclear waste. No depository exists and high and intermediate 
level wastes and the most dangerous being held in liquid form in ageing waste tanks, 
vulnerable to accidents and more recently terrorist attacks’ (Brown 2002) 
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 ‘For supporters of nuclear power, a new generation of reactors is critical to meeting 
Britain’s ambitious climate-change targets…Environmental campaigners, however, remain 
sceptical; arguing that nuclear’s contribution to greenhouse gas reductions is exaggerated 
and outweighed by the intractable problem of waste’ (Henderson 2008) 
By the early 2000s confidence in a lucrative renewables industry along with no clear solution to the 
nuclear waste problem meant that the Government were favouring renewables. It is important to 
note however that the inclusion of State support for renewable energy technologies was minimally 
based on its environmental comparisons with nuclear power. Whereas EMOs in particular 
continued to argue for renewables in comparison to nuclear power on environmental grounds, the 
Government where both confined by their previous promise not to build any more nuclear plants 
and their pessimism regarding the financials of the industry. Interestingly, renewables offered a 
similar package to nuclear back in the 1940s; security of indigenous energy supply and the 
possibility of a large and internationally-leading green energy market developing in the UK. Whilst 
the public and press became increasingly vocal about the environmental implications of energy 
choices both in respect to carbon and local ecology, the Government were consistent in their 
market, resource and target-based environmental values.  
2003 White Paper: Nuclear’s Demise? 
 
‘Although nuclear power does not cause pollution like gas or coal-fired electricity 
generation, the Government believes that the best way of combating global warming is to 
subsidise renewable energy supply’ (Baldwin, Henderson and Mortishead 2001)  
The 2003 white paper entitled ‘Our Energy Future: Creating a Low-Carbon Economy’ provided an 
interesting insight into the alternative values undergirding the battle between nuclear and 
renewables. The press debated which technology represented the most ‘environmental’ option 
based on the journalists’ perspectives regarding what constituted environmental behaviour. The 
Government was more inclined to base their assessment of legitimacy on both liberal-market and 
state-resource dimensions within the context of environmental targets. Thus although judgements 
by the Labour Government were made in line with the values of the target based logic, they also 
had to satisfy the dominating liberal-market logic to invite investment and had to ensure a 
necessary level of secure supply. Given this constellation of situated logics within the energy 
industry the Government favoured economically incentivising renewables because if technological 
development followed the expected trajectory, renewables would be economically favourable and 
203 
 
deployable on a commercial scale, allowing emissions targets to be met fully. Additionally, 
renewables could be in place on a larger scale much sooner than new nuclear stations. Indeed, the 
embellishment of renewable energy sources was part of a wider industrial and fiscal belief that the 
UK could lead globally in a green industry grounded on renewable innovation. It was widely 
concluded that Britain’s days of nuclear leadership had dissolved after decades of low investment 
and minimal experience in nuclear construction (UK expertise was at an all-time low). Nuclear had 
not only lost its financial legitimacy, but national pride and sovereignty related to the industry had 
thawed. Any new reactors would have to be imported from Europe (EPR type) or North American 
companies (CANDU type). The 2003 white paper encapsulated these considerations, combining an 
economic imperative for renewables with a depiction of nuclear power as expensive and dated: 
‘In this white paper we set the ambition of doubling renewable’s share of electricity 
generation in the decade after that…nuclear power is currently an important source of 
carbon-free electricity. However, its current economics make is an unattractive option for 
new, carbon-free generating capacity…as we move to a new, low carbon economy, there 
are major opportunities for our businesses to become world leaders in the technologies we 
will need for the future’ (Department for Trade and Industry 2003 pp.12-13) 
The 2003 white paper advocated the development of new technologies in light of exceedingly tough 
carbon targets (60 per cent reduction in carbon dioxide by 2050) and worries over security of supply 
given the closure of dated carbon intensive plants and old MAGNOX reactors. Energy reliability was 
to be sought through diversity in energy suppliers and diversity in turn was to be met by amplifying 
investment in carbon free technology and energy efficiency measures in public and private 
domains. To spur the marketplace for renewables, a Renewables Obligation (RO) had been 
introduced in April 2002. The RO incentivised electricity suppliers to provide a specified and 
annually increasing proportion of their sales from renewable technologies – in much the same way 
the non-fossil-fuels obligation contracted suppliers to buy nuclear. Generators were able to claim 
one Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) for every 1MW of eligible renewable electricity 
generated, which could then be sold to suppliers who would meet their obligation by presenting 
their ROCs or by paying a buyout fund. This fund then went to all suppliers who presented ROCs. 
Obligations to buy ‘green energy’ and to entice businesses into green energy generation illustrated 
the requirement of the Government and its environmental social goals to align with the economic 
objectives of the private sector.  
The 2003 paper finalised its suggestions by announcing that although nuclear power stations would 
not be banned, the Government would not contribute financially to any new installations in the 
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foreseeable future. The press recognised this move as the ‘final nail in the coffin’ (Wiliamson 2003) 
given that very few commentators believed nuclear power could remain competitive without state 
money: ‘…nowhere in the world have new power stations been built under proper market 
conditions’ (Baldwin, Henderson and Mortishead 2001). The conclusion was linked specifically to 
the nuclear debacle in 2002 when BE required a State bailout to avoid bankruptcy. The debacle 
began when a BE owned nuclear plant in Torness had to be shut down in August 2002, allegedly 
costing BE £250,000 a day and causing a flurry of media speculation which led to BE’s share prices 
dropping by almost 30% and its output falling around 5% below forecasted (Macalister 2002). The 
drop in market value and income as well as the planned closure of Dungeness B for refuelling led 
to a rapid collapse. The Energy Minister Brian Wilson had 18 months before introduced NETA (New 
Electricity Trade Arrangements) which had made electricity generation more competitive and 
brought down bulk energy prices, adding to BE’s list of problems. BE approached the Department 
for Trade and Industry for help to continue operations whilst it restructured: 
‘…the Government was faced last night with demands of up to £1bn and possible power 
blackouts as the country’s biggest electricity generator asked for an immediate financial 
bailout. The near collapse of British Energy is a huge blow to the nuclear industry, which 
has been lobbying hard to be allowed to build a new generation of atomic power plants’ 
(Macalister 2002)  
The BE debacle led to speculation over whether the company would go into administration, be re-
nationalised or whether the Department for Trade and Industry’s continued support would be 
found illegal by the European Commission. The Labour Government eventually took a 64% share in 
BE to avoid its financial collapse; nevertheless the reputational damage had already been done. The 
pro-renewables lobby began to use nuclear powers troublesome finances to reconfirm the 
plausibility of renewables. Opportunities to criticise the nuclear lobby by reference to the economic 
values of the energy sector were seized by EMOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth who 
argued through the press that nuclear stations were financially unviable and economically 
dangerous. Greenpeace even threatened legal action against the Government’s ‘bailout’ claiming 
that it was illegal without prior approval from the European commission and was unfair in 
conditions of market competition: 
‘Roger Hinman, nuclear campaigner at Friends of the Earth, said: “British Energy’s troubles 
show yet again that nuclear power is unreliable and uneconomic as well as being a threat 
to the environment. Ministers must not throw good money after bad with further subsidies 
to the failed nuclear industry”’ (Macalister 2002) 
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‘Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have said BE's situation highlights problems with 
the industry as a whole - that it is unreliable and uneconomic. Greenpeace said on Friday: 
"Britain would be better without BE's creaking nuclear power stations."’ (Anon 2002) 
Advocates of the nuclear industry were in a catch 22 position because to prove that new reactors 
could be green, clean and cheap would require building them, and to build them they needed to 
prove that they could be green, clean and cheap. Moreover, because of the stale state of innovation 
and research in the sector any new reactor designs would need to be imported. Energy market 
incentives would thus need to be substantial enough to compel international energy operators to 
enter the UK energy sector. In sum the 2003 white paper signalled an end to the nuclear power 
‘dream’ of the 1950s, with current operators struggling to even maintain the extant fleet. With 
carbon targets still a central concern of the Government, renewables provided an exciting future 
based on ideals of economic success driven by innovation and technological change. For the 
environmental lobby and its EMOs renewables were the quintessentially green option that could 
provide a more financially rewarding avenue than nuclear. Nonetheless there was a strengthening 
nuclear lobby which was predominantly spearheaded by Ministers and key scientists who saw the 
2003 white paper as a ‘cop-out’ which failed to offer a realistically attainable energy mix (Charter 
2006). With all that seemed wrong with the nuclear industry, its low carbon footprint and the 
possibility of a carbon price to make it financially viable provided it with a possible future.  
The Noughtie U-Turn 
 
‘There was a need for a left-wing demonology, and nuclear power was always there in the 
grimoire of villainy. Until this week. For a curious alteration has taken place. And nukes are 
now fashionable. Indeed, not just fashionable but thoroughly directional. The last word in 
chic. Irradiated isotopes have never been so on trend’ (Gove 2008) 
Three years after the Government announced a push for renewables at the expense of nuclear 
continuation, pessimism regarding the potential of renewables began to filter into the media. There 
were three key drivers of the reconsideration of renewables: Supply concerns became immediate 
issues given stunted renewable growth and the closure of coal and oil plants under EU 
environmental directives (Large Combustion Plant Directive: LCPD). Rising prices of fossil-fuels 
made nuclear power appear relatively more attractive than it had been three years ago, as did the 
prospect of implementing a carbon price; and the alternative ‘green’ technologies had yet to prove 
themselves commercial, meaning that carbon targets were looking much more challenging to 
achieve by the 2020 and 2050 deadlines. These drivers refer directly to the constellation of situated 
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logics within the energy industry. The first scenario problematised the ability of renewables to meet 
supply needs of the nation. Supplementing renewables with fossil-fuels would then be problematic 
given the latter two scenarios – fossil-fuels would make the entire mix much more expensive and 
would likely threaten the ability of the UK to meet carbon targets. The Government were forced to 
reconsider nuclear because the reliance on renewables was threatening the very values upon which 
they sought to build their energy plans. In essence the UK was facing a future of mass energy 
importation as well as hiked fuel prices considering the imminent shortage of fossil-fuels. Without 
a large supply of clean energy the UK’s future energy situation was looking expensive and likely to 
fall short of its binding Kyoto agreements. Consequently, a heated argument between the 
environmental movement, the press and the Government arose regarding what could be 
considered ‘clean energy’.   
The 2006 Energy Review (Department for Trade and Industry) reversed the Government’s 2003 
position by concluding that nuclear, as a source of low carbon energy, would contribute to the 
diversity of energy supplies and offer an economic option based on likely scenarios for gas and 
carbon prices. The following section will explore the reasoning behind what the media called 
Labour’s energy ‘U-turn’ (Jenkins 2006). With the Government altering its position, the nuclear 
versus renewables debate raged on with an upped tempo. Interestingly the debate continued as an 
example of two opposing environmental understandings. Those supporting nuclear power tended 
to argue with reference to the instrumentally rational values of the target-based environmentalism, 
advising that the monitoring of emissions was far more likely to protect nature than any practices 
or processes endorsed by the social movement approach. As the debates progressed a ‘lesser of 
two evils’ rhetorical strategy emerged whereby nuclear advocates explicitly recognised the problem 
of nuclear waste, but saw it as a lesser environmental issue than climate change. As both the Labour 
Government and the Conservative Government of 2010 continued to legitimate nuclear power as 
the most environmentally friendly option given the energy context, the voices of anti-nuclear 
environmentalists became almost entirely marginalised. Eventually nuclear power was proposed 
by much of the media and the Government as the only plausible ‘green’ option.  
By the end of the decade the green credentials of nuclear power also became the vehicles through 
which it maintained its economic stability. To reconcile the liberal-market values of the private 
sector with the social state-resource and target-based environmental values of the public sector, 
the Government established a way to make nuclear power economically attractive by monetising 
its means of environmentalism; carbon. By the end of the period nuclear was hailed at the policy 
level as the greenest and most cost effective means of meeting the supply and carbon requirements 
of the UK energy mix. The following section will detail the rise of nuclear power after the 2003 white 
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paper dismissed it. It will focus on the role of rhetoric and actors particularly in forming the debate 
through which the legitimacy of nuclear power became contested and constructed. It will then 
examine how nuclear came to appeal to the economic and market needs of the energy industry 
given its ‘greenness’.  
Redefining the Nuclear Argument: Nuclear or Renewables 
 
 ‘The Prime Minister…wants urgently to revise perhaps his worst-ever white paper on 
energy policy in 2003. It was a monument to the doctrine of unripe time, concluding that 
nuclear power was messy, renewables glamorous, and the whole business problematic. It 
was not a white paper but a fudge paper’ (Jenkins 2005) 
The 2007 white paper entitled ‘Meeting the Energy Challenge’ (Department for Trade and Industry 
2007a) outlined the conclusions from the 2006 energy review. With an explicit focus on carbon 
targets, the paper relayed that anticipation for a great British renewables industry had been over 
optimistic and that given supply concerns with oil, gas and coal as well as the prospect of net 
importation, nuclear power was now considered as integral. These conclusions were not met with 
the kind of hostility one might expect after the levels of nuclear revulsion characterising the early 
2000s. Debates were beginning to reconsider nuclear power given the continuing concerns over 
climate change which was receiving much press in The Times and The Guardian in particular. The 
quotes below not only highlight the developing support for nuclear power but illustrate the extent 
to which that support was based on the high value of carbon targets within the press. They are 
predominantly from before the 2006 paper illustrating that media were part of the lobbying 
movement to overturn the decisions of 2003: 
‘Tony Blair seems to be on the brink of making a really good decision. The energy minister, 
Malcolm Wicks, has spent days denying it, so it must be true. The Prime Minister intends 
to invest in nuclear power as part of Britain’s future energy mix. Praise be.’ (Jenkins 2005) 
 ‘Mr Blair said the evidence was now overwhelming that climate change was the single 
biggest long term problem facing the country, and conceded the world was nowhere near 
finding a mechanism to cut carbon dioxide emissions by the Government’s target of 60% 
by 2050. He told MPs that there was no way nuclear power could be removed from the 
agenda “if you are serious about the issue of climate change’ (Jenkins 2004) 
The nuclear policy turnaround led to a wealth of media coverage between 2006 and 2010. Articles 
critical of the proposed nuclear programme often drew from Greenpeace and FOE publications to 
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express frustration that new nuclear would monopolise enthusiasm and investment from the State. 
This demonstrated the extent to which mutual exclusivity between the two industries remained a 
core assumption of the pro-renewables lobby despite the Government’s strategy for a nuclear and 
renewable energy mix. Importantly the environmental commentators of the newspapers under 
study did not side with nuclear power at this time. For example, George Monbiot of The Guardian’s 
environmental team published prolifically against nuclear power over 2004-2008 arguing that 
investment was needed solely for renewables. Conversely, much of the discourse advocating 
nuclear power argued that renewables could not satiate the energy supply needs of the nation on 
its own, and that any supplementary low-carbon technologies were nowhere near 
commercialisation (Carbon Capture Storage in particular). Hence nuclear power provided the only 
viable way to create enough carbon neutral energy to supply the UK without requiring increased 
fossil-fuel generation or large scale imports. Indeed, the climate change discourse had partially 
removed from focus the previous environmental concerns over nuclear power. The following 
section will examine the pro-nuclear argument and begins with the work of actors to reignite pro-
nuclear discourse.  It identifies the three key pro-nuclear discourses; keeping it real, resource 
necessity and lesser of two evils.  
Forming the Nuclear Defence 
 
A key character in the redefinition of nuclear power was Sir David King the Labour Government’s 
scientific advisor. Amidst the rumours in 2002 that the Government were to reject nuclear power 
on the basis of cost and renewable possibilities the critical press began providing editorial space for 
Sir David King, often displaying him as a ‘convert’ to the necessity of atomic power. With climate 
change posing as much an environmental problem as a scientific one, his argument was that only 
the most technologically advanced energy solutions could realistically mitigate global warming. 
Essentially Sir David King rekindled the argument that Thatcher was forced to abandon in the 
privatisation wash out of 1989. Moreover, amid a regulatory background of more stringent 
emissions directives his supposition aligned with the strengthening target-based environmental 
concerns of Labour. He proposed that nuclear should receive special attention from the public 
sector including possible subsidies given its potential to ‘curb climate change’ (Hawkes and 
Henderson 2002). Given his prominent social position his argument is often credited with changing 
the mind of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair: 
‘Britain must build new nuclear power stations if it is to fight global climate change, the 
Government’s chief scientific advisor said today. David King argued that, at the very least, 
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decommissioning nuclear power plants would have to be replaced if Britain was to reduce 
its dependence on fossil-fuels and make progress in reducing carbon dioxide emissions’ 
(Vidal 2002) 
 ‘…it is believed chief Government scientist Sir David King has convinced Mr Blair that 
alternative power sources will not fill the gap created when viable reserves of traditional 
fuels like gas and coal run out’ (Blackman 2005 p.20) 
David King’s arguments reverberated throughout both press and Government discourse from 2002 
onwards. In addition to Thatcher’s rather simplistic ‘nuclear is green because of its low carbon’ 
suppositions, he further incorporated issues which resonated with the energy industry’s state-
resource values. For King, nuclear power was the only energy option reliable enough to meet 
carbon targets given the increasing energy demand of the nation. Additionally, he suggested that 
radioactive-waste was a small price to pay for long term climate stability which prompted a ‘lesser 
of two evils’ discourse which permeated much of the modern defence for nuclear power. In the 
following sections King’s pro-nuclear discourses and their evolved forms are split into three 
legitimating strategies which interlink and relate to the target-based environmental logic: Firstly, 
‘keeping it real’ highlighted the attainability of nuclear power when compared to underdeveloped 
renewables given the time frame issues inherent within climate change discourse. Second, the 
values of a state-resource logic were drawn on to legitimate nuclear power as an alternative secure 
energy supply. Thirdly, a ‘lesser of two evils’ discourse is explored which attempted to legitimate 
nuclear power with regards to both of the above. This last discourse attempted to overcome the 
traditional environmental problems of atomic power production by contending that failure to meet 
targets would result in a far more catastrophic environmental effect than that which would be 
produced by localised and controlled nuclear releases - and since renewables would not be able to 
meet targets, nuclear power remained the only truly ‘green’ option.   
 
Keeping it Real 
 
‘It’s not an environmental thing, even though nuclear power, with its total absence of 
carbon emissions, ticks all the right climate change boxes. It’s not even a security thing, 
though the location of so much oil and gas in countries run by former KGB men or holocaust 
deniers does give one pause for thought. It’s actually an authenticity thing. Nuclear power 
has been feted by a team of our nation’s leading intellectuals for displaying contemporary 
Britain’s most desired virtue – Keeping it real!’ (Gove 2008) 
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Articles in the press constructed an image of nuclear power as the only realistic option given carbon 
targets, impending nuclear and fossil-fuel plant closures and disappointing renewable performance 
at a commercial level. As the debate between nuclear and renewables intensified the nuclear 
antagonists were divided into two main groups; the environmental social movement organisations 
and the anti-nuclear generic group of ‘environmentalists’. All were framed as impractical and 
unrealistic in their justifications against nuclear power: 
‘Greenpeace argues that energy needs can be supplied by a vast expansion of renewable 
sources. This is unrealistic. Wind farms are producing the kind of furious opposition...The 
technology is still inefficient...Wave power is in its infancy. And the demand by 
environmentalists for 15,000 turbines to be built at sea – at the rate of three a day for the 
next 15 years – to meet carbon targets is utterly impractical’ (Gove 2006) 
 ‘…scientists may have tapped in to the weather to bring electricity to our homes but they 
fear nature will not be able to cope with the increasing demand for industrial power’ (Burke 
2008 p.8) 
 ‘Why reacting against reactors is irrational…anyone who thinks we can replace nuclear 
power stations with renewables is talking b*llocks’ (Mckie 2004) 
Invulnerable Nuclear 
 
Integral to the proposition that nuclear power was ‘keeping it real’ was the recognition that the 
UK’s low carbon option needed to meet the supply demand of the country to avoid the need for 
supplementation by ‘dirtier energy’ sources; implying that nuclear was somehow less dirty than 
fossil-fuels despite its environmental shortcomings. Additionally, energy supplies were ideally to 
come from a source which lessened international fuel dependencies and strengthened the energy 
sovereignty of the nation. With fossil-fuels unlikely to be commercially carbon neutral until CCS was 
perfected the only other source of low carbon energy which did not require electricity importation 
was nuclear power. In 2005 these needs appeared particularly salient as the UK crossed the 
threshold to become a net importer of energy (Department for Trade and Industry 2006). As such, 
a key component of the pro-nuclear argument was its evolving legitimacy in relation to increasingly 
relevant state resource values.  
 ‘Mr Blair told the Tory leader that Government energy policy was dictated not just by the 
need to tackle climate change but by reducing risks from future reliance on imported gas 
as North Sea oil runs out’ (Hurst 2006a) 
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 ‘For several years experts have been warning of a serious future shortfall in Britain’s energy 
supplies. They have pointed to the rapid depletion of Britain’s North Sea Gas reserves, the 
increasingly tough regulations on carbon emissions from Britain’s ageing coal-fired power 
plants and the planned decommissioning of 14 of 15 existing nuclear generating stations 
by 2025…On Tuesday night Mr Blair pre-empted his own review and provoked an uproar in 
the anti-nuclear lobby with a dramatic warning that nuclear stations were back on the 
agenda “with a vengeance”. He was absolutely right…over a ten-year “dash for gas” its [gas] 
use rose so rapidly that it now accounts for 40 per cent of electricity generation. But 
supplies are dwindling. The past winter there were real worries that shortages could lead 
to power cuts and rationing. As a result, the price has risen rapidly, provoking huge political 
and consumer unrest…the only viable alternative now is nuclear’ (Hurst 2006b) 
Furthermore articles following the 2006 announcement stressed that restricting the level of 
investment in nuclear power would lead to a dependence on fuel supplies concentrated in less 
stable regions of the world. Such a scenario would become detrimental if resource nationalism was 
to rise further and impose a greater degree of state intervention, restriction and discrimination. 
Thus, reliance on renewables and the back-up fossil-fuel plants it would necessitate caused 
apprehension.  Without a substantial new nuclear programme the Department for Trade and 
Industry (2007a) estimated that 80% of UK fuels were likely to come from overseas by 2020 and 
urged the public to consider a new generation of nuclear plants. Unlike past decades wherein the 
media appeared increasingly distanced and dislocated from the perspectives of the Government, it 
now appeared that the national papers were willing to accept the energy concerns of the pro-
nuclear lobby. For example, George Monbiot of The Guardian published an article in 2008 where 
he agreed that perhaps nuclear power was the necessary choice for a green energy agenda. He 
entered into a rather public battle in 2008 with Arthur Scargill who re-emerged as a key figure 
lobbying for more coal under the premise that nuclear was more expensive and more polluting. 
Scargill aired his thoughts in a Guardian piece in August 2008: 
‘Has George Monbiot sold out on his environmental credentials or is he suffering from 
amnesia? In his article on these pages last Tuesday he states that he has now reached the 
point where he no longer cares whether or not the answer to climate change is nuclear - 
let it happen, he says…. We need an end to all nuclear-powered electricity generation, the 
most dangerous and uneconomic method of producing electricity… Britain needs an 
integrated energy policy that will produce 250m tonnes of indigenous deep-mine clean coal 
per year ’ (Scargill 2008) 
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Monbiot retaliated by arguing that coal burning would create more radioactive discharges than 
nuclear and would be more expensive with carbon capture storage (CCS) than nuclear. In particular, 
coal and its relationship with nuclear had appeared in the Press during 2008 due to a shelved plan 
by E.ON to build a new coal station at Kingsnorth. The debacle over this particular coal station 
ignited discussions over the future of fossil-fuel stations in a low carbon economy: 
‘But the lobby groups [against Kingsnorth] quite rightly identified that when it comes 
to climate change, fossil-fuel power stations are a big part of the problem; the idea of 
building more seemed so crazy’ (Worthington 2009) 
This debate between the coal lobby and the nuclear lobby within a single newspaper highlights the 
array of complex positions taken on nuclear power. Both sides claimed that their recommendations 
for UK energy policy would lead to the cleanest form of energy generation. Unfortunately for 
Scargill, his ‘green’ coal plans relied heavily on the installation of CCS systems which were yet to be 
proven at any commercial scale. Additionally, the recession following the 2008 financial crash 
repelled the huge investment needed in CCS. This is not to say that fossil-fuel plants stopped being 
constructed altogether, but that their development was modest. Interestingly, although there was 
clearly a political debate between energy options, relatively little was said in the press regarding 
the operational activities of energy producers/suppliers or how the actions of private industry 
played into the debate. Instead the debate presented a ‘nuclear or nothing’ approach; either the 
country accepted nuclear power or the country would have to deal with renewables and the 
negative effects of higher importation rates and CC. Installing better gas storage facilities, for 
example, were absent from the discussion. Other issues were altogether silenced such as 
proliferation or cost ambiguities around decommissioning. All the points discussed above 
aggregated to form a pervasive ‘lesser of two evils’ discourse in support of nuclear power.  
The Lesser of Two Evils 
 
 ‘Environmentalists are used to fighting battles. But with environmentalism going 
mainstream…environmentalists increasingly find themselves skirmishing with one another 
as they see-saw between pragmatism and idealism’ (Lynas 2008) 
Since a radioactive-waste management programme was nowhere near completion, a discursive 
strategy emerged whereby those arguing that nuclear power offered ‘green’ energy began to set 
their brand of target-based environmentalism directly against that of the renewables supporters. 
Unable to claim that nuclear power was ‘green’ given the criteria of the environmental social 
movement, the pro-nuclear lobby instead argued that an anti-nuclear position founded on waste 
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issues ignored the ‘bigger picture’. They contended that a push for renewables in spite of nuclear’s 
waste problems would ultimately create more environmental damage than new nuclear stations 
given the threat of climate change. What emerged was the ‘lesser of two evils’ discourse which 
illuminated the tensions between the two environmental meaning systems, rationalities and the 
continuing ‘Green Paradox’. The pro-nuclear lobby reasoned that the pursuit of emissions targets 
would provide a more environmentally sound energy policy; one which could unquestionably justify 
the damage caused by radioactive-wastes given the unlikelihood of renewables meeting the 
demand needs of the nation. Perhaps the beginnings of this argument lay with Sir David King during 
his 2002 address to the press: 
 “…we have to balance the environmental questions around nuclear radioactive-waste with 
the questions around climate change. Mitigating climate change has to be the overriding 
priority’ (Radford 2002) 
The discourse became a key feature of the justifying rhetoric within official papers delineating the 
conditions of a new nuclear programme. A 2007 Department for Trade and Industry paper on the 
shape of the new nuclear programme was followed by a short public consultation on the nuclear 
matter, which was in turn followed in 2008 by a BERR White paper called ‘Meeting the Energy 
Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power’ which announced the final outline. Private industry 
was to be allowed to build and operate new nuclear power plants given the long term benefits of 
carbon neutral electricity, and the fairly minimal consequences of radioactive-waste in comparison: 
 ‘The Government believes that the intergenerational issue of radioactive-waste should not 
be considered in isolation, but alongside the long-term impact of climate change. If no new 
nuclear power stations are built there would be no additional radioactive-waste. However, 
there could be negative consequences for the environment’ (Department for Business and 
Regulatory Reform 2008 p.97) 
Part of the reasoning lay in the possibility of environmental recovery and technological solutions. 
Radioactive-waste was clearly an environmental problem, but one that could potentially be fixed 
through technological innovation over time. On the other hand, once in motion climate change was 
potentially irreversible: 
 ‘…our understanding of radioactive-waste and how to deal with it is arguably more 
advanced than our knowledge of the impact of man-made climate change and as yet we 
have no solution for mitigating the risks posed by increased Co2’ (Department for Business 
and Regulatory Reform 2008 p.98) 
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The data showed that the majority of the media texts expressed support of the Labour 
Government’s proposals and prioritisations. The ‘lesser of two evils’ discursive legitimation strategy 
was prevalent throughout media accounts of nuclear legitimacy: 
‘I do worry about nuclear waste. But I also care about climate change and energy security, 
which ministers say will worsen if we do not renew out nuclear capacity. If nuclear is part 
of the answer, I think we should get on with it’ (Cavendish 2008) 
 ‘…the daily discharges form a plant like Sellafield probably kill several dozen people a year. 
A meltdown could slaughter thousands, possible tens of thousands. Climate change has 
already killed hundreds of thousands, will kill millions, and, if we don’t do something pretty 
dramatic pretty soon, could kill billions’ (Monbiot 2004) 
The above has illustrated the ways in which the target-based environmental logic continued to 
justify a prioritisation which put nuclear power and its relationship with carbon emissions above 
the priorities of local level environmental consequences of atomic stations. State-resource values 
further reinforced a newly found legitimacy for nuclear power (to the public and the Government) 
because it offered a secure and less vulnerable solution to energy supply necessities given the 
constraining and binding carbon deadlines of the nation. The environmental legitimacy of nuclear 
power should also be understood in relation to carbon target time limits and state-resource values. 
To meet 2020 and 2050 carbon goals the UK required an immediate reduction in carbon – an 
obligation which neither renewables nor carbon storage for fossil-fuels could achieve. In sum, 
renewables had shown disappointing advancement and growth, and thus struggled to remain 
legitimate as the single ‘green’ energy option.   
Three key conclusions can be drawn from the above: Firstly the target-based environmental logic 
reflected an instrumentally rational approach to environmentalism which informed pro-nuclear 
arguments based on the comparative abilities of energy options to meet specific emissions targets. 
Secondly, this logic became central to decision making in the energy industry due to tight 
internationally ratified emissions targets and the public anxieties regarding CC. Thirdly, both the 
Labour Government and the media compared energy options against economic and resource 
criteria with a continual recognition of carbon targets which led to prevalent discourses backing 
nuclear power over other options, which in turn characterised the nuclear versus renewables 
debate. Nevertheless, although the cost of nuclear power had become marginalised in the public 
debates, if nuclear power was to undergo a ‘renaissance’ it needed to attract private investment. 
The following section will examine how the Labour Government and a Conservative-Liberal 
Coalition Government (2010) incentivised nuclear power given the debates outlined above, and 
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how as a consequence the original environmental arguments against nuclear reduced in intensity 
and influence.  
Profitable Power: Carbon Capitalism Saves Nuclear 
  
‘His [Blair] new urgency has been prompted by several factors. Global climate change has 
become an increasingly urgent political issue, but Britain is still falling well short of its 
promised cut in carbon emissions’ (Hurst 2006b) 
With the Government now pledging to renew the nuclear industry a mechanism was needed by 
which to incentivise the private sector to construct new stations. The challenge for the Government 
was to manipulate the economic feasibility of nuclear power to allow for the satiation of State social 
goals as defined by the state-resource and target-based environmental logics. An institutionalised 
division between the interests of the public and private sectors within energy sector meant that 
carbon reduction also had to be marketable. This is not to say that the Government was indifferent 
to cost. The Stern Review (2006) was initiated to assess the economic impacts of climate change, 
and had concluded that the economic effects of global warming would far outweigh the immediate 
costs of dealing with the carbon problem – the ‘lesser of two evils’ discursive strategy had gained 
an economic element.  
This provided the Government with a means to argue an economic imperative to a new nuclear 
fleet; that instead of installing nuclear despite costs it could actually be financially feasible in the 
long run. The Stern Review was thus key in the legitimation of nuclear power from a liberal-market 
and economic perspective with its inference that a carbon price would allow nuclear electricity to 
be competitive. With the growth of nuclear power looming and newly backed by economic 
arguments, the environmental lobby and renewables industry began to fight their battle on 
economic and monetary grounds, illustrating a movement in the nuclear debate towards 
economics. The eventual solution was to ‘monetise’ environmentalism through carbon pricing. 
Carbon emissions were to cost those plants that produced them fees that would be reinvested into 
low carbon technologies, subsequently making nuclear power relatively cheap for those operating 
its plants.   
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Green Money 
 
‘The Stern Review concluded that the benefits of strong, early co-ordinated action against 
climate change far outweigh the economic costs of doing nothing. It estimated that the cost 
of not taking action could be equivalent to losing between 5 and 20% of annual global GDP 
whereas the cost of taking action can be limited to around 1%’ (Department for Trade and 
Industry 2007a p.25) 
By the late ‘00s no national or international scientific body had maintained a dissenting position 
regarding the existence of some degree of climate change as delineated by the IPCC, illustrating a 
general global consensus around climate change at this time (Department for Trade and Industry 
2007a). Within this context the Stern Review (Stern 2006) was highly influential in strengthening 
the Government’s case for new nuclear. With the primary stimulus for nuclear power seemingly 
based on climate change concerns, the economic report reinforced that not only was climate 
change an environmental issue, but also an economic one. The conclusions of the review proposed 
that any state spending on nuclear power in the present would drastically reduce the costs of 
climate change in the future, which in turn permitted the goals of target-based environmentalists 
to align with the values of an economic and liberal-market logic; carbon minimising would become 
economic. To ensure that investment would follow the State’s recommended trajectory, the review 
pointed to the need for a carbon price signal across countries and sectors to push private interest 
away from fossil-fuels and towards nuclear power and renewables. The carbon price signal would 
ensure that emission reductions could be delivered in the most cost effective way by obliging those 
producing carbon to pay into a fund that would support expensive carbon free technologies. 
Ultimately, the price signal would manipulate the profitable characteristics of energy options so 
that the large liability and construction costs of nuclear power would become more feasible in 
comparison to the cheap to construct but carbon intensive fossil-fuel plants. UK priorities for carbon 
price signalling were tentatively set out in the EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) 
vision statement in late 2006. The following year the European Council agreed to a common 
European strategy for energy security and tackling climate change. The agreement committed the 
EU to a binding target of reducing GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. It was 
expected that the European carbon trading scheme would incentivise the market to deliver the 
Governments wider social and environmental goals:  
‘However, energy markets on their own will not deliver the our wider social and 
environmental objectives…The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme sets caps on emissions and 
puts a price on carbon emissions for the first time. This gives firms the added incentive to 
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make investments consistent with our carbon goals’ (Department for Trade and Industry 
2007b p.5) 
The Department of Trade and Industry’s ‘Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear 
Power’ (2007a) developed the UK’s expectations of the EU ETS, and responded to criticisms that 
the Government had been too ‘nuclear-centric’ by increasing investment in renewables through 
strengthening the RO, developing greener oil and gas via carbon capture and storage investment 
(CCS), researching and developing technologies such as biomass, incentivising micro generation and 
implementing combined heat and power. These technologies were to supplement the large nuclear 
developments planned in the coming decades given that these other technologies would be far 
more expensive than the new nuclear fleet if they were developed under pressure in a scenario of 
no nuclear. The paper also outlined the intentions of the Climate Change Act (2008) which makes 
it the duty of the Secretary of State for the DECC to ensure that the UK meets all Kyoto agreements 
by 2050 (80% less emissions than 1990). The Act also created the Committee on Climate Change to 
advise ministers on how to meet the targets. Indeed, by 2008 meeting the targets within the Kyoto 
time frame had become a primary focus of the Labour Government, and was to be met by an energy 
mix which included a new and economical nuclear programme.  
To statistically ‘prove’ their economic suppositions, the Government drew on the Markal-Macro 
model (MMM) (a simulation programme) which assessed the options in context of the carbon 
reduction and price signalling commitments. The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) underwent a 
study for DTI and DEFRA using the energy systems model to report on the range of UK 60 per cent 
Co2 abatement scenarios (UKERC 2007). The UKERC produced their report (2007) as a companion 
publication to the DTI 2007 white paper. The UKERC, using MMM, found that the costs of rejecting 
nuclear energy were high and that it would be unlikely that the Government would reach its carbon 
goals in time. When nuclear was omitted from the MMM scenarios a more substantial re-
configuration of the energy strategy would be needed and would likely cost the UK £1bn by 2050, 
and six times that much if CCS failed to develop. Nuclear was framed economically in relation to the 
other options available to the Government at the time, of which few could claim carbon neutrality, 
baseload generation and a relatively invulnerable fuel sourcing; all characteristics which when 
valued financially would benefit the nuclear industry’s economic standing once the EU ETS was in 
place: 
 ‘Given the carbon price assumptions in the modelling, nuclear power becomes the 
cheapest generation technology by around 2023…the modelling suggests that wholesale 
prices would be around 4% higher, on average, than if nuclear was included as an 
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option…our modelling indicates that excluding nuclear is a more expensive route to 
achieving our carbon goal’ (Department for Trade and Industry 2007a p.193) 
‘…renewed [private sector] interest reflects assessments that with carbon being priced to 
reflect its impacts and gas prices likely to be higher than previously expected, the 
economics of new nuclear power stations are becoming more favourable’ (Department for 
Trade and Industry 2007a p.176) 
Attracting the Private Sector 
 
By November 2007 the Prime Minister Gordon Brown publicly announced his intention for an 
immediate public consultation and hinted at possible manipulation of planning protocols to quicken 
the pace of new nuclear build preparation. However, the allure and eventual competitiveness of 
nuclear power depended primarily on the cost of carbon being substantially above zero. Thus the 
carbon price needed to instil confidence that it would remain as a long term and international 
mechanism. Businesses interested in nuclear propositions were reported in the papers as nervous 
of the promised carbon pricing, highlighting the anxiety around nuclear costs and the financial 
impact upon firms if the EU ETS failed to offer long-term measures to make nuclear relatively 
competitive.  Additionally, there was concern that the carbon price would not be enough 
considering the liabilities associated with decommissioning given that the current decommissioning 
of retired MAGNOX plants was presenting ever escalating costs: 
‘EDF energy, which wants to build four reactors in Britain at a cost of about £20 billion, was 
accused of holding the Government ransom last night, after an executive told The Times 
that none would be built unless the Government agreed to underwrite part of the cost…the 
nuclear programme would proceed only if the Government ensured consumers paid more 
for electricity from fossil-fuels’ (Pagnamenta 2009b) 
To calm the anxieties of the private sector the Government published its ‘UK Low Carbon Transition 
Plan’ in 2009 which laid out strategies to deliver emissions cuts of 18% of 2008 levels by 2020. The 
‘plan’ involved giving each main UK Government department 5 year carbon budgets which placed 
binding limits on aggregate carbon dioxide emissions. It assured that the early stages of the carbon 
pricing system was looking promising and was expected to continue into the foreseeable future as 
the central part of Britain’s long term decarbonisation plan.  
The economic legitimacy of nuclear power was based on relative costs to low carbon and high 
investment innovations including renewables, and to fossil-fuel plants given escalating carbon fees. 
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Nevertheless, nuclear power’s financial aptitude should be noted in light of the speed at which the 
carbon targets needed to be met. Nuclear power was cost effective as an immediate response to 
looming 2020 carbon targets and as such its marketability was intrinsically linked to the temporal 
values of a target-based environmental logic – If the carbon targets did not require prompt 
fulfilment to ‘avoid’ climate change, alternatives may have become the cheaper option. Thus 
economical appeal and environmental targets were key for nuclear legitimacy. Without the targets 
nuclear power may not have been considered ‘green’ given that renewables and alternative 
technologies such as CCS and biomass could have been feasible with the aid of the RO and carbon 
trading schemes over time. Indeed, the MMM and similar economic evaluations which illustrated 
that without nuclear energy the UK would need to introduce a substantially more expensive plan 
were based on the need to meet 2020 limits. In sum, the constellation of situated logics within the 
energy industry began to centre around the instrumental priorities of a target-based logic, yet, in 
its legitimating of solutions such as nuclear it rallied actions which hoped to align it with the values 
and conventions of coexisting industry level logics such as the market. This reinforced the 
dominance of an economic logic and the importance of nuclear marketability: 
‘So why nuclear? It’s probably the cheapest option…If it isn’t, then nothing the Government 
said yesterday will force anyone to build new stations’ (Roper 2008 p.8) 
‘A Brave Nuke World’ (Blackman 2006 p.12) 
 
‘…the Government is committed to enabling nuclear new build as soon as possible and 
envisages the first new nuclear power stations operating from around 2018, but will look 
to accelerate timescales where possible’ (HM Government 2009) 
In July 2008 Gordon Brown reinforced the nuclear agenda by announcing that the Government 
would be looking for energy firms to construct nuclear plants at eight designated sites as part of 
the ‘nuclear renaissance’. Twelve Giga-watts of nuclear power was hoped to begin construction by 
2010 and to be connected to the grid by 2018 to meet 2020 carbon targets. The 2008 white paper 
‘The Road to 2010: Addressing the Nuclear Question in the 21st Century’ reinforced the now decisive 
decision to include nuclear power in the coming energy mix, and set out the guidelines for site 
assessments and necessary administrative tasks required by companies proposing nuclear plans. 
For both media and Government, the potential of nuclear power now appeared a necessity: 
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‘Now nuclear is essential. All the time this prevarication has been going on, power stations 
have been getting older, North Sea gas has been running out, and climate change 
imperatives have become more pressing’ (Beattie 2009a p.25) 
Deadlines on carbon objectives motivated planning alterations to allow energy firms quicker 
planning protocols and access to nuclear sites. New and more stringent rules around nuclear 
application processes had been instigated when the nuclear industry was privatised in a bid to stem 
anxieties over the profit incentive jeopardising safety standards. It was now mandatory for new 
nuclear projects to undertake a formal Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) as part of the 
Strategic Siting Assessments (SSA) (Department for Business and Regulatory Reform 2008). 
Applicants would need to carry out full environmental impact assessments of their installation and 
its impression on the local context as part of these comprehensive assessments. Decommissioning 
plans would also need to be submitted to BERR, and a new board called the ‘Nuclear Liabilities 
Assurance Board (NLAB) was set up to advise on the suitability of decommissioning programmes. 
The radioactive-waste to be created would join the legacy waste in interim storage until being 
disposed of underground somewhere in the UK yet to be specified, in accordance with 
recommendations from CoRWM (Committee on Radioactive-waste Management). Communities to 
host the disposal site were to do so by volunteering themselves. However, plants would have to be 
constructed before a geological disposal could be built due to the lead times on nuclear plants, 
going against the Government’s previous promise not to build until the waste problem was sorted. 
Communities would be consulted if they were under consideration as a site for any new builds, but 
most would be at existing sites to avoid local protest.  
To overcome the deterring nature of the numerous assessments necessary to build a nuclear power 
station, the Government instigated measures to speed up the process; for example, changes in the 
Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) meant that local consultations would not be eligible to 
discuss the overall rationality of nuclear power procedures. Community discussions at plant sites 
were only to debate the local and directly implicated aspects of the build, rather than nuclear power 
as a practice, thus speeding up consultancy times. By 2009 application processes for sites had been 
streamlined and a pre-approved list of possible sites was presented which had already been 
subjected to an Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) as part of the SSA. A 2009 National Policy 
Statement by DECC meant that private investors would not have to identify their own suitable sites, 
but would instead buy or lease the sites already approved for the nuclear purpose. Many of these 
sites housed retired MAGNOX reactors which were owned by the Government, and as such it was 
assumed than the communities at each site would be amenable to nuclear power construction. The 
site announcement was a profound step towards the ‘nuclear renaissance’: 
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 ‘Ed Miliband, the Energy and Climate Change secretary, welcomed the announcement of 
the 11 sites…as another important step towards a new generation of nuclear power 
stations. “nuclear is part of the low carbon future” he said’ (Pagnamenta 2009c) 
Greens versus Angry Greens 
 
The fast-tracking of nuclear power lead to environmental backlashes at both the policy and 
community level. Greenpeace and FOE had been lobbying against the Government on both 
economic and waste grounds. Conversely, local disputes by planning authorities and residents were 
idiosyncratic between sites and focused on ecology and habitats at risk. Both viewed the new 
planning laws as a short-cut which would jeopardize the safety of new builds, as well as 
marginalising the democratic right of communities to challenge the builds. Within the media data 
there were a number of articles which reflected public anxiety over the speed by which nuclear 
developments were taking place, and the environmental impacts of this accelerated pace: 
‘Environmental groups reacted with fury yesterday after Ed Miliband tore up the planning 
rulebook to push through 10 new nuclear power stations…campaigners accused him of 
ignoring issues such as reactor design safety and toxic waste disposal’ (Beattie 2009b p.19)  
‘Environmental groups said the Government was railroading through plans despite the 
dangers’ (Beattie 2009b p.19) 
For those newspaper articles covering the environmental debate, concern was centred on the local 
environmental consequences of nuclear power stations, especially given the limited scope for 
community consultation. Interestingly, renewables were meeting similar resistance at the 
community level for very similar reasons suggesting that at some level these communities were 
more concerned with the general and amenity based problems of industrial development in rural 
areas; a concern which echoes to that of the 1950s. Nevertheless, nuclear power’s environmental 
credentials lay in its long term, intangible and macro level ‘environmentalism’ in the context of 
binding environmental emissions deadlines. It became increasingly apparent that nuclear power’s 
local level and tangible impacts were a low priority to the Government who saw them as a necessary 
price to pay for long term environmental welfare. Local opposition to energy projects illustrated 
that all energy choices had local impacts on the environment, and that nuclear was just as 
acceptable as any other low carbon technology: 
‘…what is clear is that all energy-generation technologies have an impact on the 
environment – and environmentalists are going to have to think more deeply about that 
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their hierarchy of priorities it. For example, nuclear and hydro power were both anathema 
to environmentalists for decades but are slowly and reluctantly being accepted back into 
the fold due to their perceived potential for producing low-carbon energy’ (Lynas 2008) 
The most explicit example of this approach to nuclear power can be found through the use of 
‘Imperative Reasons of Overriding Public Interest‘ (IROPI) in the justification of nuclear power at 
local site levels. IROPI was set out in the EU’s Habitats Directive (1992) to aid decisions on whether 
to allow potentially disruptive projects on sites that may have conservation value. The directive 
requires that Habitat Regulations Assessments (HRAs) are applied to these sites. The HRA obliges 
that there be ‘no alternative solution’ and IROPI to allow projects to be accepted. If IROPI is claimed, 
compensatory measures must be secured and the Secretary of State is required to agree with the 
claims. However, IROPI is subject to interpretation and can be based on social, health and economic 
arguments: ‘…the Habitats Directive does not specify what is meant by this term, but it implies that 
health and safety, environmental benefits, and large-scale and long-term social and economic 
benefits can be IROPI’ (Marine Management Organisation 2007 p.7). During ‘Assessments of 
Sustainability’ in the prepared list of sites in the NPS, official ‘justifications’ (their terminology) 
recognised that a number of sites would be subject to environmentally adverse effects as identified 
during the HRA. Most of these adverse effects were related to biodiversity and geological issues; 
the kind of issues prevalent in local disputes over nuclear stations. Nevertheless, all ten sites (out 
of a possible 12) recommended by the NPS had local environmental issues, yet each site was 
permissible on the grounds of IROPI: 
 ‘...the Government has concluded that there is an Imperative Reason of Overriding Public 
Interest that favours the inclusion of this site in the Nuclear NPS despite the inability to rule 
out adverse effects on European sites at this stage. This takes into account the need for 
sites to be available for potential deployment by the end of 2025, the lack of alternatives, 
and the consideration given to compensatory measures. This site therefore passes this 
criterion‘ (Department for Energy and Climate Change 2009 p.112) 
‘In demonstrating IROPI the Government acknowledges that the plan has the potential to 
have an adverse effect on the integrity of Natura 2000 sites, including possible impacts on 
priority habitats (coastal dune, heathland, dune grassland and lagoons). However, the 
grounds for IROPI in this case relate to the protection of human health and public safety, 
and to beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment. In accordance 
with Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive the Government is therefore not seeking an 
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opinion from the Commission, despite the presence of priority habitat types within sites 
which may be affected.‘ (Department for Energy and Climate Change 2009 p.77) 
As seen above, the use of IORPI in these circumstances tended to be rather vague. Nevertheless, 
IROPI illustrated the avoidance of local level issues and their marginalisation. Communities were 
not allowed to challenge the policy instigating nuclear power, but were only able to debate the local 
environmental issues specific to each site so that they could be considered during construction. 
Target based environmentalism essentially became the Imperative Reason of Overriding Public 
Interest, with nuclear power in tow.  
The Continuation of a Private Nuclear Industry 
 
Once privatisation had been successfully implemented in 1996, nuclear power was set on a course 
for slow decline. The Labour Government’s social and environmental objectives could be met, 
assumedly, by a growing and lucrative green technology industry. Market mechanisms were in 
place to ensure that nuclear power was bought purely in order to maintain the industry. 
Additionally, funds from the fossil-fuel levy were diverted into renewables investment to entice 
private industry to invest in wind and solar power in particular. The private sector did not appear 
interested in the construction of new power stations, and by 2003 the Government announced 
their intentions to rule out nuclear power on the grounds that it offered an uneconomical option 
given the possibility of renewables. However, by 2006 it became increasingly evident that 
renewables were unable to offer the security of supply necessary at a low carbon rate, and would 
thus require fossil-fuel supplementation to meet carbon deadlines. 
Nuclear power’s legitimacy now rested on the inability of an energy mix reliant on renewables to 
meet carbon goals. By the late 00s nuclear power appeared to have garnered legitimacy from its 
environmental credentials in light of its ability to help the UK meet such goals. The Government 
announced its intentions to introduce a new programme of nuclear power in 2006 with 
considerable media backing which reflected the increasing public anxiety over climate change. 
Discursive defence of nuclear power during this time highlighted its alignment with the target-
based environmental values of both the state and the public. Nevertheless, the Government still 
had to ensure that nuclear power was economical and thus alluring to the private sector. A carbon 
price system was eventually confirmed which would align the Governments social and 
environmental values with the liberal-market values of industry. By 2010 the local environmental 
issues of nuclear power were understood as minimal in comparison to the environmental benefits 
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in mitigating climate change by the Government. In essence, the focus on carbon targets within the 
energy industry had allowed nuclear to bask in its narrow breed of environmentalism; one that 
broke away from, and was often in tension with, the substantive ethical and moral concerns of the 
original environmental movement. In doing so it faced criticism from environmental organisations 
and local pressure groups, whilst appealing to those who viewed nuclear power as the lesser of two 
evils, environmentally speaking. Indeed, the ‘green paradox’ of nuclear power continued.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to contribute to neo-institutional theory by introducing the 
concept of a societal environmental institutional logic and demonstrating its utility. As stated in 
Chapter 3, organisational studies as an academic subject has a poor track record in its integration 
of environmental issues, and there are few examples of institutional theory breaking from this trend 
(exceptions include Sine and Lee 2009, Holm 1995). This thesis proposes that the development and 
recognition of an environmental institutional logic provides institutionalism with the tools 
necessary to engage more deeply with environmental issues. An environmental logic informs how 
actors ascribe meaning to the natural environment by providing a set of assumptions and values 
which shape how they understand and conduct their relationship with nature. The ‘green paradox’ 
of nuclear power in the UK media presented an empirical opportunity to apply an environmental 
logic and test its efficacy as an institutional analytical tool. In 2009 when this research was being 
planned there was an escalating debate in the media which questioned the green credentials of 
nuclear power; nuclear power appeared both as the only green option to meet carbon targets and 
as the antithesis to environmentalism given its radioactive processes and the waste produced. To 
explore and explicate this paradox a case study built from 60 years of historical data relating to the 
green nuclear debate was constructed from media and Government documents. The case study 
focused on how various acting Governments legitimated their positions on nuclear power, and how 
the attitudes and values of actors engaged within environmental debates pertaining to nuclear 
power were represented within the media.  An historical and longitudinal research design was 
necessary to fully comprehend the nature of the environmental debate and to ‘track’ the 
emergence (and shifting nature) of environmental understandings.  
The findings show that the ‘green nuclear’ debate consisted of opposing environmental 
perspectives on nuclear power which were underpinned by contradictory institutionalised 
understandings of what constituted environmentally friendly behaviour. The nature of the debate 
resonates with the trend in neo-institutionalism to examine contestation over the meaning and 
legitimacy of actions and practices by researching the conflict between multiple institutional logics 
(Reay and Hinings 2005, 2009, Zilber 2006, Tracey et al 2010). Yet it also provides a rare example of 
how contradictory arguments pertaining to the legitimacy of a single practice may be informed by 
a common societal logic. In other words, negotiation of a practice or action’s legitimacy is not 
necessarily always between two (or more) factions drawing from fundamentally different societal 
logics. Instead a societal logic can emerge in multiple situated forms (which reflect the contextual 
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historicities and competing rationalities of the actor groups who enact, interpret and discursively 
reconstruct them) which may provide contradictory understandings of legitimacy. Understanding 
how these situated logics emerge and why they may contradict each other is the focus of this 
discussion and provides insights into how inconsistencies within institutional logics manifest around 
significant policy debates.  
The means by which a societal logic becomes ‘situated’ also contributes to current institutional 
theorising by clarifying the interconnections between levels of analysis and processes of 
institutional work. By asking the question ‘how do societal logics become manifest at lower levels 
of analysis’, this thesis embellishes the concept of institutional work by identifying intentional 
processes which connect societal changes with the institutional context of the industry and the 
political power and motivation of actors. It also builds on literature which has shown that 
intentional institutional work which is focused on achieving certain political and material goals can 
trigger and sustain long-lasting institutional change (Tracey et al 2010), such as the emergence of a 
situated logic within an industry. Both the intentional and unintended consequences of institutional 
work are therefore significant in modelling the way in which nuclear power came to be understood 
as a green energy option in the UK.  
It should be reiterated here that the Critical Realist perspective of Leca and Naccache (2006) frames 
this research discussion. Societal institutional logics are recognised as ‘real’ social structures which 
possess causal powers. Actors such as journalists, Governmental Departments and Ministers exist 
at the empirical level of CR’s stratified ontology and provide insights, via their own perspectives, 
into ‘actual’ events and the nature of the generative mechanisms which may have activated (in a 
specific space and time) to cause them. From this ontological stance, the ‘green paradox of nuclear 
power’ represents a particular conjunction of generative mechanisms pertaining to certain 
institutional logics which can be explored through perceptions, understandings and justifications 
identified in Government documents and the Press. From these sources the nature of the green 
paradox is retroduced and the best explanation, with the conceptual and material resources 
available, is provided. Important to this discussion is the additional understanding that actors have 
causal powers themselves (Bhaskar 1998) and thus their institutional work has a significant part to 
play in the triggering of generative mechanisms. The interaction between the causal powers of 
actors, influenced at all time by context, and those of the institutional logics may not be intentional 
or conscious, but has been teased out as means to understand how an environmental logic has 
come to be embedded within the practices and legitimations of an industry which previously 
rejected it.   
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This thesis formulated the following three research questions which aim to address the research 
gaps presented in Chapters 2 and 3. These research questions were developed from a Critical Realist 
(Houston 2010) ontological position and therefore act as transcendental research questions with a 
focus on the relationship between theoretical constructs. These research questions also reflect the 
hypotheses made in the methods chapter and are restated below: 
Research Question 1 
 What is the relationship between institutional levels of analysis?  
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ provide insights into the interactions 
between agents, fields and societal logics? 
o How does the concept of ‘situated logics’ help explain the green paradox of nuclear 
power? 
 
Research Question 2 
 What role do actors play in the development of ‘situated logics’? 
o How can an institutional work approach be utilised to fully understand the role of 
agency in the construction and/or reinforcement of situated logics? 
o To what extent can processes of institutional entrepreneurship help elucidate the 
manifestation, elaboration and institutionalisation of situated logics? 
o How do the actions of actors contribute to the creation of a green paradox? 
 
Research Question 3 
 How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic provide utility within an 
institutional research agenda?  
o How does the concept of an environmental institutional logic help explain the 
green paradox of nuclear power? 
Summary of Key Findings 
 
The case study of the UK nuclear energy industry and its environmental credentials over the period 
1950-2010 illustrated that a number of situated environmental logics informed the nuclear power 
debate. Over the 60 years of the civil nuclear industry the State, energy industries, political parties, 
trade unions, the media, social movement organisations and community groups fought over and 
negotiated the legitimacy of the UK’s nuclear power programme. The lack of agreement pertaining 
to nuclear power’s ‘green’ legitimacy illustrated four environmental situated logics which informed 
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the arguments of four distinct groups of actors. These actor groups were analytically differentiable 
by their predominant rationality types and the form of social relations they engaged in (Biggart and 
Delbridge 2004). More specifically groups of actors involved in the green nuclear debate employed 
arguments which largely resonated with either substantive or instrumental rationality (Kalberg 
1980) and were engaged in either universalistic or particularistic social relations. The four 
corresponding situated logics have been termed the amenity-environmental logic, the community-
environmental logic, the social-movement environmental logic and the target-based environmental 
logic. Each represented a manifestation of the societal environmental logic within the idiosyncratic 
actor groups. The prevalence of arguments informed by each of these situated environmental logics 
oscillated over time as actors’ understandings of the relationship between society and nature 
shifted.  
The emergence of the situated target-based environmental logic is of particular interest in this 
discussion because it relates to a conception of environmentalism which developed after, and in 
contradiction to, an already institutionalised social-movement environmental logic. From the late 
1960s up until the late 1980s the energy industry had rejected EMO’s requests that the 
environment should be considered in energy decisions and as such this latter situated logic had 
remained external to the industry. From the late 1980s a target-based conception of what it meant 
to be ‘green’ developed within the energy industry and challenged the EMO’s approach to 
environmental protection by redefining nature; instead of a qualitative, complex and morally 
essential environment, it was reconstituted as a quantifiable, measurable and scientific system. By 
adhering to the latter construction the consideration of the environment could be considered 
within the decision making machinery of the energy department – units of the environment such 
as carbon could be identified and energy options could be compared so that the option with the 
least quantitative effect could be chosen and claimed ‘green’. Regardless, to the environmental 
social movement nuclear power could never be justified on environmental grounds. Not only do 
these competing situated environmental logics explain the green paradox of nuclear power as 
presented in the media, but an understanding of how situated logics form can provide additional 
insights into how the analytical levels of institutionalism are interconnected. That is, how societal 
logics come to be manifest within industries through contextualised institutional work. In its 
discussion of the above this thesis provides a multi-level narrative which builds on previous 
literature regarding institutional work (Tracey et al 2010, Lawrence et al 2011) and borrows from 
current theorising around elites (Reed 2012) to explain the manifestation of an environmental 
societal logic within the energy industry. 
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In its explanation of how the target-based environmental logic emerged the first section of the 
discussion focuses on the period 1980 – 2010. At the end of the 1980s an authoritative ‘energy 
elite’ (Reed 2012) within national Government, supported by a global scientific discourse of CC, 
sought to legitimate nuclear power for political and economic reasons. In their bid to further the 
prospects of nuclear power and popularise the technology to an increasingly sceptical public they 
engaged in processes of institutional work which associated nuclear power with the green agenda 
of CC. Via processes of theorisation and discursive legitimation Thatcher’s Government pushed for 
a reconsideration of nuclear power as a ‘green’ technology. The intended consequence of these 
processes was an energy policy which had nuclear power at its heart. However, when the nuclear 
industry failed financially in 1989 the intentions to build more nuclear reactors were abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the institutional work undertaken by the energy elite resulted in a more fundamental 
institutional change within the energy industry. By claiming that the energy sector should take on 
certain responsibilities for mitigating CC, key decisions over energy policy were, for the first time, 
including environmental assessments. Importantly, what constituted ‘environmental’ was 
determined by quantifying the environmental implications of options and comparing them with 
national and international targets. Over time the necessity of binding carbon treaties, intensifying 
CC concerns and political promises became further institutionalised. When nuclear power was back 
on the agenda in 2006 a process of valorisation was employed because, as had been shown after 
its financial crisis, nuclear power also needed to be financially viable. This further reflected the 
measurable element of nature given that ‘units of nature’ such as carbon were becoming financially 
valued.  
Importantly processes of theorisation and legitimation should always be understood as products of 
context as well as of actor’s causal powers. That is, actors (elites or otherwise) with the knowledge 
and reflexivity to recognise opportunities for change created theorisations within an industry which 
had its own institutionalised history, conventions, norms and prevailing rationality. A situated logic 
may begin to emerge as actors pursue intentional change and reinforce their favoured meaning 
systems as delineated by their initial theorisations. The nature of the situated logic is therefore not 
an ‘engineered’ product, but rather an outcome of institutionally embedded and intentional 
discursive work which may, over time, contribute to more significant (albeit unplanned) 
institutional change. Moreover, as a new meaning system gathers momentum through discursive 
reinforcement and regulatory support it can become disassociated from the objective or practice 
of which it was originally in support and may eventually come to inform alternatives and taken-for-
granted decisions within an industry. A conception such as this moves institutional logic analysis 
away from problematic scientific diffusion metaphors and structural determinism (Zilber 2002) and 
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towards an understanding of embedded agency in the construction of new situated institutional 
logics. It also elaborates on Tracey et al’s (2010) finding that new institutional forms such as logics 
may continue to be believed and enacted despite the failure of the initial material change/action 
to which it owed its existence.  
The contributions of this research are threefold: Firstly the recognition of inconsistency within a 
single societal logic, such as that characterised by contradictory situated logics, is a new 
development which contributes to the ways in which institutionalists might consider the 
relationship between societal logics and lower level logics. In relation to Critical Realism this 
contribution speaks to how real social structures such as societal logics (Leca and Naccache 2006) 
come to emerge (Elder-Vass 2008), as a result of agency, in the form of situated logics which inform 
the legitimacy and efficacy of events and institutions within the realm of the actual. Secondly an 
understanding of embedded institutional work extends previous multi-level literature on 
institutional work (Tracey et al 2010) by considering in more detail how the process of theorisation, 
legitimation and, in this case, valorisation are mechanisms through which the institutional structure 
and conventions of an industry (in which these processes are enacted) come to be reflected in an 
emergent logic. Thirdly the development and application of an environmental logic provides future 
researchers with a conceptual tool to understand how actors work within and engage with 
institutionally defined notions of ‘environmentalism’ and ‘nature’. It is hoped that future research 
within the domains of environmental responsibility, technology and conservation, for example, 
might apply an environmental institutional logic in order to more deeply engage with the natural 
environment rather than treat it as an objectified resource with a fixed and static meaning.  
There are two primary areas of discussion within this final chapter. The first delineates what is 
meant by a situated logic before focusing on the emergence of the target-based environmental 
logic. Ultimately this first half of the discussion provides a multi-level narrative which explains how 
the societal environmental logic became situated over time. In so doing it argues that the symbolic 
and discursive processes of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, Tracey et al 2010, 
Lawrence et al 2011) interconnect levels of analysis in ways that can help explain how higher order 
logics come to be embedded in previously unrelated industries. The ability of actors to act and 
engage in these processes is supported by a conception of power and agency which is elaborated 
within literature on elites (Zald and Lounsbury 2010, Reed 2012). The aim of the section is to 
embellish the idea of ‘situated logic emergence’ by exploring the societal context which provided 
possibility and opportunity for institutional work. The power to act and the interests (both personal 
and political) of the actors engaging with such opportunities is considered an integral part of such 
context and helps explain the ways in which actors’ actions both intentionally and unintentionally 
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defined new understandings of the natural environment. As a consequence of this embedded 
action the ways in which the industry compared energy options was fundamentally altered. 
Thus the emergent nature of the target-based environmental situated logic is seen as symptomatic 
of the continual dynamic between agency and wider social movements and discourses with which 
actors re-enact reinforce and embellish certain values or norms given the opportunity, power and 
political will. The processes actors use to do so are recognised in this case to fall under the 
categories of theorisation, discursive legitimation and valorisation. These processes act across 
levels of analysis because they involve actors drawing from societal logics and their constitutive 
discourses in order to legitimate institutional work. For example, as actors theorised new causal 
relationships between nuclear and nature in order to legitimate a more favourable nuclear energy 
policy, they drew from the legitimacy of global political CC discourse and applied it in a way 
(unintentionally or otherwise) that suited their interests and aligned with the dominant values, 
conventions and rationality of the industry itself. Thus the processes of institutional work identified 
in the case study occurred within the particular institutional context of the energy industry which 
provides an insight into why the new situated logic was so easily integrated into the industry’s 
decision making mechanisms.  
The second area of discussion focuses on the ‘green paradox’ of nuclear power and explains the 
variation in environmental situated logics via the application of literature pertaining to rationality 
types (Kalberg 1980) and systems of exchange theories (Biggart and Delbridge 2004). This part of 
the discussion explores the ways in which the societal environmental logic appeared manifest in 
multiple forms within various groups of actors; such as geographically local communities, social 
movement organisations and the energy industry. A taxonomy is provided (Table 12) which maps 
out the different environmental situated logics apparent throughout the green nuclear debate. It 
illustrates how the societal environmental logic was understood, interpreted and discursively 
reconstructed by actors who displayed contrasting rationalities and enacted their debates through 
either particularistic or universalistic social relations. Actors informed by dissimilar situated 
environmental logics often disagreed over the environmental credentials of a practice or action 
because they held opposing understandings of the society and nature relationship. In other words, 
by understanding the society and nature relationship differently, opposing actor groups not only 
valued different means towards environmental protection, but fundamentally differed in their 
expectations and understandings of what could be considered as environmentally friendly. 
Throughout the debate over green nuclear the most prolific tension existed between the EMOs and 
the pro-nuclear lobby within Government. The former believed that the rationality of nuclear 
power was severely under question given that it was environmentally illegitimate on moral 
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principles and the latter argued that the rationality of nuclear power was based on its ability to 
provide low carbon energy and therefore represented the most environmentally sound option.  
The latter sections of the chapter outline the contributions of this research and the limitations of 
the project. Avenues for future research are suggested which both overcome these limitations and 
provide important ways to continue and extend research into the issues raised within this 
discussion.  
Situated Logics 
 
‘Situated logic’ is the term used to refer to the manifestation of societal institutional logics which 
reflect the historical context and institutionalised interests of actors/actor groups within a given 
industry. The findings of this research suggest that the dominant values, norms and conventions of 
the energy industry were reflected in its configuration of embedded ‘situated logics’. Such situated 
institutionalised values echoed the unique historical and meaningful characteristics of the industry 
as perceived by industry level actors, thus combining the abstract meaning structures of societal 
level institutional forms with the physicalities and practicalities of the industry. The situated logics 
identified by this research are those which informed the debate over nuclear power’s validity as an 
energy option and were apparent in the legitimation strategies of both the various Governments 
over time, as well as the media. 
The situating of societal logics is of specific interest because it speaks to the relationship between 
actors, fields and institutional structures. The concept of a situated logic provides a theoretical tool 
to recognise how one societal logic may inform multiple and potentially contradictory situated 
logics. Because societal logics are manifest as a result of actors’ interpretations within context and 
subject to the specific interests and orientation to action of individual actors in relation to those 
societal logics, different contexts inhabited by actors pertaining to the same societal logic may 
nurture opposing situated logics. Moreover, by studying the process of situating it is possible to 
overcome the problematic issue of ‘scientific diffusion’ metaphors within institutional literature 
(Zilber 2002). This is because the ‘situated’ approach accepts that whilst industries sit within a pre-
defined inter-institutional societal context which provides institutional rules and norms (Friedland 
and Alford 1991) for actors to draw on when determining legitimate meanings, an industry’s distinct 
institutional and historical values, conventions and rationalities affect the ways in such rules and 
norms manifest. This is because the a-priori institutional structures of industries influence what 
actors perceive as legitimate and possible when generating and enacting new meaning systems. An 
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emergent situated logic will therefore not provide a direct reflection of an ‘ideal type’ societal logic 
(Thornton 2004), but will become manifest as a refracted outcome of values, norms and 
conventions within its host industry.  
Explaining an Emergent Target-Based Environmental Logic.  
 
In the following section a narrative is developed which illustrates how pro-nuclear elites (referred 
to as the ‘energy elite’) within the Conservative Government of the 1980s set in motion certain 
processes which constructed a target-based approach to environmentalism in a bid to popularise 
nuclear power and overcome its ubiquitous environmental critique. By publicly and politically 
marketing nuclear power as ‘green’ they embedded within the energy industry a particular set of 
environmental values and conventions which informed how energy choices were to be compared 
and justified into the 1990s and 2000s. More specifically the energy elite underwent three 
institutional work processes: theorisation, discursive legitimation and valorisation. These processes 
worked across levels of analysis in ways that linked social movements, global CC discourse, the 
energy industry’s institutional context and the interests and political positions of pro-nuclear 
actors. In other words, the situated manifestation of societal logics is understood to be the 
(intended and unintended) outcome of institutional work which interconnects multiple levels of 
analysis so that both societal and industry level institutional and political context becomes reflected 
in the nature of ‘lower-level’ situated institutional logics. Understanding the basics of this process 
will shed light on how societal logics may come to be inconsistent at lower levels of analysis – given 
that their ‘creation’ is dependent on time, space and agency.   
The following sections neither place all explanatory pressure on agent-centric theories of 
institutional work, nor forward a structurally deterministic explanation of change. Rather, they 
embed the former in the latter and suggest that the interactions between the two result in situated 
logics at the industry level. Institutional research on societal trends and changes has shown how 
social movements (Rao, Monin and Durand 2005) and new discourses (Maguire et al 2004) provide 
actors with opportunities to work on and even change institutionalised meanings intentionally or 
otherwise. In many cases such changes ‘jolt’ the institutional structure of an industry by providing 
new meaning systems with which individuals may, if reflective, motivated and opportunistic 
enough, use to alter how themselves or others perceive the legitimacy of practices. In the case 
study two particular societal level structural changes occurred which had the potential to affect the 
way in which nuclear power could be understood and legitimated – these were the environmental 
social movement of the late 1960s and the global development of a political discourse around CC 
234 
 
in the late 1980s. Both pressurised the State to consider the environment when deliberating over 
energy policy, although each provided different cues as to how green behaviour might be enacted.  
This section begins with an exploration into their implications in order to understand why and how 
an international CC discourse came to be theorised in relation to nuclear power to create an idea 
of ‘green nuclear’. It should be noted that these societal changes should not be considered as 
isolated from the political interests of actors or from the institutional nature of the energy industry. 
In other words, the way in which the environmental movement and CC discourse affected nuclear 
power was an outcome of their interaction with embedded actors and was therefore not 
structurally determined. Nevertheless, to understand how certain actors contributed to the 
emergence of a situated target-based environmental logic, the context for their actions at the 
macro societal level of analysis must be understood (Tracey et al 2010).  
Social Movements and Global Political Discourse 
 
Social movements have been well documented as important vessels in the creation and 
recombination of institutional logics (Rao, Monin and Durand 2005, Lounsbury et al 2002). Sine and 
Lee (2009) have examined the role of social movements in propagating cognitive frameworks. They 
argue that social movements disrupt institutional arrangements by disseminating new cultural and 
cognitive frames for sensemaking through which they define and distribute elements of societal 
logics to fields previously unrelated. These movements are often highly value laden and strive to 
mobilise the highest volume of actors possible through education and awareness. By doing so, 
social movements can create mass antagonism towards a practice or technology on ethical and 
moral grounds within a short space of time. In the 1970s new-environmentalism was a highly 
politicised social movement which problematised various aspects of the nuclear industry. Whilst 
diffusing its own value laden morals, its educative element enticed public debates over the 
environmental legitimacy of nuclear power. Contentious issues surrounding nuclear waste and 
plutonium proliferation during the Cold War were brought to the attention of the public for the first 
time, and very quickly the nuclear power industry became a clear antagonist to Environmental 
Movement Organisations (EMOs).  
Interestingly EMOs employed a process similar to Leca et al’s (2008) specification whereby nuclear 
power’s environmental failure was framed in a way that included a diagnosis and causation which 
aimed to interpret ‘the problem’ in ways which linked it to the EMOs broader cultural 
environmentalist schema. In other words, the problem with nuclear power was unrelated to the 
usual energy-comparison schemas of the energy industry and was instead specified from a 
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previously unconnected environmental lens. Consequently the industry was ill-equipped to rebuff 
the environmental criticism of nuclear power and given that there was no solution to many of the 
issues the industry instead rejected the notion that such issues should be a consideration. 
Regardless of whether the EMOs were ‘unrealistic’ in their requests for nuclear abandonment, the 
social movement had provided society with a moralistic lens through which to understand its 
relationship with nature. It is evident in the media coverage of nuclear power’s environmental 
impact at the time that this particular approach to nature became ubiquitous, illustrated by the fact 
that there were only a handful of references between 1960 and 1988 to nuclear power being in any 
way environmentally friendly. Indeed, it was publicly accepted that under no circumstances could 
atomic energy be green.  
It was not until the late 1980s that the world started to take seriously a more quantitative and 
scientific environmental agenda. The ratification of CC and the formation of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on CC in 1988 should be viewed as a significant environmental jolt (Sine and Lee 2003) which 
eventually affected institutionalised understandings regarding the role of energy industries in 
environmental protection. The political legitimacy of international institutions now concerned with 
escalating CC provided the nuclear lobby with the opportunity to reconfigure institutional 
arrangements. An important aspect of this particular jolt was the way in which the Government 
(and therefore the national energy industry) were embedded within it. Indeed CC represented both 
an environmental issue as well as a macro societal discourse within the global political economy. 
As Wittneben, Okereke, Banerjee and Levy (2012) note ‘…CC is not just an ‘environmental problem’ 
requiring technical and managerial solutions; it is a political issue’ (p1431) which is influenced by, 
but resides ‘above’, the political bailiwick of individual national Governments. However, although 
CC is defined by supra-national organisations such as the UN and its inter-Governmental panels 
(IPCC) it is consistently renegotiated and remains ambiguous in its interpretation across levels. For 
example, Wittneben et al (2012) note that Governments routinely clash over their responsibilities 
in addressing CC at the international policy level; companies struggle to balance investor interests 
with regulatory pressures for reduced emissions at the organisational level; and at the level of the 
individual, consumers remain unsure of the trade-offs between consumerism and their carbon-
footprints.  
The issues discussed above have a number of repercussions. Firstly inter-Governmental bodies such 
as the IPCC have the political power to define and govern CC in relation to the nations under their 
jurisdiction, particularly given that since 1997 a number of these nations have signed a binding 
treaty to meet certain IPCC standards. As Wittneben et al remark ‘Climate change is a global issue 
and, while national Governments have a key role to play in climate policy, the global governance of 
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climate change occurs in a broader international political economy. These international institutional 
structures shape the prospects and limits of political agency and action.’ (2012 p.1937). Although 
they may shape the nature of political agency, the implications of CC at the level of State remain 
contested. That is, national Governments are somewhat independent when it comes to their 
perceived responsibilities for carbon mitigation and the role of certain industries in that mitigation. 
CC is thus accepted and structurally reinforced by international organisations, yet is further 
delimited by the political interests and institutionalised conventions of actors within national 
Government and its related industries. As such CC discourse both presses for conformity and retains 
an element of ambiguity in terms of how it should ‘play out’ in industry sectors. Additionally it is 
both substantively focused on the moral obligation of humankind to protect the planet and itself 
and evidently target orientated given its focus on global carbon and GHG emissions levels. By 
playing on the ambiguity regarding operationalising CC mitigation and its links with more moralistic 
environmental discourse, the pro-nuclear lobby hoped to associate CC’s scientific and measured 
approach to environmental protection with nuclear power’s low carbon output and subsequently 
call nuclear ‘green’.  
Ultimately the Government and its energy industry were aware of the public support for the EMOs 
cause and were also embedded within, and expected to act in concordance with, the broader 
political landscape of which CC became a part. Both the social movement and the CC discourse 
provided potentially complementary yet fundamentally alternate conceptions of what constituted 
nature and ‘green’ action – representing distinct manifestations of an environmental societal logic. 
The international environmental social movement diffused a moralistic and qualitative 
environmental logic (social-movement environmental logic) into the UK which put pressure on the 
Government by not only proposing a new environmental meaning system to the electorate, but by 
actively propagating how nuclear power contradicted it. The internationally ratified and UN backed 
CC discourse provided an opportunity for nuclear supporters to finally counter environmental 
critique of nuclear power, and in the process, reinforce a quantitative and target orientated 
approach to environmental action. Thereafter international CC organisations and subsequent 
treaties enforced their own breed of environmental concern and provided politically legitimated 
discursive and symbolic resources for actors to argue that low carbon technologies were green.  
The following section is specifically interested in the ‘actors’ who promoted nuclear power as an 
environmental solution to CC in 1988. The section begins its analysis in 1979 when a newly elected 
Conservative Government first illustrated its enthusiasm for initiating a third nuclear power 
programme. It was during the early years of this Government that an ‘energy elite’ was established 
who, in 1988, first delineated a ‘target-based environmental logic’ within the energy industry.  The 
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configuration, purpose and power of this elite is integral to understanding how a new meaning 
system was able to become so successfully embedded into the industry.  
Power, Elites and Embedded Action 
 
The discussion of elites in this section responds to recent literature by Zald and Lounsbury (2010) 
and Reed (2012) who propose a research agenda considerate of national and international elites 
and ‘command situations’ in the study of important policy issues. In the following section the 
development of a state centred authoritative elite and a supra-national expert elite is outlined; 
both of which formed around, and were advocates of, a pro-nuclear agenda. The former came 
about as a result of political will power, interest and the authoritative autonomy of high-ranking 
politicians. The latter reflected developing cultural expectations in regards to CC and a growing 
international scientific community which developed with the ideological backing of major supra-
national organisations such as the United Nations. In line with Reed (2012) the following discussion 
has a distinct focus on State centred structures of domination but maintains recognition of 
normative and cultural context in reinforcing the legitimacy of the elites and their theorisations. 
The aim of the section is to understand the propensity of actors with certain forms of power to act, 
and in doing so how they contributed to the emergent manifestation of a situated logic.  
The pro-nuclear elite, referred to throughout this discussion as the ‘energy elite’, were linked by a 
common cause and high-ranking bureaucratic positions within the Government’s energy 
department and related organisations such as the CEGB. The actors constituting the energy elite 
had a form of power which relates most directly to Reed’s (2012) understanding of authoritative 
elites. According to Reed (2012) the members of an authoritative elite are embedded in structures 
of domination which give them the potential bureaucratic and authoritative power to engage in 
strategies through which their interests can be pursued. The hierarchically stratified power 
structures and mechanisms within the State gave the ‘energy elite’ privileged access to resources 
with which they were able to progress their agenda for nuclear power development. These 
resources relate to their propensity to initiate public inquiries, liaise with the BNFL to build a strong 
defence for nuclear power, engage in policy decisions and develop national energy strategy. In 
other words, the energy elite were ‘…agents who [had] the “structural place” and “organizational 
power” to shape the governing structures and regimes through which the everyday lives of citizens 
are ordered and managed’ (Clegg et al 2006 p.343). The following section explores the creation and 
influence of Thatcher’s ‘energy elite’ who were key in the development of ‘green nuclear’ 
discourses in the late 1980s. Their political relationship with alternative energy industries such as 
coal and their rejection of renewable technologies (and their supportive EMOs) meant that they 
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saw the development of nuclear power as integral to UK energy supplies as well as the future of 
the construction consortia.   
The State had consistently favoured nuclear power between 1945 and 1980 given the energy supply 
security it provided and its future economic and market promise. Initially the CEGB and UKAEA had 
reinforced distancing and normalising discursive strategies which appeared successful in framing 
nuclear power as peaceful and ‘just like all the others’ in terms of its ordinary processes and 
outputs. When the antagonistic environmental social movement problematised the distancing and 
normalising strategies in the 1970s the State used its authoritative power (Reed 2012) to discredit 
environmentalism and its influence on energy policy. It claimed that their emotive concerns were 
idealist and unattainable since they provided no alternatives to nuclear power which could satisfy 
the institutionalised requirements of energy options (resource security and market potential). 
Nevertheless, by the late 1970s the nuclear industry was in disarray. A lack of new orders by the 
CEGB due to indecision over the next reactor design meant the construction consortia were 
struggling to survive. Indecision regarding nuclear power eventually ceased in 1979 when 
Thatcher’s Conservatives won the election and began to execute their political aspirations of 
quashing the power of the trade unions and revitalising the nuclear industry.  
Under the explicit auspices of energy security and future economic promise, and more implicitly to 
provide stable electricity whilst the coal industry was downsized, the Conservatives pledged to 
reanimate the UKs nuclear industry by constructing a PWR reactor at Sizewell. To this end and under 
the direction of Thatcher a rising cadre of pro-nuclear individuals came to occupy key power 
positions or ‘command situations’ (Reed 2012) within the energy industry. As such the ‘energy elite’ 
was both symptomatic of the broader state of affairs within the energy sector that was considered 
problematic given the institutionalised cultural and normative expectations of the industry, and the 
political interests of high-ranked politicians embedded in the more enduring socio-material 
domination structures of the industry. More specifically in 1979 Thatcher began filling influential 
pre-defined ‘command situations’ within the bureaucratic structure of Government by appointing 
David Howell as her first Secretary for Energy. Howell was immediately tasked with building the 
country’s first PWR reactor and was therefore responsible for initiating the Sizewell Inquiry and 
constructing the Governments PWR defence alongside BNFL. Nigel Lawson took over Howells post 
in 1983 given his advocacy of Thatcher’s privatisation policy, and was followed by Peter Walker 
(1983-1987) who successfully won out against the Miners in the strikes of the mid-1980s and 
approved the application for Sizewell B in 1987 following the inquiry. Peter Walker had previously 
shown support for nuclear power in 1973 during which time he was imperative in the establishment 
of the NNC as Secretary for Trade and Industry. A perhaps more influential appointment was that 
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of Lord Marshall of Goring in 1983 to the post of CEGB Chairman from a previous post as the 
chairman of the UKAEA. Additionally in 1987 a diehard Thatcher supporter Cecil Parkinson was 
made energy secretary and was keen to both enforce competition on electricity and preserve 
nuclear power – two goals which were ultimately to be in conflict.   
Backed by her deliberate arrangement of influential and bureaucratically powerful actors within 
the key command situations of the industry, Thatcher was in a position to enact a high degree of 
autonomy over the crafting of a pro-nuclear energy policy in the UK. By the time CC discourse had 
become ratified by the UN this pro-nuclear energy elite had already succeeded at the PWR Sizewell 
Inquiry. Nevertheless, what was clear from the case study was that public opinion relayed by the 
newspapers at the time did not reflect the Government’s nuclear enthusiasm, particularly in terms 
of environmental impact and safety. Discursive legitimation based on the national market and state 
resource situated logics was just not able to counter the public’s perception of environmental 
threat caused by nuclear reactors given the recent Three Mile Island and Chernobyl crises. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the energy elite jumped at the opportunity to market a green discourse 
around nuclear power, and they were in the perfect position to do so. After the UN accepted CC as 
an issue and established the IPCC the CEGB took out advertising space in both The Times and The 
Guardian proposing to the readers that nuclear power was environmental. At the same time 
Thatcher delivered environmental speeches which included the promotion of nuclear policy as an 
environmental response. The energy elite’s counterfactual thinking (Tracey et al 2010) – that 
nuclear power was green – was diffused in a way that reflected their authoritative power: at 
international conferences, in policy documents and within Government backed marketing 
campaigns.  
Theorisation in Context 
 
Theorisation (Tolbert and Zucker 1999, Suddaby and Greenwood 2005) and the resultant 
legitimation strategies engaged in by the energy elite were constructed within the institutional 
context of the energy industry. This thesis argues that all institutional work processes identified in 
the case study (theorisation, legitimation and valorisation) connect multiple levels of analysis, such 
as societal movements, industry meaning systems and actor interests, so that their outcomes 
reflect both the intentional objectives of actors and the prevalent rationality embedded within the 
industry. In particular the discursive legitimation and theorisation of the energy elite, and its 
repetition by sympathetic Press, created a discourse of ‘green nuclear’ intentionally designed to 
support a favourable nuclear policy and an institutionalised understanding that the energy industry 
should consider target-based environmental issues when deciding over energy options. This latter 
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outcome should not be considered a planned and pre-meditated institutional change, but an 
emergent and potentially unintentional consequence of institutional work. First this section will 
consider the process of theorisation and its role in the emergence of the target-based 
environmental logic. Second it will discuss how theorisation occurs within, and may be affected by, 
the institutional context of an industry.  
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) define theorisation as the means by which institutional 
vocabularies are employed to justify new ideas by linking them to broader cultural schemas. The 
body of literature focusing on theorisation tends to show how it achieves shifts between logics. 
However, by linking together broad meaning systems and political objectives, the energy elite were 
able to locate a previously ‘external’ logic within the energy industry and draw on it to legitimate a 
desired practice. CC discourse provided the necessary discursive resources for nuclear power to be 
linked with an environmental agenda so that energy legitimacy began to cohere around the 
assumption that energy options with the lowest carbon output should be considered the greenest. 
Drawing from Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) one may identify this type of theorisation as 
primarily value-based. By initially associating nuclear power with carbon mitigation and proposing 
it as a solution to CC, actors hoped to connect nuclear power with environmental ideologies. 
Certainly carbon targets were discursively aligned with normative, ethical and moral environmental 
cultural templates (Rao, Monin and Durand 2005) encapsulated by the environmental social 
movement. By relating nuclear power with said targets it was hoped that it too would become 
aligned with these ideologies. This is similar to the findings of Maguire et al (2004) who show that 
theorisation is the processes through which institutional entrepreneurs political mobilise normative 
support by relating new or favoured practices with the key values of different actors in order to 
create a broad base of support.  
It should also be noted that international expert elites involved in the CC movement helped 
reinforce the theorisations of the energy elite. Zald and Lounsbury (2010) noted in their review of 
the institutional elite literature that there is a need to focus on a new breed of international experts 
‘…who coalesce into more informal collective communities of expert discourse and can shape 
command post outcomes in more subversive ways’ (p.972). Certainly the global scientific 
community of NGOs and policy boards, which coalesced around CC, could be considered as 
important international expert elites. The issue of CC was fostered by several overlapping 
international scientiﬁc networks under the guidance of the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and the International Council of Scientiﬁc Union (ICSU) (see Andresen and Agrawala 2002). 
This scientific community warned of climatic dangers and provided substantial research which 
academically reinforced the problems associated with emissions release. Essentially, the 
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international field of CC experts constructed itself over time and developed new normative 
expectations, regulatory capabilities and modes of reinforcement which, in the case of the UN’s 
IPCC, they were able to mandate at a nation-state level.  
Interestingly the national authoritative ‘energy elite’ and the international expert elite reinforced 
the legitimacy of each-others’ discourses. Target-based environmental theorisations reinforced the 
urgency of CC concerns and CC discourse acted as a supporting infrastructure (Reed 2012) against 
which the industry could develop an energy policy which furthered their own pro-nuclear interest. 
Green nuclear theorisations were fed back to the international and scientific community for 
reinforcement. For example Thatcher’s addresses at the UN General Assembly on the Global 
Environment and the 2nd World Climate Conference in 1990 proposed nuclear energy as a means 
to mitigate dangerous carbon release. Given the lack of nuclear support in the UK the international 
community contained far more potential allies for the nuclear cause. Additionally politicians and 
scientists may have been considered the most likely audience to sympathise with target-based 
environmental theorisations given their predisposition to instrumentality, operability and 
measurement. Interestingly environmentalists were not considered a receptive audience and were 
not expected to comply with the proposition that nuclear power posed an environmental solution 
to CC. Thatcher herself exclaimed that the use of nuclear to cut carbon emissions would not be well 
received by EMOs. This suggests that value-based theorisations are open to resistance and audience 
selection is crucial to their successful diffusion. 
The way in which the green nuclear theorisation became diffused reflected intentional efforts by 
the energy elite to legitimate an energy policy with a stronger focus on nuclear power back in the 
UK. This work discursively delimited how the energy industry should approach environmental issues 
and hence set in motion the manifestation of a target-based environmental logic. In order for this 
form of environmental concern to make sense to actors within the industry the target-based logic 
needed to align with the institutionalised conventions and embedded systems informing energy 
decisions. In other words, green nuclear theorisations relied on a related and emerging 
institutionalised understanding which delineated how ‘green’ could be understood – this 
understanding reflected both the objective orientated nature of CC discourse and the quantitative 
and instrumental personality of the energy industry.   
Industry as Mediator 
 
When EMOs broke down the normalisation and distancing discursive strategies of the nuclear lobby 
and encouraged public debates around radioactive waste and proliferation, their concerns were 
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countered and resisted by the energy industry who claimed that the environmentalists were 
unrealistic in their demands and that the nuclear industry was ‘keeping it real’. At no point during 
the first four decades of the civil nuclear programme was nuclear claimed ‘green’ – rather the idea 
that the environment should be a consideration by the energy industry was shunned. For the 
industry the legitimacy of nuclear lay in its capacity as a UK designed baseload generator of 
electricity and its promise of future economic prospects. This reflected a highly instrumental 
approach to judging the rationality of energy choices. This thesis argues that the institutional 
structure of the energy industry and its prevalent rationality affected the form of the emergent 
target-based logic. As Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012) note ‘…societal-level institutional 
logics are not… transposed directly to institutional fields in whole cloth. At the cognitive level, 
societal logics provide available and accessible categories and schemas for sensemaking and 
action…at the social level, these categories and schemas are translated and adopted in the 
institutional field at various levels of abstraction…’ (p152). The instrumental rationality of the 
industry was predominantly reflected in the way in which the industry utilised quantitative proxies 
for energy option comparisons. Such an approach became a central characteristic of its emergent 
approach to environmental care.  
In particular, energy option adherence to values and conventions informed by the state-resource 
and national-market situated logics could be assessed quantitatively. In this way industry actors 
displayed a highly instrumental relationship with energy options reflected in the ways in which the 
financial costs or percentage of UK based fuels used could be compared between options (although 
one should not discount the importance of political interest in the construction of such figures and 
in the definition of the end goals). As Biggart and Delbridge (2004) note, ‘An action is instrumentally 
rational when someone attempts to consider all possible means to an end and weighs the 
alternative means in a decision-making calculus, often in a quantitative analysis…’ (p34). In a similar 
vein, the emergent environmental ‘green nuclear’ theorisations displayed characteristics which 
permitted its integration into the proxy-based decision-making machinery. The proposition that 
environmentalism was in some way quantifiable via the measurement of carbon units, reinforced 
by CC discourse, represented a theorisation based on instrumental rationality. It was therefore 
comprehensible and easier to accept than a more substantive environmental logic for the industry 
because it aligned with a customary cognitive and comparative approach. Thus, by portraying 
nuclear power as green, the energy elite were inadvertently proposing an instrumental approach 
to environmental friendliness which matched the institutional and rational nature of the energy 
industry’s dominant sources of legitimacy.  
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This can be understood as the result of three related factors: Firstly these actors were themselves 
institutionally embedded within the field and therefore were likely to construct their theorisations 
and discursive legitimations in ways which reflected their taken-for-granted understandings of how 
energy comparisons should be made. Secondly the continual reinforcement of target-based 
environmentalism over time in regulation and policy worked to both fortify the instrumentality and 
enforce environmental consideration. Thirdly the approach is greatly reflective of the scientific 
nature of the global CC discourse. Given that the Government were keen to adhere to the carbon 
limits defined by the international community their theorisations, which initially delimitated the 
target-based environmental logic, drew heavily on the quantitative character of CC discourse. Taken 
as a whole, the institutional structure of the energy industry informed the development of 
environmental meanings which ensured the comprehensibility and operability of the emerging 
target-based logic. As the target-based environmental logic became increasingly institutionalised 
within the industry its exclusive association with nuclear power weakened. Indeed, when nuclear 
power was shown to be financially problematic in the latter part of 1989 the Government was keen 
to centre a new energy policy on alternative green options such as renewables. 
Emergence and Institutional Change 
 
Institutional work of the energy elite, in their pursuit of legitimating nuclear power, kick-started the 
emergence of the situated target-based logic which continued to institutionalise despite the 
financial collapse of nuclear power in 1989. The following discussion seeks to explain the emergent 
institutionalisation of the target-based environmental logic over time and consists of two parts: The 
first focuses on the implementation of regulatory support to reinforce target-based 
environmentalism, further embedding it in the institutional infrastructure of the energy industry. 
The second part examines how theorisation and regulatory reinforcement related to the 
emergence of the situated logic which continued to be elaborated within the energy sector 
regardless of its dwindling use in the legitimation of nuclear power. The discussion demonstrates 
that actors may intentionally enact causal powers in the form of institutional work towards political 
ends, aided by their power to pursue action, but that these actions may have wider repercussions 
for the institutional landscape of the industry over time which may support future actions unrelated 
to the initial political project. This latter finding extends previous literature on the unintended 
consequences of institutional work (Tracey et al 2010) by providing a discussion of how the 
intentions of those specifically in power may become reinforced and subverted over time.  
The ‘low carbon equals green energy’ theorisation was reinforced by regulatory embellishments 
which forced the energy industry to meet environmental targets. The planned privatisation of the 
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energy industries in the late 1980s meant that the CEGB was facing dismantlement in 1990. Losing 
the CEGB and its leadership would weaken the political power of the pro-nuclear energy elite 
thereby threatening the future of nuclear. Choices between energy options would be dependent 
on private interests and nuclear power was expensive and uncompetitive. In an attempt to 
reinforce the utility of nuclear power in light of CC, UK carbon targets were initially crafted in early 
1989 at an international Downing Street Conference. Similarly when the Department of Energy was 
dissolved in 1992 and energy responsibilities moved to the DTI, international legally binding targets 
were already in discussion in the Rio de Janeiro World Summit. By 1997 the Kyoto protocol treaty 
had set objectives which reinforced the instrumental and temporal character of the carbon targets. 
However, the Kyoto Protocol made no mention of nuclear power, illustrating that by the mid-1990s 
(after the failed nuclear privatisation) the emerging target-based situated logic was taking shape 
without the theorisations which connected it to nuclear power. The binding nature of emissions 
agreements embedded national Governments deeper within the global field of CC and as a result 
energy industries in particular were becoming increasingly implicated in the struggle to mitigate 
global warming. 
What can be inferred from above is that the intentional actions of the energy elite to support 
nuclear power by strengthening carbon regulations before its privatisation (to ensure its 
competitiveness) reinforced target-based environmentalism and ensured its re-enactment within 
the entire energy industry. The continued reference to the target-based logic in the legitimation of 
alternative energy options after the nuclear moratorium illustrated its on-going emergence. ‘Green 
nuclear’ theorisation and resultant legitimation strategies provided discourse which, when 
reinforced over time, contributed to the continuing institutionalisation of the target-based 
environmental logic. Such an understanding is in alignment with literature detailing emergence and 
its elaboration through co-determination: ‘…elaboration is co-determined by the conditional 
influence exerted by antecedent structures together with the autonomous causal powers of current 
agents’ (Elder-Vass 2007a quoting Archer 1995 p.26). These antecedent structures comprise of CC 
discourse and the institutional context of the energy industry. Such emergence is also relational in 
that the emergent properties of institutional logics ‘…are not contained in the elements themselves, 
but could not exist apart from them’ (Archer 1982 p.475). In other words the emergent properties 
of an institutional logic have the potential to create structures which are greater than the sum of 
their parts, dependent on the ways in which they are configured. Situated logics are therefore 
representative of a distinctive organisation of a societal logic’s causal and emergent properties 
which developed over time given the interaction between agents and the institutional influences 
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of the field.  This emergent approach provides an explanation as to how a situated logic can progress 
without being pre-meditated or actively engineered.  
The discussion of the on-going emergence of the target-based logic after the financial 
delegitimation of nuclear power extends Tracey et al’s (2010) understanding that the creation of 
new institutional logics to legitimate new organisational forms can create institutional change even 
if the material organisational form eventually fails. In this case-study the target-based 
environmental logic which was initially triggered by the diffusion of new discourses related to the 
theorisation of ‘green nuclear’ continued to institutionalise (emerge) in the energy industry even 
after nuclear power’s legitimacy dwindled. Thus when trying to understand the origins of specific 
situated logics the answer may not lie in exclusively exploring the purposeful institutional work of 
actors to initiate change, but also the consistently reinforced meaning systems which that change 
required to make sense, and which may unintentionally become institutionalised thereafter.  
So far this discussion has focused on the process of theorisation and its role in interconnecting levels 
of analysis during institutional change. However processes of discursive legitimation have so far 
only been touched upon (such as ‘keeping it real’). The following section explores the re-emergence 
of the ‘green nuclear’ debate in the mid to late 2000s and highlights the role of a specific discursive 
legitimation strategy labelled here as ‘accommodation’. The process of valorisation is also discussed 
as nuclear power needed to appear financially stable if it was to be taken seriously by the now 
privatised energy companies. Both legitimation and valorisation institutional work processes drew 
from the situated target-based environmental logic to legitimate nuclear power in distinct ways, 
often reinforcing target-based environmentalism by reiterating its meaning system and, in the case 
of valorisation, intertwining its symbolic and material dimensions with that of wider economic 
systems.  
Legitimation and Valorisation in the Late 2000s 
 
The use of language in the form of legitimation strategies is central to the institutionalisation of 
theorisations (Greenwood and Suddaby 2005). The case study illustrated the role of humanisation 
and narritivisation (Vaara et al 2004) discursive strategies throughout anti-nuclear rhetoric which 
sought to de-legitimate nuclear power on the grounds of safety and environmental pollution and 
break down the normalisation and distancing strategies of the Government and UKAEA. The 
Government responded by rejecting the anti-nuclear rhetoric as utopian and idealist, instead opting 
to re-affirm nuclear power’s legitimacy by drawing on the national-market and state-resource 
situated logics to reinforce its instrumental rationality as a necessary energy option. This type of 
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legitimation aligns with Vaara et al’s (2004) concepts of authorisation and rationalisation so that 
legitimation is formed both by reference to authority garnered from tradition, custom or law, and 
based on the cognitive validity of certain social actions as embedded within the energy industry. 
The contestation between these legitimation strategies utilised by the pro and anti-nuclear lobbies 
played out throughout the initial decades of the case study primarily because of an implicit 
acceptance by both parties that nuclear power could never be considered ‘green’. Instead the 
debate was one of environmental problematisations by one side, and objections to their relevance 
to energy decisions by the other. However, by the mid-2000s the situated target-based 
environmental logic had become institutionally entrenched within the industry and was central to 
discursive strategies which supported nuclear power’s green ‘renaissance’. This paved the way for 
an important new nuclear legitimation strategy, which was applied by the pro-nuclear lobby as a 
means to ‘accommodate’ the environmental concerns of the EMOs into their legitimation of 
nuclear. This accommodation is referred to as the ‘lesser of two evils’ strategy and became 
prevalent in media coverage of the nuclear debate from 2003 onwards.  
The Lesser of Two Evils 
 
The ‘lesser of two evils’ proposition claimed that, in light of the inability of renewables to mitigate 
CC, nuclear power provided the most environmental energy solution regardless of its waste and 
proliferation issues. This proposition is important to consider for three reasons. Firstly it clearly 
demonstrated the institutionalisation of the instrumental and quantitative target-based 
environmental logic within the industry. Nuclear power was only considered ‘green’ because it 
could meet carbon targets necessary for the mitigation of global warming, an attribute which 
propelled it into the 2006 energy mix (Department for Trade and Industry 2006). By claiming that 
nuclear power was a lesser ‘evil’ than CC, nuclear advocates were implying that all other options 
including renewables were less environmentally viable because they increased the risk of the 
greater ‘evil’ – CC. All options could be compared quantitatively based on their determined 
emissions and were evaluated as green against very specific numerically defined ‘ends’. Other 
environmental concerns such as radioactive waste were marginalised by this discussion given that 
they had no way of being incorporated into the system of decision making within the energy 
industry, and that the particular ‘ends’ did not specify any additional environmental considerations. 
Thus it is clear that this strategy drew from, and reinforced a highly institutionalised target-based 
environmental logic, and was central in legitimating nuclear power in the mid to late 2000s.  
Secondly it is a clear illustration of a discursive strategy (legitimation process) which interconnects 
the wider CC global discourse with the interests of pro-nuclear elites and the institutionalised 
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nature of the industry. Interestingly it was a pro-nuclear scientific elite comprised of Sir David King 
and a number of well-regarded environmental nuclear ‘converts’ (for example, Guardian 
environmental columnist George Monbiot and Gaia theory writer John Lovelock) which initially 
proposed that CC was a much worse fate than that of nuclear pollution. The Labour Government 
agreed, given the impending carbon targets, with the backing of both global institutions such as the 
UNs International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who proposed nuclear as a carbon mitigation tool, 
and a mixture of scientists and environmentalists within the UK who were willing to discursively 
relate the mitigation of CC with nuclear power. This provided the discursive strategy with political 
impetus and contributed to its development as a widely accepted justification for nuclear power.  
Thirdly the ‘lesser of two evils’ strategy was illustrative of a type of ‘accommodating’ strategy 
whereby the environmental problems of nuclear power illuminated by the EMOs were accepted 
yet overcome with the referral to ‘higher’ environmental discourse. In essence, global CC discourse 
had become somewhat of a tie-breaker for debates attempting to define environmental practice. 
As such the environmental problems of nuclear power could be accommodated into its legitimation 
(yes nuclear is evil) without destroying it because they were immediately marginalised by the 
‘bigger issue’ (but not AS evil as global warming). The identification of this discursive strategy 
contributes to the body of literature on legitimation which has not previously considered the 
strategy of ‘accommodation’; the integration and subsequent marginalisation of antagonistic 
arguments through referral to broader/higher-level systems of meaning. However, although 
nuclear power was flagged as a necessary green energy option, it still needed to appear 
commercially and economically viable in order to receive the substantial investment it required. 
This is where the process of valorisation came into play.  
Valorisation  
 
Valorisation refers to the process by which the Government (Labour and then the Conservative-
Liberal coalition) attempted to assign monetary value to natural substances (i.e. carbon) which 
were then used to measure environmental ‘friendliness’. More specifically the valuation of carbon 
in the late 2000s aided both the financial legitimacy of nuclear power and simultaneously reinforced 
the target-based environmental logic. For the reanimation of the nuclear industry this process was 
vital because nuclear electricity would not be competitive in the energy markets otherwise. 
Following nuclear power’s financial collapse in the late 1980s and privatisation in 1996 (and British 
Energy’s financial crisis in 2002) the Labour Government promised that nuclear power would 
receive no subsidies from Government (Department for Trade and Industry 2003a) and would only 
be constructed if deemed competitive by private industry. Indeed privatisation had merely 
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reinforced the importance of economic competitiveness in shaping public policy (Wittneben et al 
2012). By 2006 it was evident that all low carbon technologies were expensive and produced 
electricity which was difficult to sell within competitive energy markets. To better the chances of 
tempting private investment in low carbon technologies the Government planned to introduce an 
EU based carbon market. If firms released more than a centrally designated amount of emissions 
they would suffer a financial penalty and vice versa, with the amount lost or gained dependent on 
the value of certificates which represented carbon and could be traded. 
Through commodification and control over the means of exchange of atmospheric elements the 
Government’s low-carbon energy policy established an economy of climate capitalism (Childs 2003, 
Wittenben et al 2012) which signified a meeting of two seemingly separate worlds; 
environmentalism and the capitalist market. Climate capitalism provides an example of situated 
logic coexistence; the initiation of the carbon market was illustrative of the dominance of both neo-
liberal market beliefs and the unquestioned requirement to meet carbon targets. Both were able 
to coexist because the former could be applied to the latter, permitting integration rather than 
conflict. Via economic modelling, the Government were able to ‘prove’ that nuclear power could 
mitigate the environmental damage of CC, within the time limits defined by the Kyoto Protocol, at 
a lower cost than alternative low-carbon technologies. Consequently, the valorisation of carbon 
intertwined the symbolic dimensions of the target-based environmental logic with the market 
mechanisms of an entrenched and dominant economic ideology and was therefore an important 
process in reinforcing the legitimacy of nuclear. Additionally the integration of carbon targets in 
economic modelling for future energy policy ensured the target-based environmental logic’s 
relevance and repetition within the energy industry. 
Concluding Situating  
 
The previous narrative clarifies how a societal environmental logic became situated as a target-
based environmental logic within the energy industry. Theoretical value comes from the treatment 
of institutional levels of analysis which are interconnected through the processes of institutional 
work identified. A ‘real’ societal institutional logic, as evident in the diffused discourse and schemas 
of the environmental social movement, was initially rejected by the energy industry until 1988 
when the CC movement provided an opportunity for the pro-nuclear Conservatives to link nuclear 
with a ‘green’ agenda pre-defined by the environmental movement as necessary and moral. 
Processes of embedded institutional work which aimed at achieving such a link reflected the agency 
of an elite embedded in the ‘actual’ institutional and historical context of their industry. This 
embedded institutional work leads to both intentional and unintentional consequences. The energy 
249 
 
elite were knowledgeable and powerful actors who were provided power by their location within a 
state bureaucracy and were able to use their political influence to publicly legitimate an energy 
policy more favourable to nuclear power. Over time their theorisation of causal relationships and 
development of discursive legitimations came to constitute a supportive situated target-based 
environmental logic. This speaks to both its emergent nature and the fact that it came to be 
embedded in a form which could be drawn on to legitimate a variety of low carbon technologies. 
The societal environmental logic became situated within the energy industry in a target-based form 
as a result of the intentional institutional work of the energy elite, backed by a growing international 
expert elite, to popularise nuclear power. The theorisations and legitimation discourses which they 
produced were created and enacted from within an industry predisposed to an instrumental form 
of rationality. In other words, the cognitive schemas historically employed to weigh and evaluate 
the rationality and comparative appropriateness of energy options valued the role of measurement, 
quantification and economic modelling. Target-based environmentalism could be operationalised 
because it legitimated a carbon emissions proxy from which all energy options could be compared, 
and without which environmental comparisons would be ambiguous, contentious and unstable. 
Additionally the impact of the social movement in the 1970s and the pre-existing situated logics of 
the energy industry during the 1950s and 1960s were crucial in understanding the context from 
which the opportunity for institutional change arose.  
By the 1990s, and certainly into the 2000s, environmental considerations were integral to the 
Department of Energy’s decisions between energy options. Notably the target-based 
environmental logic reflected a specific understanding of the relationship between society and 
nature whereby nature was considered quantifiable and environmentalism could be achieved 
through meeting certain emissions limits. The following discussion will examine how this particular 
approach to the natural environment sat in tension with the alternative perspectives evident 
throughout the green nuclear debate. Alternative situated environmental logics informed different 
groups of actors who contested the environmental credentials of nuclear power as espoused by the 
pro-nuclear lobby. Ultimately this thesis argues that multiple situated logics may exist in tension 
even when they pertain to the same societal logic. In this case study their contradiction was because 
each insinuated and informed a different relationship between humanity and nature. 
Consequently, nuclear power was considered legitimate under a situated logic which understood 
humankind’s protection of nature as one of monitoring and measuring to ensure minimal human 
damage; but it was also perceived as illegitimate under a situated logic which viewed man’s 
protection of nature as one of ethical and moral conservation. These tensions maintained nuclear’s 
‘green paradox’ because nuclear power was simultaneously construed as environmentally friendly 
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by actors informed by the former situated logic and intolerably un-ecological by actors informed by 
the latter.  
The Green Paradox of Nuclear Power: Situated Logic Contradiction  
 
So far the discussion has concentrated on the emergence of the situated target-based 
environmental logic which informed arguments asserting ‘green nuclear’ from the late 1980s 
onwards. However, the debate over nuclear power’s legitimacy engaged many actor groups who 
did not agree with the quantifiable approach towards the natural environment. Target-based 
environmentalism informed a highly instrumental relationship between society and nature, yet 
alternative manifestations of the societal environmental logic provided contradictory belief 
systems. Actor groups outside of the energy industry understood, interpreted and discursively 
reconstructed the societal environmental logic in ways which reflected their own interests and 
institutional background. In other words, arguments which challenged the energy industry’s own 
green nuclear discourse were informed by alternative institutionalised understandings of the 
relationship between nature and society and therefore conveyed a different view on nuclear 
power’s environmental credentials. By recognising contradictory situated environmental logics it is 
possible to cast light on the ‘green paradox’ of nuclear power. Competing logics bring ‘…rivalry to 
the fore’ (Reay and Hinings 2009 p.629, 2005, Thornton 2004) and certainly rivalry was endemic 
within the nuclear power debate, suggesting that various logics informed conflicting positions.  
This area of discussion speaks to institutional literature on complexity and institutional rationality. 
Literature pertaining to institutional complexity (Greenwood et al 2011) has highlighted how local 
level institutional logics, such as those residing within a geographically distinct community, affect 
actors’ perceptions of legitimacy relating to actions and practices associated with encroaching 
logics. Complexity is therefore symptomatic of the interactions between multiple institutional logics 
and the implication of these interactions on the legitimacy of an action or practice. This discussion 
builds from such ideas by arguing that groups of actors draw from their own distinct situated logics, 
and many such groups can potentially converge on a single debate over the legitimacy of an action 
or practice. The plurality of standpoints provides the potential for conflict. Furthermore, types of 
institutional rationality are applied throughout the discussion as distinguishing elements of actor 
groups to help explain the nature of the conflicts over meaning which occur between actors 
informed by the different situated logics. Glynn and Lounsbury (2005) argued that certain logics are 
more akin to certain types of rationality. In their study they suggested that an aesthetic logic within 
the orchestral field was predicated on a Weberian form of substantive rationality, whereas a market 
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logic was more akin to the formal rationality of a capitalist society (p.1037). Biggart and Delbridge 
(2004) liken formal rationality to instrumental rationality which is more neatly associated with the 
predication for ‘measuring and monitoring’ found in the energy industry. It is understood here that 
situated environmental logics are underpinned by either substantively or instrumentally rational 
arguments which reflect the nature of the related actor groups. For example, the situated target-
based environmental logic reflected the instrumental rationality of the industry in which the agents 
who contributed to its emergence resided. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the societal 
environmental logic, of which each situated logic represents a manifestation, instils an overarching 
substantive and value-laden quest for environmental protection; yet there are many means 
towards environmental ends.  
Differentiating Logics 
 
A taxonomy is presented below (Table 12) which distinguishes between different and often 
contradictory situated institutionalised understandings of environmental behaviour. That is the 
taxonomy identifies distinct situated environmental logics which informed the various approaches 
to the green nuclear debate. To clearly delineate why these situated environmental logics differed 
from one another (in ways that affected the green perception of nuclear) this discussion draws on 
the dimensions employed by Biggart and Delbridge (2004) to identify various systems of exchange. 
These authors propose that the ‘market’ is but one form of exchange and that there exist 
‘…qualitatively distinct types of socially organised exchange that support substantively different 
orientations to economic action’ (p29). Their analysis found that the rational orientations of actors 
and the social relations between them combined to produce distinct systems of exchange. This is 
applicable to the arguments formed below because it provides variables through which actor 
groups can be meaningfully differentiated and from which their distinct cognitive schemas and 
institutional meaning systems can be identified. Certainly both rational orientation and forms of 
social relation were relatable to the characteristics of actor groups engaged in the green nuclear 
debate, and their combination unearthed varying orientations towards environmental action. In 
other words, the variables are understood as having affected the emergent properties of the 
various situated environmental logics because they influenced how specific actor groups developed 
perceptions of green nuclear 
Actor groups who display different rationality types will perceive and operationalise the norms and 
conventions of societal logics differently. Their opposing judgements over ascriptions of rationality 
have the potential to lead to conflict as an action considered instrumentally rational may not 
appease acceptable substantive ends, and vice versa. Rationality type is likely to be an historical 
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characteristic of an industry and therefore affects the process through which a societal logic 
becomes situated. Secondly, the structure of social relations between actor groups engaged in the 
green nuclear debate is considered as either universalistic or particularistic (Parsons 1968). Types 
of social relation identified are strongly linked to whether the debate was focused at the national 
policy level or within localities and communities. Universalistic relations are evident when, in 
principle, all actors are treated the same and equally and are identifiable at higher levels of 
aggregation; i.e. at the national policy level of debate. For example, the debate between EMOs and 
the Energy Department was characterised by impersonality and universalistic relations between 
the two parties engaged in a fairly generic dispute. Indeed, at this level all anti-nuclear campaigners 
tended to be referred to in Government documents and media articles as ‘environmentalists’ rather 
than specific EMOs or campaigning groups. A particularistic orientation exists in settings where the 
actors’ relations to each other are taken into consideration and the nature of the interaction is 
more personal and relatable to the actors involved. This type of relation is often more evident at 
lower levels of aggregation such as when residents of specific geographical localities resist the 
Government’s proposals via local planning meetings.  
The social relations of interest were those between anti-nuclear actor groups and the pro-nuclear 
lobby within Government. The nature of the social relations unearthed the environmental issues 
which were most salient to the actor groups. This provided a helpful distinction because the focus 
of environmental concern indicated the ways in which specific groups of actors understood what 
constituted environmentally friendly behaviour. For actors concerned with the effects of local 
nuclear installations and with particularistic relations with the Government, environmental concern 
was often related to site specific ecosystems and pollution. Their understanding of the relationship 
between society and nature reflected this focus by valuing local conservation and the protection of 
localised habitats. National and universalistic debates tended to be more focused on abstract and 
long-term issues whereas particularistic debates were inclined to consider the immediate, 
observable and short term environmental impacts recognised by specific individuals or small groups 
of individuals. In sum, the nature of the actor groups and the character of the situated logics were 
found to be closely intertwined given that societal logics manifest in certain ways because they are 
reflections of the actors who construct, reinforce and reconstitute them. Table 9 provides an 
overview of the four different situated logics identified as informing the arguments of those 
engaged in the green nuclear debate.  
 
 
253 
 
Instrumentally Rational Environmentalism 
 
The situated environmental logics underpinned by instrumentally rational arguments are identified 
as amenity and target-based logics. The situated amenity logic predominantly informed the 
environmental nuclear debates during the 1950s and 1960s when environmental awareness was 
low and debates focused on short term issues surrounding the visual effect of nuclear installations. 
Groups concerned with amenity issues illustrated instrumental rationality in their quick definition 
of specific problems and their acceptance of instrumental solutions. The instrumentality appears 
symptomatic of a lack of concern with the moral and ethical need to protect nature and the practical 
valuation of nature as an entity to be maintained for human convenience. 
 
Table 43 A Taxonomy of Situated Environmental Logics and their Respective Actor Groups 
Social Relations > 
 
Rationality type  
Particularistic Universalistic 
Instrumental 
Rationality (IR) 
Amenity 
 
landscaping and monitoring at the 
reactor site level 
 
Environmentalism as local amenity  
Target-based 
 
Setting and meeting of environmental 
targets at policy level 
 
Environmentalism as global targets 
and objectives 
Actor groups:  
Individuals or community groups 
with interest in local amenity.  
Actor groups: 
Government energy departments 
(DECC), energy generators.  
Substantive 
Rationality 
(SR) 
Community 
 
Specific and isolated resistance to 
environmentally concerned plans 
at site level 
 
 
Environmentalism as local 
protection. Focus on particular 
ecosystems or habitats based on 
geographical location.  
 
Social Movement 
 
Foundational source of environmental 
values at global/national level – 
political agenda 
 
Environmentalism as global change 
and ecological priorities 
Actor groups: 
Local Planning Authorities, Local 
Councils, community groups  
Actor groups: 
EMOs 
Source: Informed by the work of Biggart and Delbridge (2004) 
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The Department for Power very rarely considered environmental amenity issues in the judgement 
of energy option legitimacy unless an installation was flagged as a threat to protected flora and 
fauna (the Isle of White MAGNOX station was cancelled on such grounds). Instead, local 
communities living near nuclear installations would sometimes complain of the negative impacts 
upon the amenities of the countryside and the Government would provide solutions which worked 
with the amenity based diagnosis. For example the Department for Power landscaped around the 
early offending reactors because the locals did not like the appearance of the installations. 
Interestingly in the 1970s, during which the public moved away from amenity concerns towards 
more substantive apprehensions, the Department of Energy continued to propose amenity based 
responses to the public’s problematisations. For example, the Government introduced measures to 
lessen the impact of nuclear stations on their immediate surrounding area after the Flowers Report 
in 1976, but in doing so they failed to provide any substantive response to the worries of the 
environmental movement. These measures illustrated a clear misunderstanding by the Department 
of Energy of the emerging public insight into the moral ecological complications of nuclear power.  
Moreover the situated amenity logic appeared to be an antecedent to the target-based logic. The 
industry’s reaction to the Flowers Report culminated in the establishment of advisory boards and 
monitoring schemes which worked to implement quantified and ‘acceptable’ pollutant levels. 
Targets were necessary to judge environmental adequacy, although importantly energy options 
were not opted for by the Department of Energy based on the need to meet these targets. Rather, 
much like other measures underpinned by the amenity logic in the past, the monitoring was purely 
to appease the critics once the decision had been made. Alternatively, the situated target-based 
logic underpinned judgements between energy choices, rather than merely forcing options already 
chosen to conform to set environmental standards. Additionally, target-based arguments were 
principally proposed by actors debating the configuration of national energy policy whereas 
amenity concerns were played out between specific communities and Government representatives 
in regards to certain installation sites.  
Informed by an understanding that emissions targets equalled environmental action, the energy 
industry pursued a green energy policy throughout the ‘90s and ‘00s by comparing energy options 
based on their ability to meet emissions objectives. The international setting of binding targets at 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 solidified this instrumental approach and enforced a temporal element 
by requiring immediate environmental action for long-term conservation. As the binding targets 
made at Kyoto drew nearer, particularistic social relations between the Government and 
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communities became rarer. Instead, the Department of Energy was increasingly faceless and 
universalistic. This was illustrated by IROPI in the late 2000s. When the National Policy Statement 
in 2009 outlined potential nuclear sites which had passed the Governments siting assessments the 
Government hoped to speed up the planning processes by ruling that local planning meetings 
would not discuss siting choices, just local implications. Whilst communities were silenced from 
questioning overall nuclear policy each site was officially justified under the term IROPI which 
claimed that the ecological damage identified by the assessments was overruled by Imperative 
Reasons of Overriding Public Interest. In other words, meeting carbon targets was more important 
in terms of environmental protection than local ecological damage.  
Substantively Rational Environmentalism 
 
Situated environmental logics underpinned by a substantively rational argument were the social 
movement and community logics. Nuclear power faced its most prominent battle for legitimacy 
against a very public environmental movement which engaged society in debates around 
radioactive-waste and proliferation. As shown in the literature, social movements bring with them 
new logics (Rao, Monin and Durand 2005) that tend to have broad moral and social goals which are 
reinforced by the substantive rationalisations of their constitutive actors such as EMOs. The global 
environmental movement of the late 1960s and 1970s had brought international EMOs into the UK 
which focused on national policy issues. These EMOs problematised nuclear from their own 
ecological ethics, presenting disputes which could not be solved through solutions previously 
appropriate in overcoming amenity anxieties in the 1950s and 1960s. In many ways, the EMOs 
engaged in universalistic social relations with the pro-nuclear lobby because of their generic anti-
nuclear stance. On the other hand, there was some cross-over between the broad agenda of the 
social movement and the particularistic communities. EMOs would mobilise, support and back local 
nuclear campaigners, thereby involving themselves in particularistic debates. Both these local and 
nationally based anti-nuclear environmental groups rejected nuclear builds given their substantive 
valuation of nature and the environment. For them, nuclear power could never be acceptable 
because of the environmental risk it posed and the natural harm it had the potential to cause.  
The differing objectives of EMOs and community actor groups created a clear distinction between 
the community environmental logic and the social-movement logic. This is because the alternate 
goals of each group influenced the kind of social relations they participated in. For community actor 
groups, the objective was to protect a very specific area of land. Although sometimes evident in the 
media, their short-term mobilisation meant that their presence in the Press was often short lived 
or referred to under the broad and unelaborated term ‘environmentalism’. Much like those with 
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amenity concerns, they partook in specific planning inquiries in relation to sites in their ‘back yard’ 
(although it is possible that some were also members of EMOs). On the other hand, EMOs were 
well funded and mobilised around policy issues with long-term objectives which were aimed at 
national Government. Their informed critique of Government attracted substantial media attention 
and accounted for why EMOs were well represented in newspapers. Interestingly, their 
universalistic political agenda also put them in conflict with community groups over installations 
such as wind farms because they had environmental implications at a site level. Nevertheless, in 
the nuclear debate EMOs and community groups tended to support each other as their goals often 
aligned. Both were visible in environmental protests and Public inquiries (THORP and Sizewell) with 
the former providing detailed policy critique and the latter illustrating public frustrations and local 
ecological concerns. Often EMOs would financially support communities. For example at the 
Windscale THORP inquiry (which required oppositional parties to self-fund) community groups 
opposed nuclear power with the support of FOE who could afford to oppose BNFL at the inquiry. In 
the following section the chapter will discuss the implications and contributions of both the 
taxonomy outlined above and the multi-level narrative of logic situating with which this chapter 
began.  
Contributions to Knowledge 
 
Biggart and Delbridge’s (2004) system of exchange typology provides a framework for interpreting 
the impact of ‘competing logics of action’ (p45) which underpin multiple and distinctive 
understandings of the role and composition of a market. The same variables used by Biggart and 
Delbridge (2004) have been applied in a similar vein in order to demarcate between four 
qualitatively distinct approaches to environmentalism and ‘rational’ green action (Table 9). Each 
has been distinguished by an underpinning situated environmental logic which informs and reflects 
the nature of different actor groups engaged in the green nuclear debate. The situated logics 
identified illustrate the multitude of ways in which the values of a single environmental societal 
logic can be reinterpreted, enacted and situated within specific actor groups who are differentiated 
based on their approaches to rationality and the form of social relations in which they partake. The 
discussion extends Biggart and Delbridge (2004) in two key ways. Firstly, their framework is applied 
outside of the ‘market systems’ approach and provided utility in distinguishing between varying 
manifestations of societal institutional logics. As explained previously, actors contribute to the 
emergence of a situated logic within their ‘groups’ by theorising and legitimating its central themes 
from a position of embeddedness. As such Biggart and Delbridge’s dimensions (rationality type and 
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forms of social relations) are meaningful in delineating actor groups predisposed to developing 
differing situated logics precisely because they are prevalent yet distinct institutionalised features 
of each group’s context – which then become unconsciously inculcated during theorisation and 
legitimation processes. It is therefore likely that a similar application to the one achieved here could 
result in the discovery of various situated logics within multiple industries and pertaining to other 
societal logics.  
Secondly, Biggart and Delbridge (2004) do not discuss the ways in which systems of exchange may 
come into tension yet this thesis illustrates how each situated logic has the potential to be in 
contradiction with another when mobilised around a common debate. This is primarily because an 
action considered rational by actor groups with a predominant sense of instrumental rationality 
may clash with more substantively rational actors if the action is considered in contradiction with 
an entrenched form of substantive value. The green paradox of nuclear power is explained by 
showing that actor groups engaged most heavily in the green nuclear debate (the energy industry 
and the EMOs) are unlikely to reconcile over nuclear power because their arguments are 
underpinned by different approaches to rationality and thereby informed by different situated 
logics. These extensions of Biggart and Delbridge’s (2004) work have permitted a theoretical 
contribution which has broader appeal within institutional theory. Specifically, the idea that 
multiple situated logics may exist and compete within a single debate (and implicate a single 
industry) contributes to considerations of institutional complexity and logic interaction. Greenwood 
et al (2011) showed how institutional complexity can mean that a specific societal logic may become 
resisted at a more geographically local level because of community based institutional histories 
which align with oppositional societal logics. These findings both support this theoretical movement 
towards understanding the logics of specific communities, and extend it by illustrating how one 
societal logic may manifest in multiple ways and come into tension with itself based on the 
institutional histories of specific actor groups. By doing so, institutional complexity is increased 
because one has to understand both the institutional origins of the situated form (the real 
institutional logic and its generative mechanisms) as well as the embedded agency which 
contributed to its development, and the continual interaction between the two which reinforce and 
reconstitute it over time.  
Additionally, the multi-level institutional work narrative provided at the beginning of this chapter 
theoretically contributes to existing literature in the field in two ways. Firstly, it speaks to the role 
of institutional work processes in interconnecting levels of analysis. Although scholars have 
accepted that institutional work occurs at various levels of analysis (Tracey et al 2010, Lawrence et 
al 2011) those who fully combine a multi-level analysis within research on institutional work have 
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focused on the capacity of the actor to transcend the totalising influence of institutions. As a result 
much institutional work literature has provided overly ‘bottom-up’ analyses whereby the 
institutional context is under theorised (Hwang and Colyvas 2011). This discussion has looked to 
avoid an over-focus on agency by showing how actors, although responsible for institutional work, 
enact intentional behaviours within the bailiwick of their own institutional contexts. Actors reflect 
and act on opportunities presented to them from shifting societal discourse or social movements if 
they have the knowledge and political capacity to do so. Their ‘acting on’ an opportunity, in the 
form of institutional work processes, is predominantly a discursive task (legitimation and theorising 
in particular) which is enacted within, and is moulded by, their institutional context. In other words, 
given that situated logics are reflections of actors’ theorisations and their concurrent discursive 
strategies, any emergent situated logic will not only be a reflection of an actor’s interests and 
intentions, but will likely reflect the historically institutionalised nature of that actor’s context. 
Additionally the new logics’ institutional alignment with such a context may be necessary for its 
long term survival, as without such alignment it may not be readily operationalised. For example, if 
the target-based environmental logic did not legitimate emissions proxy’s the energy industry 
would have struggled to integrate it into their own systems for decision making.  
The multi-level narrative also contributes to existing literature by taking seriously the ‘origins’ of 
more ‘local’ level logics. Previous research within neo-institutionalism has often failed to clearly 
delineate how lower level institutional logics (within fields, industries or organisations) are defined 
and constructed. That is, the logics identified within institutional literatures are rarely linked back 
to the societal logics identified by Friedland and Alford (1991) or Thornton et al (2012). Recognising 
that societal logics may become situated allows researchers to consider how actor groups 
embedded within multiple institutional structures effect the manifestation of societal logics. 
Structural determinacy and scientific diffusion metaphors (Zilber 2002) are overcome by the 
recognition that agentic institutional work affects the nature of situated manifestations, yet 
voluntarism is avoided by considering agency as bounded by their immediate institutional context. 
Primarily it is the institutional work processes (legitimation, theorisation and valorisation) which 
discursively interconnect actors, institutional context and societal change, and thus actors take 
central stage in the initiation of change. Moreover, this research builds on literature which has 
shown how institutional work may not ultimately lead to desired material outcomes, yet may 
initiate long-lasting and successful institutional change (Mutch 2007 and Tracey et al 2010). It 
elaborates this literature by more specifically detailing the role of emergence and its relationship 
with forms of power and social action. In this vein the thesis has shown how institutional 
entrepreneurs are unlikely to consciously create institutional change or design a new institutional 
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logic. Instead their actions may be motivated by their own interests and power to act which can 
lead to processes of theorisation, legitimation and valorisation becoming successfully diffused and 
embedded in both practice and language. Additionally, that which is diffused may become 
institutionalised apart from the original material practice to which they were originally linked.  
Furthermore, power is rarely discussed within neo-institutionalism yet it is important in 
understanding how embedded institutional work comes to be mobilised. Politically motivated 
institutional work processes were successful in initiating change primarily because those enacting 
them were in positions of elitist power (Zald and Lounsbury 2010, Reed 2012). More specifically 
they were part of a deliberately engineered (and embedded) ‘energy elite’ within Government 
tasked with reviving the nuclear power industry, and were increasingly backed by a growing 
international expert elite related to CC. The energy elite, in their original pursuit for favourable 
nuclear energy policy, used their authoritative power and bureaucratically defined responsibilities 
to establish regulatory bodies and legally binding policies which enacted green agendas fixated on 
meeting emissions objectives. In so doing, they ensured the continuation of target-based 
environmentalism after the financial collapse of the nuclear industry in 1989. In sum, the energy 
elite were the actors responsible for the continual emergence of the situated target-based 
environmental logic. By combining an understanding of elites with that of institutional work this 
research contributes to current institutional literature by acknowledging the role of power (national 
and international) and its contribution to new institutional logic formation. Certainly power within 
institutional analysis is heavily under theorized and is often implicitly regarded from a resource-
dependency perspective alongside theories of social position (Battilana 2006) and embeddedness 
(Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). However, by drawing on elite literature and its conception of 
‘command situations’ (Reed 2012)’ it is possible to integrate institutional work research with a 
recognition of actor’s locations within vertical and hierarchical structures of domination in order to 
better account for their propensity to act.  
The role of Critical Realism and its relationship with the multi-level approach adopted within this 
discussion should also be noted as a contribution to current institutional theorising. This research 
represents one of a handful of studies which have overlaid institutionalism’s levels of analysis 
(individual, organisation and society) with CR’s stratified ontology and agency/structure duality 
(Leca and Naccache 2006, Wry 2009, Delbridge and Edwards 2013). As discussed, agency is 
considered an embedded empirical level phenomenon, yet can be held apart from the structures 
which embed it so that the relational dynamic between the two can be better understood. In this 
analysis, actors are not dis-embedded from the social world during the act of initiating institutional 
change but are instead considered ontologically distinct from it and with their own causal powers. 
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This is in line with both Leca and Naccache (2006) and Wry (2009) who have argued that 
institutional entrepreneurs may ‘use’ the causal powers of logics to reinforce or challenge 
institutions. In other words, the ontological separation of agency from structure provides room to 
conceptualise how actors may, through institutional work (intentional or not), come to uniquely 
configure the generative mechanisms of social structures such as institutional logics in ways which 
may define new institutionalised rules, norms and conventions (also see Mutch 2007).  
Moreover, this discussion extends their argument by suggesting that actors may utilise the causal 
powers of societal logics (without the knowledge of doing so) in ways that configure them to align 
with the pre-existing configurations of the causal powers of other logics with which they must co-
exist. For example, the process of valorisation shows how the situated manifestations of a market 
logic and an environmental logic were able to coexist because the environmental proxy of ‘carbon’ 
could be monetised and traded (carbon capitalism). This process leads to a configuration of causal 
powers or generative mechanisms in the realm of the actual which is both distinctly related to a 
specific societal logic, but which can align with an historical and institutional context at a lower level 
of analysis in which other logics are situated. Such a suggestion reaffirms the continual impact of 
the realm of the actual (institutions) on the ways in which actors relate to and utilise ‘real’ social 
structures. It also illustrates that societal logics can coexist at a situated level in certain conditions 
if they share similar characteristics which allow actions deemed as legitimate by each to be met. In 
terms of the example, the carbon price provided nuclear power with the means to be financially 
viable whilst also reaching carbon targets. Of course, further research might want to look more in 
depth at the mechanics of this coexistence and to understand in more detail the relationship 
between the logics and the role of agency in their alignment.  
Finally, the use of media documents and the methodological focus on discursive strategies has 
brought to light a number of legitimating strategies previously not identified within the literature. 
Normalisation, authorisation, moralisation and narritivisation were all identified in concurrence 
with the findings of Vaara and colleagues (2006). The identification of discursive strategies was 
integral in understanding how nuclear power was legitimated, and provided a basis from which to 
retroduce the institutional logics being drawn on, contested and negotiated. The use of a variety of 
newspapers was particularly useful for such an endeavour because they portrayed a diverse mix of 
politically charged perspectives and provided a rich view of background context. Not only is such a 
methodology relatively innovative within institutionalism, but previously unrecognised discursive 
legitimation strategies were also noted. For example, distancing strategies are used to disassociate 
two practices which may lose legitimacy if conceptually connected. Distancing strategies were vital 
to the nuclear industry in the early decades of the nuclear programme in order to disconnect 
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nuclear power from nuclear armament. In particular the UN’s IAEA used a distancing strategy as its 
tag line ‘Atoms for Peace’. Additionally a discursive strategy labelled ‘accommodation’ was 
identified during the latter decade of the case. The use of accommodation was most prevalent in 
the ‘lesser of two evils’ discourse whereby pro-nuclear actors attempted to marginalise 
oppositional discourse by accommodating it into their own discursive strategies, within which they 
then downplayed its relevance through referral to more threatening discourses such as CC. 
Although theoretical generalisability of the strategies identified may be low due to their specific 
relevance to the issues of the case study, they nevertheless extend the body of literature on 
discursive strategies.  
Utility of an Environmental Logic  
 
The four types of situated environmental logic provided within this discussion illustrate the 
different ways groups of actors engaged in the green nuclear debate understood the relationship 
between society and nature. The research highlights that the natural environment is not merely 
part of an organisation’s technical environment (Scott 1991). Actors’ understandings of what 
constitutes environmental action are determined by institutionalised meanings residing within the 
institutional environment. At the societal level an environmental institutional logic informs actors 
of the need to protect and conserve nature and ecosystems, yet it manifests within groups of actors 
depending on their own interests, historical contexts and predominant rationality types. This 
societal environmental logic therefore becomes enacted in various ways and informs differentiable 
understandings of the relationship between society and nature, which further inform how 
individuals perceive the environmental credentials of certain practices. This is an important 
contribution because it moves institutional theorising away from its tendency to objectify and 
externalise the natural environment in its analysis (Maguire and Hardy 2009, Hoffman 1999). By 
considering an environmental institutional logic it is possible to understand how institutionalised 
understandings of what nature ‘is’ affects behaviour towards environmental policy, carbon 
mitigation and environmental law, among many other issues.  
The findings of this research have illustrated the utility of this conceptualisation. Institutionalised 
approaches to the natural environment clearly affected the perceived legitimacy of the nuclear 
programme to various audiences. The future of the nuclear power industry depended on the 
emergence of the situated target-based environmental logic to align it with environmentally 
orientated societal expectations. Indeed, the green paradox of nuclear power was not a mere side 
debate to larger issues of resource supply or the market, but was central in the discussion over long 
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term energy policy. Without the development and adoption of an environmental societal logic 
throughout this research the negotiations over nuclear power’s legitimacy could not have been 
clarified. This thesis therefore suggests that the addition of an environmental institutional logic to 
the logics already accepted as constitutive of the intra-institutional system (Thornton and Ocasio 
2008, Friedland and Alford 1991) is necessary at a time when environmental consideration is 
attracting increasing scholarly attention within the organisational studies discipline (Goodall 2009). 
It seems surprising that so far this has not been pursued by key theorists within the discipline 
(Thornton et al 2012).  
Limitations 
 
Practical limitations to the size and scope of the case study meant that certain areas of interest 
could not be discussed. Broadening the case study may have provided further insights into the 
institutional structure of the energy industry. For example, a closer look at the debates around 
renewable technologies may have shed more light on the Government’s approach to nuclear power 
in the 1990s and 2000s. Given limitations of case study size there is a possibility that the evidence 
was not ‘saturated’ (Houston 2010) and that other connections and social activities could have 
explained elements of the analysis differently. Moreover the theoretical contributions proffered by 
this research project would benefit from verification in other fields of study. Certainly this study 
provides a starting point to understand how an environmental logic affected the legitimacy of the 
other energy industries such as coal and oil.  
Additionally the construction of the case study relied heavily on media documents which may be 
perceived as ambiguous in their intent. Much effort was taken to maintain connections between 
media articles and their historical context, yet there are many ways in which a single text can be 
read and interpreted. Also it is difficult to identify whether an article is from the perspective of the 
newspaper or journalist, or whether it represents the feelings of the public. Riaz et al (2011) regard 
journalism as institutional work, yet to understand the institutional work underpinning 500 articles 
and the implications upon analysis would be highly time-consuming. Nonetheless, all articles were 
analysed and interpreted with sensitivity to the historical context of the articles as well as the 
political interests of the newspapers. Indeed, it was the political and journalistic differences 
between newspapers which led to a separate case-study being built for each. By constantly re-
reading and referring back to newspaper based case studies certain arguments and discursive 
strategies could be directly linked to the political endeavours of certain papers. Therefore, all 
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feasible effort has been taken to make clear the associations between certain arguments and 
particular newspapers when deemed necessary. 
A third limitation relates to the lack of additional data types. Interview data collected from both 
industry historians and from industry representatives may have supplemented the evidence 
gathered from texts and provided a fresh perspective on the case study. However, the budget and 
time scale of this research project meant that the addition of a second method of data collection 
would have been difficult, especially given the lengthy and necessary process of transcription. 
Additionally interview transcripts would require methodological reconsideration and integration 
which would have added cumbersome complexity to the research. Fortunately there was plentiful 
document data on all aspects of the case study and both Government and media texts covered the 
60 years with consistency. Nevertheless, if there was more time and a higher word limit then 
interview data would likely have been sought. Certainly interviews would be important in the 
development of the research findings and likely to be of most help once certain contributions are 
put under further scrutiny.  
Future Research 
 
The development and application of an environmental logic provides future researchers with a 
conceptual tool to understand how actors work within, and engage with, institutionally defined 
notions of ‘environmentalism’ and ‘nature’. It is hoped that future research within the domains of 
environmental responsibility, sustainability and conservation, for example, might apply an 
environmental institutional logic in order to more deeply engage with the social dimensions of the 
natural environment, rather than treat it as an objectified resource with a fixed and static meaning.   
Additionally this research has suggested the propensity for particular industries to be characterised 
by prevalent forms of rationality which affect their approach to certain issues. Although focus has 
been on the energy industry, future research may find value in exploring the impact of rationality 
types comparatively across multiple industries. In particular it would be interesting to compare 
energy industries and their varying (or not) approaches towards environmental protection. This is 
based on the assumption that different energy industries would be characterised by alternate 
rationality types. For example, it was noted in the findings that the Government supported 
renewables in the 1990s precisely for the same instrumentally rational reasons they supported 
nuclear power in the 1950s – for future economic prosperity (a world leading green technology 
sector) and resource security. By the late 2000s the possibility of renewables to meet these 
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objectives and impending carbon targets was severely questioned and the Government’s planned 
reliance on renewable technology was scaled back. Future research might explore how the 
renewables industry perceived itself in terms of its environmental mission and whether it embraced 
the target-based environmentalism of the wider energy industry, or found itself in tension with the 
resultant expectations of efficiency and cost, and the apparent disregard of other more substantive 
forms of environmentalism. Supplementary research in this area would more fully develop an 
understanding of the environmental tensions between the renewables industry (and its EMO 
supporters) and alternative energy industries, ultimately providing insight into how such tensions 
could be minimised.  
The above is related to the future possibilities of applying the concept of ‘situated logics’ to explore 
the institutionalised rules and conventions informing contradictions over the meaning of practices 
within individual industries. Research utilising and extending this concept might find its utility in 
recognising and explaining the contesting approaches to a practice of interest which appear 
informed by a single societal logic. Indeed this may provide a means for institutional research to go 
beyond the ‘one societal logic versus another’ model and towards a recognition of societal logic 
inconsistencies. It also begs the question of the extent to which institutional logics are 
decomposable. In other words, future research may look to understand whether, and through what 
processes, actors decompose institutional logics (for example, by de-aggregating their generative 
mechanisms) when attempting institutional change projects. This requires a more advanced 
development and definition of an ‘institutional logic’ and the ways in which agency interacts with 
its ‘parts’. A more stringent application of an ontological framework such as Critical Realism may 
aid such a research agenda because it proposes a theory which relates to the components of social 
structures such as their causal properties and generative mechanisms.  
Theoretically there is further scope to examine the interactions between powerful elites, 
institutional work and institutional histories. Nascent and upcoming literature on ‘institutional 
biographies’ (Lawrence et al 2011) and ‘institutional portfolios’ (Suddaby and Viale 2011) suggests 
that the personal backgrounds and institutional histories of individuals can provide valuable insights 
into their propensity to act. Certainly a more detailed look at the backgrounds of those constituting 
the energy elite might provide greater detail regarding their power to form and diffuse influential 
theorisations. Another avenue for prospective research involves an engagement with the links 
between rhetorical appeals, discursive strategies and types of rationality related to the institutional 
logics to which they refer. Moreover the energy industry is not well-researched within institutional 
literature (Sine and David 2003, Sine and Lee 2009) which tends to focus on the contradictions and 
negotiations which occur between actors informed by professional and market based logics 
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(Townley 2002, Thornton 2004, Greenwood and Hinings 2005). Indeed, the recognition of an 
environmental societal logic provides an avenue for institutionalists to research the institutional 
dynamics of other empirical contexts which are not characterised by professional versus managerial 
conflicts – such as the on-going conflict over the UKs energy policy. 
Ultimately the findings proposed by this thesis provide the theoretical foundations for future 
research to explore the novel interactions between situated institutional logics in numerous 
different settings. Additionally the combination of levels of analysis, institutional work, power elites 
and discursive legitimation within the thesis provides a basis with which to begin the detailed 
examination of how all these institutional ‘tools’ of analysis can combine to comprehensively 
explain an institutional phenomena such as nuclear power’s ‘green paradox’. Finally, there is much 
work still to be done in the development of an environmental logic, yet its utility in addressing a 
major research gap within institutional literature – the lack of environmental consideration – is 
unquestionably evident and deserves academic embellishment in the future.  
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Acronym Key 
 
Acronym Meaning 
AEA Atomic Energy Authority 
AERA  Atomic Energy Research Authority 
AERE  Atomic Energy Research Establishment 
ACAE Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy 
AGR Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor 
AoS Appraisal of Sustainability 
APC Atomic Power Constructions 
AWRE  Atomic Weapons Research Establishment 
BE British Energy 
BEPO  Britain Experimental Pile Zero 
BERR  Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
BNDC British Nuclear Design and Construction Ltd 
BNFL British Nuclear Fuels Limited 
CANDU  Canada Deuterium Uranium 
CC Climate Change 
CCGT Combined Cylinder Gas Turbine 
CCS  Carbon Capture Storage 
CEGB Central Electricity Generating Board 
CND  Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
COP Conference of the Parties 
CoRWM  Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
CSD Commission on Sustainable Development 
DECC  Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DEFRA  Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DM Daily Mirror 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
EA Environment Agency 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EMO Environmental Movement Organisations 
EU ETS  European Emissions Trading Scheme 
EURATOM  The European Atomic Energy Community 
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Acronym Meaning 
FOE Friends of the Earth 
FBR Fast Breeder Reactor 
GEC General Electric Company 
GHG Greenhouse Gasses 
HLW High Level Waste 
HSE  Health and Safety Executive 
HTR High Temperature Reactor 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority 
IFCE International Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
ILW  Intermediate Level Waste 
INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate 
Change  
IPCC Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 
IROPI  Imperative Reasons of Overriding Public Interest 
LCPD Large Combustion Plant Directive 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NCB National Coal Board 
NDA Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
NDF Nuclear Decommissioning Funds 
NE Nuclear Electric 
NEA  Nuclear Energy Agency 
NEC Nuclear Energy Company 
NETA  New Electricity Trade Arrangements 
NFFO Non-Fossil-Fuel Obligation 
NII Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
NLAB Nuclear Liabilities Assurance Board 
NNC National Nuclear Corporation 
NPPC Nuclear Power Plant Company 
NPS National Policy Statement 
NPT Nuclear Proliferation Treaty 
NRPB  National Radiological Protection Board  
NUM National Union of Mineworkers 
NUTS Nuclear Utilisation Targeting Strategy 
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction 
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Acronym Meaning 
MMM Markal-Macro Model 
MOX Mixed Oxide (fuel) 
MWs Mega-Watts 
OCNS Office for Civil Nuclear Security 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
ONR The Office for Nuclear Regulation 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PWRs  Pressurised Water Reactors 
RO Renewables Obligation 
ROC Renewables Obligation Certificates 
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty 
SALT II Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II 
SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment 
SGHWR  Steam Generated Heavy Water Reactor 
SMOs Social Movement Organisations 
SSA Strategic Siting Assessments 
SSEB  South of Scotland Electricity Board 
THORP Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
TNPG The Nuclear Power Group 
TMI Three Mile Island 
TUC Trade Union Congress 
UK  United Kingdom 
UKAEA  United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
UKERC  UK Energy Research Centre 
UKSO   UK Safeguards Office 
UN  United Nations 
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WMO  World Meteorological Organization  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Reactor Types in the 1970s 
 
The inefficiency and escalating costs of the British AGR reactor type forced the industry to 
reconsider its preferences for the third programme. Without knowing which reactor to build and 
with no orders for AGRs from international nuclear nations, construction consortia were struggling 
to remain buoyant within a market of multiple players and low order volumes. The Science and 
Technology Select Committee recommended that a single consortium be created to focus firmly on 
the new British Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR). Following the committees 
advice, the Conservative Government in the early 1970s began a process of restructuring. A single 
design and building company called the National Nuclear Company (NNC) was established from an 
amalgamation of construction consortia (the Government and UKAEA took shares in the NNC, 
whilst the General Electric Company (GEC) ran it). Breaking from the committee’s 
recommendations, the CEGB continued to favour the import of American Light Water Reactors or 
the newer American Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) which had proven efficient and economical 
in the US. In an echo of the previous tensions between reactor designs, the UKAEA and Ministry of 
Power favoured the British developed SGHWR design. They considered the PWR problematic 
because it would require modifications to meet the UK safety standards and would disturb the 
perceived ‘British-ness’ of the nuclear programme. Finally, in 1974 a new Labour Government 
agreed with the Select Committee recommendations and the go ahead was given for the SGHWR 
to constitute the third nuclear power programme for the UK. In July 1974 Eric Varley, the new 
Secretary of State for Energy (1974-1975) stated that there was to be a programme of around 
4000MWs of capacity to be met with SGHWRs to boost the British industry. 
By 1977 the SGHWR programme was put on hold, with the CEGB and NNC recommending the AGRs 
and PWRs instead. A year later the Labour Government abandoned the SGHWR altogether and 
suggested that the CEGB and SSEB were instead to build more AGRs and one American imported 
PWR design, Sizewell C, dependent on the outcome of an inquiry. Additionally there was 
considerable excitement around a Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) prototype which was running in the 
UKAEAs Dounreay research facility (set up in 1955). The FBR had the potential to offer the UK a 
means to create large amount of electricity with substantially higher fuel efficiency whilst 
simultaneously creating fuel for AGR reactors (FBRs and their earlier counterpart, High 
Temperature Reactors (HTR) are uranium fuelled and have the potential to breed more fissile 
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material than they use and create plutonium as a waste product). The third nuclear power 
programme was considered by many to be the prelude for a full-scale commercial FBR programme.  
Similar arguments to those which characterised the late 1950s and early 1960s were playing out in 
the 1970s. Both the Labour and Conservative power Ministers were striving to buffer a fragile 
British nuclear industry by backing the UKAEA designed SGHWRs, and then AGRs when plans for 
the former fell through. With few threats to security of supply the choice between reactors boiled 
down to the CEGB’s cost focus versus the Governments will to retain State dominance over energy 
resources. Further legitimacy of a nuclear programme lay in the market and resource possibilities 
of a future FBR programme which were exciting the press: It would be exportable, efficient and 
would minimise importation fuels. However, as the 1970s progressed the industry became 
increasingly pressured to respond to escalating concern that nuclear power had unique 
environmental implications. Judgements based solely on energy supply or market considerations 
were becoming problematised.  
Appendix 2: Industry Privatisation  
 
Whilst the non-fossil-fuel obligation continued to ensure the sale of nuclear electricity to suppliers 
for the time being, the nuclear industry began to reform under the management of Nuclear Electric 
(1990-1995), Chaired by John Collier a former chair of the UKAEA, and the watchful eye of the new 
Office of Energy Regulation (OFFER) and the director general of electricity supply. In 1989-1990 the 
CEGB was split into three generating companies (Powergen, Nuclear Electric and National Power) 
and a separate transmission company (the National Grid). Nuclear Electric took control of all English 
and Welsh nuclear stations (Scottish Electric was responsible for the Scottish reactors) and was the 
only generating company to remain in State hands (and Scottish Nuclear which owned Scottish 
reactors). Nuclear Electric (NE) had its own board of directors which were tasked with reviving the 
fortunes of the nuclear industry in time for its 1995 review. With OFFER in place, a system of central 
planning was finally replaced by a dialogue between State policy and market forces as delimited by 
contracts. To maintain competition in the privatised energy industry OFFER prohibited mergers and 
takeovers among the electricity companies. Additionally, Government special shares in National 
power, PowerGen and NGC ensured fair competition in the introductory years of the ‘electricity 
pool’ (the heart of the energy market). 
In response to NE’s successes the 1995 review white paper entitled ‘The Prospects for Nuclear 
Power in the UK’ announced the Conservative Government’s intention to privatise part of the 
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nuclear generation industry. It was decided that the nine Magnox stations owned by Nuclear 
Electric and Scottish Nuclear would be held by a State owned standalone company and would be 
integrated with BNFL. A holding company called British Energy (BE) was established in 1995 to 
contain those elements of both Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear to be privatised (only the 
seven functioning AGRs and the PWR). In 1996 the process of privatising BE was initiated by the 
Department for Trade and Industry; all AGRS, the PWR and their liabilities in full were transferred 
over to the company. BE was floated and the Government pledged that no more public money 
would ever subsidise a nuclear project. To aid the transfer and to ensure aptitude in the new 
corporation the Government retained ‘special shares’ in BE and its subsidiaries. Moreover, the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Fund (NDF) was established to help BE pay the future costs of 
decommissioning by saving over time, monitored by five-yearly reviews of BE’s decommissioning 
strategies by the Health and Safety Executives’ (HSE). 
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Appendix 3: Initial Coding Framework 
 
First order event codes Second order codes  
   
EI - Energy markets (general)     
EI - Renewables industry (general)     
    
EI-EC - Privatisation (negative)     
EI-EC - Privatisation (positive)     
    
EI-ENV - Benefits of green energy     
EI-ENV - Environment and energy (general)    
EI-ENV-CC - Climate change and energy (general)    
EI-ENV-CC - Energy Policy - carbon reduction     
    
EI-N - Alternative options (oppose)     
EI-N - Alternative options (support)    
EI-N - Energy diversity/supply    
EI-N - Industrial benefit/economic needs     
   
N - Nuclear integration in energy industry     
N - Nuclear opposition (general)    
N - Nuclear support (general)     
    
N - Ownership - boards/committees     
N - Ownership - regulators    
N - Ownership - reorganisation of industry     
    
N - Radioactive waste - disposal     
  Community repercussions  (moralisation) 
  Construction - disruptive (rationalisation) 
  
Long term Environmental 
Damage (moralisation) 
N - Radioactive waste - storage    
  Community repercussions (moralisation) 
  Construction - disruptive (rationalisation) 
  
Long term Environmental 
Damage (moralisation) 
N - Radioactive waste (general)     
    
N-EC - Economic viability (negative)     
  Cost escalation  (rationalisation) 
  Unaffordable (rationalisation) 
  Market uncertainty (rationalisation) 
  Economic uncertainty (rationalisation) 
  Technological uncertainty (rationalisation) 
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N-EC - Economic viability (positive)    
  Cost cutting (rationalisation) 
  Cost effective (rationalisation) 
  Current cost savings (rationalisation) 
  Future cost savings (rationalisation) 
N-EC - Industry in decline    
N-EC - Privatisation (negative)    
N-EC - Privatisation (positive)     
    
N-EMO - Emotional Appeal (negative)     
  Fear of nuclear (moralisation) 
  Future Generations (moralisation) 
N-EMO - Emotional Appeal (positive)    
  Justified (moralisation) 
  New challenges of tomorrow (moralisation) 
     
N-ENV - Environment and nuclear (general)     
N-ENV - Environment and nuclear (concern)    
  Mastery over nature (narritivisation)  
  
Nature over-ruled - economic 
reasons (rationalisation) 
  
Nature over-ruled - 
environmental reasons (rationalisation) 
N-ENV - Environmental constraints    
N-ENV - Nuclear an environmental option    
  Nuclear as best green option (rationalisation) 
N-ENV - Nuclear not part of environmental 
agenda     
     
N-ENV-CC - Climate change - nuclear (negative)     
N-ENV-CC - Climate change - nuclear (positive)    
  Nuclear as lesser of two evils (rationalisation) 
  No alternative to nuclear (rationalisation) 
N-ENV-CC - Climate change - renewables    
N-ENV-CC - Climate change and nuclear (general)     
    
N-POL - Political agenda     
N-POL - International implications     
N-POL - International regulations    
N-POL - National - election    
N-POL - National - party conflict     
   
N-SOC - Societal Implications     
  Health (concern) (moralisation) 
  Health (not a concern) (moralisation) 
  
Impact on communities 
(concern) (narritivisation)  
  
Impact on communities (not a 
concern) (narritivisation)  
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  Safety (concern) (moralisation) 
  Safety (not a concern) (moralisation) 
     
N-TECH - Technological advancement     
  
Faith in science/technological 
progress (rationalisation) 
  
Nuclear problems can be 
overcome (rationalisation) 
  Nuclear advancing technology (rationalisation) 
     
N-TECH - Problem with low carbon alternatives    
  Economic issues (rationalisation) 
  Carbon target issues (rationalisation) 
  International market issues (rationalisation) 
     
N-TECH - Nuclear technology - higher risk     
    
N-T-FU - New Nuclear (2000s)     
  Technologically advances (rationalisation) 
  Technological predictions (rationalisation) 
  Nuclear Fusion (rationalisation) 
    
N-T-PA - Historical accounts (general)     
N-T-PA - Past problems    
  Unsafe (rationalisation) 
  Uneconomical (rationalisation) 
  Unnecessary  (rationalisation) 
    
N-WEP - Disarmament/non-proliferation     
  Civil rights concerns (narritivisation)  
  Plutonium economy (narritivisation)  
  Terrorism (moralisation) 
  National security (rationalisation) 
N-WEP - Protest    
N-WEP - Power unlike weapons    
  Distancing  (distancing) 
  Peaceful nuclear (narritivisation)  
N-WEP - Power same as weapons    
  Conflation (distancing) 
  
Key  
N - Nuclear EI – Energy Industry 
EC - Economic ENV – Environment 
CC – Climate Change EMO – Emotional Appeal 
POL - Political SOC – Societal 
TECH - Technological FU – Future 
WEP  - Weaponry  
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